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The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Indian	  Diplomacy:	  A	  Critique	  of	  Eurocentrism	  
	  
Diplomacy	   is	   conventionally	   understood	   as	   an	   authentic	   European	   invention	   which	   was	  
internationalized	  during	  colonialism.	  For	  Indians,	  the	  moment	  of	  colonial	  liberation	  was	  a	  false-­‐
dawn	   because	   the	   colonized	   had	   internalized	   a	   European	   logic	   and	   performed	   a	   European	  
practice.	   Implicit	   in	   such	   a	   reading	   is	   the	   enduring	   centrality	   of	   Europe	   to	   understanding	   the	  
logics	  of	  Indian	  diplomacy.	  The	  only	  contribution	  to	  diplomacy	  permitted	  of	  India	  is	  restricted	  to	  
practice,	  to	  Indians	  adulterating	  pure,	  European,	  diplomacy.	  This	  Eurocentric	  discourse	  renders	  
two	   possibilities	   impossible:	   that	   diplomacy	   may	   have	   Indian	   origins	   and	   that	   they	   offer	   un-­‐
theorised	  potentialities.	  
	  
These	  potentialities	  are	  the	  subject	  because	  combined	  they	  suggest	  that	  Indian	  diplomacy	  might	  
move	   to	   a	   logic	   unknown	   to	   conventional	   approaches.	   However,	   what	   is	   first	   required	   is	   a	  
conceptual	   space	   for	   this	   possibility,	   something,	   it	   is	   argued,	   civilizational	   analysis	   provides	  
because	   its	   focus	   on	   continuities	   does	   not	   devalue	   transformational	   changes.	   Populating	   this	  
conceptual	   space	   requires	   ascertaining	   empirically	   whether	   Indian	   diplomacy	   is	   indeed	   extra-­‐
European?	   It	   is	   why	   current	   practices	   are	   exposed	   and	   then	   placed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
literature	   to	   reveal	   ruptures,	  what	  are	   termed	  controversies.	  The	  most	  significant,	  arguably,	   is	  
the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   Indian	   diplomatic	   modernity?	   Resolving	   this	   controversy	   requires	  
exploring	   not	   only	   the	   history	   of	   the	   revealed	   practices	   but	   also	   excavating	   the	   conceptual	  
categories	  which	  produce	  them.	  The	  investigation	  therefore	  is	  not	  a	  history,	  but	  a	  genealogy	  for	  
it	  identifies	  the	  present	  and	  then	  moves	  along	  two	  axes:	  tracing	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  
apparatus	  and	  the	  rationales	  underpinning	  them.	  The	  genealogical	  moves	  made	  are	  dictated	  by	  
the	   practitioners	   and	   practices	   themselves	   because	   the	   aim	   is	   not	   to	   theorize	   about	   the	  
literature	  but	  to	  expose	  the	  rationalities	  which	  animate	  the	  practitioners	  of	  international	  politics	  
today.	   The	  only	  means	   to	   actually	   verify	   if	   the	   identified	  mentalities	  do	  animate	   international	  
politics	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  impact	  on	  practice.	  It	  is	  why	  the	  project	  is	  argued	  empirically,	  in	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   and	   Fabio	  
Petito.	  The	  former	  supported	  me	  throughout	  when	  others,	  confounded	  by	  my	  arguments,	  fell	  by	  
the	   wayside.	   Dr.	   Knafo	   also	   introduced	   me	   to	   Dr.	   Petito.	   Though	   a	   late	   entrant,	   Dr.	   Petito	  
introduced	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  categories	  and	  authors	  within	  which	  this	  work	  operates	  and	  
infused	  the	  project	  with	  his	  enthusiasm.	  Underlying	  all	  this	  was	  my	  father	  and	  his	  patience	  with,	  
in	  his	  words,	  a	  ‘remittance	  man’.	  
	  
A	  history	  propelled	  by	  ethnography,	  this	  work	  was	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  people	  being	  studied.	   I	  
must	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  the	  officers	  of	  the	  Indian	  Foreign	  Service	  and	  Indian	  Administrative	  
Service	   along	  with	   several	  Ministers	   in	   South	   Block	   and	   elsewhere	  who	   endured	  me	   over	   14	  
months	   of	   fieldwork.	   Frequently	   amused	   and	   occasionally	   perplexed	   by	   my	   questions,	   they	  
endeavoured	   to	   answer.	   Their	   frankness	   is	   contingent	   on	  maintaining	   their	   anonymity,	   unless	  
specifically	  sanctioned.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  probationers	  at	  the	  Foreign	  Service	  Institute	  in	  New	  
Delhi	   and	   Lal	   Bahadur	   Shastri	   National	   Academy	   in	  Mussoorie	  with	  whom	   I	   lived	  made	  work	  
seem	  like	  pleasure,	  and	  provide	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  future.	  
	  
There	  would	  have	  been	  no	  project	  but	  for	  Prime	  Minister	  Manmohan	  Singh.	  Only	  his	  personal	  
intervention	  overcame	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  and	  gave	  me	  the	  access	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  

















TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
	  
Introduction.......................................................................................................	  1	  
Work	  plan	   5	  
	  
Chapter	  I:	  Controversies.....................................................................................	  9	  
The	  internationalization	  of	  Western	  modernity	   11	  
Consequences:	  Disciplinary	  failure	  and	  regeneration	   15	  
Tools	  of	  analysis:	  Civilizations	   17	  
Local	  ‘logics’	  for	  ‘local’	  practices	  and	  encounters	   28	  
Method	   32	  
Conclusions	   36	  
	  
Chapter	  II:	  Diplomacy	  Today..............................................................................	  38	  
Theoretical	  understandings	  of	  non-­‐Western	  modernity	   39	  
Sources	  of	  non-­‐Western	  modernity:	  History,	  fieldwork	  and	  de	  Certeau	   44	  
Non-­‐Western	  modernity	   52	  
Negotiating	  non-­‐Western	  modernity:	  The	  ‘event’	   62	  
Conclusions	   68	  
	  
Chapter	  III:	  Non-­‐Western	  Sources	  of	  Indian	  Diplomatic	  Theory..........................	  70	  
The	  Mahābhārata	  today	   71	  
Managing	  the	  text	   75	  
Application:	  The	  Mahābhārata	   80	  
The	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  Mahābhārata	   91	  
Conclusions	   99	  
	  
Chapter	  IV:	  Non-­‐Western	  Sources	  of	  Indian	  Diplomatic	  Practice........................	  102	  
The	  state	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  Mughal	  India	   104	  
The	  coming	  of	  authentic,	  modern,	  European	  diplomacy	   111	  
Conclusions	   124	  
	  
Chapter	  V:	  The	  Death	  of	  Diplomacy...................................................................	  127	  
British	  rationales	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  local	  diplomacy	   129	  
British	  innovations	  to	  local	  diplomacy	   149	  
Conclusions	   155	  
	  
Chapter	  VI:	  Diplomacy	  Reborn...........................................................................	  157	  
Gandhi’s	  innovations	  within	  a	  tradition	  of	  dharma	   159	  
Gandhian	  theory	  in	  practice:	  Kashmir	  and	  China	   171	  
The	  apparatus	   177	  
The	  strategy	   181	  
Strategy	  in	  practice:	  Indian	  nuclear	  policy	   185	  
Conclusions	  	   191	  
	  
Conclusions........................................................................................................	  194	  
Negotiating	  dharma	   198	  
	  
Bibliography......................................................................................................	  203	  











What	   I	   want	   to	   say	   here	   and	   now	   is	   that	   India	   is	   not	   heading	   towards	  
catastrophe:	   India	   is	   a	   living	   catastrophe	   and	   its	   people,	   including	   its	  
intellectuals,	  know	  it.	  
– Paul	  R.	  Brass1	  
	  
	  
India	  is	  a	  democracy,	  by	  far	  the	  best	  functioning	  and	  genuine	  free	  system	  of	  any	  
of	   the	   nations	   achieving	   independence	   following	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   Its	  
ruling	  group	  speaks	  excellent	  English.	  The	  Indian	  civil	  service,	  though	  extremely	  
bureaucratic	  and	  influenced	  by	  socialist	  theories	  imbibed	  at	  the	  London	  School	  
of	  Economics,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  Almost	  all	  of	  
its	  leaders	  have	  studied	  in	  Western	  universities.	  Yet	  Americans	  have,	  in	  the	  past,	  
great	  difficulty	  in	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  way	  Indian	  leaders	  approach	  foreign	  
policy.	  




In	   2007	   Indian	   diplomats	   and	   American	   officials	   negotiated	   a	   treaty	   which	   undid	   decades	   of	  
what	   India	   has	   called	   ‘nuclear	   apartheid,’	   unravelling	   a	   nuclear	   regime	   crafted	   specifically	   to	  
‘contain’	   India	   and	   generally	   to	   prevent	   the	   history	   of	   India’s	   nuclear	   program	   ever	   being	  
repeated	  by	  anyone.	  This	  treaty,	  the	  123	  Agreement,	  has	  been	  understood	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  
Within	  India,	  the	  agreement	  generated	  a	  political	  crisis	  which	  threatened	  the	  Government	  –	  the	  
                                                
1	  Brass.	  2006.	  P.120	  
2	  Kissinger.	  2001.	  p.154	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first	   time	  an	   international	  negotiation	  had	  done	  so.	   India’s	  Prime	  Minister	  Manmohan	  Singh	  –	  
the	   arch	   proponent	   and	   principal	   architect	   of	   the	   deal	   –	   faced	   a	   triple	   challenge	   arising	   from	  
domestic	   political	   opposition,	   elements	   of	   his	   own	   bureaucracy	   and	   from	   the	   international	  
community.3	   Ultimately,	   he	   put	   himself	   personally	   on	   the	   line	   to	   neuter	   the	  most	   significant	  
opponents	   by	   threatening	   to	   resign	   if	   his	   party	   did	   not	   back	   him.4	   Faced	   with	   Singh’s	  
intransigence,	   a	   reluctant	   Congress	   Party	   and	   a	  majority	   in	   the	   Indian	   Parliament	   did	   support	  
him.	  The	  United	  States	   (US)	  Congress	  approved	  of	   the	   treaty,	  as	  did	   the	   international	  Nuclear	  
Suppliers	  Group	  (NSG).	  	  All	  of	  this	  was	  possible	  only	  because	  US	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  
firmly	  behind	  the	  agreement.	  	  A	  President	  universally	  derided	  for	  creating	  the	  quagmire	  of	  Iraq	  
and	  Afghanistan	  pushed	  through	  a	  deal	  with	  a	  Prime	  Minister	  regarded	  as	  spineless,	  a	  ‘very	  civil	  
servant’.5	  The	  123	  Agreement	  reflected	  the	  meeting	  of	  minds	  in	  Washington	  between	  Singh	  and	  
Bush	   in	   2005	   and	   the	   rest,	   as	   they	   say,	   is	   history.	   Over	   the	   next	   two	   years	   Indian	   diplomats	  
worked	  out	  the	  details	  of	  an	  agreement	  to	  bring	  India	  in	  from	  the	  cold	  to	  a	  nuclear	  powered	  fire.	  
In	   the	  West	   it	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   blow	   for	   non-­‐proliferation.	   China	   opposed	   the	   deal	   to	   the	   end	  
acting	  thru	  its	  proxies	  –	  New	  Zealand,	  Austria	  and	  Ireland	  amongst	  other	  nations	  usually	  lumped	  
together	  as	  the	  ‘West’.	  Meanwhile,	  many	  in	  India	  viewed	  the	  agreement	  as	  a	  capitulation	  to	  the	  
West.	  Others	  –	  especially	  within	  the	  Indian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  –	  saw	  in	  it	  the	  triumph	  of	  realpolitik	  
over	   Non-­‐Alignment	   which	   had	   governed	   India’s	   engagement	   with	   the	   world	   since	  
independence.	  The	  US	  expected	  payment	  for	  the	  agreement:	  India	  should	  ditch	  its	  longstanding	  
avoidance	   of	   international	   alignments	   for	   an	   alliance	   with	   the	   US,	   said	   Secretary	   of	   State	  
Condoleezza	   Rice.6	   Ultimately,	   India	   got	  what	   it	  wanted	   and	  was	   able	   to	   reject	   US	   calls	   for	   a	  
strategic	   realignment.	   Moreover,	   always	   exceptional	   in	   the	   nuclear	   debate,	   India	   remained	  
exceptional	  even	  upon	   joining	   the	  nuclear	   community:	  no	  other	  nation	  has	   the	   right	   to	  never	  
open	  a	  handful	  of	  its	  reactors	  to	  the	  international	  community	  for	  inspection	  by	  the	  International	  
Atomic	   Energy	   Agency	   (IAEA).7	   India	   made	   what	   looked	   like	   strategic	   concessions	   during	   the	  
process	   of	   negotiations	   –	   such	   as	   voting	   for	   the	   first	   time	   against	   Iran	   at	   the	  United	  Nations,	  
                                                
3	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  July	  8,	  2008.&	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  September	  9,	  2008.	  
4	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  July	  10,	  2008.	  
5	  Interview	  with	  a	  former	  BJP	  Cabinet	  Minister.	  
6	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  August	  13,	  2008.	  See	  also	  Pranab	  assails	  Rice	  remarks.	  June	  30,	  2007.	  
7	  See	  the	  Indo-­‐US	  Separation	  Plan.	  And	  the	  Government	  of	  India’s	  note	  to	  the	  IAEA.	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alongside	   the	  US	  –	  but	   it	  was	   just	   tactical:	   Indo-­‐Iranian	   relations	  have	   returned	   today	   to	  what	  
they	  were	  before	  the	  123	  negotiations.8	  
	  
Clearly,	   Indian	   foreign	   policy	   is	   remaking	   the	   international	   order.	   In	   two	   short	   years,	   India	  
deconstructed	   the	   West’s	   nuclear	   order	   built	   up	   over	   decades,	   broke	   up	   a	   Western-­‐led	  
international	   cartel	   and	   secured	   from	   the	  West	  exceptional	  privileges	   for	   itself.	   India	   seeks	   to	  
reproduce	   these	   successes	   in	   other	   fields,	   to	   counter	   and	   overcome	   international	   regimes	   in	  
trade,	   the	   movement	   of	   people	   and,	   much	   more	   immediate,	   the	   environment,	   crafted	   by	  
Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.9	  
	  
The	   future	   Indian	   intends	   to	   craft,	   it	   is	   argued,	   arises	   from	  a	  history	  –	   intellectual	   as	  much	  as	  
practical	   –	   which	   has	   never	   been	   systematically	   investigated.	   No	   doubt	   the	   history	   of	   Indian	  
diplomacy	   has	   generated	   a	   multitude	   of	   examinations	   and	   explanations	   by	   analysts,	   India-­‐
watchers	   and	   foreign	   diplomats,	   but	   none	   are	   synoptic	   or	   focused	   on	   diplomacy.	   When	   the	  
extant	   work	   is	   not	   reproducing	   the	   pronouncements	   of	   politicians,	   the	   literature	   invokes	   the	  
categories	  of	  classical	  IR	  to	  explain	  Indian	  practice.10	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  explicative	  powers	  of	  
IR.	  However,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  identify	  practice	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  practitioners	  and	  
to	  illuminate	  their	  rationales	  because	  they	  govern	  the	  makers	  of	  Indian	  foreign	  policy.	  It	  is	  only	  
by	   unearthing	   these	   conceptual	   categories	   that	   any	   explanation	   true	   to	   the	   protagonists	   is	  
possible.	   What	   current	   investigations	   do	   not	   do	   is	   provide	   a	   reading	   of	   Indian	   international	  
relations	   in	   the	   terms	   in	   which	   the	   actors	   perceive	   the	   world	   or	   the	   rationales	   of	   the	   policy	  
makers	   themselves	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   formulating	   policy.11	   Only	   one	  work	   approaches	   such	   a	  
perspective	  and	  written	  by	  a	  former	  diplomat,	  it	  focuses	  simply	  on	  bureaucratic	  structures,	  not	  
mentalities	   or	   their	   evolution.12	   Though	   histories	   of	   the	   Indian	   Foreign	   Service	   (IFS	   and	   also	  
known	  as	  the	  Ministry	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  MEA)	  do	  attempt	  to	  explicate	  the	  mentalities	  of	  the	  
agents,	   they	  are	  highly	  specific	  and	   lack	  historical	  depth.	  They	  are	  however	  highly	   indicative.13	  
Detailed	  history	  is	  another	  genre,	  and	  Datta-­‐Ray’s	  Waiting	  for	  America	  and	  Looking	  East	  to	  Look	  
West	  are	  based	  on	  extensive	  access	  to	  participants	  and	  primary	  sources	  and	  do	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  
                                                
8	  Private	  interview	  with	  a	  very	  senior	  Cabinet	  member	  in	  the	  Congress	  Government.	  
9	  Interview	  with	  Secretary	  level	  officers	  and	  senior	  politicians	  in	  the	  Congress	  Cabinet.	  
10	  A.	  Appadorai	  &	  M.S.	  Rajan.	  1988	  &	  A.	  Appadorai.	  1963.	  
11	  Karnad.	  2002	  &	  Bajpai.	  2004.	  
12	  Rana.	  2009.	  For	  a	  highly	  explorative	  article	  on	  culture	  see.	  Latham.	  1997.	  
13	  Dixit.	  1998.	  &	  Dixit.	  2004.	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Indian	  diplomacy	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  diplomats	  and	  politicians	  and	  their	  underlying	  rationales	  and	  
logics.	  However,	  both	  works	  are	  limited	  to	  specific	  episodes.14	  In	  short,	  works	  firmly	  grounded	  in	  
primary	   work	   are	   episodic	   while	   those	   that	   purport	   to	   present	   the	   underlying	   principles	   and	  
operations	  of	  the	  MEA	  are	  rare.	  Those	  that	  do	  exist	  are	  speculative	  or	  attempt	  to	  fit	  the	  actors	  
into	   categories	   alien	   to	   the	   practitioners.	   No	   work	   attempts	   to	   systematically	   identify	   the	  
present	  condition	  and	  mentality	  of	  the	  IFS	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  personnel	  composing	  the	  organisation	  
and	   formulating	   policy.	   Nor	   does	   any	   work	   attempt	   to	   systematically	   explain	   how	   today’s	  
rationales,	   exposed	   in	  hard	  practice,	   arose.15	   Instead,	   the	   literature	   amounts	   frequently	   to	  no	  
more	  than	  a	  series	  of	  diktats	  with	   little	  substantiation	  or	  even	  means	  of	  verification	  while	   the	  
practitioner’s	  experience	  of	  dealing	  with	   India	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	   India	   leaves	   them	  –	  and	  us	  –	  at	  
best	  with	  tantalizing	  indications	  but	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  befuddled.	  
	  
This	  inexplicability	  –	  expressed	  by	  diplomats	  and	  academics16	  who	  engage	  India	  –	  and	  the	  total	  
lack	  of	  dialogue	  between	   the	  pronouncements	  of	   analysts,	   academics	   and	   India-­‐watchers	   and	  
actual	  practitioners	   is	  what	  this	  project	  seeks	  to	  replace	  by	  systematically	  exploring	  the	   Indian	  
diplomatic	  present	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  current	  practitioners	  and	  thru	  the	  sparse	  and	  scattered	  traces	  
their	  predecessors	  have	   left	  us.17	  A	  producer-­‐centred	  approach	   to	   IR	   is	  proposed	  because	   IR’s	  
self	   professed	   concerns	   are	   states	   and	   their	   interactions	  within	   the	   international	   system.	   In	   a	  
world	   where	   increasingly	   the	  most	   significant	   decisions	   are	  made	   at	   the	   inter-­‐state	   level,	   an	  
approach	   from	   within	   IR	   and	   focused	   on	   the	   mentalities	   of	   the	   communities	   making	   and	  
remaking	  the	  international	  system	  can	  make	  significant	  contributions.	  What	  is	  first	  required,	  of	  
course,	   is	   to	   eject	   certain	   notions,	   including,	   opposing	   states	   of	   being	   paraded	   by	  
anthropologists,	   that	   is,	   the	   ‘other’	  of	   cultural	   theorists;	   that	  actors	  are	  either	   separated	   from	  
their	  society	  or	   that	  public	  and	  private	   lives	  are	  somehow	  disconnected.	  Only	  by	  doing	  so	  can	  
                                                
14	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  2002	  &	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  2009.	  
15	  The	  lack	  of	  dedicated	  analysis	  of	  the	  MEA	  leads	  scholars	  to	  make	  nonsensical	  suggestions	  based	  on	  
faulty	  premises.	  See:	  Markey.	  July	  2009.	  
16	  Markey.	  Ibid.	  
17	  For	  instance	  when	  and	  if	  IR	  scholars	  focus	  on	  the	  threats	  to	  India	  they	  speak	  of	  China	  and	  Pakistan.	  In	  
other	  words,	  scholars	  speak	  of	  ‘geo-­‐strategic’	  threats.	  However,	  India’s	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  senior	  
diplomats	  perceive	  the	  ay	  the	  greatest	  threat	  to	  India	  lies	  within,	  from	  the	  disenfranchised	  within	  while	  
the	  without	  offers	  opportunities	  rather	  than	  threats.	  See	  ‘Naxals	  biggest	  threat,	  says	  PM.’	  16	  September,	  
2009.	  &	  Indian	  papers	  have	  invented	  stories	  of	  Chinese	  perfidy.	  A	  long	  standing	  bogey	  is	  that	  China	  is	  
building	  a	  series	  of	  naval	  bases	  to	  encircle	  India.	  See	  No	  Chinese	  military	  bases	  in	  Indian	  Ocean.	  11	  
September,	  2009	  &	  Cherian.	  Oct.10-­‐23,	  2009.	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one	  return	  to	  the	  original	  call	  by	  Wight	  to	  study	  the	  states-­‐system	  from	  the	  perspective	  for	  the	  




The	  aim	  of	  the	  project,	  then,	  is	  to:	  
1. Fill	   the	   gap	   in	   a	   literature	   on	   Indian	   foreign	   policy	   which	   is	   devoid	   of	   any	  
explanation	   of	   practice	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   agents	   themselves.	   The	   project	   will	  
therefore	  identify	  current	  rationalities	  and	  the	  practices	  they	  produce.	  
2. To	   identify	   historically	   how	   the	   rationalities	   underpinning	   current	   practice	  
became	  possible.	  
A	   framework	   borrowed	   from	   ‘civilizational	   analysis’	   will	   be	   deployed	   to	   manage	   the	   data	  
because	   it	   accords	   importance	   to	   specific	   legacies	  while	   providing	   space	   for	   contact	   between	  
civilizations	  and	  hence	  modification.	  This	  framework	  will	  be	  modified	  because	  as	  its	  proponents	  
note,	   civilizational	   analysis	   requires	   considerable	   modification	   to	   be	   applicable	   to	   different	  
societies.	  Secondly,	   civilizational	  analysis	  precludes	   the	  possibility	  of	  modernity	  arising	  outside	  
Europe.	  It	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  project	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  these	  two	  possibilities	  that	  civilizational	  
analysis	  is	  tailored.	  Further	  tailoring	  is	  required	  because	  the	  project	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  those	  
aspects	  of	  the	  civilization	  which	  continue	  to	  shape	  practice	  today.	   It	   is	   for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  
project	   uses	   the	   genealogical	   method.	   Genealogy	   starts	   from	   today	   because	   history	   is	   being	  
excavated	  not	  for	  history’s	  sake	  but	  to	  discover	  the	  why	  today	  exists	  in	  the	  way	  it	  does?	  In	  short,	  
the	  present	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  civilizational	  analysis	  performed	  genealogically.	  
	  
This	  is	  why	  chapter	  two	  identifies	  current	  practices	  but	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  exercise	  in	  list-­‐making.	  
The	  purpose	  is	  to	  identify	  key	  ruptures	  and	  controversies	  for	  systematic	  enquiry.	  The	  means	  to	  
locate	  them	   is	   to	  situate	  the	   findings	  of	   the	   fieldwork	  within	   the	   literature’s	  pronouncements.	  
The	   most	   significant	   controversy	   arises	   from	   the	   literature’s	   position	   that	   diplomacy	   is	   an	  
authentic,	  modern,	  European	  invention.	  Though	  this	  project	  is	  not	  a	  quest	  for	  origins,	  it	  cannot	  
but	  engage	  with	  the	  question	  because	  the	  disciplinary	  position	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  
field.	  This	   is	   critical	  because	  enveloped	   in	   the	   literature’s	  position	   is	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  what	  
modernity	  is:	  diplomacy	  regardless	  of	  where	  it	  is	  practiced	  is	  definitively	  Europeanized	  because	  
                                                
18	  Wight.	  1966.	  p.18	  
Page	  6	  of	  227 
 
modernity	  was	  born	  there.	  Given	  the	  divergences	  between	  the	  findings	  within	  the	  field	  and	  the	  
literature,	   a	   short	   explanation	  of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   fieldwork	   is	   required	   and	  provided	  before	  
introducing	  lived	  Indian	  reality.	  
	  
The	   project	   seeks	   to	   resolve	   the	   controversies	   produced	   by	   the	   juxtaposing	   of	   the	   fieldwork	  
chapter	  by	  chapter.	  The	  means	  is	  not	  to	  theorise-­‐about-­‐theory	  but	  to	  investigate	  historically	  the	  
notions	   and	  practices	   the	   fieldwork	  uncovered	   and	   along	   the	   tangents	   the	   agents	   themselves	  
offered.	  Chapter	  three	  investigates	  one	  such	  avenue:	  the	  Mahābhārata	  (Mb)	  which	  is	  selected	  
because	  the	  agents	  say	  it	  provides	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  for	  modern	  Indian	  diplomacy.	  Yet,	  IR	  has	  
never	  viewed	  it	  as	  a	  resource,	  either	  conceptually	  or	  practically.	  This	  text	  is	  universally	  known	  in	  
India,	  has	  significant	  sections	  on	  diplomacy	  and	  is	  regularly	  referred	  to	  by	  Indian	  diplomats.	  The	  
Mb	  requires	  analysis	  because	  it	  is	  presented	  and	  understood	  today	  by	  serving	  Indian	  diplomats	  
as	  the	  origins	  of,	  and	  the	  means	  of	  understanding,	  diplomacy.	  This	  text	  is	  investigated	  in	  terms	  
of	   the	   current	   understandings	   of	   the	  Mb	   by	   Indian	   diplomats	   to	   ascertain	   their	   deep-­‐seated	  
conceptual	   understanding	   of	   diplomacy.	   The	   Mb	   is	   not	   mined	   for	   historical	   fact;	   rather	   it	   is	  
viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  current	  diplomats	  –	  as	  the	  repository	  for	  a	  philosophy	  (termed	  dharma)	  and	  
practices	  of	  diplomacy.	  Finally,	  the	  practices	  of	  diplomacy	  are	  also	  highlighted	  to	  illustrate	  that	  it	  
was	  known	  to	  Indians	  millennia	  before	  the	  entrance	  of	  Europeans.	  
	  
Chapter	   four	   resolves	   the	   controversy	   about	   origins	   with	   specific	   reference	   to	   practice.	   The	  
evidence	  is	  in	  the	  records	  left	  by	  the	  earliest	  diplomatic	  contacts	  between	  India	  and	  Europe.	  The	  
historical	   record	   demonstrates	   that	   what	   actually	   happened	   was	   that	   the	   British	   inserted	  
themselves	   into	   long	   established	   local	   diplomatic	   practices.	   However,	   these	   were	   not	   those	  
described	   by	   the	   Mb	   since	   first	   diplomatic	   contact	   between	   the	   two	   civilizations	   took	   place	  
when	   India	   was	   under	   Mughal	   rule.	   That	   meant	   that	   though	   dharma	   was	   the	   philosophy	   of	  
diplomatic	  action	  –	   the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  –	   it	  was	  subsumed	   in	  Mughal	   India	  by	  a	  Muslim	  
logic.	  This	  was,	   it	   is	  argued,	  secularized	  as	  far	  as	  diplomacy	   is	  concerned	  because	  the	  Mughals	  
found	   themselves	   in	   a	   land	   of	  dharma.	   Next,	   the	   actual	   inter-­‐civilizational	   diplomatic	   contact	  
between	   Europe	   and	   the	  Mughal	   Empire	   is	   investigated	   in	   detail	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  wealth	   of	  
sources,	   including	   the	   diaries	   maintained	   by	   the	   interlopers	   themselves.	   The	   focus	   is	   on	  
European	  perceptions	  because	  this	  is	  the	  moment	  that	  the	  literature	  imbues	  with	  the	  entrance	  
of	  ‘modernity’.	  The	  moment	  is	  rendered	  controversial	  by	  the	  historical	  evidence.	  A	  plethora	  of	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sources,	   European	   and	   local,	   exist,	   including	   the	   detailed	   diaries	   and	   correspondence	   of	   the	  
British.	  The	  evidence	  suggests,	  conclusively,	  that	  far	  from	  the	  Mughals	  transforming	  themselves,	  
it	  was	  the	  reverse:	  the	  British	  adopted	  existing	  diplomatic	  practices.	  
	  
Chapter	  five	  continues	  to	  unravel	  a	  controversy	  produced	  by	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  If	  the	  British	  
did	   insert	   themselves	   into	  prevalent	  practices	   then	  why	  does	   the	   literature	   imbue	  colonialism	  
with	  such	  significance?	   It	   is,	   for	   the	   literature,	   the	  moment	  of	   inter-­‐civilizational	  contact	  when	  
modernity	  entered	   India.	  What	  then,	  was	  the	  actual	  contribution	  of	  European	  modernity?	  The	  
answer,	   the	   chapter	   argues,	   was	   the	   introduction	   of	   underlying	   principles,	   the	  metaphysic	   of	  
‘othering’	  which	  further	  subsumed	  dharma.	  ‘The	  other’,	  became	  the	   leitmotif	  of	  the	  British	  Raj	  
and	  it	  came	  to	  govern	  British	  diplomacy	  in	  India.	  This	  had	  odd	  practical	  manifestations	  because	  
though	   the	   British	   appropriated	   local	   practices,	   they	   eliminated	   locals	   and	   ultimately	   local	  
diplomacy	   by	   deleting	   locals	   from	  positions	   of	   decision	  making,	   curtailing	   diplomacy	   between	  
locals,	   subsuming	   local	   rationales	   for	   diplomacy.	   In	   short,	   it	   was	   the	   extinction	   of	   local	  
diplomacy.	   The	   chapter	   introduces	   the	   British	   metaphysic	   of	   the	   ‘other’	   in	   social	   terms,	   the	  
social	   system	   it	   engendered	   in	   India	   and	  how	   these	  overwhelmed	   local	   practice	   and	   thought.	  
Despite	   the	   changes	   the	   Raj	   produced	   in	   the	   Empire,	   there	   were	   continuities	   between	   the	  
British	  and	  Mughals,	  but	   in	  distinct	  ways.	  Of	   significance	  was	   that	   they	  were	  both	   focused	  on	  
bodies:	  for	  the	  Mughals	  the	  polity	  was	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Emperor’s	  divine	  self	  whereas	  for	  the	  
British,	  the	  polity	  came	  to	  fundamentally	  divided	  along	  racial	  lines.	  
	  
The	   final	   controversy	   tackled	   in	   chapter	   six	   arises	   from	   the	   earlier	   chapters:	   Though	   India	  
possessed	   a	   diplomatic	   theory	   (dharma)	   this	   was	   subsumed.	   Next,	   though	   India	   possessed	   a	  
diplomatic	   practice,	   this	   was	   usurped	   by	   the	   British	   to	   further	   their	   own	   metaphysic.	   Both	  
naturally	  indicate	  what	  is	  the	  literature’s	  conclusion,	  that	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  non-­‐West	  is	  derived,	  
that	  non-­‐Western	  diplomacy	  can	  at	  best	  make	  only	  a	  contribution	  at	   the	   level	  of	  practice	  and	  
that	   Europe	   remains	   central	   to	   understanding	  modern	   diplomacy.	   Yet,	   the	   fieldwork	   suggests	  
otherwise.	   The	   practitioners	   claim	   to	   be	   performing	   to	   a	   tune	  which	   is	   resolutely	   local.	  What	  
then	  is	  modern	  Indian	  diplomacy?	  The	  means	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  is	  to	  once	  again	  to	  delve	  
into	   the	   world	   of	   modern	   Indian	   diplomacy	   and	   to	   tease	   out	   the	   intellectual	   origins	   of	   their	  
thought	   and	   to	   verify	   these	   in	   terms	   of	   practice.	   The	   preeminent	   diplomats,	   including	   India’s	  
first	  Prime	  Minister	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru,	  are	  analysed	  and	  explored	  along	  the	  vectors,	  once	  again,	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that	  they	  themselves	  suggest.	  This	  leads	  directly	  to	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  who	  is	  posited	  as	  the	  key	  
formulator	  of	  the	  principles	  of	   Indian	  foreign	  policy	  by	  the	  practitioners.	  Gandhi’s	  and	  Nehru’s	  
thoughts	  require	  a	  return	  to	  the	  notions	  of	  dharma	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  Mb	  and	  are	  introduced	  
with	  reference	  to	  several	  philosophers	  –	  since	  modern	  India’s	  founding	  fathers	  had	  no	  interest	  
in	  keeping	  with	  dharma	  to	  formulate	  philosophy	  as	  understood	  in	  the	  West.	  Since	  the	  project	  is	  
interested	   in	   actuality,	   the	   operation	   of	   Gandhi’s	   and	   Nehru’s	   formulations	   will	   be	   traced	   in	  
terms	  of	  actual	  policy.	  The	  specific	  policy	  will	  be	  nuclear	  because	  of	  the	  role	  it	  has	  played	  in	  the	  
geographical	  zone	  that	  IR	  has	  been	  traditionally	  concerned	  with:	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  
	  
In	  short,	  the	  analysis	  first	  produces	  a	  series	  of	  controversies	  by	  using	  the	  tool	  of	  ostranenie.	  This	  
is	  to	  compare	  the	  literature’s	  position	  with	  the	  actuality	  of	  Indian	  diplomatic	  practice.	  The	  intent	  
is	   to	   manage	   these	   controversies	   not	   by	   theorising	   but	   by	   exploring	   the	   world	   of	   the	  
practitioners	   since	   it	   is	   they	   who	   are	   remaking	   the	   international	   order.	   The	   exploration,	   it	   is	  
argued,	  reveals	  the	  mentality	  or	  weltanschauung	  of	   Indian	  diplomacy	  thru	  investigating	  its	  key	  
figures.	  However,	  for	  a	  project	  interested	  in	  actuality,	  the	  intention	  is	  not	  to	  displace	  one	  body	  
of	  theory	  with	  another	  but	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  local	  theories	  govern	  non-­‐Western	  diplomacy.	  
This	   is	   why	   revealing	   the	   mentality	   is	   not	   enough.	   What	   is	   also	   required	   is	   to	   ascertain	   the	  
operation	  of	  that	  mentality	   in	  actual	  diplomatic	  encounters.	  This	   is	  done	   in	  an	   investigation	  of	  
the	   literature	  on	  the	   Indo-­‐China	  war	  set	   in	  relief	  by	  the	  arguments	  of	   this	  project.	  Finally,	   in	  a	  
post-­‐script,	   the	   analysis	   returns	   to	   the	   Indo-­‐US	   nuclear	   deal	   as	   a	   demonstration	   of	   how	   the	  
practices	  and	  theories	  uncovered	  in	  the	  project	  operate	  today.	  
	  
Ends	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CHAPTER	  ONE:	  	  CONTROVERSIES	  
	  
The	  Indian	  political	  theorist	  has	  a	  harder	  task	  than	  his	  Western	  counterpart.	  He	  
first	  of	   all	   has	   to	  be	  a	   good	  deal	  more	   learned	   for	  he	   is	   required	   to	   know	   the	  
history	  of	  Western	  political	  thought	  as	  well	  as	  the	  history	  of	  Asian	  thought.	  He	  
has	  to	  possess	  an	  array	  of	  linguistic	  skills	  that	  are	  uncharacteristic	  nowadays	  of	  
Western	   political	   theories.	   Second,	   he	   has	   to	   sustain	   a	   relationship	   with	   his	  
Western	   colleagues	   in	   which	   he	   takes	   their	   concerns	   with	   a	   seriousness	   that	  
they	  rarely,	  unless	  they	  are	  among	  the	  few	  Western	  specialists	  in	  Indian	  politics,	  
reciprocate.	  Thus,	  genuine	  dialogue	   is	   for	  the	  most	  part	   lacking.	   It	   is	  we	   in	  the	  
West	  who	  are	  impoverished	  by	  our	  failure	  to	  sustain	  our	  part	  in	  this	  dialogue.	  	  
	  




The	  doyen	  of	  modern	  diplomatic	   studies,	  Martin	  Wight	   complained	   in	  1966	   that	   ‘few	  political	  
thinkers	   have	   made	   it	   their	   business	   to	   study	   the	   states-­‐system,	   the	   diplomatic	   community	  
itself’.’2	   Theoretically,	   if	   not	   practically,	   it	   is	   a	   different	   story.	   In	   1998	   Cohen	   told	   us	   that	  
diplomacy	   is	   the	   ‘engine	   room’	   of	   international	   relations.3	   Sharp	   concurs.4	   Others	   go	   further:	  
Diplomacy	   is	   not	   just	   the	   key	   to	   international	   relations	   but	   to	   comprehending	   social	   life	   in	  
general.5	   Evidently,	   scholars	   do	   talk	   about	   diplomacy.	   Furthermore,	   though	   the	   practice	   of	  
diplomacy	   is	   infused	   with	   significance	   by	   the	   discipline	   of	   IR,	   that	   discipline	   tells	   us	   nothing	  
about	  why	  diplomats	  perform	  international	  relations	  and	  how	  they	  do	  it.6	  Answering	  these	  two	  
questions	   in	   a	  meaningful	  manner	   calls	   for	   shifting	   the	   focus	   of	   analysis	   to	   the	   producers	   of	  
                                                
1	  Quoted	  in	  B.N.Ray.	  1998.	  
2	  Wight.	  1966.	  p.18	  
3	  Cohen.	  1998.	  
4	  Sharp.	  1999.	  
5	  Constantinou.	  1996.	  
6	   This	   line	   of	   enquiry	   was	   first	   proposed	   by	   Martin	   Wight.	   See	   Wight.	   1966.	   Since	   then	   others	   have	  
encouraged	   the	   same	   type	   of	   enquiry.	   See:	   Cohen.	   May	   4,	   1998;	   Sharp.	   1999;	   Constantinou.	   1996;	  
Simpson.	  1995.	  Most	  recently	  Hopgood	  has	  asked:	  ‘	  …	  what	  has	  the	  discipline	  of	  IR,	  taught	  anyone	  about	  
how	  world	  politics	  works	   in	  detail	   that	  they	  would	  not	  have	  learned	  by	  the	  meticulous	  reading	  of	  a	  few	  
quality	  newspapers	  or	  by	  reading	  history?’	  in	  Hopgood.	  2003.	  
Page	  10	  of	  227 
 
international	   relations:	   diplomats.	   To	  do	   so	   is	   to	   restore	   agency	   to	   the	   actors.	   It	   is	   to	   assume	  
that	  international	  relations	  are	  produced	  by	  participants,	  some	  more	  markedly	  than	  others	  and	  
that	  underpinning	  their	  actions	  are	  certain	  ideas.	  Identifying	  these	  requires	  not	  theorizing	  about	  
theory	  but	  performing	  producer-­‐centred	  analysis	  of	  IR.	  	  
	  
A	   disciplinary	   assumption	   precludes	   such	   an	   enterprise.	   One	   theoretical;	   the	   other	   historical.	  
Together,	   not	   only	   do	   they	   structure	   diplomatic	   theory	   and	   the	  history	   of	   diplomacy	  but	   also	  
shape	   our	   understanding	   of	   international	   relations	   as	   it	   functions	   today.	   The	   theoretical	  
assumption	  is	  a	  particular	  conceptualization	  of	  modernity,	  its	  conflation	  with	  the	  West	  and	  the	  
internationalization	   of	   this	   ‘Western	   modernity’.	   These	   presumptions	   produce	   a	   peculiar	  
understanding	   of	   diplomacy	   and	   lead	   to	   totalizing	   histories	   where	   diplomacy	   functions	   to	  
overcome	  a	  universe	  of	  alienated	  subjects.	  	  
	  
Such	   a	   reading	   of	   IR	   precludes	   the	   possibility	   of	   agents	   acting	   on	   an	   entirely	   different	  
metaphysic,	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  unified	  cosmos.	  Tickner,	  for	  instance,	  notes	  that:	  	  
‘Contrary	  to	  the	  Western	  model	  of	  universality,	  which	   is	  premised	  upon	  a	  self-­‐
other	   binary	   in	   which	   the	   other’s	   agency	   and	   identity	   must	   necessarily	   be	  
negated,	   Hindu	   culture’s	   universality	   does	   not	   require	   the	   suppression	   of	  
difference,	   given	   that	  each	  of	   the	  particularistic	   identities	   that	   comprise	   it	   are	  
viewed	  as	  legitimate	  and	  equal	  parts	  of	  a	  unified	  whole.’7	  
Are	   we	   to	   assume	   that	   despite	   a	   radically	   different	   understanding	   of	   universality	   that	   the	  
practitioners	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  India	  act	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  which	  govern	  Western	  diplomacy?	  
Exploring	  the	  significance	  of	  such	  non-­‐Western	  conceptualizations	  can	   lead	  to	  a	   ‘rethinking’	  of	  
the	   ‘foundational	   knowledge	   of	   what	   constitutes	   IR’	   writes	   Behera	   in	   a	   special	   issue	   of	  
International	  Relations	  of	  the	  Asia	  Pacific	  dedicated	  to	  ‘why	  is	  there	  no	  non-­‐Western	  theory	  of	  
IR’.8	  But	  such	  a	  move	  requires	  two	  acts.	  First,	  it	  ‘calls	  for	  creating	  alternative	  sites	  of	  knowledge	  
construction	   with	   an	   alternative	   set	   of	   tools	   and	   resources.’	   This	   thesis	   will	   not	   attempt	   to	  
create	   an	   alternative	   site	   of	   knowledge	   production	   but	   will	   rather	   explore	   one	   of	   several	  
unexplored	  sites	  already	  in	  existence:	  the	  IFS.	  
	  
                                                
7	  Tickner.	  2003.	  p.304.	  
8	  Behera.	  2007.	  p.	  358	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Exploring	  a	  site	  never	  considered	  for	  analysis	  however	  requires	  some	  explanation	  and	  devising	  a	  
method.	  This	  chapter	  will	  therefore:	  
1. Identify	  the	  current	  thinking	  about	  the	  rationale	  underpinning	  diplomacy.	  
2. Demonstrate	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  analysis	  with	  reference	  to	  what	  Buzan	  and	  Little	  call	  the	  
‘failure’	  of	  such	  investigations.	  
3. Introduce	   and	   modify	   civilizational	   analysis	   as	   a	   means	   to	   investigate	   Indian	  
diplomacy.	  
4. Outline	  the	  necessity	  of	  using	  a	  ‘genealogical’	  method	  to	  perform	  the	  analysis.	  
	  
The	  internationalization	  of	  Western	  modernity	  
	  
An	   investigation	   of	   diplomacy	   which	   seeks	   to	   move	   beyond	   the	   limits	   set	   by	   Eurocentric	  
assumptions	   conflating	   diplomacy	   and	  modernity	  with	   the	  West	   requires	   identifying	   how	   this	  
conflation	   inhibits	   research	   into	   non-­‐Western	   international	   relations.9	   In	   IR	   the	   conflation	   of	  
modernity	  with	  the	  West	  is	  unquestioned.	  Bull’s	  The	  Anarchical	  Society	  is	  indicative.	  He	  assumes	  
that	   the	   cultural	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   modern	   states	   system	   and	   the	   diplomatic	   system	   are	  
preponderantly	   European.	   Bull	   writes	   that	   by	   the	   ‘eighteenth	   and	   nineteenth	   centuries	  
international	   society’	   had	   ‘visible	   expression	   in	   certain	   institutions	   that	   reflected	   the	   co-­‐
operation	  of	  its	  member	  states.	  International	  law	  was	  recognised	  to	  be	  a	  distinct	  body	  of	  rules,	  
arising	  from	  the	  co-­‐operation	  of	  modern	  states;	  it	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  distinct	  also	  from	  matters	  of	  
private	  law	  extending	  across	  frontiers,	  as	  was	  recognised	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  by	  the	  term	  
‘public	   international	   law’’.	   Alongside	   this,	   ‘the	   diplomatic	   system,	   whose	   role	   in	   relation	   to	  
international	  society	  was	  now	  set	  out	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Callieres	  and	  other	  diplomatic	  theorists,	  
was	  recognised	  to	  be	  the	  concern	  of	  international	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  by	  the	  Congress	  of	  Vienna,	  
whose	   Final	   Act	   regularised	   it	   and	   brought	   it	   into	   conformity	   with	   the	   doctrine	   of	   sovereign	  
equality	  of	  states.’10	  	  
	  
                                                
9	  Recent	  works	  have	  even	  begun	  to	  do	  this	  along	  a	  major	  tangent	  –	  proposing	  Eastern	  origins	  for	  Western	  
civilization.	  See	  Hobson.	  2004.	  Several	  works	  have	  attempted	  to	  rescue	  the	  history	  and	  theories	  of	  non-­‐
European	  civilization	  from	  Eurocentric	  discourse.	  See	  Abu-­‐Lughod	  1989;	  Amin	  1989;	  Bernal	  1991;	  Blaut	  
1993,	  1992;	  Frank	  1998;	  Goody	  1996;	  Gran	  1996;	  Joseph	  1992;	  Kanth	  2005;	  Pomeranz	  2000;	  Wolf	  1982  
10	  Bull.	  1977.	  P.37	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This	   history	   has	   produced	   a	   culture	   of	   modernity	   which	   is	   resolutely	   Western	   and	   as	   Bull’s	  
subtext	  indicates,	  imposed	  upon	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world:	  
‘It	   is	   important	   to	   bear	   in	   mind,	   however,	   that	   if	   contemporary	   international	  
society	  does	  have	  any	  cultural	  basis,	  this	  is	  not	  any	  genuinely	  global	  culture,	  but	  
is	  rather	  the	  culture	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘modernity’.	  And	  if	  we	  ask	  what	  is	  modernity	  in	  
culture,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  we	  answer	  this	  except	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  the	  culture	  
of	  the	  dominant	  Western	  powers.’11	  
Such	   a	   culture	  produces	   a	   particular	   type	  of	   ‘rationality’	  which	  of	   course	   is	   also	  Western.	   For	  
Bull,	   ensconced	   within	   the	   dominant	   culture,	   described	   as	   an	   ‘international	   political	   culture	  
which	  determines	   the	  attitudes	   towards	   the	   states	   system	  of	   the	   societies	   that	   compose	   it,’12	  
there	  is	  ‘such	  a	  thing	  as	  rationality	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  action	  that	  is	  internally	  consistent	  with	  given	  
goals.	  Diplomatic	   theory	  presents	   the	   role	  of	   the	   ‘ideal	  ambassador’	   in	   terms	  of	  adherence	   to	  
canons	  of	  rationality	  in	  this	  sense,	  and	  the	  modern	  diplomatic	  tradition	  embodies	  an	  attempt	  to	  
sustain	  behaviour	  on	  this	  model.’13	  	  
	  
Though	   the	   West	   is	   the	   origin	   and	   at	   best	   the	   benefactor,	   it	   is	   however	   increasingly	   under	  
threat.	  As	  Bull	  states:	  
‘We	  may	  say	  that	  in	  this	  world	  international	  society	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  diplomatic	  
or	  elite	  culture,	  comprising	  the	  common	  intellectual	  culture	  of	  modernity:	  some	  
common	   languages,	   principally	   English,	   a	   common	   scientific	   understanding	   of	  
the	   world,	   certain	   common	   notions	   and	   techniques	   that	   derive	   from	   the	  
universal	   espousal	   by	   governments	   in	   the	   modern	   world	   of	   economic	  
development	  and	  their	  universal	   involvement	   in	  modern	  technology.	  However,	  
this	   common	   intellectual	   culture	   exists	   only	   at	   the	   elite	   level;	   its	   roots	   are	  
shallow	   in	  many	   societies,	   and	   the	  common	  diplomatic	   culture	   that	  does	  exist	  
today	   is	   not	   powerfully	   reinforced	   by	   an	   international	   political	   culture	  
favourable	  to	  the	  working	  of	  a	  states	  system.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether,	  
even	   at	   the	   diplomatic	   level,	   it	   embraces	   what	   was	   called	   a	   common	   moral	  
culture	   or	   set	   of	   common	   values,	   as	   distinct	   from	   a	   common	   intellectual	  
culture.’	  
                                                
11	  Ibid.,	  P.39	  
12	  Ibid.,	  P.316	  
13	  Ibid.,	  P.170	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And:	  
‘The	   future	   of	   international	   society	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   determined,	   among	   other	  
things,	  by	  the	  preservation	  and	  extension	  of	  a	  cosmopolitan	  culture,	  embracing	  
both	  common	   ideas	  and	  common	  values,	  and	  rooted	   in	  societies	   in	  general	  as	  
well	   as	   their	   elites,	   that	   can	   provide	   the	   world	   international	   society	   of	   today	  
with	   the	   kind	   of	   underpinning	   enjoyed	   by	   the	   geographically	   smaller	   and	  
culturally	  more	  homogenous	  international	  societies	  of	  the	  past.’14	  
However	  despite	  all,	  Western	  conceptions	  continue	  to	  influence	  world	  politics	  –	  everywhere.15	  
	  
The	  assumption	   is	   of	   course	   totally	  untested	  and	  highly	   limiting	   since	   it	   denies	   the	  non-­‐West	  
any	   ability	   apart	   from	   brute	   force.	   Nor	   is	   Bull’s	   position	   original	   or	   novel.	   In	   conflating	  
modernity	  with	   European	   culture,	   he	   squarely	   positions	   himself	  within	   a	   set	   of	   theoreticians	  
whose	  analyses	   grew	  out	  of	   studies	  of	  Western	  Europe,	   including	  amongst	  others,	   Eisenstadt	  
and	  Nelson,	   indicating	   the	  hegemonic	  nature	  of	   these	  views.	   In	   following	   them,	  Bull	  also	   sets	  
the	   tone	   for	   successive	   investigations	   into	   the	   understanding	   of	   international	   society	   and	   its	  
functioning.	  Secondly,	  though	  Bull	  attributes	  a	  certain	  dynamic	  to	  diplomacy	  –	  dictated	  by	  the	  
particular	  concerns	  of	  the	  particular	  diplomatic	  operation	  –	  the	  underlying	  rationality	  is	  one	  of	  
Western	   modernity.	   Finally,	   though	   the	   influence	   of	   Western	   modernity	   is	   in	   decline	   by,	  
presumably	   the	   rise	   of	   non-­‐Western	   modernities,	   Bull	   closes	   with	   the	   statement	   that	   the	  
‘cosmopolitan	   culture	   of	   today,	   like	   the	   international	   society	   which	   it	   helps	   to	   sustain,	   is	  
weighted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  dominant	  cultures	  of	  the	  West.’	  For	  Bull,	  then,	  the	  decline	  of	  Western	  
power	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Europe’s	  influence	  will	  wain.	  The	  international	  system	  will	  continue	  
to	   be	   sustained	   by	   the	   culture	   of	   the	   West	   which	   after	   all,	   it	   is	   assumed,	   produced	   the	  
diplomatic	  systems	  of	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world.	  
	  
Bull’s	   student	   Der	   Derian	   theorises	   this	   position	   by	   identifying	   two	   critical	   moments	   in	  
diplomatic	  history:	  when	  the	  mutual	  estrangement	  of	   states	   from	  Western	  Christendom	  gives	  
rise	  to	  an	  international	  diplomatic	  system;	  and	  when	  the	  Third	  World’s	  revolt	  against	  Western	  
‘Lordship’	   precipitates	   the	   transformation	   of	   diplomacy	   into	   a	   truly	   global	   system’.16	   In	   this	  
post-­‐structuralist	   reading	  even	   the	   limited	   space	  Bull	   allowed	   in	  his	  historicist	   reading	   for	   the	  
                                                
14	  Ibid.,	  P.316-­‐317	  
15	  See	  Bull,	  H.	  &	  A.	  Watson.	  1984	  
16	  Der	  Derian.	  1987.	  p.23.	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development	   of	   non-­‐Western	   diplomacy	   –	   that	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   modernity	   developing	  
without	  Western	   contact	   –	   is	   erased	   by	  Der	  Derian	  who	  presents	   the	  multiple	   births	   of	   non-­‐
Western	   diplomacy	   as	   identical,	   appearing	   from	   the	   same	   European	  mould.	   At	   the	   centre	   of	  
these	  delusive	  myths	  that	  structure	  the	  discipline	  is	  a	  mantra	  that	  the	  West,	  writes	  a	  historian	  
of	  China,	  continues	  to	  repeat:	  	  
‘Be	   like	  us	  and	  you	  will	   succeed.	  Persist	   in	  your	  own	  (i.e.,	  backward)	  ways	  and	  
you	   will	   fail.’	   Above	   all	   writes	   Murphy,	   ‘The	   rhetoric	   of	   imperialism	   has	  
continued	  to	  blind	  us	  to	  many	  truths,	  as	  it	  has	  kept	  us	  from	  seeing	  the	  falseness	  
of	   Western	   assumptions	   that	   Asia	   was	   somehow	   wrong	   because	   it	   did	   not	  
uniformly	  react	  to	  Western	  assertions	  in	  a	  Western	  way.’	  17	  
	  
The	  Western	  way	  –	  and	  everyone’s	  way	  –	  of	  diplomacy	  set	  out	  by	  Der	  Derian	  arises	  from	  Bull’s	  
notion	   of	   modernity	   being	   Westernized.	   This	   for	   Der	   Derian	   is	   alienation.	   The	   section	   on	  
alienation	  –	  technically	  the	  most	  important	  part	  of	  the	  book,	  for	  it	  drives	  the	  entire	  investigation	  
–	  ends	  with	  the	  statement	  ‘I	  do	  wish	  to	  reiterate	  that	  alienation	  is	  not	  a	  philosopher’s	  stone.’18	  
And	   yet	   he	  makes	   it	   the	   leitmotif	   of	   diplomacy.	   The	   notion	   is	   furthered	  when	   he	  writes	   that	  
diplomacy	   is	   the	   least	   dangerous	   possibility	   ‘until	   we	   learn	   to	   recognize	   ourselves	   as	   the	  
Other.’19	   He	   identifies	   diplomacy	   as	   a	   means	   to	   overcome	   ‘otherness’	   (and	   in	   Antidiplomacy	  
argues	   that	   everyone	   is	   a	   diplomat).20	  Antidiplomacy	   is	   the	   victory	   of	   alienation.	   Everyone	   is	  
rendered	  as	  alienated	  from	  the	  other	  but	  simultaneously	  Der	  Derian	  draws	  upon	  several	  criteria	  
to	   group	   together	   individuals	   supposedly	   irreconcilably	   divided.	   One	   such	   criterion	   is	   colonial	  
and	  colonized.	  And	  yet,	  there	  is	  scantly	  a	  mention	  of	  the	  latter	  or	  investigation	  of	  what	  actually	  
happened	   to	   the	   colonized?	   In	   short,	   what	   happened	   when	   the	   metaphysic	   of	   modernity,	  
‘othering’,	  entered	  the	  non-­‐modern	  world?	  
	  
Der	   Derian’s	   theoretical	   image	   of	   diplomacy	   being	   structured	   around	   an	   alienation	   which	  
supposedly	  permeates	  society	  from	  the	  state	  level,	  via	  communities	  to	  even	  the	  micro	  level	  of	  
individual	   human	   beings	   precludes	   a	   number	   of	   avenues	   central	   to	   the	   type	   of	   research	  
                                                
17	  Ibid.,	  Introduction	  p.4-­‐5.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  p.28.	  
19	  Ibid.,	  p.209.	  
20	  Der	  Derian.	  2001.	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proposed.	   Bull	   hints	   at	   this	   when	   he	   notes	   the	   decline	   of	   Western	   power.	   If	   modern	  
understandings	  are	  in	  decline,	  what	  other	  rationalities	  are	  on	  the	  rise?	  If	  for	   instance	  a	  people	  
viewing	   the	   world	   as	   founded	   not	   on	   alienation	   but	   on	   inextricably	   intermixed	   subjects	   in	   a	  
unified	  cosmos	  practice	  diplomacy	  what	  would	  it	  be?	  And	  what	  is	  the	  significance	  for	  diplomatic	  
encounters	   with	   such	   an	   organization?	   In	   such	   a	   world,	   the	   underlying	   assumption	   is	   not	  
sovereign	  alienated	  subjects	  but	  interconnected	  subjects	  constantly	  in	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation	  
to	  reduce	  constricting	  forces	  to	  create	  a	  state	  of	  being	  with	  the	  minimum	  of	  encumbrances.	  The	  
way	  of	  achieving	  this	  could	  be	  to	  ceaselessly	  experiment.	  Such	  diplomacy	  would	  be	  an	  ongoing	  
experiment	   to	  not	  break	  barriers	  but,	  what?	  Finally,	  what	   shape	  will	   the	  cosmopolitan	  society	  
Bull	   speaks	   of	   take?	   All	   these	   questions	   arise	   from	   a	   central	   problématique:	   is	   international	  
society	   truly	  balanced	   in	   favour	  of	  Western	  modernity?	  The	  answer	   requires	   investigating	  not	  
just	   non-­‐Western	   societies	   but	   the	   practitioners	   of	   diplomacy	   in	   those	   societies	   because	   the	  
central	   concern	  of	   this	  work	   is	   not	  how	   international	   relations	  ought	   to	  be,	   but	  how	   it	   is	   and	  
why.	  	  	  	  
	  
Consequences:	  Disciplinary	  failure	  and	  regeneration	  
	  
The	   failure	   to	   study	   even	   European	   international	   relations	   in	   a	   broader	   social	   and	   historical	  
context	   has	   in	   part	   contributed	   to	   what	   Buzan	   and	   Little	   call	   the	   discipline’s	   ‘failure	   as	   an	  
intellectual	  project.’21	  The	  failure	  is	  not	  only	  the	  discipline’s	  abstraction	  from	  what	   it	  professes	  
to	  study	  (IR	  practices),	  but	  also	  a	  product	  of	  the	  discipline’s	  insulated	  theorizing	  about	  not	  actual	  
practice,	  but	  theory.	  After	  all,	  the	  discipline’s	  key	  texts	  –	  Morgenthau,	  Waltz,	  Keohane	  and	  Nye,	  
Gilpin,	  Walt,	  Wendt	  etc.	   –	   are	   ‘necessary	   reading	   to	  understand	   the	  discipline,	  not	   to	   analyse	  
what	  happens	  in	  IR	  as	  people	  experience	  it	  every	  day.’22	  For	  a	  discipline	  that	  professes	  to	  explain	  
diplomacy	  the	  disconnect	  between	  the	  two	  is	  surprising.	  As	  Sharp	  notes,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  
about	  diplomacy23	  and	  it	  emanates	  from	  the	  discipline	  intentionally	  cutting	  itself	  from	  the	  polis	  
(society)	  and	  thereby	  deliberately	  creating	  a	  misfit	  between	  the	  means	  of	  study	  and	  the	  actual	  
object	  of	  study.	  	  
	  
                                                
21	  Buzan	  &	  Little.	  2001.	  
22	  Hopgood.	  2003.	  	  
23	  Sharp.	  1999.	  p.44	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Correcting	  these	  self-­‐inflicted	  wounds	  is	  one	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  moves	  have	  already	  
been	  made.	  The	  broader	  failings	  of	  such	  approaches	  have	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  discipline.	  It	  is	  
suggested	   that	   a	   move	   towards	   recognizing	   the	   plurality	   of	   precept	   and	   practice,	   i.e.,	   the	  
inextricably	  intertwined	  relationship	  between	  theory	  and	  practice	  would	  correct	  the	  error.	  The	  
discipline	   also	   encourages	   the	   transgression	   of	   disciplinary,	   methodological	   and	   theoretical	  
boundaries24	   and	   others	   tell	   us	   ‘How	   to	   Make	   a	   Social	   Science	   Practical’	   and	   encourage	  
‘pragmatism,	  critical	  social	  science	  and	  multiperspectival	  theory.’25	  	  
	  
Following	   these	   suggestions,	   the	   thesis	   researches	   the	   social	   world,	   i.e.,	   the	   actual	   world	   of	  
international	   relations	   as	   a	  means	   of	   healing	   the	   rupture	   that	   led	   to	   the	   discipline’s	   ‘failure’.	  
Investigating	  practice	  is	  essential	  because	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  rationale	  underpinning	  a	  
particular	  nation’s	  diplomacy	   then	  the	  discipline	  has	   to	  explore	   the	  practice	  of	   that	  diplomacy	  
and	  how	  it	  came	  about.	  Just	  as	  Bull’s	  notions	  arose	  from	  a	  section	  of	  the	  literature,	  these	  newer	  
disciplinary	  realizations	  match	  other	  developments	  within	  the	  academy.	  Geertz,	  for	  one,	  argues	  
that	   ‘a	   system	   of	   inherited	   conceptions	   expressed	   in	   symbolic	   forms’	   is	   the	  means	   by	   ‘which	  
people	   communicate,	   perpetuate	   and	   develop	   their	   knowledge	   about	   and	   attitudes	   toward	  
life’.26	   This	   project	   limits	   itself	   to	   understanding	   ‘life’	   as	   the	  work	   of	   the	   people	  who	   conduct	  
relations	   between	   sovereign	   units	   since	   the	   intention	   is	   to	   identify	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   a	  
particular	  set	  of	  people	  understand	  and	  act.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  development	  of	  why	  
they	  do	  what	  they	  do	  and	  how	  they	  do	  it.	  	  
	  
Answering	  questions	  of	   this	   type	   though	   aided	  by	  Geertz’s	   approach	   requires	  moving	  beyond	  
him.	   Another	   step	   is	   required	   –	   especially	   when	   the	   object	   of	   study	   is	   diplomacy,	   a	   practice	  
which	   by	   definition	   is	   ‘inter-­‐cultural,’	   international	   and	   at	   the	   very	   core	   of	   modern	   global	  
relations.	  Geertz’s	  approach	  is	  useful	  because	  ‘political	  theory	  [is]	  understood	  as	  an	  intellectual	  
craft,’	  and	  challenges	  Western	  political	  and	  social	   theorists	   to	  put	   to	   the	   test	   the	  adequacy	  of	  
their	  views	  on	  political	  power	  through	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  search	  for	  new	  meanings.27	  In	  IR	  this	  is	  an	  
attempt	   to	   explain	   international	   relations,	   in	  Hollis’	   and	   Smith’s	  words,	   from	  both	   ‘inside	   and	  
                                                
24	  Buzan	  &	  Little.	  2001.	  
25	  Bohman.	  2002.	  
26	  Geertz.	  1973.	  p.89	  
27	  Ball.	  P.29	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outside.’28	  Yet,	  despite	  this,	  very	  few	  scholars	  have	  attempted	  to	  understand	  IR	  from	  the	  inside.	  
Even	   ‘Constructivists’	   who	   stress	   ‘culture’	   rarely	   perform	   empirical	   research.	   If	   it	   were	  
attempted,	  then	  such	  an	  inquiry	  would	  correspond	  to	  what	  Dallmayr	  calls	  ‘propitious	  moments	  
in	  the	  history	  of	  political	  philosophy,’	  when	  ‘Western	  and	  Eastern	  thought	  for	  the	  first	  time	  can	  
become	   partners	   in	   a	   genuine	   global	   dialogue.’29	   The	   practice	   of	   diplomacy	   is	   a	   vehicle	   that	  
lends	  itself	  to	  such	  dialogue	  –	  as	  a	  category	  of	  analysis	  operationalised	  as	  a	  social	  practice	  when	  
academics	   choose	   to	  do	   so.	  They	  do	   so	  when	   in	  addition	   to	  using	  Foucault,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  or	  
Lacan	   to	   understand	   the	   self	   or	   the	   body	   in	   India	   or	   Africa,	   they	   also	   take	   local	   conceptual	  
packages	  to	  understand	  local	  issues.	  Doing	  so	  is	  vital	  for	  an	  investigation	  into	  how	  international	  
relations	  is	  actually	  made,	  because	  in	  that	  realm	  the	  ‘symbolic	  forms’	  of	  the	  practitioners	  –	  and	  
not	  the	  observers	  –	  make	  the	  stuff	  of	  international	  relations.	  
	  
Tools	  of	  analysis:	  Civilizations	  
	  
Why	   use	   civilizational	   analysis	   as	   the	   means	   to	   comprehend	   the	   ‘symbolic	   forms’	   of	   the	  
practitioners?	  Firstly,	  because	  it	  focuses	  on	  what	  Geertz	  calls	  the	  ‘minimal	  degree	  of	  coherence’	  
which	   ‘cultural	   systems	  must	   have’	   to	   denote	  what	  we	   ‘call	   systems.’	  Geertz	   goes	  on	   to	  note	  
that	  ‘by	  observation,	  they	  normally	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  more.’30	  Secondly,	  the	  concept	  of	  labyrinth	  
of	  civilizations,	  ‘all	  of	  them	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  modern	  transmutation,	  but	  each	  of	  them	  possessing	  
specific	   legacies	  and	  resources	   that	  can	  be	   reactivated	   in	   inventive	  ways’	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  
capturing	   the	   dynamic	   relations	   between	   a	   civilization	   and	   the	   global	   ecumene.31	   Thirdly,	  
Nelson’s	  multifaceted	   and	   ‘systematic’	   work	   provides	   the	  means	   to	   grasp	   theory	   and	   history	  
because	  his	  style	  of	  ‘investigation	  was	  linked	  to	  an	  urgent	  concern	  about	  current	  intellectual	  and	  
historical	   challenges.	   He	   opposed	   all	   theoretical	   ‘uniformitarianism’,	   as	   a	   distortion	   of	   the	  
actualities	   of	   human	   experience	   through	   their	   reduction	   to	   one	   or	   another	   comprehensive	  
system	  of	  concepts’.32	  Civilizational	  analysis	  therefore	  focuses	  on	  the	  particular	   in	  a	  milieu	  and	  
over	  time	  while	  being	  fundamentally	  concerned	  with	  actual	  events.	  	  
	  
                                                
28	  i.e.,	  theoretically	  and	  practically.	  See	  Hollis	  &	  Smith.	  1990.	  
29	  Dallmayr.	  1990.	  
30	  Geertz.	  1973.	  pp.17-­‐18.	  
31	  Arnason.	  2006.	  p.52.	  
32	  Quote	  from	  Nielsen.	  1981.	  P.241-­‐2	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The	  term	  civilization	  however	  poses	  a	  formidable	  set	  of	  definitional	  problems.	  As	  Arnason	  notes,	  
thinking	  of	  ‘civilization’	  or	  ‘civilizations’,	  i.e.	  in	  the	  singular	  or	  plural	  makes	  a	  world	  of	  difference.	  
Interwoven	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  civilization	  and	  culture	  if	  only	  because	  authors	  connect	  
the	   two.33	   Wallerstein,	   however,	   short-­‐circuits	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   civilizations	   by	  
claiming	  that	  they	  are	  a	  fiction,	  nothing	  but	  ideological	  uses	  of	  the	  past.	  In	  short,	  ‘the	  concept	  of	  
civilizations	   (plural)	  arose	  as	  a	  defence	  against	   the	  ravages	  of	  civilization	   (singular)’.34	  Even	  so,	  
the	   ‘defence’	   implies	  difference,	  and	   that	  very	  difference	   requires	  analysis	   to	  understand	  why	  
the	  ‘defence’	  was	  fought	  at	  all?	  At	  a	  more	  basic	   level,	  Wallerstein	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  that	  
History	  might	  actually	  be	  more	  constitutive	  of	  the	  present	  than	  simply	  providing	  a	  collection	  of	  
facts	  waiting	  to	  be	  deployed.	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case	  several	  authors	  adopt	  the	  contrary	  position	  and	  view	  History	  as	  constitutive	  of	  the	  
present.	   Bagby	   presents	   civilizations	   in	   the	   plural	   because	   he	   relies	   on	   culture	   and	   posits	  
civilizations	   as	   internal	   to	   a	   culture,	   defined	   as	   a	   ‘way	   of	   life’.35	   In	   forwarding	   such	   a	   highly	  
localised	   and	   comprehensive	   conceptualisation	   of	   culture,	   he	   excludes	   the	   possibility	   of	  
civilizations	  undergoing	  transformational	  change.	  In	  contrast,	  culturalist	  approaches	  emphasize	  
the	  locality	  and	  hence	  plurality	  of	  civilizations.	  For	  Braudel	  civilizations	  are	  ‘geographical	  areas’	  
and	   to	   grasp	   a	   civilization	   requires	   analysing	   the	   land	   and	   its	   contours,	   climate,	   vegetation,	  
animal	  species	  and	  natural	  or	  other	  advantages	  and	  what	  locals	  have	  made	  of	  these	  conditions.	  
He	   finally	   posits	   ‘civilizations	   as	   ways	   of	   thought’	   though	   obviously	   aware	   that	   this	   cultural	  
component	   is	   least	   transferrable	   across	   civilizational	   borders,	   therefore	   most	   likely	   to	   be	  
misunderstood	   and	   hence	   requiring	   detailed	   investigation.36	   Moving	   along	   this	   trajectory,	  
Katzenstein	  notes	  that	  civilizations	  exist	  as	  porous	  geographical	  spaces;	  exist	  over	  long	  periods;	  
are	   primarily	   cultural	   entities	   consisting	   of	   shared	   meanings	   and	   cosmological	   world	   views,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  area	  of	  high	  culture,	  at	  times	  shared	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent	  even	  beyond	  the	  
elite	   stratum.37	   He	   emphasizes	   that	   civilizations	   have	   clearly	   demarcated	   geographic	   centres.	  
Arnason	   interjects	   that	   Katzenstein’s	   approach	   is	   somewhat	   ahistorical	   since	   he	   appears	  
                                                
33	  Rival	  definitions	  are	  provided	  by,	  amongst	  others:	  Bowden.	  2004;	  Mozaffari.	  2002;	  Elias.	  1994;	  Cox.	  
2000;	  Cox.	  2001;	  Mazlish.	  2004;	  Mazlish.	  2001.;	  Arnason.	  2003;	  Nelson.	  1973;	  Tehranian.	  2007;	  Braudel.	  
1993.	  
34	  Wallerstein.	  1991.	  p.224	  
35	  Bagby.	  1963.	  
36	  Braudel.	  1993.	  p.9	  
37	  Puchala.	  1997.	  p.8,	  10	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oblivious	   to	   the	   transformations	   of	   the	   high	   culture	   from	  with	   its	   civilizational	   base.	   Arnason	  
therefore	  posits	  a	  ‘relational	  and	  pluralistic	  concept	  of	  civilization,	  i.e.	  one	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  
interconnections	  of	  culture	  and	  the	  social	  world’	  because	  it	  is	  ‘more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  
historical	  experience.’38	  
	  
In	   keeping	   with	   the	   lines	   of	   enquiry	   and	   approaches	   outlined	   above,	   civilization	   will	   be	  
understood	  in	  the	  plural	  because	  Asian	  identity	  or	  commonality	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  strategic	  
fiction.39	   However,	   civilization	  will	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   nested	   in	   a	   ‘way	   of	   life’	   as	   they	   are	  
always	  open	  to	  radical	  change	  in	  Asia,40	  nor	  will	  it	  be	  presumed	  that	  regardless	  of	  their	  histories	  
that	  all	   civilizations	  are	  destined	   for	  a	  modernity	  of	   control	  over	  nature	  and	   society.	  To	  do	   so	  
would	   impose	   the	   subject	   matter	   into	   a	   restrictive	   deterministic	   framework	   framed	   on	   the	  
European	   Enlightenment	   experience.	   In	   any	   case	   terms	   such	   as	   nature	   are	   understood	   in	  
radically	  different	  ways	  even	  within	  civilizations.41	  Civilizations	  will	  however	  be	  assumed	  to	  exist	  
in	  the	  long	  durée	  because	  of	  the	  ‘degree	  of	  coherence’	  they	  provide	  to	  its	  current	  members	  and	  
because	  even	  when	  being	  renegotiated	  they	  may	  be	  by	  the	  coherence	  imbuing	  features	  of	  the	  
civilization.	  However,	   the	   ubiquitous	   notion	   of	  many	   civilizations	   transforming	   into	  modernity	  
raises	  a	  fundamental	  question:	  does	  ‘a	  single	  principle’	  originating	  in	  Europe	  animate	  the	  culture	  
of	   all	   modernities?42	   Implied	   is	   that	   regardless	   of	   their	   specificities	   civilizations	   have	   all	  
transformed	   into	  modernity.	   If	   so,	  why	   study	   anything	  before	   the	   advent	   and	   transmission	  of	  
the	  European	  principle	  which	  provides	  the	  ‘degree	  of	  coherence’	  in	  all	  societies	  today?	  	  
	  	  
The	  question	  has	  to	  be	  posed	  not	  just	  because	  Bull	  characterizes	  modernity	  as	  synonymous	  with	  
the	  West	  but	  because	  both	   the	   standard,	   if	   rival,	   conceptions	  of	  modernity	  presume	   that	   the	  
entire	   globe	   is	   animated	  by	   a	  modernity	   born	   in	   Europe.	   The	   conceptions	   are	  modernity	   as	   a	  
self-­‐contained	  and	  complete	  civilization,	  imposing	  its	  logics	  and	  systems	  on	  other	  civilizations	  or	  
modernity	   understood	   as	   a	   set	   of	   technical	   innovations	   adaptable	   to	   various	   civilizations.	  
Interlinking	  them	  is	  their	  antipathy	  towards	  tradition.	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  these	  conceptions	  
                                                
38	  Arnason	  p.4	  
39	  See	  Nay	  1970;	  Camroux	  and	  Domenach,	  1997.	  
40	  See	  for	  instance	  Dikotter.	  2007	  
41	  Nielsen.	  1991.	  
42	  Kaviraj.	  2000.	  p.	  137	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and	  then	  challenge	  them	  by	  proposing	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  completely	  modern	  practice	  arising	  in	  
the	  non-­‐Western	  world.	  
	  
The	  dominant	  conceptions	  of	  modernity	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  von	  Laue’s	  materialist	  analysis	  of	  ‘the	  
world	  revolution	  of	  Westernization’.43	  The	  story	   is	   that	  possessing	  an	  exceptional	  combination	  
of	   cultural	   skills,	   Western	   society	   achieved	   a	   decisive	   advantage	   in	   the	   contest	   for	   military	  
power.	  Von	  Laue	  continues	  that	  as	  Western	  powers	  ‘exploited	  the	  world’s	  resources	  …	  for	  their	  
own	  gain	  …	  Western	  political	  ambition	  and	  competitiveness	  became	  universal’.44	  Simultaneously	  
all	  non-­‐Western	  responses	   to	  Western	  domination	   failed	  because	   the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  was	  
unable	  to	   ‘match	  the	  cultural	  creativity	  of	  spontaneous	  cooperation’	   in	  the	  West.45	  Hence,	  the	  
world	  Westernized	  since	  it	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  challenge	  European	  domination.	  Accompanying	  
von	   Laue’s	   temporal	   explanation	   is	   Parson’s	   ‘spiritual’	   notion	   that	   modernity	   is	   the	   direct	  
inheritor	  of	  a	  potential	  locked	  in	  Christian	  culture.46	  Its	  ability	  to	  maintain	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  
of	   ‘differentiation	   from	   the	   social	   system	  with	  which	   it	  was	   interdependent’	   is	  what	  unlocked	  
modernity	  in	  Europe.47	  This	  reading	  posits	  Christianity	  as	  imbuing	  the	  culture	  with	  the	  capacity	  
to	  transcend	  given	  contexts	  and	  boundaries.	  It	  is	  the	  root	  of	  both	  the	  proactive	  ability	  to	  adapt	  
and	  the	  inclusivist	  principles	  of	  integration.	  	  
	  
For	   Luhman	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   this	   new	   Christian-­‐culture	   was	   a	   reflexive	   and	   relativistic	  
understanding	   of	   culture.48	  Modernity	   therefore	   differs	   from	   the	   ‘regional	   societies	   of	   earlier	  
civilizations	  (Hochkulturen)’	  with	  ‘cosmic	  world-­‐views’	   linked	  to	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  principles.49	  The	  
new	  civilization	  of	  modernity	  not	  only	  undermined	  its	  own	  originary	  world	  but	  also	  other	  worlds	  
making	   for	   a	   uniform,	   global	   society.50	   The	   diffusion	   of	   modernity	   was	   facilitated	   by	   purely	  
cognitive	   integrations	   of	   possible	   partners	   for	   interaction,	   what	   Luhmann	   called	   a	   ‘world	  
society’.	   Later,	   Luhmann	  defined	   the	   unity	   of	  world	   society	   in	   terms	  of	   global	   communicative	  
operations.	   However,	   Luhmann’s	   global	   society	   even	   today	   remains	   an	   abstraction	   and	   so	   he	  
                                                
43	  Von	  Laue.	  1987.	  
44	  Ibid.	  p.4	  
45	  Ibid.	  p.6	  
46	  Parsons.	  1966.	  
47	  Parsons..	  1971.	  P.29.	  
48	  Luhman.	  1997.	  P.151.	  
49	  Luhman.	  P.64.	  
50	  Luhman.	  1997.	  P.	  145-­‐70.	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introduced	   the	  notion	  of	   cultural	  diversity	  by	  noting	   that	   civilizational	   remnants	   remain.	   Local	  
cultures	   are	   regarded	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   the	   system	   to	   be	   managed	   by	   a	   new	   reflexive	   and	  
relativistic	  concept	  of	  culture.51	  	  
	  
Eisenstadt	  offers	  a	  slightly	  different	  reading	  with	  three	  defining	  components.	  He	  keeps	  with	  von	  
Laue	  and	  Luhman	  that	  modernity	  was	  born	  in	  Europe	  and	  is	  a	  technique	  to	  question	  everything	  
including	   itself.	   This	   is	   ‘reflexivity’	   and	   ‘it	   developed	   first	   in	   Western	   and	   Central	   Europe’	  
entailing	  ‘distinct	  ideological	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  premises.’52	  Eisenstadt	  draws	  on	  Weber	  who	  
‘finds	  the	  existential	  threshold	  of	  modernity	  in	  a	  certain	  deconstruction:	  of	  what	  he	  speaks	  of	  as	  
the	  “ethical	  postulate	  that	  the	  world	  is	  a	  God-­‐ordained,	  and	  hence	  somehow	  meaningfully	  and	  
ethically	  oriented	  cosmos.”’53	  The	  deconstruction	  produced	  a	  distinct	  shift	  in	  how	  human	  agency	  
was	   conceptualised,	   its	   position	   in	   time	   and	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   future	   characterised	   by	   a	  
number	   of	   possibilities	   realisable	   through	   autonomous	   human	   agency.	   The	   premises	   of	  
prevailing	   social,	   ontological,	   and	   political	   order,	   and	   the	   legitimating	   of	   that	   order,	   were	   no	  
longer	   taken	   for	   granted.	   An	   intensive	   reflexivity	   developed	   around	   the	   basic	   ontological	  
premises	  of	  structures	  of	  social	  and	  political	  authority.	  This	  reflexivity	  ‘gave	  rise	  to	  an	  awareness	  
of	   multiple	   visions	   that	   could	   be	   contested’.54	   It	   is	   this	   ability	   to	   question	   and	   problematize	  
foundational	   premises,	   i.e.	   a	   metaphysic,	   that	   is	   for	   Eisenstadt	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	  
modernity.55	  Helpfully,	  he	  lists	  the	  various	  social	  phenomena	  that	  this	  ability	  produced.	  In	  short:	  
new	   roles	   beyond	   traditionally	   sanctioned	   ones,56	   a	   wider	   translocal	   identity,57	   rebellion	   and	  
protest,58	  a	  distinctive	  manner	  of	  creating	  identity	  boundaries,59	  and	  of	  course,	  for	  a	  modernity	  
arising	  from	  Christianity	  –	  the	  possibility	  of	  creating	  Heaven	  on	  Earth.60	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  1993,	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Now	  defined,	  the	  second	  component	  of	  Eisenstadt’s	  argument	  is	  that	  modernity	  ‘should	  be	  seen	  
…	  as	  a	  case	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  a	  new	  civilization	  of	  a	  new	  great	  tradition	  –	  not	  unlike,	  for	  instance,	  
the	   spread	   of	   Christianity	   or	   of	   Islam	   or	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Great	   Historical	   Empires.’61	  
Modernity	  ‘is	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  civilization’	   it	  is	  also	  ‘a	  mutation	  of	  the	  European	  legacy	  
into	  a	  more	  global	  and	  dynamic	  pattern’.62	  Yet,	  ‘modernity	  and	  Westernization	  are	  not	  identical;	  
Western	   patterns	   of	   modernity	   are	   not	   the	   only	   “authentic”	   modernities,	   though	   they	   enjoy	  
historical	   precedence	   and	   continue	   to	   be	   a	   basic	   reference	   point	   for	   others.’	   In	   other	  words,	  
though	   Europe	   was	   the	   first	   to	   produce	   the	   technology	   of	   reflexivity,	   this	   technique	   can	   be	  
deployed	  elsewhere	  and	  create	  questioning	  minds	   in	  other	   civilizations.	  The	  only	  difference	   is	  
that	  the	  premises	  questioned	  are	  not	  those	  which	  defined	  the	  old	  European	  civilization,	  but	  the	  
metaphysics	   of	   other	   civilizations	   which	   modern	   Europe	   came	   into	   contact	   with.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  
sense	  that	  modernities	  are	  multiple.	  
	  
Finally,	  modernity	  basically	  performs	  the	  same	  function	  elsewhere	  as	  it	  did	  originally	  in	  Europe.	  
It	   is	   ‘the	   most	   far-­‐reaching	   undermining	   of	   traditional	   civilizations	   that	   has	   ever	   occurred	   in	  
history	   together	   with	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   international	   systems	   within	   which	   take	   place	  
continuous	  shifts	  in	  power,	  influence	  and	  centres	  of	  cultural	  model-­‐building’.63	  This	  takes	  place	  
even	  where	   there	   is	   no	   tradition.	   As	   Ortiz	   shows,	   despite	   lacking	   an	   ‘ageless’	   tradition,	   Latin	  
America	  still	  has	  a	  story	  of	  modernization.	  It	  is	  choosing	  from	  differing	  modernities	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  either	  Americanization	  or	  the	  ‘spiritual’	  qualities	  of	  Europe.	  
	  
This	   reading,	   defining	  modernity	   by	   the	   development	   of	   reflexivity	   from	   a	   particular	   religious	  
tradition	   –	   Christianity	   –	   and	   in	   a	   particular	   location	   –	   Europe	   –	   is	   challenged	   by,	   perhaps	  
unsurprisingly	  by	  an	  Indian	  schooled	  in	  social-­‐science.	  Kaviraj	  raises	  the	  question	  stated	  above:	  
Does	  a	  ‘single	  principle’	  animate	  all	  modernities?	  He	  describes	  the	  above	  processes	  as	  subsets	  of	  
what	   is	   a	   single	  process	  of	   rationalization	   in	   the	   social	  world.	   Kaviraj’s	   attack	   is	   threefold	   and	  
limited	  to	  how	  the	  European	  notion	  of	  reflexivity	  is	  operationalised	  in	  foreign	  climes.	  At	  no	  point	  
does	   he	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   alternative	   birthplace	   for	   reflexivity	   –	   the	   hallmark	   of	  
European	  modernity.	  Kaviraj’s	  first	  point	  is	  that	  even	  if	  the	  ‘single	  principle’	  was	  introduced,	  and	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created	  a	  ‘modern	  way	  of	  doing	  things’	  the	  principle	  ‘is	  not	  written	  on	  a	  “clean	  slate.”’64	  Second,	  
‘not	   only	   is	   one	   process	   insufficient	   for	   the	   production	   of	   others,	   but	   the	   precise	  manner	   in	  
which	  they	  are	  interconnected	  have	  a	  strong	  bearing	  on	  the	  form	  that	  modernity	  takes.’65	  Third,	  
because	  ‘modernity’	   is	  defined	  by	  reflexivity,	   it	   ‘generates	  a	  constantly	  recursive	  consideration	  
of	   options	   and	   consequently	   learn	   from	   an	   analysis	   of	   their	   own	   and	   others’	   experience.	  
Because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  recursive	  rationality	  it	  is	  unpractical	  to	  expect	  that	  later	  
societies	   would	   blindly	   repeat	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   West.	   The	   initial	   conditions	   of	   their	  
modernity	  are	  different,	  and	  therefore	  they	  cannot	  imitate	  the	  West.’66	  	  
	  
Despite	  his	  attack,	  Kaviraj	  has	  not	  moved	  very	  far	  from	  the	  theorists	  he	  challenges.	  All	  of	  them	  
rule	  out-­‐of-­‐court	  the	  possibility	  that	  reflexivity	  could	  have	  been	  born	  anywhere	  outside	  Europe.	  
There	  is	  no	  scope	  that	  ‘modernity’	  can	  be	  animated	  by	  anything	  other	  than	  the	  specific	  historical	  
conditions	  which	  tempered	   it	   in	  the	  region	  of	   its	  birth.	  This	  project	  will	  however	  entertain	  the	  
notion	   of	   not	   just	  multiple	  modernities	   but	  multiple	   reflexivities.	   To	   do	   so,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	  
permits	  possibilities	  so	  far	  denied	  to	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world.	  	  
	  
An	  alternative	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  investigation	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  wholesale	  evacuation	  of	  the	  
methods	   of	   civilizational	   analysis,	   only,	   applying	   that	   method	   –	   a	   deep	   study	   of	   a	   particular	  
process	   –	   to	   the	   non-­‐Western	   world.	   Eisenstadt	   provides	   the	   example.	   An	   Eisenstadt-­‐like	  
investigation	   into	   a	   non-­‐western	   civilization	   could	   very	   well	   undermine	   the	   foundational	  
assumptions	  which	  arose	  from	  his	  study	  of	  just	  one	  civilization	  to	  underpin	  all	  civilizations	  –	  that	  
only	   Christian-­‐Western	   society	   produced	   the	   required	   cultural	   predisposition	   towards	   social	  
transformation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  entirely	  new	  conception	  of	  social	  agency.	  Such	  an	  agency,	   if	   it	  
originated	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  historical,	  geographical	  and	  social	  setting	  could	  be	  capable	  of	  
producing	  far	  deeper	  and	  broader	  social	  relations	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  of	  humans	  affected	  and	  
the	  depth	  of	   continuing	   lived	  history	  –	   rather	   than	  being	   solely	   concerned	  with	  and	  driven	  by	  
the	  urge	  to	  ‘undermine’	  tradition.	  Eisenstadt’s	  reading	  presumes	  that	  non-­‐Christian	  civilizations	  
adopted	  not	  just	  modern,	  Western	  institutions	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  realising	  a	  Christian	  ideal	  on	  Earth	  
but	   also	   the	   basic	   tensions	   which	   prefigure	   the	   Christian	   revolutionary	   ideal.	   Such	   a	   reading	  
denies	  the	  possibility	  of	  other,	  alternative	  civilizational	  aspirations.	  Only	  a	  historical	  investigation	  
                                                
64	  Kaviraj	  p.138	  
65	  Ibid.,	  p.139	  
66	  Ibid.,	  P.140	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of	   a	   non-­‐Christian	   civilization	   can	   verify	   Eisenstadt.	   Such	   an	   investigation	   might	   produce	   a	  
completely	  different	  set	  of	  ideals,	  or	  none	  at	  all,	  for	  which	  Western	  institutions	  and	  practices	  are	  
just	  conduits.	  What	  is	  therefore	  required	  is	  not	  just	  a	  history	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  colonial	  power	  but	  
also	   of	   modernity	   understood	   as	   an	   intellectual	   mode	   and	   why	   it	   was	   absorbed	   by	   non-­‐
Westerns.	   It	   shifts	   the	   emphasis	   to	   the	   prevailing	   logics	   which	  made	  modernity	   attractive	   to	  
non-­‐Westerns	  and	  how	  those	   logics	  appropriated	  modernity,	   that	   is	   if	   there	  was	  anything	   too	  
appropriate.	   The	   question	   is	   not	   how	   European	   modernity	   spread,	   but	   what	   actually	   is	  
modernity	  and	  how	  new	  was	  it	  to	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world?	  It	  is,	  in	  short,	  the	  attempt	  to	  identify	  
the	  metaphysic	  of	  modernity	  and	  verify	  whether	  it	  existed	  outside	  Europe.	  
	  
This	  identification	  may	  move	  from	  the	  literature	  positing	  colonialism	  as	  the	  preeminent	  moment	  
when	   the	  metaphysic	  of	  modernity	  was	   transmitted	   to	   the	  world.	  The	   rest	  of	   this	   section	  will	  
explore	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  transmission	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  transmission	  
might	  have	  been	   from	  East	   to	  West.	  At	   the	  centre	   is	   the	  ability	  of	  metaphysics	   to	   intermingle	  
which	   is	   indicated	   by	   Aranason’s	   pluralistic	   theory	   of	   civilization	   and	   related	   argument	   about	  
multiple	   modernities.67	   With	   a	   strong	   hermeneutical	   dimension	   to	   civilizational	   analysis,	  
Aranason’s	   relies	   on	   Castoriadis’s	   theory	   of	   the	   imaginary	   component	   in	   cultural	   models	   of	  
interpretation,	   which	   are	   a	   central	   feature	   of	   the	   self-­‐constitution	   of	   every	   society.68	   For	  
Aranson,	   Castoriadis	   broke	   new	   ground	   in	   philosophy	   in	   that	   his	   notion	   of	   a	   radical	   social	  
imaginary	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  mechanism	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  civilizational	  encounters.	  In	  this	  
approach	  civilizations	  are	  contested	  grounds	  in	  which	  different	  visions	  of	  the	  world	  emerge	  and	  
undergo	  transformation,	  central	  to	  which	  are	  dynamics	  of	  encounters	  and	  syntheses.	  
	  
This	  very	   internal	  differentiation	   leads	  sociological	  writers	   to	  speak	  of	  civilization	   in	  the	  plural.	  
They	   recognize	   not	   more	   or	   less	   fixed	   entities	   but	   focus	   instead	   on	   cross-­‐border	   and	  
transcivilizational	   encounters.69	   This	   outlook	   originated	   with	   Nelson	   whose	   means	   of	   inquiry	  
offers	   a	   system	  which	   affirms	   the	   continuity	   of	   civilizations	   in	   the	   longue	   durée,	   yet	   open	   to	  	  
fundamental	   transformation,	   even	   accepting	   of	   a	   change	   in	   ‘metaphysic’	   heralded	   by	   inter-­‐
civilizational	  contact.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  he	  attempts	   to	  avoid	   the	  positivism	  of	  modernity	  and	  
the	   essentialism	   which	   accompanies	   it.	   Nelson’s	   ideas,	   drawn	   from	   Durkheim	   and	   Mauss,	  
                                                
67	  Arnason.	  2003.	  
68	  Castoriadis.	  1987.	  
69	  Cox.	  2001.	  p.109;	  Mazlish.	  2004.	  P.	  xi;	  Mozaffari.	  2002.	  pp.75-­‐92.;	  Holzner.	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focused	   on	   the	   highest	   level	   cultural	   production	   common	   to	   a	   society	   or	   the	   ‘coefficient	   of	  
expansion	   and	   internalization’.70	   These	   highest	   level	   cultural	   productions,	   what	   Mauss	   called	  
‘categories	   of	   the	   human	   spirit’71	   are	   the	   ones	   which	   define	   views	   across	   time	   and	   space72	  
because	  they	  are	  the	  ‘directive	  systems’	  defining	  reality	  but	  not	  necessarily	  free	  from	  conflicts	  
among	   ‘mediatorial	   elites’.73	   In	  other	  words,	   they	  are	  a	   cultural	   repertoire	   constantly	  open	   to	  
reinvention.	  To	  analyse	  these	  processes	  requires	  penetrating	  a	  society	  at	   its	  elite	   level.	  That	   is	  
why	  the	  central	  policy	  making	  apparatus	  of	  India	  is	  the	  target	  for	  study	  –	  for	  it	  represents	  if	  not	  
just	  the	  high	  culture	  of	  Indian	  international	  relations,	  it	  is	  where	  ‘mediatorial	  elites’	  operate	  thru	  
their	  ‘directive	  systems’	  to	  create	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  over	  1	  billion	  humans.	  
	  
Nelson	  was	  however	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  mediatorial	  elites.	  The	  central	  focus	  of	  
Nelson’s	   civilizational	   analysis	   is	   the	   study	   of	   intercivilizational	   encounters,	   those	   occasions	  
when	  the	  central	  frame,	  or	  metaphysic	  of	  a	  civilization	  is	  challenged	  thru	  contact	  with	  another	  
civilization.	  For	  him	  there	  were	  primarily	  three	  types	  of	  consciousness	  or	  ways	  of	  being.74	  Sacro-­‐
magical	   –	   central	   to	  which	   is	   a	   sense	  of	   collective	   responsibility	   and	   sacrifices,	   expiations	   and	  
commemorations	  of	  collective	  crimes	  or	  wrongs	  which	  require	  atonement.75	  The	  second,	  Faith	  
structures	  is	  explained	  by	  ‘the	  key	  to	  is	  that	  individuals	  committed	  to	  faith	  feel	  themselves	  to	  be	  
part	  of	   the	  truth,	  a	  manifestation	  of	   the	  divine	   in	  expression	  of	   the	  universal	  will	  or	  sovereign	  
design’.76	   And	   ‘Any	   member	   of	   the	   community	   can	   claim	   to	   be	   a	   messenger,	   exemplar	   or	  
incarnation	   of	   the	   faith.	   Charismatic	   breaks	  with	   social	   class	   and	   caste	   privilege	   are	   regularly	  
possible’.77	   Faith	   structures	   for	   Nelson	   laid	   the	   basis	   for	   universal	   participation	   and	   total	  
rationalization	  or	  modernity.	  
	  
In	   the	   Christian	   world	   total	   rationalization	   occurred	   when	   acute	   disagreements	   about	   the	  
central	  rationales	  concerning	  action,	  belief	  and	  opinion	  resulted	  in	  a	  ‘crisis	  of	  faith’.	  For	  Nelson,	  
such	  an	   ‘axial	   shift’	   towards	   a	   comprehensive	   rationalization	   took	  place	   in	  Western	  Europe	   in	  
                                                
70	  Durkheim	  &	  Mauss.	  1971.	  p.812	  
71	  Nielsen.	  1999.	  P.13-­‐16	  
72	  Nelson.	  1981.	  P.84	  
73	  Ibid.	  ch.2	  
74	  Ibid.	  p.80,	  92.	  
75	  Ibid.	  p.93	  
76	  Ibid.	  p.95	  
77	  Ibid.	  p.96	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the	  12th	  –	  13th	  centuries.78	  The	  problem	  is	  however	  that	  this	   is	   just	  one	  way,	  not	  the	  way	  as	   is	  
assumed	  by	  the	  academy.	  In	  the	  European	  case	  over	  centuries	  modernity	  gestated	  until	  finally	  
there	  was	   a	   ‘maximum	   rationalization	   of	   intelligence’	  which	   required	   ‘substantial	   numbers	   of	  
persons	  be[ing]	  legally	  empowered	  and	  psychologically	  disposed	  to	  carry	  on	  mental	  production	  
at	   the	   highest	   level	   of	   operation	  without	   being	   called	   to	   a	   halt	   by	   disabling	   private	   or	   public	  
inhibitions	   or	   barriers’.79	   It	   required	   individuals	   to	   transcend	   the	   ‘particularistic	   restraints	   of	  
family,	  kin,	  caste	  and	  class	  and	  allow	  their	  minds	  to	  wander	  within	  ‘neutral	  zones’	  provided	  by	  
institutions	  free	  from	  political	  and	  religious	  dictate’.80	  This	  is	  just	  a	  typology,	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  
comprehensive	  classificatory	  device	  and	  ‘for	  it	  to	  have	  wider	  applicability	  beyond	  the	  questions	  
discussed	   by	   Nelson,	   it	   requires	   considerable	   conceptual	   differentiation	   and	   historical	  
specification’.81	  	  
	  
Another	   advantage	   is	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   is	   that	   it	   is	   realisable	   since	   the	   object	   is	   actual	  
manifestations	  of	  the	  structures	  of	  consciousness	  which	  constitute	  historical	  ‘phenomenologies’	  
of	   experience	   and	   expression.82	   The	   typology	   implies	   a	   concrete	   research	   program	   found	  
especially	   in	   the	   study	   of	   historical	   individuals.	   Nelson	   himself	   focused	   on	   major	   European	  
historical	   figures.	   Such	   an	   approach	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   avoiding	   the	   false	   choice	   between	  
‘macro’	   and	   ‘micro’	   analysis.	   The	   ‘macro’	   concept	   of	   civilizational	   complexes	   points	   to	   the	  
highest	  level	  categories	  constituting	  the	  structures	  of	  consciousness	  of	  civilizations,	  but	  they	  are	  
experienced	  and	  put	   to	  work	  by	   individuals	   in	   real	   ‘micro’	   situations	  and	  predicaments	  where	  
conduct,	  opinion,	  thought	  and	   imagination	  take	  place.	  This	  emphasis	  on	   individual	  experience,	  
consciousness	   and	   forms	   of	   expression	   provides	   a	   particularly	   valuable	   entry	   point	   into	   the	  
concrete	  study	  of	  such	  civilizational	  processes.	  
	  
Though	  focused	  on	  the	  advancement	  of	  rationalization	  processes	  in	  the	  West,	  Nelson	  deals	  with	  
an	  equally	  strong	  concern	  with	  the	  precariousness	  of	  civilizational	  patterns.83	  Nelson	  dismissed	  
                                                
78	  Ibid.	  p.99.	  Axial	  Age	  civilizations	  are	  those	  that	  developed	  independently	  of	  each	  other.	  See.	  Jaspers.	  
1953.	  
79	  Ibid.	  p.184,	  187	  
80	  Nielsen.	  Sept.	  2001.	  p.409	  
81	  Ibid.	  p.	  410	  
82	  Nelson.	  1981.	  p.203-­‐5	  
83	  Ibid.	  p.8-­‐9	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the	   notion	   of	   fixed	   and	   irreversible	   historical	   stages	   as	   ‘unhistorical’.84	   It	   is	   possible	   for	  
‘regressions’	  to	  occur	  from	  one	  type	  to	  another.85	  There	  can	  occur	  the	  selective	  development	  in	  
‘segmental’	   form	   of	   ‘modernizing’,	   rationalizing	   enclaves	   within	   fundamentally	   ‘traditional’	  
societies	   as	   they	   encounter	   modern	   ones.86	   Yet,	   the	   means	   in	   which	   these	   changes	   were	  
imagined	  were	  a	  product	  of	  assuming	   that	   the	   rationality	  of	  modernity	  originated	   in	  only	  one	  
place.	  It	  led	  to,	  as	  Nielsen	  notes:	  	  
‘Weber’s	  way	  of	  posing	  his	  questions,	  asking	  why	  in	  one	  civilization	  (the	  ‘West’)	  
cultural	  developments	  of	   ‘universal	   significance	  and	  value’	   emerged	  which	  did	  
not	   occur	   independently	   elsewhere.87	   This	   form	   of	   question	   has	   particularly	  
unhappy	  consequences.	  Indeed,	  Nelson	  is	  not	  entirely	  free	  from	  this	  tendency.	  
It	   too	   easily	   becomes	   a	   study	   of	   the	   ‘success’	   and	   (especially)	   the	   ‘failure’	   of	  
civilizations	   in	   the	   gestation	   of	   particular	   cultural	   forms	   (for	   example,	  modern	  
science)	  abstracted	  from	  universal	  history.	  It	  obscures	  a	  more	  central	  question:	  
what	   structures,	   histories	   and	   experiences	   did	   actually	   occur	   in	   different	  
civilizations?’88	  
	  
What	  is	  therefore	  required	  is	  an	  Eisenstadt-­‐type	  deep	  investigation	  into	  the	  structures,	  histories	  
and	  experiences	  of	  a	  non-­‐Western	  civilization.	  ‘To	  get	  at	  this	  problem,	  we	  must	  disaggregate	  the	  
ideas,	   images	   and	   categories	   embedded	   in	   various	   sacro-­‐magical	   structures	   and	   study	   their	  
histories,	   including	   their	   relationships	   to	   later	   possible	   developments	   with	   the	   core	   sacro-­‐
magical	  structure.’89	  Only	  by	  doing	  this	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  has	  already	  been	  done	  for	  Europe	  
can	  one	  begin	  to	  ascertain	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  modernity,	  check	  its	  uniqueness	  and	  perhaps	  even	  
posit	  that	  the	  flow	  was	  not	  from	  West	  to	  East	  but	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  
	  
Nelson	   provides	   a	  method	   of	   capturing	   these	   flows.	   As	  Nelson	   notes,	   the	   emergence	   of	   faith	  
structures	  is	  already	  a	  ‘pre-­‐monition	  of	  the	  next	  phase’:	  that	  is,	  the	  rational	  examination	  of	  the	  
contents	  of	   faith	  through	  the	  development	  of	  a	  prime	  science	  of	   theology.90	  But	  how	  was	  this	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  Ibid.	  1981.	  p.91	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  p.97	  
86	  Nelson	  1981.	  p.	  102-­‐5.	  
87	  Weber.	  1958.	  pp.	  13-­‐31.	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  Sociology	  vol.16,	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  Ibid.	  p.412	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  Nelson.	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Page	  28	  of	  227 
 
done?	   And	   even	  more	   fundamental,	   how	   did	   local	   faith	   structures	   structure	   the	   examination	  
and	   how	   did	   foreign	   ‘prime	   science’	   affect	   the	   examination?	   Nelson	   argues	   that	   the	   various	  
‘Axial	  Age’	  cultures	  developed	  universalising	  and	  rationalising	  outlooks	  to	  varying	  degrees	  and	  in	  
different	   ways.91	   He	   also	   notes	   that	   the	   intracivilizational	   adaptation	   of	   Greek,	   Roman,	   and	  
Jewish-­‐Christian	   ideas	   in	   later	   European	   history	   contributed	   to	   Europe’s	   subsequent	  
development	  of	  fully	  rationalized	  civilizational	  structures.92	  But	  these	  later	  adaptations	  assume	  
the	   prior	   partial	   rationalization	   of	   specific	   cultural	   spheres	   in	   these	   ancient	   civilizations.	   We	  
need	   to	   understand	   these	   rationalizing	   segments	   emerging	   in	   ancient	   civilizations	   after	   their	  
initial	   breakthroughs	   into	   their	   ‘axial’	   formations.93	  Once	   again,	   it	   requires	   a	   return	   to	   a	   deep	  
study	  of	  the	  histories	  of	  particular	  ideas,	  images	  and	  rationales.	  	  
	  
Local	  ‘logics’	  for	  ‘local’	  practices	  and	  encounters	  
	  
A	  deep	  study	  of	  non-­‐Western	   ideas,	   images	  and	  rationales	  would	  be	  undermined	   if	   they	  were	  
interpreted	   according	   to	   the	  Western	   canon.	   To	   do	   so	  would	   simply	   reproduce	   the	   view	   that	  
modernity	   (regardless	   of	   the	   guises	   it	   takes	   on)	   is	   ‘animated	   by	   a	   single	   principle.’94	   Such	   an	  
approach	  does	  not	  discount	   intermingling	  only	   that	   it	   recognises	   that	   there	  are	   local	   logics	   at	  
play	   during	   the	   process	   of	   contact	   with	   European	   modernity.	   Hesitant	   first	   steps	   towards	  
allowing	  the	  non-­‐Western	  lay	  person,	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  their	  everyday	  culture	  to	  serve	  as	  
an	  authoritative	  source.	  Anthropologists,	  since	  they	  make	  a	  fetish	  of	  going	  into	  the	  Third	  World,	  
have	   done	   so.	   They	   even	   make	   non-­‐western	   intellectuals	   the	   object	   of	   study.	   What	   they	  
resolutely	  will	  not	  do	   is	   this.	  Social	   scientists	  will	  always	  analyse	  non-­‐Western	  thru	  the	   lens	  of	  
authoritative	  Westerners.	  Essentially,	  social	  scientists	  overlook	  the	  literate,	  high	  cultures	  of	  the	  
places	   they	   study.	   This	   is	   especially	   relevant	   to	   the	   study	   of	   diplomatic	   practice	   because	   the	  
entire	  society	   is	   ‘high	  culture’	  and	   infused	  with	  a	  particular	  cultural	   repertoire	  developed	  over	  
time.	  Uncovering	   the	   ‘inherited	  conceptions’	  and	   ‘symbolic	   forms’	   is	  not	  enough.	  What	   is	  also	  
required	  is	  to	  take	  them	  on	  their	  terms.	  To	  understand	  the	  rationale	  underpinning	  actions	  in	  a	  
particular	  context.	  In	  short,	  while	  the	  anthropologist	  allows	  the	  lay	  individual	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  
authority	   and	   to	   challenge	   the	   reader	   but	   always	   thru	   a	   patina	   of	   Western	   theory.	   Social	  
                                                
91	  Nelson	  1981.	  p.11	  
92	  Nelson	  1981.	  p.98	  
93	  Eisenstadt.	  1986	  
94	  Kaviraj.	  P.137	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scientists	   engage	   the	   ordinary	   but	   never	   adopt	   the	   frameworks	   that	   they	   use,	   i.e.,	   the	  
intellectuals	  of	  the	  non-­‐West.95	  
	  
This	  resistance	  to	  engage	  prestigious,	   literate	  non-­‐Westerns	  seriously,	  as	  capable	  of	  producing	  
theory	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   disqualification	   of	   people	   who	   produce	   the	   analytic	   categories	   of	  
ordinary	   people,	   the	   ones	   anthropologists	   patronizingly	   claim	   to	   be	   retrieving.96	   What	   is	  
required	   is	   to	   conduct	   research	   on	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   researched.	   To	   allow	   them	   their	  
authoritative	   sources,	   to	   develop	   what	   Haliburton,	   calls	   ‘authoritative	   sources.’	   He	   means	  
philosophers	  and	  social	  analysts	  whose	  ideas	  social	  scientists	  adopt,	  whose	  words	  are	  quoted	  to	  
help	  make	  sense	  of	  some	  object	  of	  study.	  Authoritative	  sources	  provide	  the	  principle	  theoretical	  
insights	  that	  guide	  the	  work	  and	  draw	  meaning	  out	  of	  the	  ethnographic	  material	  used.	  In	  other	  
words,	   they	   teach	   the	   audience	   something	   about	   a	   truly	   different	   world	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	  
authoritative	   sources	   is	   not	   to	   establish	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   work	   being	   performed	   but	   rather	  
introducing	  a	  quote	  or	  a	  set	  of	  insights,	  using	  the	  words	  of	  the	  authority	  as	  an	  originary	  point	  in	  
the	  work’s	  interpretive	  endeavours.	  
	  
The	   last	   shibboleth	   of	   civilizational	   analysis	   which,	   arising	   from	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   originary	  
Western	  modernity,	  has	  to	  be	  discarded	  because	  of	  the	  possibilities	  it	  closes	  off.	  It	  is	  the	  notion	  
of	   ‘master’,	   ‘hybridity’	   and	   ‘cross-­‐contamination’	   forwarded	   by	   Delanty.97	   These	   three	   terms	  
might	  have	  marked	  the	  displacement	  of	  civilization	   in	   the	  singular	  by	  civilizations	   in	   the	  plural	  
(as	  put	   forward	  by	  Nelson’s	  notion	  of	  encounters)	  but	  there	  remains	   in	  them	  an	  aroma	  of	  the	  
Weberian	   question	   of	   ‘universal	   significance	   and	   value.’	   In	   terms	   of	   IR,	   though	   Bull	   does	   not	  
explicitly	  say	  so,	  his	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘cosmopolitan	  culture’	  and	  it	  being	  predominantly	  Western	  rides	  
on	  this	  limiting	  view	  of	  an	  expanding	  and	  all-­‐consuming	  Western	  culture.	  
	  
These	   notions	   are	   limiting	   because	   they	   are	   founded	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘authenticity’.	   Master	  
suggests	   as	   its	   opposite	   the	   novice,	   hybrid	  means	   the	   coming	   together	   of	   two	  masters	  while	  
cross-­‐contamination	   indicates	   the	   unselfconscious	   coming	   together	   of	   two	   masters.	   The	  
underpinning	   notion	   of	   purity	   can	   be	   contested	   on	  many	   grounds	   but	   for	   this	   project	   is	   self-­‐
defeating	   because	   it	   assumes	   ‘alienation’	   between	   two,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   pure	  masters	   who	  
                                                
95	  Halliburton.	  Autumn	  2004.	  P.793-­‐817	  
96	  For	  instance	  Subaltern	  Studies.	  
97	  Delanty.	  2006.	  P.45-­‐46	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engage	  each	  other.	  It	  is	  a	  return	  to	  Der	  Derian	  and	  his	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘other’.	  Diplomacy,	  in	  such	  
an	   understanding	   of	   interactions	   is	   rendered,	   once	   again,	   the	   transactions	   between	   two	  
essentialist,	   pure,	   and	   opposing,	   forms.	   Such	   an	   understanding	   renders	   meaningless	   Cox’s	  
suggestion	   that	   civilizations	   evolve	   gradually	   and	   are	   forever	   changing,	   in	   response	   to	   their	  
internal	  pluralism	  and	  international	  encounters.98	  
	  
Despite	   the	   falsehood	   of	   ‘purity’	   which	   underpins	   ‘hybridity’,	   it	   nonetheless	   continues	   to	   be	  
deployed	  eagerly	   in	   cultural	   studies	   today.99	   This	  despite	   the	  decline	   in	   respectability	  of	   racial	  
theories:	  the	  term	  was	  first	  used	  by	  physical	  anthropologists	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  keen	  to	  
describe	   ‘mixture’	   of	   ‘pure	   races’	   as	   inferior,	  mongrelised	   ‘hybrids’.100	   Bakhtin	  was	  one	  of	   the	  
first	   to	   transpose	   the	   term	   from	   biology	   to	   culture	   by	   describing	   the	   ‘mixture’	   of	   two	   social	  
languages	   as	   ‘hybridisation’.	   The	   linguist	   Whinnon	   similarly	   argued	   in	   1971	   that	   is	   was	  
satisfactory	   because	   ‘the	   biological	   and	   linguistic	   processes	   of	   hybridisation	   are	   closely	  
comparable	   if	   not	  mechanically	   identical.’101	   Such	  deliberate	  parallels	   are	  not	   surprising,	   since	  
the	   fields	   of	   biology	   and	   linguistics	   have	   overlapped	   ever	   since	   their	   appearance	   in	   the	  
nineteenth	  century:	  race	  and	  language	  were	  virtually	  synonymous	  in	  Darwin’s	  time,	  for	  instance	  
in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘Aryan’.102	  Despite	  the	  decline	  in	  respectability	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘hybridity’	  
first	  in	  biology	  and	  now	  in	  linguistics,	  not	  a	  few	  practitioners	  of	  cultural	  studies	  have	  resorted	  to	  
it	   to	   perpetuate	   essentialist	   understandings	   of	   human	   interaction.	   ‘Hybridity’	   continues	   to	  
replicate	  simple	  binary	  opposites	  and,	  more	  importantly	  rides	  roughshod	  over	  the	  perspectives	  
of	  historical	  agents,	  who	  did	  not	  necessarily	  see	  a	  clash	  in	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  different	  objects.	  	  
	  
The	  final	  term	  ‘cross-­‐contamination’	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘acculturation’,	  used	  to	  portray	  
the	   changes	   induced	   by	   ‘globalisation’.	   Social	   scientists	   critical	   of	   the	   ‘intrusion	   of	   the	  West’	  
have	   interpreted	   the	   global	   circulation	   of	   ideas	   and	   commodities	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   market	  
system	   with	   no	   regard	   for	   local	   needs.	   Latouche	   argues	   that	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   West	   to	   world	  
domination	   has	   brought	   widespread	   social,	   cultural	   and	   material	   destruction,	   as	   ‘oppressed	  
people’	   reject	   Eurocentric	  modes	   of	   development:	   globalisation	   has	   led	   to	   acculturation,	   as	   a	  
                                                
98	  Cox	  2000.	  P.217,	  220	  
99	  Young.	  1995.	  
100	  Duvernay-­‐Bolens.	  Jan-­‐March	  1993.,	  pp.144-­‐52;	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  recent	  uses	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
hybridity	  see	  Kapchan	  &	  Strong.	  1999.	  pp.239-­‐53.	  
101	  Whinnom.	  1971.	  p.91	  
102	  For	  a	  study	  of	  the	  links	  between	  racial	  theory	  and	  the	  study	  of	  languages	  see	  Hutton.	  1999.	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stable,	   tradition	   bound	   regime	   of	   production	   is	   followed	   by	   a	   disoriented	   response	   to	   a	   new	  
global	  mode	  of	  production.103	  ‘Traditional	  Russia’,	  argues	  von	  Laue,	  was	  destroyed	  by	  imported	  
gadgets,	  whether	  grand	  pianos	  or	  fine	  liquors.104	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  global	  economy	  of	  ideas	  leads	  
to	   the	   inevitable	   destruction	   of	   local	   identities,	   as	   a	   homogenised	   culture	   ruthlessly	   displaces	  
previously	  autonomous	  cultural	  experiences	  in	  its	  subjugation	  of	  the	  world,	  has	  appeal	  for	  those	  
–	   such	   as	  Bull	   –	  who	  mistake	   globalisation	  with	  Westernisation.	  But	   local	   people	  have	   always	  
creatively	   incorporated	   products,	   institutions	   and	   social	   forms	   for	   purposes	   other	   than	   those	  
intended	  by	  their	  producers,	  as	  Errington	  and	  Gewertz	  demonstrate	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Papua	  New	  
Guinea.105	  Sahlins	  too	  notes	  that	  local	  culture	  does	  not	  necessarily	  disappear	  under	  the	  impact	  
of	  rapid	  change,	  as	  global	  homogeneity	  and	  local	  differentiation	  develop	  together:	  he	  refers	  to	  
this	  process	  as	  the	  ‘indigenisation	  of	  modernity’	  a	  vision	  articulated	  around	  the	  arresting	  image	  
of	   lokua,	   small	   fish	   living	   in	   reef	   ponds	   cut	   off	   from	   the	   sea	   at	   tidal	   lows	   but	   periodically	  
replenished	  by	  ocean	  waters.106	  
	  
Using	  ‘hybridization’	  and	  ‘cross-­‐contamination’	  to	  ascertain	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  ‘minimal	  degree	  
of	  coherence’	  or	  the	  ‘transcivilizational	  bridges’	  which	  undermine	  the	  coherence	  however	  is	  to	  
reinforce	  the	  notion	  that	  diplomacy	  is	  nothing	  but	  contact	  across	  alienated	  ‘others’.	  Using	  such	  
a	   paradigm	   to	   investigate	   non-­‐Western	   diplomacy	   is	   to	   fall	   back	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   the	   ‘other’,	  
defeats	   the	  notion	  of	  a	   radically	  different	  metaphysic	  which	  does	  not	   recognise	   the	  self/other	  
divide	   and	   precludes	   the	   option	   of	   a	   unified	   cosmos,	   or	   the	   negation	   of	   ‘alienation’	   in	  
philosophical	  terms.	  
	  
Instead	   the	  concept	  of	  appropriation	   is	   a	  more	  useful	   tool	   to	  account	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
particular	   modernity.	   Appropriation	   assumes	   ordinary	   people	   operate	   from	   within	   a	   social	  
universe	   in	  which	  things	  are	  used	  and	  circulated	   in	  culturally	  specific	  ways.	  Cultural	  modernity	  
was	  not	  a	  set	  of	  givens	  imposed	  but	  a	  repertoire	  of	  new	  opportunities.	  A	  kit	  of	  tools	  which	  could	  
be	   flexibly	   appropriated	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   imaginative	  ways	   and	   crucially	   a	   kit	  which	   could	   have	  
been	  adopted	  by	  the	  West.	  The	  local,	  in	  this	  process	  of	  cultural	  bricolage,	  was	  transformed	  just	  
as	  much	  as	   the	   global	  was	   inflected	   to	   adjust	   to	   existing	   conditions:	   inculturation	   rather	   than	  
                                                
103	  Latouche.	  1995;	  see	  also	  Spybey.	  1995.	  
104	  von	  Laue.	  1987.	  pp.43-­‐5.	  
105	  Errington	  &	  Gewertz.	  March	  1996.	  pp.114-­‐26;	  See	  also	  Miller.	  1994.	  
106	  Sahlins.	  2000.	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acculturation	  accounts	  for	  the	  broad	  cultural	  and	  material	  changes	  which	  marks	  the	  operation	  
of	  diplomacy.	  
	  
A	   critique	   of	   the	   fictions	   of	   ‘authenticity’,	   ‘hybridity’	   and	   ‘acculturation’	   thus	   leads	   us	   to	  
emphasise	   instead	   the	   circulation	   of	   practices	   between	   civilizations	   and	   their	   creative	  
appropriation	  by	  users	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  rapidly	  changing	  social	  contexts.	  As	  Appiah	  has	  observed,	  
there	  is	  no	  fully	  autochthonous,	  echt-­‐African	  culture	  awaiting	  salvage,	  and	  the	  postulation	  of	  a	  
binary	   opposition	   between	   a	   unitary	   Africa	   against	   a	   monolithic	   ‘West’	   is	   the	   last	   of	   the	  
shibboleths	  of	  the	  modernisers	  that	  we	  should	  learn	  to	  live	  without.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  a	  sculpture	  
representing	   a	   Yoruba	  man	  with	   a	   bicycle,	  which	   he	   uses	   to	   explore	   how	  pan-­‐Africanism	   and	  
postmodernist	   theory	   have	   failed	   to	   come	   to	   terms	  with	   cultural	   bricolage	   and	   the	   ceaseless	  
circulation	  of	   cultures,	  he	  underlines	   that	   the	  African	  artist	  who	  carved	   it	   cared	   little	   that	   the	  
bicycle	  was	   the	  white	  man’s	   invention:	   ‘It	   is	   there	  because	  someone	  cared	   for	   its	  solidity;	   it	   is	  
there	  because	  it	  will	  take	  us	  further	  than	  our	  feet	  will	  take	  us;	  it	  is	  there	  because	  machines	  are	  
now	   as	   African	   as	   novelists	   –	   and	   as	   fabricated	   as	   the	   kingdom	   of	   Nakem.’107	  What	   such	   an	  
approach	  opens	  up	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  universal	  notion	  of	  pragmatic-­‐practicalism	  which	  while	  
it	  underpins	  the	  transmission	  of	  goods	  and	   ideas	  cannot	  explain	  to	  what	  uses	  they	  are	  put	  to.	  
For	  that	  what	  is	  required	  is	  to	  return	  to	  the	  local	  logics	  produced	  by	  accumulated	  experience	  in	  




Why	  use	  Nietzsche	  –	  a	  European	  philosopher	  –	  and	  his	  method	  of	  genealogy	  to	  analyse	  the	  non-­‐
Western	  world?	   In	   seeking	   to	   answer	   this	   question,	   this	   section	   outlines	   the	  main	   aspects	   of	  
Nietzsche’s	   genealogical	   approach	   to	   demonstrate	   its	   fit	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   civilizations.108	  
Nietzsche’s	   method	   is	   useful	   in	   a	   world	   of	   civilizations	   constantly	   undergoing	   change	   thru	  
cultural	  bricolage	   for	   four	   reasons.	  First,	  a	  genealogy	   is	   focused	  on	   the	  present.109	  Secondly,	  a	  
genealogy	   does	   not	   just	   present	   a	   history	   of	   now	  but	   also	   critiques	   it	   by	  making	   the	   obvious	  
contingent	  thereby	  expanding	  the	  boundaries	  of	  knowledge.	  Thirdly,	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  moments	  
                                                
107	  Ibid.,	  p.157	  
108	  Cox.	  2001;	  Mazlissh.	  2004;	  Mozaffari.	  2002.	  
109	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  project	  the	  idea	  of	  inventing	  diplomacy.	  See	  Acharya	  &	  Buzan.	  2007.	  p.287-­‐312;	  
Behera.	  2007.	  p.341-­‐368.	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of	  manoeuvre	   and	   is	   therefore	   particularly	   suited	   to	   the	   in-­‐depth	   historical	   analysis	   over	   the	  
longue	   durée	   required	   by	   civilizational	   analysis.	   Finally,	   a	   genealogy	   readily	   acknowledges	   its	  
location	  in	  a	  stream	  of	  intellectualising.	  
	  
Nietzsche’s	   Towards	   a	   Genealogy	   of	   Morals	   is	   the	   text	   which	   dealt	   with	   genealogy.	   While	  
Nietzsche	   never	   described	   anything	   approximating	   a	   ‘genealogical	   approach’	   and	   he	   innately	  
abhorred	   systems	   –	   ‘I	   mistrust	   all	   systematizers	   and	   avoid	   them’110	   –	   his	   writings	   provide	   a	  
means	   to	   map	   a	   genealogical	   approach.	   The	   task	   of	   outlining	   a	   genealogical	   method	   is	  
complicated	  by	  Nietzsche	  not	  offering	  any	  specific	  definition	  of	  genealogy.	  In	  fact	  he	  noted	  ‘only	  
that	   which	   has	   no	   history	   is	   definable’.111	   Furthermore,	   Nietzsche’s	   genealogical	   approach	  
insists,	  from	  the	  outset,	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  allowing	  for	  a	  plurality	  of	  appropriations.	  Nothing,	  in	  
other	   words,	   would	   contradict	   the	   intentions	   of	   the	   genealogist	  more,	   than	   to	   attach	   only	   a	  
single	   meaning	   to	   the	   term	   ‘genealogical’.	   Nor	   do	   the	   various	   aspects	   of	   the	   genealogical	  
approach	   form	   a	   coherent,	   harmonious	   and	   parsimonious	   whole;	   rather,	   there	   is	   often	   a	  
creative	   and	   productive	   tension	   between	   its	   various	   constituent	   components.	   Despite	   these	  
tensions,	  however,	  there	  are	  at	   least	  four	  aspects	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  work	  that	  broadly	  outline	  the	  
main	  attributes	  of	  his	  approach	  and	  that	  have	  subsequently	  inspired	  other,	  similar	  studies.112	  
	  
In	  the	  first	   instance,	  genealogy	   is	  a	  specific	   type	  of	  historical	   inquiry.	  Nietzsche’s	  Genealogy	  of	  
Morals,	   for	   example,	   turned	   quite	   explicitly	   towards	   the	   history	   of	   morals	   in	   Europe.	   Yet,	   a	  
genealogy	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  ordinary	  history,	  if	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing.	  For,	  a	  genealogy	  is	  primarily	  
concerned	  with	  providing	  a	  history	  of	   the	  present	   rather	   than	  a	  history	  of	   the	  past.113	   Instead	  
‘writing	   a	   history	   of	   the	   past	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   present’,114	   or	   even	   in	   terms	   of	   some	   idealised	  
future,	  a	  genealogy	  serves	  to	  illuminate	  the	  present	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  past.115	  Indeed,	  
as	  Jens	  Bartelson	  notes	  in	  his	  study	  of	  sovereignty,	  ‘a	  genealogy	  has	  not	  as	  its	  task	  to	  tell	  what	  
                                                
110	  Nietsche.	  1968.	  See	  also	  Saurette.	  1996.	  
111	  Nietzsche.	  1967.	  II,	  §13,	  80.	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  to	  insist	  that	  definitions	  are	  irrelevant,	  but	  rather	  
that	  they	  always	  already	  entail	  ‘an	  enormous	  sphere	  of	  human	  evaluations’.	  See	  Shinoda.	  1998.	  P.	  13.	  
112	  Foucault,	  for	  example,	  once	  noted	  that	  ‘[i]f	  I	  wanted	  to	  be	  pretentious,	  I	  would	  use	  “The	  Genealogy	  of	  
Morals”	  as	  the	  general	  title	  of	  what	  I	  am	  doing’.	  Foucault.	  1980.	  P.	  53.	  See	  also	  Schrift.	  1995;	  and	  Mahon.	  
1992.	  For	  some	  examples	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  International	  Relations,	  see	  Der	  Derian.	  1987;	  Ashley.	  
1987;	  Smith.	  1995;	  and	  Bartelson.	  1995.	  
113	  See	  Foucault.	  1979.	  P.	  31.	  
114	  Ibid.,	  31.	  
115	  Bartelson,	  p.7.	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actually	  happened	   in	   the	  past	   ,	   but	   to	  describe	  how	   the	  present	  became	   logically	  possible’.116	  
The	  first	  characteristic	  of	  a	  genealogical	  approach	  then	  is	  that	   it	   is	  a	  historical	  study	  that	  turns	  
towards	  the	  past,	  not	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  past,	  but	   in	  order	  to	  explain	  something	  that	  remains	  
problematic	  or	  unknown	  today.	  It	  is,	  in	  short,	  a	  history	  of	  how	  we	  have	  become	  what	  we	  are.117	  
	  
Secondly	  and	  closely	  related	  to	  this	  first	  point,	  a	  genealogy	  is	  also	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  present.	  As	  
Owen	  observes,	  in	  the	  Nietzschean	  usage	  a	  genealogy	  aims	  at	  ‘providing	  a	  history	  of	  the	  present	  
in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  critical	  reflection	  on	  the	  present’.118	  It	  is	  critical	  in	  the	  broader	  Coxian	  sense,	  
rather	  than	  the	  narrower	  Habermasian	  one,	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  simply	  take	  the	  prevailing	  order	  
for	   granted	  but	   rather	   seeks	   to	   inquire	   into	  how	   this	   order	   evolved	  historically;119	   it	   is,	   in	   the	  
words	   of	   Shinoda,	   ‘a	   philology	   of	   the	   history	   of	   human	   evaluations’.120	   Much	   in	   this	   vein	  
Nietzsche	  himself	  insisted	  that:	  
‘we	  need	  a	  critique	  of	  moral	  values…and	  for	  that	  there	  is	  needed	  a	  knowledge	  
of	   the	   conditions	   and	   circumstances	   under	  which	   [morals]	   grew,	   under	  which	  
they	  evolved	  and	  changed…a	  knowledge	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  has	  never	  yet	  existed	  or	  
even	  been	  desired.’121	  
The	  point	  of	  his	  genealogy,	  in	  turn,	  was	  to	  gather	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  
critique.	  This	  critical	  perspective	  also	  serves	  to	  explain	  why	  Nietzsche	  chose	  to	  subtitle	  his	  work	  
a	  Streitschrift,	  a	  polemical	  treatise	  aimed	  at	  provoking	  controversy	  about	  the	  moral	  imagination	  
of	   modern	   Europeans.	   Later,	   Foucault	   would	   similarly	   draw	   upon	   a	   genealogical	   approach	   in	  
order	   to	   challenge	  many	   of	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   Europeans	   traditionally	   thought	   about	   power,	  
knowledge,	   sexuality,	   punishment,	   etc.	   Following	   Nietzsche’s	   earlier	   maxim	   of	   only	   attacking	  
that	   which	   is	   successful,122	   both	   Nietzsche	   and	   Foucault	   demonstrated	   how	   the	   genealogical	  
approach	  can	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  critically	  on	  some	  of	  a	  society’s	  most	  cherished	  ideals,	  
‘especially	   as	   they	   pretend	   to	   be	   compelling	   and	   absolutely	   obvious’.123	   In	   addition,	   then,	   to	  
being	  a	  history	  of	  the	  present,	  a	  genealogy	  is	  usually	  also	  a	  critical	  reflection	  on	  something	  that	  
                                                
116	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	  	  
117	  Owen.	  1994.	  P.	  163.	  
118	  Owen.	  1995.	  P.	  39.	  
119	  See	  Cox’s	  useful	  distinction	  between	  critical	  theory	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  theory.	  Cox.	  1981.	  
120	  Shinoda.	  2000.	  
121	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  §6,	  20.	  
122	  Nietzsche.	  1967.	  ‘Why	  I	  am	  So	  Wise’,	  §7,	  232.	  
123	  Blondel.	  1994.	  P.	  310.	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is	   predominant	   in	   the	   present	   –	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study,	   the	   accepted	   notion	   of	  
‘alienation’	  governing	  diplomacy.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  such	  a	  critical	  history	  of	  the	  present,	  a	  genealogical	  approach,	  thirdly,	  does	  
not	   seek	   to	   recount	   the	   entire	   history	   of	   a	   phenomenon	   from	   the	   time	   of	   its	   historical	  
emergence	   through	   to	   the	   present	   day.	   A	   genealogy	   answers	   the	   concern	   that:	   ‘In	   practical	  
terms,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  know	  what	  diplomacy	  is,	  or	  where	  it	  might	  be	  heading,	  we	  must	  know	  how	  it	  
came	   into	  being.’124	   The	   answer	   is	   episodic,	   restricted	   to	   those	  historical	   episodes	   that	   are	  of	  
decisive	   importance	   in	   seeking	   to	   understand	   a	   current	   phenomenon,	   singled	   out	   as	  
problematic.125	   To	   this	   extent,	   a	   genealogical	   investigation	   is	   also	  much	  more	   interested	   in	   a	  
phenomenon’s	  descent,	  or	  Herkunft,	  than	  in	  its	  origin	  or	  Ursprung.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  lies	  partly	  
in	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  warning	  that	   ‘the	  cause	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  a	  thing	  and	   its	  eventual	  utility…lies	  
worlds	  apart’.126	  The	  utility	  of	  a	  present	  value	  may	  be	  altogether	  different	  from	  the	  reasons	  or	  
conditions	  under	  which	  it	  first	  emerged,	  and	  a	  confusion	  of	  the	  two	  should	  be	  avoided.	   In	  this	  
vein,	   Nietzsche’s	   own	   genealogical	   study	   of	  morality	   was	   also	   partially	   directed	   against	   Rée’s	  
book,	  The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Moral	  Sensations,	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  used	  a	  social-­‐Darwinist	  perspective	  
to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  modern	   individual	  constituted	  the	  highest	  product	  of	  a	   linear,	  human	  
evolution.127	  The	  fault	  of	  this	  book,	  Nietzsche	  argued,	  was	  that	  it	  reduced	  the	  history	  of	  morality	  
to	   the	  notion	  of	   its	  utility	   in	   the	  present.128	  Nietzsche,	  however,	  wished	   to	  contest	   these	  neat	  
and	   linear	   conceptions	   that	   couched	   the	   question	   of	   morals	   exclusively	   in	   terms	   of	   utility,	  
disagreeing	   with	   the	   book	   proposition	   by	   proposition.129	   It	   is	   also	   in	   this	   same	   sense	   that	  
Foucault	  later	  echoed	  in	  his	  article	  ‘Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  History’	  that	  the	  genealogist	  ‘must	  be	  
able	   to	   recognise	   the	   events	   of	   history,	   its	   jolts,	   its	   surprises,	   its	   unsteady	   victories	   and	  
unpalatable	   defeats—the	   basis	   of	   all	   beginning	   atavisms,	   and	   heredities.’130	   Nietzsche’s	  
genealogical	  approach	  therefore	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  simply	  recount	  historical	  continuities	  leading	  
to	  the	  present,	  but	  rather	  wishes	  to	  recover	  the	  important	  ruptures,	  detours	  and	  discontinuities	  
that	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   present,	   the	   ‘accidents,	   the	   minute	   deviations—or	   conversely,	   the	  
                                                
124	  Der	  Derian.	  1987.	  p.1	  
125	  Bartelson,	  p.	  8.	  
126	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  II,	  §12,	  77.	  
127	  Ibid.,	  Preface,	  §4,	  18.	  
128	  Hoy.	  P.	  251.	  
129	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  §4,	  18.	  
130	  Foucault.	  1998.	  P.	  373.	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complete	  reversals—the	  errors,	  the	  false	  appraisals,	  and	  the	  faulty	  calculations	  that	  gave	  birth	  
to	  those	  things	  that	  continue	  to	  exist	  and	  have	  value	  for	  us’,	  as	  Foucault	  put	  it.131	  
	  
Fourthly	  and	  finally,	  the	  genealogical	  approach	  readily	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  is	  already	  situated	  in	  
a	   particular	   historical	   and	   cultural	   context.	   A	   genealogy	   is	   self-­‐consciously	   immanent.132	  
Moreover,	   it	   claims	   this	   status	   not	   only	   for	   itself	   but	   also	   for	   the	   phenomena	   it	   investigates.	  
Foucault	  emphasised	  this	  point	  with	  reference	  to	  Nietzsche	   in	  his	  aforementioned	  essay	  when	  
he	  noted	  how	  the	  genealogist:	  
‘finds	  that	  there	  is	  ‘something	  altogether	  different’	  behind	  things:	  not	  a	  timeless	  
and	   essential	   secret,	   but	   the	   secret	   that	   they	   have	   no	   essence,	   or	   that	   their	  
essence	  was	  fabricated	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  fashion	  from	  alien	  forms.	  Examining	  the	  
history	   of	   reason,	   he	   learns	   that	   it	   was	   born	   in	   an	   altogether	   ‘reasonable’	  
fashion—from	  chance.’133	  
In	  this	  sense,	  a	  genealogy	  is	  also	  an	  exercise	  in	  what	  Foucault	  calls	  an	  ‘effective	  history’;	  it	  seeks	  
to	   distance	   itself	   from	   the	   metaphysical	   assumptions	   that	   characterise	   much	   of	   traditional	  
history,	  such	  as	  the	  histories	  produced	  by	  the	  discipline.134	  Indeed,	  the	  genealogical	  ethos	  might	  
even	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   traditional	   ontologies	   in	   that,	   as	   Alexander	   Nehamas	  
explains,	  ‘[i]t	  allows	  for	  many	  alternatives,	  and	  it	  neither	  discovers	  nor	  imposes	  once	  and	  for	  all	  
a	  ready-­‐made	  reality	  because	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  indeterminate	  picture	  of	  the	  world	  provided	  by	  
the	  will-­‐to-­‐power’.135	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  a	  genealogy	  in	  the	  sense	  pioneered	  by	  Nietzsche	  is	  a	  





In	  keeping	  with	  the	  method	  of	  genealogy,	   this	  chapter	  has	   identified	  the	  state	  of	   the	  art	  of	   IR	  
and	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  a	  producer-­‐centred	  analysis	  of	  diplomacy.	  The	  enterprise	  is	  
further	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   target	   for	   analysis	   is	   non-­‐Western.	   The	   project’s	  
                                                
131	  Foucault.	  ‘Nietzsche’,	  p.	  374.	  
132	  See,	  for	  example,	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  §3,	  17	  and	  Foucault,	  ‘Nietzsche’,	  382.	  
133	  Foucault,	  ‘Nietzsche’,	  371.	  The	  reference	  is	  to	  Nietzsche.	  1982.	  §123,	  77.	  
134	  See	  Foucault,	  ‘Nietzsche’,	  379-­‐81;	  and	  Owen.	  P.	  147.	  
135	  Nehamas.	  1985.	  P.	  104.	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effectiveness	   lies	   in	   not	   only	   uncovering	   the	   practices	   but	   the	   local	   logics	   underpinning	   them	  
and	   their	   evolution	   to	   explain	   the	   world	   as	   it	   exists	   today.	   In	   terms	   of	   IR,	   diplomacy	   is	  
understood	  as	  an	  authentically	  modern	  practice	  and	  within	  the	  academy	  there	  is	  the	  conflating	  
of	  modernity	  with	  the	  West.	   In	   IR,	  Der	  Derian	   inserted	   into	  Bull’s	  historicity	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  
‘alienation’	   and	   converted	   diplomacy	   into	   the	  means	   to	   overcome	   alienation.	   This	   focus	   on	   a	  
particular	   history	   and	   example	   to	   explain	   the	   world	   produced	   in	   IR	   a	   theoretical	   abstraction	  
from	   real	   practices	   and	   opinions	   resulting	   in	   what	   Buzan	   and	   Little	   call	   the	   ‘failure	   of	   the	  
discipline’.	  	  
	  
The	   means	   to	   correct	   this	   failure	   is	   to	   invoke	   the	   tool	   of	   civilizational	   analysis.	   Eisenstadt	   is	  
invoked	  because	  he	  is	  a	  proponent	  of	  civilizational	  analysis	  as	  a	  technique	  and	  is	  also	  concerned	  
with	   the	   coming	   of	   modernity.	   However,	   Eisenstadt’s	   conclusions	   are	   ejected	   since	   Kaviraj	  
questions	  the	  feasibility	  of	  attributing	  highly	  differentiated	  processes	  to	  one	  process	  originating	  
in	   Europe.	   Kaviraj	   himself	   stops	   short	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   alternative	   births	   of	   modernity.	   In	  
addition,	  though	  Nelson,	  like	  Eisenstadt,	  ascribes	  modernity	  to	  Europe,	  the	  former	  also	  thru	  the	  
notion	   of	   intercivilizational	   encounters	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	   transmission	   between	  
civilizations.	  Tracing	  these	  meetings	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  practitioners	  in	  a	  non-­‐Western	  
civilization	  required	  two	  further	  steps.	  First,	  not	  attempting	  to	  force	  non-­‐Western	  practices	  into	  
Western	  models.	   This	   requires	   recognising	   that	   a	   non-­‐Western	   civilization	   has	   its	   own	   canon	  
which	  is	  interpreted	  and	  reinterpreted	  by	  successive	  elites	  as	  they	  encounter	  other	  civilizations.	  
Secondly,	   intercivilizational	   encounters	   cannot	   operate	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   ‘authenticity’	   in	   a	  
world	  defined	  by	  constant	  change.	  
	  
The	  project	  essentially	  aims	  to	  do	  what	  Behera	  encourages	  when	  writing:	  ‘Those	  re-­‐imagining	  IR,	  
however,	   must	   question	   the	   implicit	   yet	   ubiquitous	   usage	   of	   western	   standards	   to	   judge	  
knowledge	   produced	   through	   non-­‐western	   modes	   of	   thinking	   or	   at	   non-­‐western	   sites	   of	  
knowledge	  making.’136	  Such	  an	  enterprise	  need	  not	  be	  inexplicable	  to	  another	  civilization.	  What	  
is	   required	   is	   translation	   of	   practices	   and	   the	   logics	   underpinning	   them	   in	   relation	   to	   other	  
discourses.	  It	  is	  a	  start	  to	  creating	  the	  ‘genuine	  dialogie’	  MacIntyre	  spoke	  of.	  
	  
Ends	  
                                                
136	  Behera.	  P.360	  









What	  to	  do,	  we	  are	  like	  this	  only!	  
	  
– Indian	  diplomat	  quoting	  





A	  precursor	  to	  ‘genuine	  dialogie’	  with	  Indian	  diplomacy	  requires	  knowing	  what	  exists	  today.	  This	  
chapter	  will	   introduce	   Indian	  diplomatic	   society	  as	   it	   exists	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	   literature,	   to	  
argue	  for	  two	  possibilities	  rendered	  impossible	  by	  the	  discipline.	  One	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  modernity	  
and	   its	   practices	   could	   arise	   independently	   in	   the	   non-­‐West.	   The	   other	   is	   that	   modernity	  
requires	  analysis	   in	   terms	  of	   local	   theoretical	   frameworks.	  Yet,	   it	   is	   the	  position	  of	  authors	  on	  
diplomacy	  that	  diplomacy	  as	  an	  authentic,	  modern,	  European	  invention	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	  world,	   including	   India.	   This	  makes	   for	   a	   knot	   –	   a	   controversy	   –	  which	   the	   genealogical	  
method	  can	  undo	  because	   it	   takes	  something	  natural	   (the	  disciplinary	  position),	  demonstrates	  
(through	  empirical	  evidence)	  why	  this	  is	  highly	  unnatural	  for	  a	  given	  diplomatic	  community,	  and	  
then	  resolves	  the	  knot	  by	  exposing	  the	  historical	  roots	  of	  today’s	  practices	  and	  their	  underlying	  
notions.	   Genealogy	   thus	   renders	   what	   is	   taken	   for	   granted	   (i.e.,	   the	   position	   of	   authors	   on	  
diplomacy)	  as	  strange	  and	  unfamiliar	  –	  defamiliarized	  (ostranenie)	  –	  by	  placing	  it	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  actual	  practitioners.2	  In	  this	  it	  performs	  the	  same	  function	  as	  Tolstoy’s	  Kholstomer	  where	  the	  
artist	  estranges	  the	  everyday	  by	  presenting	  it	  from	  some	  novel	  perspective	  –	  in	  his	  case	  that	  of	  a	  
                                                
1	  The	  diplomat	  quoted	  a	  line	  from	  a	  very	  popular	  Indian	  television	  advertising	  spoof	  of	  American	  spaghetti	  
Westerns.	  It	  features	  a	  fat	  south	  Indian	  called	  Quick	  Gun	  Murugan	  in	  garish	  cowboy	  attire.	  He	  walks	  into	  a	  
kitsch	  bar	  in	  a	  hick	  town,	  orders	  a	  whisky	  and	  a	  dosa	  (a	  vegetarian	  snack),	  spews	  expletives	  and	  challenges	  
one	  and	  all	  to	  fight.	  As	  the	  spoof	  ends	  the	  punchline	  appears:	  ‘We	  are	  like	  this	  only’.	  See:	  
http://www.quickgunmurugun.com/	  	  
2	  Crawford.	  1984.	  pp.	  209-­‐219	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horse.3	   But	   genealogy	   is	   not	   just	   a	   literary	   device.4	   It	  moves	   beyond	   defamiliarization	   to	   take	  
another	  step	  –	  refamiliarization	  –	  by	  explaining	  the	  controversy	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  controversial.	  It	  
is	   a	   reconstructive	   process,	   but	   not	   to	   return	   to	   familiar	   ground.5	   The	   return	   is	   to	   a	   new	  
framework,	   required	   not	   least	   because,	   as	   Plumb	   commented,	   consensus	   about	   history	   does	  
little	  to	  further	  historical	  knowledge	  and	  consequently	  there	  is	  little	  point	  in	  accumulating	  facts	  
within	  agreed	  frameworks	  of	  knowledge.6	  What	  are	  required	  are	  new	  frameworks,	  not	  because	  
they	   are	   new	   but	   because	   the	   old	   are	   not	   the	   terms	   in	   which	   the	   practitioners	   practise	  
diplomacy.	   This	   chapter	   will	   therefore	   first	   demonstrate	   IR’s	   position	   on	   diplomacy.	   This	   will	  
then	  be	  defamiliarized	  by	  introducing	  the	  MEA	  through	  the	  people	  who	  actually	  compose	  it.	  In	  
terms	  of	   the	  diplomat	  quoted	  above,	   the	   chapter	   aims	   to	   first	   explicate	  what	   it	   is	   that	   Indian	  
diplomats	  are	  and	  then	  examine	  why	  they	  are	  ‘like	  this’.	  These	  moves	  are	  made	  to	  test	  whether	  
the	  possibilities	  decreed	  impossible	  by	  the	  discipline	  do	  exist.	  For	  now,	  the	  chapter	  will	  present	  
the	  literature	  and	  then	  Indian	  diplomatic	  reality.	  
	  
Theoretical	  understandings	  of	  non-­‐Western	  modernity	  
	  
The	  possibility	  for	  Indian	  diplomatic	  originality	  is	  according	  to	  the	  discipline	  impossible.	  At	  best	  
Indian	   diplomacy	   is	   a	   derivative	   discourse.	   This	   is	   because	   IR	   understands	   diplomacy	   to	   be	  
‘essentially	   European	   in	   its	   focus,	   its	   concepts	   and	   in	   its	   monopoly	   of	   power’.7	   The	   major	  
thinkers	   of	   diplomacy	   are	  Machiavelli,	   Guicciardini,	   Grotius,	   Richelieu,	   Wicquefort,	   Callieres,	  
Satow,	   Nicolson	   and	   Kissinger	   according	   to	   Berridge’s	  Diplomatic	   Theory	   from	  Machiavelli	   to	  
Kissinger	   from	  the	  Palgrave	  series	   ‘Studies	   in	  Diplomacy’.	   IR	  accepts	   these	  authors	  as	   seminal.	  
They	   are	   the	   classical	   thinkers	   of	   diplomacy.	   Not	   only	   are	   they	   European	   but	   Berridge	   also	  
asserts	   that	   the	  diplomacy	  of	   ‘the	  modern	  world	   system	  …	   first	   came	   into	  being	   in	   the	   Italian	  
peninsula	  and	  reached	  its	  full	  expression	  in	  Europe’.8	  As	  for	  diplomatic	  theory,	  Berridge	  says:	  ‘as	  
with	   other	   forms	   of	   theorising	   …	   diplomatic	   theory	   is	   reflective	   in	   character,	   permanently	  
indebted	  to	  historical	  reasoning,	  and	  unfailingly	  ethical	  in	  inspiration’.	  He	  adds	  that	  ‘diplomatic	  
                                                
3	  Shklovsky.	  1990.	  P.7-­‐12	  
4	  Ginzburg.	  1996.	  P.	  8-­‐28.	  
5	  Refamiliarization	  in	  this	  work	  is	  therefore	  similar	  to	  the	  proposals	  made	  by	  Miall	  &	  Kuiken.	  1994.	  See	  
also:	  Miall	  &	  Kuiken.	  2001;	  &	  Miall	  &	  Kuiken.	  2002.	  
6	  Dikotter.	  2008.	  P.1	  
7	  Anderson.	  1993;	  See	  also	  Der	  Derian	  1987;	  Berridge	  1995;	  Hamilton	  &	  Langhorne	  1995.	  
8	  Berridge.	  2001.	  P.1	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theory	  appeared	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  diplomacy	  began	  to	  assume	  its	  distinctively	  modern	  form	  
in	   the	   late	   fifteenth	   century’.9	   Explicit	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   diplomacy	   is	   an	   authentic	   Western	  
invention	  and	   that	   the	   theories	  of	  diplomacy	  arise	   from	   the	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	   in	  Western	  
Europe.	  This	  original	  European	  practice	  and	  theory	  has,	  in	  the	  main,	  remained	  unchanged	  to	  this	  
day.	   In	   the	   Dictionary	   of	   Diplomacy,	   also	   published	   by	   Palgrave,	   Berridge	   agrees	   that	   the	  
‘essence	   of	   diplomacy	   is	   unchanged’.	   It	   has	   to	   do	   ‘as	   always	  …	  with	   promoting	   and	   justifying	  
states’	  interests.’10	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   diplomacy,	   therefore,	   the	   only	   contribution	   a	   study	   of	   Indian	  
diplomacy	   can	   make	   is	   to	   describe	   the	   interests	   that	   drive	   Indian	   diplomacy	   without	   saying	  	  
anything	   about	   the	  nature	  of	   diplomacy.	   In	   short,	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   such	   an	   investigation	   to	  
make	  any	  meaningful	  claims	  about	  ‘diplomacy’	  per	  se	  because	  as	  Neumann	  puts	  it:	   ‘Like	  other	  
cultures,	  diplomacy	  does	  not	  stand	  still	   for	   its	  portrait.	  Still,	   it	   is	   true	  that	   it	  carries	  with	   it	   the	  
memory	  of	  its	  history,	  and	  that	  history	  is	  a	  Western	  history.’11	  This	  notion	  affects	  not	  just	  IR	  but	  
also	   extra-­‐IR	   theorists.	   The	  manner	   in	  which	   they	   are	  bound	   together	   can	  be	  unveiled	  by	   the	  
category	  of	  ‘modernity’.	  The	  corollary	  to	  IR’s	  declaration	  that	  this	  European	  cultural	  form	  called	  
diplomacy	  holds	  the	  world	  together	  is	  the	  proclamation	  by	  the	  theorists	  of	  modernity	  that	  non-­‐
Western	  societies,	   too,	  are	   tinged	  by	  Europe.	  The	  claim	   is	  made	   in	  works	   that	   range	   from	  the	  
overt	  to	  the	  subtle	  (relatively).	  They	  are	  all,	  however,	  held	  together	  by	  the	  notion	  that	  studying	  
the	   East	   must	   be	   premised	   on	   first	   studying	   the	   West.	   If	   alienation	   is	   the	   touchstone	   for	  
theorists	  of	  diplomacy,	  then	  its	  equivalent	  amongst	  the	  theorizers	  of	  modernity	  is	  that	  the	  West	  
is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  East.	  That	  the	  East	  today	  cannot	  be	  understood	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  
but	  only	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  West.	  In	  other	  words,	  modernity	  is	  in	  some	  way,	  shape	  or	  form,	  a	  
Western	  attribute.	  
	  
Non-­‐Western	  writers	  are	  just	  as	  liable	  to	  advance	  this	  view	  as	  Gaonkar’s	  Alternative	  Modernities	  
indicates.	   It	  begins:	   ‘to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	   ‘alternative	  modernities’	   is	  to	  admit	  that	  modernity	   is	  
inescapable	  and	  to	  desist	  from	  speculations	  about	  the	  end	  of	  modernity.	  Born	  in	  the	  West	  some	  
centuries	   ago	   under	   relatively	   specific	   socio-­‐historical	   conditions,	   modernity	   is	   now	  
                                                
9	  Ibid.	  P.2	  
10	  Berridge	  &	  James.	  2001.	  	  
11	  Neumann.	  2005.	  p.	  72	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everywhere’.	   For	  Gaonkar,	   ‘the	  West	   remains	   the	  major	   clearinghouse	  of	   global	  modernity.’12	  
He	   argues	   that:	   ‘Modernity	   has	   travelled	   from	   the	  West	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world	   not	   only	   in	  
terms	  of	   cultural	   forms,	   social	  practices,	  and	   institutional	  arrangements,	  but	  also	  as	  a	   form	  of	  
discourse	  that	  interrogates	  the	  present.’13	  There	  is	  no	  room	  in	  such	  a	  reading	  of	  modernity	  for	  
saying	  anything	  about	  modernity	  that	  is	  not	  relational	  to	  Europe.	  
	  
A	  relational	  view	  of	  modernity	  has	  other	  implications	  for	  an	  investigation	  into	  modern	  practices.	  
For	  Chakrabarty	  in	  Provincializing	  Europe	  it	  means	  that	  the	  very	  act	  of	  thinking	  about	  modernity	  
means	  having	  to	  first	  immerse	  oneself	  in	  European	  history	  and	  concepts.	  Chakrabarty	  writes:	  	  
‘The	  phenomenon	  of	  “political	  modernity”	  is	  impossible	  to	  think	  of	  anywhere	  in	  
the	  world	  without	  invoking	  certain	  categories	  and	  concepts,	  the	  genealogies	  of	  
which	   go	   deep	   into	   the	   intellectual	   and	   even	   theological	   traditions	   of	   Europe.	  
Concepts	   such	   as	   citizenship,	   the	   state,	   civil	   society,	   public	   sphere,	   human	  
rights,	   equality	  before	   the	   law,	   the	   individual,	  distinctions	  between	  public	   and	  
private,	  the	   idea	  of	  the	  subject,	  democracy,	  popular	  sovereignty,	  social	   justice,	  
scientific	   rationality,	   and	   so	   on	   all	   bear	   the	   burden	   of	   European	   thought	   and	  
history.	  One	  simply	  cannot	  think	  of	  political	  modernity	  without	  these	  and	  other	  
related	   concepts	   that	   found	   a	   climactic	   form	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   European	  
Enlightenment	  and	  the	  nineteenth	  century.’14	  	  
Later,	  in	  Habitations	  of	  modernity,	  he	  concedes	  that	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  modernity	  in	  
non-­‐European	   terms	   and	   begins	   to	   question	   the	   meanings	   of	   modernity	   in	   non-­‐Europe.	   He	  
poses	  the	  question:	  ‘How	  do	  we	  think	  about	  the	  global	  legacy	  of	  the	  European	  Enlightenment	  in	  
lands	  far	  away	  from	  Europe	  in	  geography	  or	  history?	  How	  do	  we	  envision	  or	  document	  ways	  of	  
being	  modern	  that	  will	  speak	  to	  that	  which	  is	  shared	  across	  the	  world	  as	  well	  as	  to	  that	  which	  
belongs	   to	   human	   cultural	   diversity?	   Here	   modernity	   might	   manifest	   itself	   in	   new	   and	  
unforeseen	   ways,	   but	   they	   are	   still	   related	   to	   Europe.’	   After	   all,	   Chakrabarty’s	   project	   is	   to	  
conceptualise	  ‘forms	  of	  modernity	  that	  have	  deviated	  from	  all	  canonical	  understandings	  of	  the	  
term.’15	  The	  West	  remains	  instrumental	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  non-­‐West.	  
	  
                                                
12	  Gaonkar.	  2001.	  P.	  1	  
13	  Ibid.	  p.14	  
14	  Chakrabary.	  2007.	  P.6	  
15	  Chakrabarty.	  2002.	  All	  quotes	  from	  Introduction.	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Taylor	   hesitantly	   destabilizes	   the	   sanctity	   of	   the	   West	   in	   the	   development	   of	   modernity	   by	  
proposing	   a	   ‘cultural’	   manner	   of	   understanding	   rather	   than	   an	   ‘acultural’	   perspective.	   The	  
former	  describes	  the	  transition	  to	  modernity	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  set	  of	  culture-­‐neutral	  operations.	  ‘On	  
this	  view,	  modernity	   is	  not	  specifically	  Western,	  even	  though	   it	  may	  have	  started	   in	  the	  West.	  
Instead,	  it	  is	  that	  form	  of	  life	  toward	  which	  all	  cultures	  converge,	  as	  they	  go	  through,	  one	  after	  
another,	  substantially	  the	  same	  changes.’16	  For	  Taylor,	  the	  first	  error	  is	  that	  Western	  modernity	  
is	  itself	  a	  distinctive	  ‘culture’.	  Second,	  it	  imposes	  a	  false	  uniformity	  on	  encounters	  between	  the	  
West	   and	   the	   rest.	   In	   contrast,	   cultural	   theory	   holds	   that	   modernity	   always	   unfolds	   within	  
specific	   cultural	   or	   civilizational	   contexts	   and	   that	   different	   starting	   points	   lead	   to	   different	  
outcomes.	  In	  writing	  ‘I	  want	  to	  describe	  the	  change	  as	  moving	  us	  from	  one	  dense	  constellation	  
of	  background	  understanding	  and	   imaginary	   to	  another,’17	   Taylor	  proposes	  a	   research	  agenda	  
that	  he	  performs	  in	  his	  Sources	  of	  the	  Self.	  However,	  once	  again	  Taylor’s	  modernity	  remains	  the	  
product	  of	  an	  intermingling	  of	  two	  dense	  cultures.	  
	  
This	  meeting	  of	  dense	  constellations	   is	  what	  van	  der	  Veer	  proposes	   for	   investigation.	  His	  view	  
demotes	   the	   notion	   of	   centre	   and	   periphery	   because	   modernity	   is	   produced	   by	   the	  
intermeshing	  of	  differing	  cultures.	  He	  argues	   that	   ‘national	   culture	   in	  both	   India	  and	  Britain	   is	  
developed	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  shared	  colonial	  experience’	  and	  the	  means	  of	  finding	  this	  is	  to	  adopt	  
the	   ‘interactional	   perspective’.18	   Such	   a	  method	   permits	   ‘an	   escape	   from	   the	   essentialisms	   of	  
British	   modernity	   versus	   Indian	   anti-­‐modernity	   by	   attempting	   to	   lay	   out	   fields	   of	   historical	  
interaction	   and	   encounter,	   however	   fragmentary.	   In	   fact,	   the	   fragmentary	   nature	   of	   the	  
enterprise	  is	  a	  blessing	  in	  disguise	  because	  it	  works	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  national	  history,	  which	  is	  
written	   to	   put	   fragments	   into	   a	   whole,	   signifying	   the	   nation,	   or	   else	   put	   them	   to	   oblivion.	  
Interactional	  history	  is	  precisely	  an	  attempt	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  national	  story	  and	  get	  at	  some	  of	  
the	  fragments	  without	  losing	  coherence	  in	  the	  telling	  of	  the	  tale.’19	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  story	  is	  
the	   formation	  of	  modernity	  out	  of	  mutuality.	  One	   is	  not	  possible	  without	   the	  other.	   Yet	  once	  
again,	  no	  explanation	  of	  modernity	  can	  emerge	  from	  the	  non-­‐West.	  
	  
                                                
16	  Taylor.	  Two	  Theories	  of	  Modernity.	  Public	  Culture	  11(1):	  p.153-­‐174.	  P.169	  
17	  Ibid.,	  p.	  173-­‐174	  
18	  van	  der	  Veer.	  P.3-­‐8	  
19	  Ibid.	  p.8	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For	   Nandy	   the	   explanation	   for	   this	   Western-­‐centred	   understanding	   of	   modernity	   is	   ‘history.’	  
Specifically,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  and	  the	  
West.	   These	  are	  not	  merely	  political	   forms	  –	  diplomacy	  being	  one	  and	   in	   itself	  Western	  as	   IR	  
reminds	  us	  –	  but	  also	  through	  ‘historicised	  readings	  of	  the	  past’.20	  As	  Kaviraj	  remarks,	  Nandy’s	  
The	   Intimate	  Enemy,	   ‘makes	   an	   implicit	   philosophical	   point	   about	  how	  historical	   positions	   are	  
advanced.’21	   These	  historical	   positions	   (themselves	  modern)	   about	   the	  Europeanization	  of	   the	  
non-­‐Western	  world	  are	  an	  ‘over-­‐stretched	  modernity’	  in	  itself.22	  Modern	  history	  writing	  orders	  
and	  structures	  the	  operation	  of	  modern	  societies	  regardless	  of	  location.	  This	  is	  aided	  by	  Indian	  
intellectuals	   –	   like	   the	  ones	  mentioned	  above	   –	  who	  absorbed	   colonial	   self-­‐definitions	  deeply	  
enough	  to	  reproduce	  them	   in	  their	  own	   ideas.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  West	  orders	  relations	  both	  
within	  societies	  and	  between	  them.	  In	  Nandy’s	  terms,	  ‘The	  West	  is	  now	  everywhere,	  within	  the	  
West	  and	  outside;	  in	  structures	  and	  in	  minds.’23	  
	  
The	  way	  the	   ‘West’	  has	  extended	   itself	   is	   thru	   ‘history,’	  or	   rather	  a	   linear	  conceptualization	  of	  
history.	   The	   effect	   of	   this	   history	  was	   to	   let	  Western	   ideas	   ‘percolate	   to	   the	   deepest	   level	   of	  
Hindu	   religious	   ideas	   and	   accepted	   Western	   cultural	   theories	   of	   political	   subjugation	   and	  
economic	   backwardness.’	   Nandy	   observes	   that	   the	   ‘newly	   created	   sense	   of	   linear	   history	   in	  
Hinduism	   –	   an	   internalized	   counterpart	   to	   the	   Western	   theory	   of	   progress	   –	   was	   a	   perfect	  
instrument	  …	   allowed	   one	   to	   project	   into	   history	   the	   sense	   of	   inferiority	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  an	   imperial	  
faith	  and	  to	  see	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  Hinduism	  as	  an	  ancient	  version	  of	  the	  modern	  West.”24	  This	  
imposition	  tried	  to	  replace	  an	  unselfconscious	  Hindu	  understanding	  of	  history.	  So	  Nandy	  writes	  
of:	  
‘the	  salience	  given	  by	  Indian	  culture	  to	  myth	  as	  a	  structured	  fantasy	  which,	  in	  its	  
dynamic	   of	   the	   here	   and	   now,	   represents	   what	   in	   another	   culture	   would	   be	  
called	   the	   dynamic	   of	   history.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   diachronic	   relationships	   of	  
history	   are	   mirrored	   in	   the	   synchronic	   relationship	   of	   myths	   and	   are	   fully	  
reproducible	  from	  the	  latter	  if	  the	  rules	  of	  transformation	  are	  known.25	  …	  If	  for	  
the	  West	  the	  present	  was	  a	  special	  case	  of	  an	  unfolding	  history,	  for	  traditional	  
                                                
20	  Nandy.	  2000.	  p.	  170	  
21	  Kaviraj.	  1984;	  p.136-­‐138	  
22	  Nandy.	  2000.	  p.	  167	  
23	  Nandy.	  1983.	  p.xi.	  
24	  Ibid.	  p.26.	  
25	  Ibid.	  P.56-­‐57	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India	  history	  was	  a	  special	  case	  of	  an	  all-­‐embracing	  permanent	  present,	  waiting	  
to	  be	  interpreted	  and	  reinterpreted.’26	  	  
The	   past	   for	   Indians	   was	   a	   way	   ‘of	   reaffirming	   or	   altering	   the	   present.’	   The	   past	   ‘can	   be	   an	  
authority	   but	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   authority	   is	   seen	   as	   shifting,	   amorphous	   and	   amenable	   to	  
intervention.’	  The	  reliance	  on	  myths	  by	  traditional	  Indians	  ‘allows	  access	  to	  the	  processes	  which	  
constitute	  history	  at	  the	   level	  of	  the	  here-­‐and-­‐the-­‐now.	  Consciously	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  core	  
of	  a	  culture,	  they	  widen	  instead	  of	  restricting	  human	  choices.	  They	  allow	  one	  to	  remember	  in	  an	  
anticipatory	  fashion	  and	  to	  concentrate	  on	  undoing	  aspects	  of	  the	  present	  rather	  than	  avenging	  
the	   past.’27	   In	   short,	   Nandy	   outlines	   the	   opposite	   of	   history,	   theory	   or	   philosophy,	   and	  
specifically	  a	  way	  of	  being	  which	  governs	  the	  event	  while	  transcending	  specificity.	  
	  
Sources	  of	  non-­‐Western	  modernity:	  History,	  fieldwork	  and	  de	  Certeau	  
	  
Myth	  as	  philosophy	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  philosophy-­‐of-­‐History	  is	  the	  preeminent	  possibility	  that	  IR	  
excludes.	   The	   significance	   of	   myth	   is	   that	   it	   provides	   a	   rationale	   emanating	   from	   the	   actors	  
themselves.	   It	   also	   provides	   the	   means	   of	   penetrating	   India’s	   diplomatic	   community	   today.	  
Understood	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense,	  this	   is	  the	  MEA.	  The	  means	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  object	  of	  
discovery,	  specifically	  the	  multiple	  histories	  of	  the	  MEA.	  Why	  multiple?	  The	  fieldwork	  uncovered	  
that	   not	   only	   were	   there	   discrepancies	   (to	   use	   the	   language	   of	   History)	   in	   the	  MEA’s	   official	  
history	  of	  itself	  but	  that	  this	  history	  did	  not	  match	  what	  diplomats	  said	  privately	  –	  or	  formally	  to	  
themselves.28	  The	  history	  of	  the	  MEA	  presented	  below	  can	  therefore	  be	  only	  a	  partial	  history.	  It	  
is	  the	  official	  history;	  it	  is	  the	  history	  of	  the	  MEA	  for	  itself.	  What	  is	  of	  significance	  is	  not	  History,	  
but	  the	  manner	  of	  deploying	  it.	  
	  
Early	   in	   the	  career	  of	  an	   Indian	  Foreign	  Service	  probationer	  –	  before	   formal	   confirmation	   into	  
the	  service	  as	  an	  officer	  though,	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  a	  given	  –	  there	  is	  an	  introductory	  lecture	  on	  the	  
‘evolution’	  and	  ‘organisation’	  of	  the	  Ministry.	  The	  slides	  of	  the	  lecture	  highlighting	  its	  key	  points	  
were	  made	  available	  to	  me	  and	  the	  presenter	  also	  personally	  conveyed	  the	  history	  to	  me.	  This	  
reading	  presents	  the	  MEA	  emerging	  from	  the	  ‘creation	  of	  the	  “Secret	  and	  Political	  Department”	  
                                                
26Ibid.	  P.57	  
27	  Ibid.	  P.57,	  59	  
28	  See	  Chapter	  III	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in	  1842	  to	  deal	  with	  foreign	  affairs	  during	  Warren	  Hastings’s	  period.’29	  The	  MEA’s	  website	  claims	  
a	  similar	  origin	  though	  its	  date	  of	  birth	  is	  pushed	  further	  back.	  The	  website	  states:	  
‘The	  origin	  of	   the	   Indian	  Foreign	  Service	  can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	   the	  British	   rule	  
when	   the	   Foreign	   Department	   was	   created	   to	   conduct	   business	   with	   the	  
“Foreign	   European	   Powers”.	   In	   fact	   it	   was	   on	   September	   13,	   1783,	   when	   the	  
Board	   of	   Directors	   of	   the	   East	   India	   Company	   passed	   a	   resolution	   at	   Fort	  
William,	   Calcutta	   (now	   Kolkata),	   to	   create	   a	   department,	   which	   could	   help	  
“relieve	  the	  pressure”	  on	  the	  Warren	  Hastings	  administration	   in	  conducting	   its	  
“secret	   and	   political	   business”.	   Subsequently	   known	   as	   the	   “Indian	   Foreign	  
Department”,	   it	  went	   ahead	  with	   the	   expansion	   of	   diplomatic	   representation,	  
wherever	  necessary,	  to	  protect	  British	  interests.’30	  
	  
To	  further	   investigate	  this	  history	  of	  the	  MEA,	  by	  the	  MEA	  and	  for	  the	  MEA,	   I	  approached	  the	  
MEA’s	   Historical	   Division	   for	   a	   history	   of	   itself.	   They	   provided	  me	  with	   a	   set	   of	   photocopied	  
documents	  which	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  amalgam	  of	  18th	  century	  documents.	  To	  my	  questions	  about	  
‘what	  is	  this’	  came	  the	  reply	  ‘this	  is	  what	  we	  give	  to	  someone	  who	  wants	  to	  know	  our	  history.’	  
These	  documents	  push	   the	  MEA’s	  start	  even	   further	  back	   to	  1756	  when	  a	   ‘Secret	  Committee’	  
comprising	  four	  members	  was	  formed	  and	  entrusted	  with	  conducting	  the	  political	  and	  military	  
affairs	  of	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company	  (EIC)	  in	  Bengal.	  	  
	  
Combining	  the	  documents,	  slides	  and	  MEA	  website,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  MEA	  is	  this:	  The	  Court	  of	  
Directors	   in	  London	  created	  a	   ‘Select	  Committee’	   to	  manage	  the	  rising	  threat	  of	   the	  French	   in	  
India.	  This	  took	  over	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Secret	  Committee	   in	  1757.	  Growing	  complications	   in	  
the	  operations	  of	  the	  Company	  led	  to	  a	  decision	  to	  divide	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  Select	  Committee	  
into	   two	   distinct	   departments	   -­‐-­‐	   the	   ‘Public’	   and	   the	   ‘Secret’.	   The	   latter	   conducted	   the	  
Company’s	  relations	  with	  other	  powers	  in	  India.	  The	  former	  handled	  matters	  of	  administration.	  
Both	   came	  under	   a	   Secretary.	   	   Though	   briefly	   dissolved,	   the	   Secret	  Department	   continued	   to	  
operate	  and	  in	  1783	  was	  granted	  a	  ‘Foreign’	  Department	  to	  handle	  subjects	  concerning	  foreign	  
nations	  and	  powers.	  
	  
                                                
29	  Slide	  on	  Evolution	  supplied	  by	  MEA.	  
30	  MEA	  Website.	  Accessed	  on	  20	  June	  2009.	  http://meaindia.nic.in/onmouse/ifs.htm	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In	   1786	   the	   Secret	   Department	   was	   reorganised	   into	   four	   separate	   Departments:	   Secret	   and	  
Political,	  Secret	  and	  Military,	  Secret	  and	  Foreign	  and	  the	  Secret	  Department	  of	  Reform.	  The	  next	  
significant	  changes	  came	  with	  the	  Charter	  Act	  of	  1833.	  The	  Secret	  Department	  was	  transferred	  
from	   the	  Government	  of	  Bengal	   to	   the	  Government	  of	   India.	   In	  1842	   the	   Foreign	  branch	  was	  
abolished	  and	  all	  its	  functions	  transferred	  to	  the	  Political	  branch.	  The	  transfer	  of	  the	  Company’s	  
responsibilities	   to	   the	   British	   Crown	   in	   1858	   by	   the	   Government	   of	   India	   Act	   prompted	   a	  
reorganisation	   resulting	   in	   a	   Foreign	   Department	   with	   functions	   under	   six	   headings:	   Finance,	  
General,	  Judicial,	  Military,	  Political	  and	  Revenue.	  	  
	  
The	  Department’s	  power	  spread	  as	  it	  sought	  to	  take	  control	  of	  technologies	  and	  territories.	  The	  
foremost	  technology	  was	  the	  ‘electric	  telegraph’	  which	  was	  transferred	  in	  1867	  from	  the	  Public	  
Works	  Department	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Department.	  A	  Cypher	  Branch	  was	  added	  in	  1904	  to	  deal	  with	  
communications,	   and	   in	   keeping	  with	  Mughal	   practice,	   a	   Toshakhana31	   	   was	   created	   to	   keep	  
custody	  of	  presents	  received.	   	  The	  Internal	  Branch	  was	  created	   in	  1908	  to	  manage	  ceremonial	  
functions.	   The	   Department’s	   territorial	   jurisdiction	   was	   also	   broadened	   to	   include	   the	   North	  
West	  Frontier	  Province	  –	  under	  the	  Home	  Department	  –	  in	  1863.	  However,	  settled	  areas	  such	  as	  
the	  Punjab	  and	   the	  Central	   Provinces	  were	   transferred	   from	   the	  Foreign	  Department	  as	  were	  
mundane	   administrative	   tasks	   like	   revenue	   settlement,	   agriculture	   and	   forests.	   The	   Foreign	  
Department	  began	  to	  look	  more	  like	  a	  modern	  foreign	  service	  as	  it	  divested	  itself	  of	  roles	  which	  
are	   today	   performed	   by	   a	   Home	  Ministry.	   The	   first	   indication	   of	   this	   was	   in	   1876	   when	   the	  
Foreign	   Department’s	   remit	   was	   stipulated:	   it	   would	   handle	   political	   matters,	   relations	   with	  
foreign	   states	   outside	   India,	   princely	   and	   feudatory	   states	   in	   India,	   and	   independent	   or	   semi-­‐
independent	  hill	  tribes,	  passports,	  questions	  of	  extradition	  and	  extra-­‐territorial	   jurisdiction	  and	  
administration	   of	   the	   Frontier	   districts.	   The	   Department	   took	   charge	   of	   issues	   arising	   from	  
interactions	  between	  British	  India	  and	  foreign	  states	  –	  be	  they	  Indian	  or	  extra-­‐Indian.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   these	   changes,	   the	  Department	  was	   renamed	   in	   1914	   the	   Foreign	   and	   Political	  
Department.	   It	   had	   two	  wings:	   foreign	   and	  political.	   The	   next	   evolutionary	   stage	  was	   in	   1935	  
when	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  Act	  split	  the	  Foreign	  and	  Political	  Department	  into	  the	  External	  
Affairs	  Department	  and	   the	  Political	  Department.	  The	   latter	  handled	  all	  matters	  arising	  out	  of	  
British	   India’s	   interactions	  with	   other	   local	   states.	   Later,	   the	  Commonwealth	  Department	  was	  
                                                
31	  Treasury	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also	  created	  as	  an	  addendum.	  This	  was	  the	  structure	  that	  existed	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  independence.	  
Nehru	  organised	   its	  personnel	   into	   the	   Indian	  Foreign	  Service	  and	  called	   the	  combined	  set-­‐up	  	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  External	  Affairs.	  	  
	  
As	   the	   three	   sources	   make	   clear,	   they	   posit	   the	   MEA	   firmly	   within	   the	   narrative	   of	   colonial	  
modernity,	  but,	  simultaneously,	  it	  was	  completely	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  diplomats	  claim	  as	  the	  root	  
of	   their	   diplomacy.	   A	   comment	   by	   an	   officer	   that	   reflects	   the	   views	   of	   several	   others	   in	   the	  
service	  is	  significant,	  despite	  its	  hesitant	  language:	  
‘You	   see,	  we	   are	   secular.	   So	   a	   secular	   history	   cannot	   create	   a	   timeline	   going	  
back	  further.	  We	  are	  so	  riven	  with	  all	  kinds	  of	  things	  but	  we	  are	  here.	  This	  kind	  
of	  story	  then	  becomes	  the	  best	  way	  of	  …	  you	  know	  …	  maybe	  of	  not	  causing	  any	  
problems.	   In	   any	   case	   you	   cannot	   connect	   institutionally	   the	   MEA	   to	   older	  
institutions,	  can	  you?	  So	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  an	  introduction	  it	  worked.’	  
The	   comment	   exposes	   the	   secondary	   nature	   of	   History	   to	   a	   very	   particular	   philosophy	   of	  
presentism	   for	   diplomats.	   Precision	   in	   dates	   is	   irrelevant.	   The	   history	   presented	   is,	   as	   Nandy	  
reminds	  us,	  ‘an	  authority	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  authority	  is	  shifting,	  amorphous	  and	  amenable	  
to	   intervention.’	   The	   essential	   point	   is	   that	   the	   MEA’s	   History	   is	   not	   incorrect.	   It	   does	   not	  
misrepresent.	  It	  pares	  History	  down	  for	  a	  particular	  purpose,	  surviving	  the	  present	  in	  a	  particular	  
form.	  This	  purpose	  underpins	  Indian	  diplomacy	  and	  its	  origins	  are	  not	  in	  colonial-­‐era	  institutions	  
but	   in	   the	   indigenous	  myths	  with	  which	   every	   Indian	   is	   familiar.	   The	   very	   act	   of	   paring	   down	  
History	   and	   locating	   the	  MEA	  within	   colonialism	   is	   a	   product	   of	   this	   philosophy.	   Furthermore,	  
these	   acts	   are	   also	   designed	   to	   reaffirm	   and	   deal	   with	   issues	   and	   complexes	   predating	  
colonialism.	  For	  Indians	  then,	  the	  present	  is	  not	  a	  special	  case	  of	  an	  unfolding	  history.	  Quite	  the	  
opposite.	   History	   is	   a	   special	   case	   of	   an	   all-­‐embracing	   permanent	   present	   which	   in	   turn	   is	   a	  
product	  of	  History.	   In	  short,	   there	  are	   levels	  of	  history	  each	  determined	  by	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
exercise.	  It	   is	  not	  history	  which	  dominates,	  but	  the	  present	  which	  uses	  history	  for	  its	  purposes.	  
That	  is	  not	  to	  abuse	  history	  –	  for	  no	  version	  of	  the	  MEA’s	  histories	  were	  factually	  wrong.	  As	  the	  
diplomat	  said,	  secularism	  entered	  India	  with	  the	  British	  and	  that	  is	  what	  the	  state	  puts	  forward	  
as	  policy.	  It	  is	  acceptable	  and	  correct	  only	  because	  it	  matches	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  earlier	  indigenous	  
notions	  of	  the	  presentist	  philosophy	  upon	  which	  secularism	  is	  grafted.	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Another	   possibility	   ruled	   out	   of	   court	   in	   non-­‐Western	  modernity	   is	   a	   ‘relative’	   freedom	   from	  
doctrine.	   The	   word	   ‘relative’	   is	   used	   because	   ultimately	   there	   is	   no	   escape	   from	   underlying	  
principles.	  However,	  the	  type	  of	  doctrine	  which	  animates	  Indian	  diplomats	  is	  best	  described	  as	  a	  
doctrine	   of	   anti-­‐doctrine.	   This	   is	   exposed	   at	   the	   terminal	   edges	   of	   identity	   and	   boundary	   –	  
notions	   central	   to	   a	   community	   whose	   job	   is	   to	   represent	   a	   defined	   political	   entity.	   The	  
underlying	   rationale	   for	   multiple	   identities	   and	   flexible	   boundaries	   is	   a	   practical-­‐pragmatism.	  
This	   is	   easily	   and	   incorrectly	   mistaken	   for	   duplicity	   and	   the	   fieldwork	   provides	   a	   means	   of	  
explaining	   the	   operation	   of	   these	   self-­‐perceptions.	   Since	   the	   fieldwork	   is	   atypical,	   it	   requires	  
some	  explanation.32	  
	  
A	  useful	   trope	   is	  Chakrabarty’s	  adda	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  the	  Bengali	  practice	  of	  men	  (usually)	  
gathering	   together	   in	   a	   particular	   place	   for	   directionless,	   informal	   yet	   often	   intensely	   serious	  
discussion.	  Chakrabarty	  notes	   that	  adda	   is	   inimical	   to	   ‘proper’	   European	  bourgeois	   sociability,	  
with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  male	  sociability,	  regulated	  domestic	  life	  and	  delineation	  of	  the	  world	  into	  
spheres	   of	   work	   and	   leisure.	   Yet,	   adda	   is	   also	   a	   product	   of	   Bengal’s	   own	   modernity	   having	  
arrived	   at	   its	   current	   form	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century.	  Adda	   involved	   the	   production	   of	   a	  
social	   space	  and	  a	   form	  of	   sociability	   that	   is	  neither	   ‘domestic’	   nor	   ‘public’,	   and	   so	   cannot	  be	  
assimilated	   into	   what	   he	   sees	   as	   European	   norms.	   Furthermore,	   Chakrabarty	   implies	   adda	   is	  
how	   Bengalis	   ‘get	   a	   grip	   on	   the	   modern	   world	   and	   make	   themselves	   at	   home	   in	   it.’33	   The	  
modern	   world	   being	   understood	   as	   ‘globalised	   capitalism	   now’.34	   Adda’s	   social	   value	   is	  
magnified	   to	   the	   level	   of	   providing	   a	   space	   of	   relative	   autonomy	   from	   the	   otherwise	  
deterministic	  forces	  of	  global	  capital.	  	  Calcuttans	  now	  fear	  that	  ‘a	  busy	  and	  all-­‐consuming	  ethic	  
of	  work	  might	  overtake	  their	  lives’.35	  Chakrabarty’s	  materialist	  suggestion	  is	  that	  ‘[t]he	  perceived	  
gradual	  disappearance’	  of	  adda	   is	  ‘related	  no	  doubt	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  
city’.36	   Secondly,	   though	   Chakrabarty	  wants	   to	   show	   how	  Western	  modernity	   cannot	   capture	  
the	  East	   in	  Western	   terms,	  he	  essentialises	   the	  West.	  Wilson	   critiques	  Chakrabarty	  by	  writing	  
that	  he:	  	  
                                                
32	  For	  three	  exceptions	  see:	  Neumann.	  2005;	  Hopgood.	  2006	  &	  Barnett.	  2004.	  
33	  Chakrabarty	  poses	  Berman’s	  question.	  See	  Berman.	  1988.	  p.5	  
34	  Chakrabarty.	  Provincizlising	  Europe.	  P.213	  
35	  Ibid.,.	  P.181	  
36	  Ibid.,	  P.213	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‘never	   interrogates	   how	   Bengalis	   imagine	   the	   “West”	   that	   they	   are	   so	   self-­‐
consciously	   different	   from.	   He	   never	   stops	   to	   consider	   how	   Western	  
modernity	  was	  itself	  imagined,	  consumed	  and	  reproduced	  in	  Bengal,	  both	  in	  a	  
material	  and	  discursive	  form.	  Throughout	  his	  work,	  Chakrabarty	  assumes	  that	  
Western	  “modernity”	   is	  an	  actually	  existing	  set	  of	   real,	  non-­‐discursive	  social	  
processes,	   whose	   consumption	   by	   twentieth-­‐century	   Bengalis	   was	   entirely	  
unmediated	  by	  discourse.’37	  
	  
Contrary	   to	  Chakrabarty,	  my	  addas	  were	  nowhere	   as	   complicated.	   They	  happened	  because	   it	  
was	  practical.	  People	  engaged	  me	  out	  of	  pragmatism	  –	   I	  had	   lived	  abroad,	  and	  faced	  with	  the	  
daunting	  prospect	  of	  having	  to	  go	  abroad	  they	  wanted	  to	  know	  about	  abroad.	  Addas	  were	  ideal	  
for	  exchanging	  information.	  It	  was	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  liked	  to	  conduct	  themselves	  as	  did	  I.	  
Most	  of	   the	  addas	  were	  held	   in	  my	  quarters,	  but	  a	   fair	   share	  were	  also	  held	   in	   the	  homes	  of	  
foreign	   service	  officers,	   in	  offices,	  between	  phone	  calls,	   and	  during	  visits	   from	   friends	  bearing	  
sweets	   to	   celebrate	  births	   and	  marriages	  or	   even	   to	  avoid	  distractions	   at	  weekends.	   This	  was	  
how	  questions	  were	  answered.	  The	  questions	   themselves	  were	  generated	  by	   the	  access	   I	  was	  
allowed	   to	   nearly	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	   training	   provided	   to	   officers.	   I	   was	   also	   involved	   in	   the	  
training	  –	  meeting	  a	   request	  by	  probationers	   for	   instruction	   in	  writing	   reports	   in	  English	  –	   for	  
two	  batches	  of	  entrants.	  The	  same	  pattern	  was	  followed	  during	  my	  two	  weeks	  attending	  the	  Lall	  
Bahadur	   Shastri	   Academy	   in	   Mussoori	   where	   all	   civil	   servants	   receive	   their	   primary	   training.	  
Finally,	   though	  the	  fieldwork	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  bureaucracy	   itself,	   it	  was	  not	  rigidly	   focused.	  
Interviews	  were	  also	  conducted	  with	  various	  Ministers	  including	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  and	  Prime	  
Minister.	   But	   even	   here,	   the	   process	   was	   malleable	   and	   boundaries	   flexible.	   My	   entrée	   was	  
familial	  –	  most	  of	  these	  people	  were	  family	  friends.	  	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  complexes	  Chakrabarty	  highlights,	  there	  was	  no	  question	  of	  ‘getting	  to	  grip	  with	  the	  
modern	  world’	   in	  my	  addas.	   They	  were	   the	  world,	   precisely	   because	   they	   encompassed	  both	  
work	  and	  pleasure.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  means	  of	  escaping	  from	  modernity,	  adda	   is	  the	  means	  
by	  which	  work	  is	  done	  by	  and	  between	  officials	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  Indian	  modernity:	  the	  state.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	   India	  makes	  a	  practice	  of	  meeting	  dozens	  of	  people	  every	  day,	  
asking	  questions,	  discussing	  ideas	  and	  listening	  to	  their	  views	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  subjects.	  There	  is	  
                                                
37	  Wilson.	  Autumn,	  2001.	  P.290	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no	  note-­‐keeper	  at	  these	  meetings	  but	  they	  are	  as	  much	  a	  means	  of	  discussing	  ideas	  and	  carrying	  
out	   substantial	   work,	   as	   they	   are	   about	   catching	   up	   with	   old	   friends	   and	   keeping	   his	  
constituency	  happy.	  A	  related	  myth	  is	  that	  research	  into	  the	  state	  means	  accessing	  files	  because	  
the	  rational	  state	  which	  Weber	  conjured	  is	  ordered	  and	  systematic.	  It	  is.	  But	  as	  an	  official	  said:	  
‘Why	  do	  you	  want	  to	  look	  at	  files?	  That	  will	  tell	  you	  only	  process.	  Never	  intent.’38	  
	  
Intent	   and	   its	   origins,	   i.e.,	   self-­‐perceptions	   and	   boundaries	   imagined	   and	   real,	   were	   explored	  
through	  my	  addas.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  adda	  goes	  some	  way	  in	  explaining	  perceptions.	  The	  addas	  
were	   similar	   to	   Gusterson’s	   notion	   of	   a	   polyphonic-­‐dialogue.39	   Over	   the	   14	   months	   of	   my	  
attachment	  to	  the	  MEA,	   I	  began	  with	   interviews	  and	  ended	  with	  addas.	  Though	  initially	   intent	  
on	   conducting	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   of	   one	   diplomat	   at	   a	   time,	   the	   meetings	   quickly	   became	  
jamborees.	  In	  part	  it	  was	  because	  I	  lived	  with	  nearly	  60	  diplomats	  (or	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  current	  
strength).40	  These	  officers	  ranged	  from	  the	  junior	  most	  in	  rank	  (probationer)	  to	  the	  senior	  most	  
(secretary).	  My	  addas	  were	  a	  success	  if	  the	  animated	  participation	  of	  the	  conversationalists	  is	  to	  
be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  engagement	  and	  intellectual	  commitment.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  success	  
can	  be	  explained	  by	  Harraway’s	  notion	  of	  ‘situated	  knowledge’.41	  My	  enquiries	  did	  not	  set	  out	  to	  
be	   conquests;	   they	   sparked	   lively	   verbal	   exchanges	   between	   different	   situated	   knowledges,	  
including	   the	   literature	   of	   the	   academy	   –	   introduced	   by	   me.42	   This	   method	   of	   operating	  
maintained	   the	   critical	   effect	   of	   classically	   objectivist	   writing,	   but	   it	   achieved	   it	   by	   the	   very	  
immediate	   and	   real	   juxtaposing	   of	   different	   discursive	   surfaces.	   It	   opened	   up	   spaces	   where	  
different	  perspectives	  coexisted	  and	  were	  gauged	  in	  novel	  ways,	  while	  relativizing	  the	  author’s	  
position.	   In	   short,	   there	   was	   no	   particular	   ideology	   which	   governed	   participants,	   rather	   a	  
constant	   revising	  of	   each	  other’s	  positions	   in	   constant	   interaction.	   To	  establish	   some	  order	   in	  
this	  process	  of	  constant	  revision	  we	  turn	  to	  de	  Certeau.	  
	  
In	  Writing	   of	  History,	   de	   Certeau	   describes	   the	   processes	   initiated	   by	   first	   contact	   between	   a	  
European	   and	   a	   naked	   female	   ‘native’	   lying	   in	   a	   hammock	   thus:	   ‘An	   inaugural	   scene:	   after	   a	  
moment	   of	   stupor	  …	   the	   conqueror	  will	  write	   the	  body	  of	   the	  other	   and	   trace	   there	  his	   own	  
                                                
38	  Interview	  with	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  personal	  staff.	  
39	  See	  Gusterson.	  1993.	  22.	  p.	  73-­‐75	  
40	  For	  comparison,	  the	  UK	  maintains	  22,500	  diplomats.	  Conversation	  with	  British	  Deputy	  High	  
Commissioner	  to	  India	  in	  New	  Delhi.	  
41	  Harraway.	  1989.	  	  
42	  Rosaldo.	  1989.	  P.206-­‐7	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history	  …	  This	  is	  writing	  that	  conquers.	  It	  will	  use	  the	  New	  World	  as	  if	   it	  were	  a	  blank,	  ‘savage’	  
page	  on	  which	  Western	  desire	  will	  be	  written.’43	  It	  is	  what	  Spivak	  calls	  ‘worlding,’44	  the	  ordering	  
of	  other	  worlds	  thru	  European	  culture.	  The	  remaining	  object	  of	  this	  chapter	   is	  to	  defamiliarize	  
this	  familiar	  reading	  by	  exposing	  the	  tangible	  practices	  and	  the	   logics	  which	  motivate	  them.	   In	  
short,	   it	   poses	   the	   question:	   How	   did	   the	   naked	   woman	   respond	   and	   why?	   At	   best	   History	  
records	  the	  movements	  of	  the	  woman	  but	  is	  silent	  about	  her	  rationality.	  It	  is	  this	  silence	  which	  
this	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  populate	  with	  the	  silent	  voices	  of	  India’s	  diplomatic	  community.	  
	  
A	  means	  of	  understanding	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  practices	  conceal	  local-­‐logics	  is	  indicated	  by	  de	  
Certeau’s	  concept	  of	  metis45	  understood	  as	  ‘ways	  of	  operating’:	  victories	  of	  the	  ‘weak’	  over	  the	  
‘strong’	  .	  .	  .	  ,	  clever	  tricks,	  knowing	  how	  to	  get	  away	  with	  things,	  ‘hunter’s	  cunning,’	  maneuvers,	  
polymorphic	  simulations,	  joyful	  discoveries,	  poetic	  as	  well	  as	  warlike.’’46	  The	  failing	  of	  this	  model	  
is	   that	   it	   privileges	   neither	   the	   tool	   nor	   user	   but	   the	   process	   he	   calls	   ‘tools	   manipulated	   by	  
users.’47	   It	  means	   that	   the	  agent	   for	   change	   is	   an	  activity.	  His	   approach	  offers	   a	  useful	   site	   to	  
investigate	  practices	  but	  divests	  actual	  users	  of	  the	  power	  to	  effect	  change.	  Such	  an	  approach	  
would	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  make	  any	  useful	  contribution	  to	  either	  the	  theorising	  of	  diplomacy	  
or	  the	  discourse	  of	  modernity	  not	  because	  the	  non-­‐West	  has	  nothing	  to	  offer	  but	  because	  there	  
is	   nothing	   more	   to	   say	   about	   anything.	   All	   that	   is	   left	   for	   the	   researcher	   is	   to	   collect	  
improvisations.	  
	  
To	   assume,	   however,	   that	   individuals	   actually	   possess	   logics	   for	   their	   actions	   offers	   a	   more	  
profitable	   line	  of	   enquiry.	   First,	   it	   permits	   the	  notion	  of	   a	   repertoire	   (Geertz).	   It	   is	   possible	   to	  
access	   this	   repertoire	   by	   observing	   what	   de	   Certeau	   calls	   improvisations.	   Unlike	   de	   Certeau,	  
there	  is,	  however,	  another	  accessible	  step	  through	  Scott’s	  conception	  of	  metis	  which	  is	  an	  ‘array	  
of	  practical	   skills	  and	  acquired	   intelligence	   in	   responding	   to	  a	  constantly	   changing	  natural	  and	  
                                                
43	  de	  Certeau.	  1988.	  P.	  xxv-­‐xxvi	  
44	  Spivak.	  1985.	  p.	  133	  
45	  The	  term	  originates	  in	  Greek	  mythology,	  referring	  to	  the	  first	  bride	  of	  Zeus.	  For	  a	  brief	  account	  of	  its	  
origin,	  see	  Scott.	  1998.	  P.	  424,	  n.8.	  As	  Scott	  points	  out,	  Odysseus	  was	  an	  exemplary	  Greek	  figure	  often	  
praised	  for	  using	  metis	  to	  outwit	  opponents	  and	  enemies	  (ibid.,	  313).	  According	  to	  Scott,	  metis	  was	  widely	  
practised	  and	  shared	  across	  various	  cultures	  and	  philosophical	  thoughts,	  from	  Taoism	  to	  Native	  
Americans.	  de	  Certeau	  also	  mentions	  the	  Greek	  Sophists,	  the	  Chinese	  author	  Sun	  Tzu's	  The	  Art	  of	  War,	  
and	  the	  Arabic	  anthology,	  The	  Book	  of	  Tricks,	  as	  belonging	  to	  this	  tradition.	  See	  de	  Certeau.	  2002.	  xx.	  
46	  de	  Certeau.	  2002.	  xix.	  
47	  Ibid.	  P.21	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human	   environment.’48	   Local	   communities	   are	   repositories	   of	   non-­‐modern	   (by	   definition)	  
knowledge/practice	  worked	  out	  over	  millennia.49	  In	  such	  a	  conception	  the	  only	  new	  things	  to	  be	  
said	   about	   anything	   can	   emerge	   from	   bodies	   of	   knowledge	   untapped	   by	   the	   academy.	   de	  
Certeau	  was	  aware	  of	  these	  liminal	  effects	  of	  strategy	  on	  tactics	  and	  that	  the	  means	  to	  create	  
something	  more	  than	  the	  ‘alternatives’	  that	  theorists	  of	  modernity	  forward	  is	  to	  discover	  non-­‐
modern	  knowledge/practice.	  He	  wrote:	  	  
In	  the	  final	  analysis,	  and	  in	  any	  general	  semiotics	  of	  tactics	  as	  such,	  the	  former	  
[tactics]	   are	   only	   so	  many	   variants	   of	   the	   latter	   [strategies].	   Obviously,	   the	  
elaboration	   of	   such	   a	   semiotics	   would	   require	   a	   rather	   different	   emphasis	  
than	   has	   necessarily	   been	   that	   of	   the	   research	   which	   presently	   bears	   that	  
name,	   and	   which	   is	   oriented	   around	   the	   rationality	   of	   proper	   meaning.	   In	  
particular,	   it	  would	   impose	   the	   study	   of	   quite	   different	   arts	   of	   thinking	   and	  
action,	  such	  as	  the	  sixty-­‐four	  hexagrams	  of	  the	  Chinese	  I-­‐Ching,	  or	  the	  metis	  
(‘intelligence’)	  of	   ancient	  Greece,	  or	  of	   the	  Arabic	  hila,	   or	  of	   any	  number	  of	  
other	  forms	  of	  ‘logic’	  now	  alien	  to	  us.50	  
To	  the	  list	  of	  alien	  logics	  could	  be	  added	  the	  logic	  of	  what	  is	  called	  ‘traditional’	  India.	  It	  is	  these	  
which	  the	  project	  proposes	  to	  uncover.	  A	  genealogy	  however	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  past	  for	  the	  
sake	   of	   the	   past.	   It	   is	   interested	   in	   the	   past	   as	   an	   explanation	   of	   what	   exists	   today.	  What	   is	  




The	  Muslim	  wife	  of	  a	  Hindu	  IFS	  officer	  said,	  ‘it	  would	  be	  unthinkable	  for	  these	  new	  officers	  to	  
marry	   a	  Muslim’.51	   Ironically,	   a	   social	   milieu	   that	   is	   by	   definition	   fractured	   (along	   caste	   and	  
economic	  lines)	  itself	  provides	  the	  notion	  of	  community.	  It	  makes	  the	  service,	  at	  least	  amongst	  
its	   new	   entrants,	   a	   cosmos	   where	   vastly	   different	   social	   and	   economic	   worlds	   collide.	   The	  
wife’s	   comment	  was	   typical	  of	  a	   secularised	   Indian;	   implicit	   in	   it	  was	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  new	  
generation	   is	  not.	  However,	  the	  new	  generation	  still	  creates	  a	  community	  –	   its	  members	  eat,	  
live	   and	  work	   together,	   if	   only	   to	   secure	  promotion	  –	  which	   in	   its	   production	   sets	   in	   relief	   a	  
                                                
48	  Scott.	  p.313.	  
49	  Ibid.,	  Chapter	  9,	  10.	  
50	  de	  Certeau;	  Jameson;	  Lovitt.	  1980.	  p.8	  
51	  Interview	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society	  wracked	  by	  divisions.	  For	  instance,	  north	  and	  south	  Indians	  mainly	  socialised	  separately	  
amongst	  their	  own	  groups.	  As	  a	  diplomat	  put	  it,	  ‘Look	  at	  how	  divided	  we	  are,	  how	  can	  anything	  
outside	   this	   building	   be	   more	   divided?’52	   Another	   added,	   ‘There	   are	   many	   Indias.’	   If	   the	  
different	   contradictory	   worlds	   that	   are	   India	   commune,	   if	   only	   to	   live,	   eat,	   play	   and	   work	  
together,	   then	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   the	   nation-­‐state	   that	   is	   India	   cannot	   commune	   with	  
other	  nation-­‐states.	  In	  short,	  Indian	  diplomats	  are	  produced	  by	  a	  social	  milieu	  which	  is	  founded	  
on	  divisions	  and	  borders	  and	  the	  particular	  so	  that	  their	  lived	  reality	  makes	  them	  into	  persons	  
who	  are	  constantly	  focused	  on	  the	  particular	  to	  secure	  their	  own	  futures.	  A	  secondary	  product	  
is	  secularism	  founded	  on	  particularistic	  interest	  rather	  than	  an	  Enlightenment	  principle.	  	  
	  
Though	  Indian	  diplomats	  were	  once	  steeped	  in	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  (imbibed	  at	  
Oxbridge	  and	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics),	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  MEA	  has	  gradually	  been	  
transformed	   since	   independence.	  Where	  once	   India’s	   elite	   queued	   to	   join	   the	   IFS,	   today	   they	  
move	   to	   London,	   New	   York	   and	   other	   cities	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   Today’s	   IFS	   consists	   of	   a	  
sizeable	  proportion	  of	  people	  who	  the	  Anglicised,	  secularized	  and	  properly	  modernized	  elite	  of	  
India	   consider	   unimaginably	   different.	   The	   section	   below	   describes	   how	   the	   IFS	   arrived	   at	   its	  
current	  configuration.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  makes	  two	  points:	  	  
1. European	   influence	   very	   rarely	   penetrated	   into	   the	   depths	   of	   the	   society	   which	  
produces	  today’s	  Indian	  diplomats.	  
2. Indian	  diplomat’s	  harness	  modernity	  to	  further	  non-­‐modern	  aims.	  
	  
The	  historic	  and	  socially	  embedded	  divisions	   that	  now	  operate	   in	   the	  diplomatic	  service	  mean	  
that	  the	  service	  has	  been	  transformed	  from	  a	   ‘playground’	   for	  the	  Anglicised	  elite	  to	  a	  society	  
that	   is	   far	  more	  representative	  of	  the	   India	  untouched	  by	  colonialism.	  This	   is	  the	   ‘other’	   India,	  
the	  constitutional	  alternative	  of	  Bharat,	  the	  ancient	  indigenous	  name	  for	  the	  land	  that	  roughly	  
matches	   today’s	   India.	   Caste	   and	   economics	   –	   categories	   that	   predate	   colonialism	   –	   are	   the	  
borders	  between	  the	  self	  and	  the	  ‘other’	  for	  these	  occupants	  of	  Bharat	  who	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  
powerful	   role	   despite	   attempts	   to	   socially	   even	   out	   the	   MEA.	   Originally,	   royals	   were	  
incorporated	   into	   the	   IFS	   to	   provide	   ‘psychological	   and	   political	   rehabilitation	   for	   erstwhile	  
                                                
52	  Interview	  with	  member	  of	  1979	  batch	  officer	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rulers’	  wrote	   India’s	   first	  Foreign	  Secretary,	  who	  was	  himself	  a	  man	  of	  Bharat.53	  Blue-­‐blooded	  
diplomats	  were	   given	   important	   assignments54	   but	  by	   the	  1950s	  Nehru’s	   opinion	  of	   them	  got	  
the	  better	  of	  his	  wish	  to	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  rehabilitation	  to	  deposed	  princes.	  Nehru	  wrote	  in	  
1955:	  	  
‘I	  do	  not	   think	  one	  can	  entrust	   them	  (royals)	  with	  diplomatic	  work.	  They	  have	  
not	  been	  a	  success	  at	  it.	  Of	  course	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  send	  them	  to	  some	  out	  
of	  the	  way	  place	  if	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  go,	  or	  someplace	  where	  no	  political	  flair	  
is	  necessary’.55	  
Today,	   the	   Indian	   constitution	   safeguards	   a	  proportion	  of	   central	   government	   jobs	   for	  people	  
who	  are	  defined	  as	  ‘backward’	  in	  some	  manner	  or	  form	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  General	  category.	  In	  
practice,	  some	  50	  percent	  of	  entrants	  into	  the	  IFS	  are	  from	  the	  Schedule	  Caste,	  Scheduled	  Tribe	  
and	   Other	   Backward	   Caste	   (OBC)	   quotas.	   Though	   some	   probationers	   qualified	   for	   these	  
categories	   ,	   they	   still	   chose	   to	   compete	   thru	   the	  General	   category.56	   The	  Europeanised	   Indian	  
mentality	  is	  in	  retreat.	  Once	  upon	  a	  time,	  toppers	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  exams	  opted	  for	  the	  IFS.	  A	  
cursory	  look	  at	  the	  civil	  list	  shows	  that	  the	  last	  topper	  to	  join	  the	  IFS	  was	  in	  1976,	  a	  year	  when	  
nearly	  half	  of	   the	  25	  officers	   recruited	  came	  from	  the	   leading	   liberal	  arts	  college	   in	   India	  –	  St.	  
Stephens	  in	  Delhi.	  57	  
	  
The	  active	   removal	  of	   the	   socio-­‐economic	  elite	  and	   its	   replacement	  by	   the	  disadvantaged	  has	  
led	  to	   the	  service	   incorporating	  a	  whole	  new	  class	  of	  people.	  Today,	  an	   Indian	  diplomat	  could	  
just	   as	   easily	   be	   the	   son	   of	   a	   labourer	   or	   a	   rickshaw	   puller	   as	   the	   daughter	   of	   judge.58	   If	   an	  
entrant	  from	  a	  socially	  disadvantaged	  group	  is	  from	  a	  metropolitan	  city,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  
he	   or	   she	   comes	   from	   the	   bottom	   of	   society	   in	   practically	   every	   computation	   of	   the	   word	  
                                                
53	  Menon.	  1956.	  p.204.	  Menon	  also	  writes	  that	  Sardar	  Patel	  proposed	  five	  or	  six	  Maharajahs	  or	  near	  
relatives	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  services.	  Entry	  could	  be	  arranged	  by	  the	  royal	  elite.	  The	  Nawab	  of	  
Rampur	  requested	  Lord	  Moutbatten	  to	  recommend	  his	  son’s	  name	  to	  Sardar	  Patel	  for	  induction	  into	  the	  
newly	  established	  Central	  Service.	  The	  Viceroy	  wrote	  here	  is	  a	  ‘high	  class	  Muslim’	  who	  has	  a	  ‘charming	  
wife’.	  The	  Sardar	  let	  the	  Nawab’s	  son	  into	  the	  service.	  See	  Dass.	  1973.	  Vol.	  VIII.	  P.367-­‐8	  
54	  Jam	  Sahib	  Ranjit	  Sinhji	  of	  Nawangar	  represented	  India	  at	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  in	  1920	  &	  1922	  and	  his	  
son	  upon	  becoming	  Rajpramukh	  of	  Saurashtra	  was	  India’s	  Permanent	  Representative	  to	  the	  United	  
Nations.	  Maharajah	  Bhupinder	  Singh	  of	  Patiala	  attended	  the	  League	  and	  his	  son	  Yadavindra	  Singh	  became	  
Permanent	  Representative	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  ambassador	  to	  Italy	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  See	  Ramusack.	  1978.	  
p.244	  
55	  Nehru.	  27	  February	  1955.	  Selected	  Works	  of	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru.	  
56	  Interview	  with	  member	  of	  2007	  batch	  
57	  Varma.	  August	  6	  2000.	  
58	  Interview	  with	  probationers	  of	  2007	  and	  2008	  batch	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‘bottom’.	   One	   batch	   had	   just	   one	   person	   from	   a	   major	   city	   and	   he	   belonged	   to	   the	   OBC	  
category.	   He	   used	   only	   his	   first	   name	   and	   visibly	   stiffened	  when,	   taking	   down	   his	   cell	   phone	  
number	  at	  our	  first	  meeting,	  I	  asked	  his	  surname.	  Only	  later	  did	  he	  explain	  he	  had	  dropped	  his	  
surname	  because	  it	  betrayed	  his	  caste.	  His	  story	  briefly	  is:	  
‘My	  grandfather	  was	  a	  pavement	  dweller	  and	  my	  father	  was	  educated	  to	  class	  10.	  
He’s	  a	  minor	  civil	  servant.	  I	  grew	  up	  without	  ever	  having	  a	  bedroom	  and	  slept	  on	  
the	   living	   room	   floor	   with	   my	   various	   cousins.	   I	   was	   a	   good	   student	   and	  
transferred	   to	   another	   school.	   Then	   I	   had	   a	   Bengali	   teacher	   who	   saw	   some	  
potential	  in	  me	  and	  to	  cut	  a	  long	  story	  short,	  after	  several	  extra	  classes	  for	  IIT,	  the	  
civil	  services	  etc.,	  I	  finally	  managed	  to	  wind	  up	  here’.	  
The	  story	   is	  not	  unique.	  The	  pre-­‐IFS	   life	  of	   the	  entrants	   interviewed	  shows	   that	  most	  of	   them	  
were	  plagued	  by	  poverty.	   This	  manifests	   itself	   in	  a	  plethora	  of	  ways	  and	   is	  heightened	  by	   the	  
everyday	  difficulties	  of	  Indian	  life	  such	  as	  endemic	  corruption,	  family	  obligations	  (educating	  and	  
finding	  jobs	  for	  cousins,	  daughters	  and	  sisters	  or	  getting	  them	  married),	  and,	  in	  villages,	  making	  
do	   without	   basic	   services.	   Some	   interviewees	   mentioned	   relatives	   who	   live	   without	   running	  
water	   and	   electricity.	   The	   only	  means	   of	   escape	   is	   a	   technical	   education.	  One	   needs	   a	   trade.	  
There	   is	   little	   or	   no	   time	   for	   relaxation.	   Life	   is	   an	   endless	   round	   of	   preparing	   for	   exams	   and	  
taking	  extra	  classes	   since	   school	  and	  university	   teachers	  often	   regard	  providing	  what	   they	  are	  
meant	   to	   as	   an	   extra	   service	   –	  deliverable	  only	   for	  what	   amounts	   to	   a	   bribe.	   The	   run-­‐around	  
does	   not	   end	   with	   university.	   Competing	   for	   the	   Union	   Public	   Services	   Commission	   (UPSC)	  
exams	  for	  entry	  into	  all	  the	  civil	  service	  means	  moving	  to	  a	  major	  city	  to	  enrol	  at	  an	  expensive	  
crammer.	  Living	  conditions	  can	  be	  grim	  while	  preparing	  for	  the	  tests.	  One	  only	  needs	  to	  google	  
pictures	  of	  the	  lower	  middle	  class	  New	  Delhi	  suburb	  of	  Munirka	  to	  get	  a	  flavour.	  Out	  of	  nearly	  
200,000	  candidates	  who	   take	   the	  entrance	  exams	  yearly	   some	  500	   finally	  obtain	  a	   job	  after	  a	  
selection	  process	  that	  takes	  two	  years.	  Yet,	  some	  young	   Indians	  still	  choose	  to	  go	  through	  the	  
UPSC’s	   competitive	   process	   though	   they	   have	   jobs	   in	   the	   booming	   Information	   Technology	  
sector.	  They	  all	  gave	  a	  similar	  explanation:	  
‘Do	  you	  know	  what	  IT	  work	  is?	  It’s	  sitting	  at	  a	  computer	  writing	  lines	  of	  code	  man.	  
Code!	  Where	  is	  the	  life	  in	  that	  (sic)?	  This	  work	  [government	  service]	  is	  about	  life.	  
It’s	  about	  managing	  people,	  lives	  …	  creating	  something	  tangible.	  The	  money	  is	  not	  
much	   but	   it	   offers	   so	  much	  more:	   excitement,	   social	   interaction	  with	   the	  many	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India’s	  and	  foreigners	  and	  of	  course	  one	  day	  we	  might	  play	  a	  small	  role	  in	  deciding	  
which	  way	  the	  country	  will	  go.’59	  
	  
Entry	   into	   the	  service	  by	  people	  with	  a	   technical	  education	  and	   far	  more	  diverse	  backgrounds	  
has	  changed	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  IFS	  as	  an	  elite	  service	  reserved	  for	  the	  traditional	  elite.	  The	  
implications	  are	  twofold.	  Given	  the	  historical	  perception	  of	  the	  service	  it	  is	  not	  attractive	  to	  the	  
Indian	  masses.	  Interest	  amongst	  qualifying	  candidates	  in	  the	  IFS	  has	  been	  steadily	  shrinking	  over	  
the	   last	   thirty	   years.	   Haksar,	   the	   first	   Dean	   of	   the	   Foreign	   Service	   Institute,	   observed	   that	   in	  
1959,	  three	  persons	  joined	  the	  IFS	  and	  that	  they	  came	  from	  the	  top	  15	  of	  the	  combined	  UPSC	  
merit	  list.60	  Within	  a	  few	  years	  the	  situation	  changed	  as	  one	  had	  to	  go	  further	  down	  the	  list	  to	  fill	  
the	  positions	  of	  the	  IFS.	  In	  1970,	  the	  11	  candidates	  came	  from	  the	  first	  72	  in	  the	  list;	  and	  in	  1981	  
20	  out	  of	  the	  first	  81.	  In	  1988,	  10	  IFS	  vacancies	  could	  be	  filled	  only	  by	  reaching	  down	  to	  the	  480th	  
position	  on	   the	  merit	   list.	   In	  1981	   ten	  came	   from	  the	   top	  487	  and	   in	  1990	   filling	   IFS	  positions	  
required	  going	  down	   to	   the	  709th	   candidate	   in	   the	  exams.	   In	  1993	  15	  positions	  were	   filled	  by	  
going	   to	   the	  641st	   candidate.	  Haksar	  concludes	   that	  because	  of	   the	   IFS’s	  growing	  unpopularity	  
with	   the	   best	   students	   or	   the	   social	   elite,	   in	   practice	   the	   earlier	   quota	   of	   22.5	   percent	  
reservations	   has	   already	   been	   in	   force	   for	   the	   last	   30	   years	   ‘without	   causing	   any	   notable	  
disasters’.	  He	  adds:	  
‘Some	  reserved	  category	  recruits	  may	  well	  have	  been	  substandard	  or	  worse.	  But	  
so	   have	   some	   from	   the	   general	   category.	   Both	   categories	   have	   produced	  
officers	  of	  proven	  competence,	  which	  shows	  that	  everyone	  can	  do	  well	  if	  given	  
the	  opportunity.’61	  
	  
Barring	   some	   freak	   years,	   the	   downhill	   trend	   continues.	   The	   IFS	   has	   obviously	   lost	   its	   lustre	  
amongst	  the	  majority.	  In	  part	  this	  is	  because	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘vestige	  of	  the	  last	  bastion	  of	  the	  
brown	   sahib’	  where	   the	   ‘last	   remnant’	   of	   the	   ICS	  were	   ensconced	   from	   a	   time	  when	   natives	  
were	   ‘despised	   and	   kept	   at	   a	   distance	   to	   avoid	   offending	   the	   prime	   responsibilities	   of	   their	  
masters’	   and	   treated	  with	   ‘disdain’.	   SC	   and	   ST	   entrants	   feel	   discriminated	   against,	   suspecting	  
that	   they	   are	   given	   relatively	   unimportant	   posts.62	  A	   new	  probationer	   from	   the	  OBC	   category	  
                                                
59	  Amalgamation	  of	  interviews	  with	  four	  diplomats	  of	  2006,	  2007	  and	  2008	  batches	  
60	  The	  UPSC	  is	  the	  body	  which	  conducts	  the	  civil	  services	  entrance	  exam.	  
61	  Haksar.	  August	  16	  1992;	  Haksar.	  Sept	  4	  1994.	  
62	  Laiq.	  27	  Sept.	  1999.	  p.28	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urged	  me	  to	  investigate	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  from	  lower	  castes	  who	  made	  it	  to	  ambassador	  
in	  desirable	  and/or	  important	  capitals.63	  However,	  this	  probationer	  himself	  was	  selected	  for	  one	  
of	   the	   most	   challenging	   positions	   on	   offer	   which	   indicates	   that	   though	   caste	   is	   not	   a	  
determinant	  for	  selection	  for	  assignments,	  intellectually	  officers	  continue	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  
along	  deeply	  embedded	  caste	   lines.	  The	  conviction	   is	  aggravated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  postings	  and	  
promotions	  are	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inter-­‐personal	  relationships	  rather	  than	  any	  formal	  system.64	  
	  
The	  other	  impact	  of	  change	  in	  the	  social	  recruitment	  of	  the	  IFS	  is	  that	  the	  children	  of	  the	  classes	  
‘traditionally’	  perceived	  (by	  diplomats	  themselves)	  to	  provide	  the	  manpower	  for	  the	  diplomatic	  
service	  do	  not	  aspire	  to	  working	  for	  the	  government.	  Ten	  interviews	  with	  the	  children	  of	  IFS	  and	  
other	  central	  government	  officers	  produced	  a	   remarkable	  uniformity	  of	  answers.	  Though	  they	  
all	   thought	   their	  parents	  were	  doing	   ‘good’	   and	   ‘important’	  work,	  none	  of	   them	  wanted	   ‘that	  
type	   of	   career’	   and	   preferred	   to	   work	   either	   ‘abroad,	   the	   best	   place	   being	   the	   US	   or	   in	   the	  
‘private	   sector	   because	   it	   pays	   a	   lot	   of	  money	   though	   there	   is	   not	  much	   status,	   but	   that	  will	  
change	  as	   India	  develops	  a	   larger	  organised	  market.’	   The	  underpinning	   rationale	  was	   that	   the	  
people	  who	   join	   the	   service	  now	  come	   from	   lower	   levels	  of	   society	  and	  are	  not	  Westernized.	  
‘They	   are	   a	   bit	   jungly	   (uncivilised)	   nowadays,’	   said	   the	   daughter	   of	   an	   Indian	   Administrative	  
Service	   (IAS)	  officer.	  She	  elaborated	  that	   they	   ‘can’t	  use	  cutlery’,	   ‘don’t	  speak	  English’	  and	  are	  
‘dirty’.65	  
	  
Despite	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   born-­‐elite	   and	   the	   entrance-­‐exam	   elite,	   both	   groups	  
operate	   on	   the	   same	   principles	   and	   agree	   that	   the	   system	   of	   positive	   discrimination	   has	  
produced	  a	  cadre	  which	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  great	  social	  change.	  Everyone	  agrees	  that	  the	  IFS	  is	  a	  
social	  escalator.	  A	  diplomat	  and	  former	  Cabinet	  Minister	  who	  joined	  in	  1979	  says	  from	  his	  batch	  
only	  his	  daughter	  is	  still	  in	  India;	  the	  children	  of	  all	  his	  colleagues	  have	  settled	  abroad.	  Another	  
adds,	   ‘none	  of	  our	  children	  join	  the	  service.	  Why	  should	  they?’	  To	  the	  question	  ‘What	  do	  they	  
do?’	   the	   answer	   is	   ‘They	  work	   abroad.	   They	   do	   something	   better.’	   Indians	   become	  diplomats	  
primarily	  to	  serve	  themselves.	  The	  prevailing	  culture	  of	  Bharat	   is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  contradiction	  
                                                
63	  An	  impossible	  task	  since	  the	  Civil	  List	  does	  not	  state	  information	  about	  the	  officer’s	  caste	  or	  quota.	  
64	  As	  a	  senior	  territorial	  head	  at	  Headquarters	  indicated:	  ‘I	  got	  to	  know	  all	  of	  them	  (important	  people)	  
when	  I	  was	  in	  Moscow.	  I	  had	  to	  go	  and	  receive	  them	  and	  they	  got	  to	  know	  me	  …	  so	  by	  and	  by	  when	  the	  
time	  came	  I	  was	  a	  known	  quantity’.	  Interview.	  
65	  Interviews	  with	  six	  sons	  and	  daughters	  of	  central	  government	  officers	  who	  never	  considered	  public	  
service	  and	  work	  for	  multinationals.	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between	  opting	  to	  migrate	  and	  representing	  the	  nation.	  One	  recent	  addition	  to	  the	  IFS	  said	  that	  
if	  he	  had	  the	  option	  he	  would	  have	  migrated	  to	  the	  US.	  The	  IAS	  was	  his	  second	  option;	  the	  IFS	  
came	  third.	  ‘I’m	  here	  because	  I	  could	  not	  get	  anything	  else	  but	  it	   is	  not	  a	  bad	  place	  to	  be.	  The	  
accommodation	  is	  good.’	  A	  senior	  officer	  stated	  that	  ‘the	  new	  lot	  don’t	  have	  any	  understanding	  
of	  anything	  …	  they	  come	  straight	  from	  the	  village.	  That’s	  why	  you	  have	  to	  explain	  things	  to	  them	  
using	  the	  Mahābhārata.	  No	  more	  Brown	  Sahibs	  in	  the	  IFS.’	  His	  verdict	   indicated	  that	  culturally	  
they	  were	  local	  rather	  than	  a	  coalescence	  of	  local	  and	  modern	  (i.e.,	  Anglicised	  or	  Westernised).	  
All	  this	  bears	  out	  the	  validity	  of	  Nandy’s	  ‘scepticism	  of	  the	  Indian	  state’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  instead	  
of	  operating	  under	  some	  unitary	  national	  idea,	  the	  state’s	  employees	  are	  motivated	  only	  by	  an	  
economy	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  
	  
How	   is	   self-­‐interest	   understood?	   To	   the	   question	   of	   why	   Indians	   seek	   ‘status’	   the	   uniform	  
answer	  was	  ‘everyone	  does	  so.	  We	  have	  done	  so	  forever	  (caste,	  moving	  within	  and	  beyond)	  and	  
people	  today	  around	  the	  world	  seek	   it.	  You	  realise	   it	   in	  different	  ways,	  but	  we	  all	  seek	   it.’	  The	  
answer	   demonstrates	   that	   deep-­‐seated	   divisions	  within	   Indian	   society	   have	   a	   corollary	  which	  
negates	   the	   concept	   of	   self	   and	   ‘other’.	   The	   Indian	   diplomat’s	   concept	   of	   the	   world	   and	   the	  
universe	   within	   which	   s/he	   operates	   is	   what	   I	   term	   a	   dharmic	   order.	   It	   is	   a	   world	   where	  
everything	   is	   part	   of	   a	   unified	   system.	   It	   is	   the	   psychological	   assumption	   that	   produces	  
behaviour.66	  It	  is	  a	  psychological	  assumption	  because	  it	  pervades	  both	  the	  social	  and	  work	  life	  of	  
the	  Indian	  diplomat.	   In	  speech	  they	  utter	  the	  word	  dharma	  without	  being	  aware	  of	   it;	  at	  work	  
notes	  on	  dharma	  are	  exchanged	  and	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  service.67	  Since	  dharma	  views	  
the	   world	   as	   interlinked,	   by	   implication,	   any	   action	   has	   consequences.	   Thus	   dharmic	   action	  
requires,	  before	  any	  action,	  the	  weighing	  of	  everything	  in	  the	  cosmos.	  	  
	  
The	  dharmic	  conception	  which	   is	  the	  overwhelming	  principle	  –	   if	   it	  can	  be	  described	  as	  such	  –	  
underpinning	   the	  actions	  of	   the	   individual	  diplomat	   is	  not	  universal	   since	   some	  diplomats	   are	  
practising	  Christians	  or	  Muslims,	  adhering	  to	  a	  religion	  that	  could	  be	  at	  variance	  to	  the	  dharmic	  
conception.	  The	   imperative	  for	  action	  for	  non-­‐Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Christian	  diplomats	  arises	  from	  
the	  event	  itself	  rather	  than	  from	  a	  prescribed	  doctrine.	  There	  is	  no	  code	  to	  act	  on	  the	  event.	  The	  
tension	   is	   partially	   resolved	  by	   the	   interviews	   –	   along	  with	   archival	   investigations	   –	   indicating	  
                                                
66	  Mercer.	  2005.	  pp.	  77-­‐106	  
67	  Jaswant	  Singh	  as	  Foreign	  Minister	  distributed	  a	  note	  on	  dharma.	  Interview.	  March	  2007	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that	  the	  philosophical	  notion	  present	   in	  Christianity	  of	  a	  correct	  means	  of	  acting	  has	  not	  been	  
adulterated	  by	  the	  surrounding	  environment,	  but	  is	  the	  adulteration.68	  In	  short,	  foreign	  religions	  
are	  no	  more	  than	  superficial,	  limited	  to	  observable	  practice.	  
	  
It	  means	  that	  the	  culture	  is	  one	  of	  ‘unselfconscious	  Hinduism,	  by	  which	  most	  Indians,	  Hindus	  as	  
well	  as	  non-­‐Hindus,	   live.’69	  This	  is	  a	  philosophy	  of	  lived	  experience	  rather	  than	  a	  systematically	  
formulated	   ‘ideology.’70	  One	   operation	   of	   reconstituting	   power	   relations	  within	   the	   IFS	  was	   a	  
long	  standing	  and	   fierce	  argument	  between	   two	  probationers,	  one	   from	  the	  General	   category	  
and	  the	  other	  from	  the	  OBC	  category	  about	  the	  merits/demerits	  of	  the	  quota	  entry	  system.	  The	  
argument	  was	  finally	  resolved,	  as	  one	  them	  put	  it,	  by	  the	  pragmatic	  ultimate	  of	  ‘not	  bothering	  
with	  it,	  I	  mean	  we	  are	  in,	  so	  why	  bother	  talking	  about	  it?’	  He	  went	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  essence	  of	  
co-­‐existence	  and	  inter-­‐mingling	  that	  sustains	  the	  Indian	  identity.	   ‘How	  else	  do	  you	  think	  we	  all	  
(sic)	   have	   been	   rubbing	   up	   against	   each	   other	   along	   for	   this	  many	   thousands	   of	   years(?)’	   He	  
added:	  ‘The	  next	  thing	  is	  to	  progress,	  and	  for	  that	  we	  have	  to	  do	  something	  for	  the	  country,	  we	  
have	  to	  work	  together.’	   In	  part	   this	   is	  because,	  as	  Haksar	  observed,	   ‘Living	  and	  working	  under	  
similar	   conditions	   in	   a	   comparatively	   small	   community	   also	  has	   a	   certain	  homogenising	   effect	  
which	  often	  blurs	  diversities	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  backgrounds.’71	  This	  has	  been	  happening	  for	  
millennia	  and	  as	  such	  is	  only	  a	  microcosm	  of	  a	  wider	  social	  practice,	  but,	  yet,	  it	  is	  still	  happening!	  
It	   indicates	  that	  the	  process	  is	  one	  of	  constant	  rediscovery.	  Beliefs	  are	  not	  discarded.	  They	  are	  
simply	  shelved	  in	  order	  to	  collectively	  pursue	  social	  cohesion	  and	  personal	  welfare.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  
the	  philosophy	  of	  practical-­‐pragmatism.	  
	  
This	  practical-­‐pragmatism	  is	  activated	  by	  an	  ability	  to	  shelve	  beliefs,	  conceptions	  and	  ideas	  –	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  quota	  something	  which	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  shaping	  their	  lives	  –	  superficially	  
indicating	   flexibility	  and	  fragmentation.	  This	  ability	   is	  however	  predicated	  on	  a	  unifying	  notion	  
which	  is	  the	  constructed	  and	  thereby	  fictional	  nature	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  interviews,	  observation	  
and	  analysis	  of	  documents	  suggest	  that	  though	  the	  world	  is	  regarded	  as	  unified	  and	  inextricably	  
                                                
68	  Interview	  with	  2007	  batch	  officer.	  A	  low	  caste	  (toddy	  tapper)	  South	  Indian,	  this	  interviewee	  described	  
how	  in	  a	  Christian	  wedding	  someone	  or	  the	  other	  would	  come	  and	  do	  some	  ‘Hindu’	  ritual.	  It	  was	  accepted	  
that	  this	  was	  ‘heretical’	  because	  it	  acknowledged	  ‘false-­‐gods’	  but	  it	  was	  also	  their	  custom.	  ‘Christianity	  
over	  there	  is	  not	  like	  the	  Vatican	  …	  of	  course	  most	  of	  it	  is	  the	  same	  but	  there	  are	  all	  these	  little	  things.’	  
69	  Nandy.	  1991.	  P.	  100–101,	  44,	  xi,	  104.	  
70	  Nandy.	  1992.	  P.70	  
71	  Haksar.	  August	  16	  1992;	  Haksar.	  Sept	  4	  1994.	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intermeshed,	  nothing	  is	  fixed.	  Most	  fundamentally,	  the	  state	  itself	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  fictional	  entity.	  As	  
the	  Foreign	  Secretary	  (the	  MEA’s	  bureaucratic	  head)	  said:	   ‘What	   is	  fixed?	  We	  are	  certainly	  not	  
fixed.	   And	   the	   state?	   Our	   borders	   are	   constantly	   being	   renegotiated.	   Look	   at	   Kashmir	   –	   it’s	  
contested.	   There	   is	   no	   official	   border	   between	   Pakistan	   and	   Afghanistan.	   And	   the	   nature	   of	  
governance?	  That	  too	  changes.	  Look	  at	  Nepal.’	  He	  closed	  this	  idea	  by	  stating:	  ‘The	  world	  is	  fluid.	  
Our	  part	  of	  the	  world	  even	  more	  so	  and	  we	  have	  been	  fluid	  for	  centuries.	  That	  is	  the	  way	  of	  the	  
world.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  unlike	  others	  our	  history	  makes	  us	  able	  to	  accept	  it.’72	  This	  position	  
does	  not	  of	  course	  discount	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  someone	  who	  wants	  to	  
effect	  change	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  most	  powerful	  social	  organisation	  in	  existence	  to	  bring	  about	  
change,	  including	  the	  revision	  and	  even	  deletion	  of	  the	  state.	  
	  
The	   ‘natural	   state’	   of	   ‘fluidity’	   can	   occasionally	   perplex	   even	   practitioners	   of	   diplomacy.	  On	   a	  
personal	  level,	  a	  young	  diplomat	  expressed	  the	  very	  reality	  of	  what	  IR	  terms	  the	  ‘fictional	  nature	  
of	  the	  world’	  with	  a	  story	  about	  his	  father.	  ‘Nothing	  makes	  sense	  in	  this	  country.	  My	  father	  was	  
on	   a	   train	   and	   as	   it	   passed	   from	   one	   area	   to	   another	   the	   caste	   attributed	   to	   his	   surname	  
changed.	  So	  at	  some	  point	  everyone	  thought	  he	  was	  high-­‐caste	  and	  treated	  him	  well	  whereas	  at	  
other	   points	   he	   fell	   to	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   caste	   system.’73	   His	   comment	  was	   of	   course	   partly	  
made	  in	  jest	  –	  the	  caste	  system	  is	  all	  too	  real.	   It	  provided	  him	  with	  the	  leg	  up	  to	  enter	  the	  IFS	  
and	   simultaneously,	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   his	   standing	   in	   the	   social	   system	   changes	   during	   the	  
course	  of	  a	  train	  ride	  suggests	  that	  the	  world	  dramatically	  and	  in	  a	  very	  real	  sense	   in	  terms	  of	  
lived	  reality	  is	  open	  to	  constant	  and	  radical	  redesign.	  
	  
The	   lack	   of	   permanence	   does	   not	   indicate	   immateriality.	   Rather,	   it	   proffers	   the	   hope	   of	  
redesign.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  by	  the	  functionaries	  of	  the	  state.	  At	  the	  most	  fundamental	  level	  
the	  ultimate	  manner	   in	  which	  their	  world	  was	  remade	  was	  by	  qualifying	   for	   the	   IFS.	   ‘The	  next	  
thing’	  says	  a	  senior	  officer	   ‘is	  for	  some	  to	  go	  back	  to	  where	  they	  come	  from	  to	  show	  what	  big	  
things	  they	  have	  become.’	  Another	  officer	  asked,	  	  
‘Why	   have	   I	   joined	   the	   service?	   Because	   I	   come	   from	   a	   family	   with	   a	   typical	  
middle	  class	  family.	  I	  was	  a	  management	  trainee	  with	  Citi	  Bank	  [implying	  that	  it	  
was	  a	   lucrative	   job	   in	   the	  modern	  economy]	  but	  my	   father	   said	  “Forget	  about	  
                                                
72	  Interview	  with	  Foreign	  Secretary.	  	  
73	  Interview	  with	  2007	  batch	  officer	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the	  neighbours,	   even	   I	   don’t	   know	  what	   you	  are	  doing!”	   So	   I	  wrote	   the	  exam	  
and	  when	  I	  got	  in,	  forget	  about	  the	  neighbours,	  the	  entire	  mohalla	  [area]	  knew	  
what	  I	  was	  doing!’74	  
	  
The	   son’s	   success	  was	   a	  watershed	  moment	   for	   the	   entire	   family.	   In	  more	   concrete	   terms,	   a	  
handful	   of	   new	  diplomats	   had	   arranged	  marriages	  with	   girls	   from	   a	   ‘better’	   background	   than	  
themselves.75	  One	  walked	  with	  four	  mobiles	  –	  one	  for	  each	  newspaper	  in	  which	  he	  had	  placed	  a	  
marriage	   advertisement.	   Remaking,	   it	   would	   appear,	   is	   a	   constant	   in	   the	  world	   of	   the	   Indian	  
diplomat.	   At	   the	   other	   extreme	   of	   policy	  making,	   senior	   diplomats	   agreed	   that	   their	   political	  
masters	  were	  the	  ablest	  diplomats	  because	  ‘look	  at	  the	  transformations	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  bring	  
about	  and	  the	  management	  required!	  Their	  jobs	  are	  infinitely	  more	  complicated	  than	  ours.’	  The	  
quality	  which	  made	  a	  diplomat’s	  diplomat	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  foster	  change	  by	  managing	  relations	  in	  
a	  complex	  world.	  
	  
The	  underlying	  assumption	  of	  the	  world	  being	  in	  flux	  is	  similar	  to	  Constantinou’s	  argument	  that	  
the	   state	   is	   fictional.	   Citing	   Mayall’s	   realist	   comment	   that	   states	   actually	   exist,	   Constantinou	  
observes	   that	   the	   actuality	   of	   the	   representations	   of	   this	   notional	   entity	   are	   taken	   ‘for	   the	  
actuality	   of	   its	   existence,	   a	   fiction	   turned	   into	   a	   reality,	  with	   a	   life	   and	   logic	   of	   its	   own.’76	   Yet	  
there	   is	   none	   of	   the	   ambivalence	   which	   Hoffman	   detects	   when	   he	   writes	   that	   ‘diplomacy’s	  
linkage	   to	   the	   state	   is	   paradoxical	   and	  problematic.	   ...	   The	   state	  …	   is	   a	   paradoxical	   institution	  
since	   it	   claims	   a	   monopoly	   of	   force	   which	   it	   does	   not,	   and	   cannot,	   possess’.77	   The	   Indian	  
diplomat	   does	   not	   claim	   to	   have	   a	   monopoly	   of	   force	   and	   enjoys	   only	   a	   tenuous	   grasp	   on	  
authority.78	  As	  all	  the	  interviews	  had	  a	  porsographical	  component	  to	  them,	  the	  data	  shows	  that	  
the	  vast	  majority	   is	  enmeshed	   in	  a	  world	  where	  the	  rule	  of	  modern	   law	  is	  alien.	  Life	   is	  riddled	  
with	   small	   acts	   of	   corruption.	   They	   are	   well	   aware	   of	   the	   hollow	   pretensions	   of	   the	   state	   –	  
                                                
74	  Interview	  with	  2007	  batch	  officers	  and	  instructors	  at	  LaBasNa	  
75	  ‘Better’	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  plethora	  of	  ways	  but	  usually	  comprised	  of	  a	  coming	  together	  of	  some	  key	  
traits	  including	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  English,	  wealth	  and	  of	  course,	  caste	  and	  family.	  The	  opinion	  that	  they	  
are	  ‘better’	  was	  one	  that	  was	  silently	  agreed	  upon	  by	  a	  number	  of	  their	  colleagues	  within	  the	  service.	  
76	  Constantinou.	  1996.	  p.104-­‐105.	  
77	  Hoffman.	  2003.	  p.526-­‐527.	  
78	  As	  one	  officer	  put	  it,	  ‘I	  can’t	  even	  get	  a	  bank	  account	  opened	  with	  my	  position.’	  On	  a	  more	  official,	  
policy	  making	  level	  an	  officer	  said,	  ‘until	  very	  recently	  the	  territorial	  heads	  would	  never	  put	  forward	  an	  
option.	  It	  was	  left	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Secretary.	  These	  are	  very	  senior	  level	  officers	  we	  are	  talking	  about.	  They	  
should	  at	  least	  be	  able	  to	  put	  forward	  options	  –	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shoulder	  responsibility.’	  Interview	  with	  2007	  
batch	  officer.	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because	  they	   lived	   it	  and	  now	  are	   it.	  A	  woman	  told	  a	  diplomat	   that	  her	  world	  did	  not	   require	  
laws.	   ‘Laws	  are	   for	  animals	  and	  we	  are	  not	  animals.	  We	  can	   take	   care	   [govern]	  ourselves’.	  As	  
another	  Indian	  diplomat	  said,	  ‘India	  is	  a	  state	  which	  works	  in	  practice,	  but	  not	  in	  theory.’	  Theory	  
is,	   of	   course,	   European.	   The	   reason	  why	   India	   does	   not	  work	   in	   terms	   of	   European	   theory	   is	  
because	  in	  actual	  practice	  no	  unified	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  governs	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  employees	  
of	  the	  state.	  As	  such,	  if	  a	  concept	  may	  be	  deduced	  then	  it	  has	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  concerns	  
of	  the	  practitioners.	  It	  is	  how	  they	  see	  reality	  and	  frame	  it,	  conceptualize	  it	  and	  act	  upon	  it	  in	  an	  
event	  rather	  than	  thru	  some	  doctrinaire	  understanding	  of	  what	  reality	  is.79	  	  
	  
For	   example,	   several	   officers	   abroad	   complained	   that	   Headquarters	   never	   respond	   to	   their	  
memos.	  They	  are	  left	  to	  get	  on	  with	  it	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  to	  respond	  to	  events	  as	  they	  see	  fit.	  
Practices	   and	  practitioners	   are	  both	  essential	   to	   the	  event.	   IR,	   in	   the	   throes	  of	   unpacking	   the	  
state,	  is	  realizing	  that	  the	  state	  is	  both	  true	  and	  false	  –	  fact	  and	  fiction	  –	  and	  is	  realizing	  that	  ‘we	  
should	   resist	   its	   arrogant	   assumption	   that	   it	   is	   the	   former	   and	   never	   the	   latter’.80	   It	   would	  
appear	   that	   this	   was	   never	   an	   issue	   for	   Indian	   bureaucrats.	   In	   short,	   the	   practice	   of	   Indian	  
diplomacy	  is	  based	  on	  specific	  actions	  based	  around	  the	  event.	  As	  one	  ambassador	  said:	  ‘We	  are	  
always	  fire	  fighting.’	  
	  
Negotiating	  non-­‐Western	  modernity:	  The	  ‘event’	  
	  
Given	  the	  underlying	  notion	  of	  flux	  inherent	  to	  the	  Indian	  worldview,	  what	  are	  the	  markers,	  the	  
waypoints	   used	   by	   the	   practitioners	   to	   navigate	   the	   cosmos?	   Is	   Indian	   diplomacy	   just	   ‘fire-­‐
fighting’	  or	   is	   there	  a	  policy	  emanating	   from	  a	  general	   idea	  of	   the	  purpose	  of	  diplomacy?	  The	  
concept	   of	   the	   ‘event’	   is	   evoked	   but	   it	   raises	   the	   question:	  What	  makes	   an	   event	   an	   event?	  
What	  has	  been	  selected	  are	  those	  which	  the	  practitioners	  have	  self-­‐defined	  as	  noteworthy	  and	  
the	   various	   practices	   that	   they	   produce.	   All	   the	   interviews	   conducted	   with	   members	   of	   the	  
political	  class	  and	  diplomatic	  service	  suggest	  that	  the	  event	  which	  led	  to	  their	  joining	  the	  service	  
and	  in	  conducting	  their	  work	  was	  to	  ‘improve	  the	  human	  condition’	  (the	  individual	  human	  being	  
interviewed	  being	  the	  primary	  target	  for	  improvement)	  or	  to	  ‘do	  something	  for	  the	  country’.	  But	  
this	  has	  very	  particular	  meanings	  in	  India.	  
                                                
79	  Der	  Derian.	  2001.	  p.217.	  
80	  Hoffman.	  2003.	  p.530.	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The	  fundamental	  meaning	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  type	  of	  person	  who	  joins	  the	  MEA.	  The	  rich	  by	  and	  
large	  eschew	  the	  service.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  feeling	  within	  the	  MEA	  was	  not	  one	  of	  privilege	  
and	  wealth.	  They	  did	  not	  see	  themselves	  as	  the	  country’s	  economic	  elite.	  Quite	  the	  opposite	  –	  
they	   saw	   themselves	   as	   strivers.	   Striving	   to	   escape	   poverty.	   Once	   again,	   we	   turn	   to	   Nandy’s	  
Gandhi.	  For	  Nandy,	  Gandhi	  was	  not	  a	  critical	  traditionalist.	  Nandy	  writes:	  
‘Gandhi	  did	  not	  want	  to	  defend	  traditions;	  he	  lived	  with	  them.	  Nor	  did	  he,	   like	  
Nehru,	  want	  to	  museumize	  cultures	  within	  a	  modern	  frame.	  Gandhi’s	  frame	  was	  
traditional	  but	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  criticize	  some	  traditions	  violently.	  He	  was	  even	  
willing	   to	   include	   in	   his	   frame	   elements	   of	   modernity	   as	   critical	   vectors.	   He	  
found	   no	   dissonance	   between	   his	   rejection	   of	   modern	   technology	   and	   his	  
advocacy	  of	   the	  bicycle,	   the	   lathe	  and	   the	   sewing	  machine.	  Gandhi	  defied	   the	  
modern	  world	  by	  opting	  for	  an	  alternative	  frame;	  the	  specifics	  in	  his	  frame	  were	  
frequently	  modern.’81	  
Poverty	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  Indian	  traditions.	  It	  was	  why	  Gandhi	  lived	  in	  ‘poverty’.	  This	  ancient	  
category	   is	   understood	   as	   the	   defining	   event	   from	   the	   level	   of	   the	   individual	   diplomat	   to	   the	  
state.	  
	  
MEA	   officers	   come	   from	   villages	   or	   small	   towns	   and	   their	   lived	   experience	   ‘is	   of	   the	   IAS,	   the	  
district	   commissioner,	   the	   policemen.’	   They	   are	   the	   experiences	   of	   highly	   localised	  
governance.82	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   an	  earlier	   generation	  –	  now	  at	  Ambassador	   level	   –	  whose	  
primary	  motivation	  were	  Nehruvian	  ideals.	  The	  interviewee	  expanded:	  ‘What	  is	  foreign	  service?	  
That	  word	   itself	   is	  not	  a	  good	  word,	   is	   it?	   I	  mean	   ‘foreign’	   is	  …	   (a	   silence	   followed)	  …’	  A	   Joint	  
Secretary	  rank	  officer	  briefing	  probationers	  explained	  the	  silence:	  
‘A	   lot	   of	   you	  will	   come	   from	   India,	   I	  mean	   real	   India	   not	   Delhi.	   And	   now	   you	  
must	  also	  be	  wondering	  what	  all	   this	  Foreign	  Service	   is?	  A	   lot	  of	   the	  work	  you	  
will	  do	  will	  be	  very	  remote	  and	  …	  we	  are	  all	  friends	  here	  …	  quite	  pointless.	  But	  
this	   job	  which	   I’m	  doing,	   it	   can	  give	  you	  something	   real.	  You	  don’t	  have	   to	  go	  
                                                
81	  Nandy.	  1987.	  P.	  238–48.	  p.	  240–41.	  
82	  Interview	  with	  2006	  batch	  officer	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abroad.	  You	  can	  be	  posted	   in	   your	  part	  of	   India.	   You	  can	  actually	  help	  people	  
from	  your	  place!’83	  
‘Your	  place’	  was	  central	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  probationers	  interviewed.	  The	  place	  of	  
origin	  was	  decisively	  and	  unquestioningly	  understood.	  It	  could	  be	  described	  but	  was	  completely	  
variegated	   given	   that	   officers	   questioned	   came	   from	   backgrounds	   whose	   only	   commonality	  
appeared	  to	  be	  poverty,	  the	  ‘universal’84	  desire	  to	  escape	  from	  it,	  and	  that	  they	  qualified	  to	  take	  
the	  civil	  services	  exams.	  Secondly,	  the	  real	  contribution	  this	  man	  was	  making	  was	  as	  a	  passport	  
officer.	   In	   other	  words,	   his	   contribution	  was	   to	   help	   Indians	   escape	   from	   India	   –	   a	   possibility	  
which	  at	  least	  one	  IFS	  officer	  viewed	  as	  an	  opportunity.	  	  
	  
Poverty	   is	  an	   important	  analytical	  category	  because	   in	  the	  dharmic	  conception	   it	   is	  seen	  as	  an	  
‘injustice’.	  Put	  simply,	  it	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  being	  wrong	  or	  as	  K	  Subrahmanyam,	  the	  
father	  of	  the	  123	  Agreement	  negotiator	  and	  himself	  the	  architect	  of	  India’s	  nuclear	  strategy,	  put	  
it,	  ‘it	  destabilizes	  the	  universe.’85	  The	  uniform	  assumption	  by	  India’s	  diplomatic	  class	  is	  that	  the	  
instability	   of	   poverty	   is	   anathema.	   In	   part,	   this	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   reference	   to	   dharma.	  
Dharma	   is	  the	  taking	  of	  action	  based	  on	  the	  event.	  The	  action	  is	  dharmic	   if	   it	   is	   in	  consonance	  
with	   the	   cosmos,	   but	   the	   practitioner	   –	   the	   individual	   diplomat	   –	   has	   to	   judge	   the	   event	   to	  
decide	  what	  (if	  any)	  action	  to	  take.	  Here	  there	  is	  a	  surprising	  uniformity	  in	  reactions	  within	  the	  
service.	  Rather	  than	  becoming	  a	  melee	  of	  contesting	  voices,	  there	  is	  agreement	  that	  poverty	  is	  
the	  primary	   focus	  of	   diplomacy	  because,	   as	   the	   fieldwork	  –	   verified	  by	   visits	   to	   the	  homes	  of	  
some	   diplomats	   –	   shows,	   most	   diplomats	   perceive	   themselves	   to	   have	   come	   from	   poverty.	  
Interviews	  exploring	  the	  background	  of	  diplomats	  show	  that	  the	  rationale	  for	  escaping	  poverty	  
is	   as	   basic	   as	   eating.	   It	   is	   taken	   as	   universal	   and	   real.86	   Upon	   visiting	   a	   slum	   as	   part	   of	   their	  
training	  one	  probationer	  commented,	  ‘it	  was	  better	  than	  any	  slum	  I’ve	  ever	  seen.	  They	  had	  solid	  
houses’.	  The	  Indian	  diplomat’s	  tangible	  relation	  to	  poverty	  –	  set	  in	  dynamic	  relief	  by	  images	  of	  
the	  developed	  world	  and	  the	  Indian	  rich	  on	  television	  –	  is	  a	  governing	  principle	  in	  determining	  
both	  personal	  and	  public	  action.	  
	  
                                                
83	  Speech	  by	  RPO(Delhi).	  
84	  Interview	  with	  2005	  batch	  officer	  
85	  Interview	  with	  K	  Subrahmanyam.	  New	  Delhi.	  June	  2007	  
86	  ‘Wanting	  to	  escape	  from	  poverty,	  to	  better	  oneself	  is	  not	  Indian.	  It	  is	  found	  everywhere,	  I’m	  no	  
different	  from	  anyone	  in	  US	  or	  UK	  wherever	  it	  might	  be.’	  Interview	  with	  2006	  batch	  officer.	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Reared	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   unified	   cosmos,	   Indian	   diplomats	   are	   by	   and	   large	   uninterested	   in	  
effecting	  change	  throughout	  the	  cosmos.	  Hence	  their	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  international	  diplomacy.	  
A	  UPSC	  topper	  categorically	  stated	  she	  was	  not	   interested	   in	   the	   IFS	  and	  preferred	  working	   in	  
rural	  India.87	  The	  sentiment	  is	  produced	  in	  part	  by	  the	  service	  being	  ‘elite’	  –	  i.e.,	  Westernised	  –	  
and	  in	  part	  by	  the	  urge	  to	  effect	  change	  locally	  –	  within	  their	  own	  community	  or	  ancestral	  zone.	  
This	  is	  not,	  as	  has	  been	  noted	  above,	  done	  for	  the	  public	  good	  but	  to	  raise	  individual	  ‘status’.	  
	  
At	   the	   personal	   level	   the	   pre-­‐eminent	   guide	   for	   escaping	   poverty	   was	   the	   accrual	   of	   status.	  
‘Status’	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  –	  primarily	  it	  is	  practical:	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  things	  done,	  
i.e.,	  to	  overcome	  the	  small	  acts	  of	  corruption	  and	  difficulty	  which	  pervade	  Indian	  life.	  Status	   is	  
also	  the	  means	  to	  gain	  recognition	  amongst	  ones	  immediate	  circle	  –	  family,	  friends,	  community	  
(in	  terms	  of	  caste)	  and	  neighbourhood.	  The	  status	  afforded	  by	  a	  diplomatic	  job	  also	  allows	  the	  
civil	  servant	  to	  broaden	  his	  social	  field.	  It	  is	  a	  means	  to	  engage	  with	  other	  people	  only	  accessible	  
to	   those	   with	   status.	   In	   short,	   the	   diplomat	   wants	   to	   be	   a	   diplomat	   because	   of	   the	  
transformational	   capabilities	   of	   the	   ‘Government	   of	   India’	   legend	   embossed	   on	   his	   business	  
card.	  
	  
The	  legend	  ‘GoI’	  provides	  concrete	  temporal	  advantages.	  There	  were	  discussions	  about	  finding	  a	  
stationer	  who	  would,	   contrary	   to	   the	   rulebook,	  make	   cards	   for	   junior	   officers	  with	   the	  Asoka	  
Pillar	   because	   it	   conveyed	   status.88	   My	   incomprehension	   at	   this	   quest	   was	   removed	   by	  
probationers	  explaining	  the	  underlying	  logic	  to	  me.	  It	  stemmed	  from	  the	  poverty	  and	  corruption	  
which	  marred	  their	  lives.	  One	  officer	  explained	  that	  after	  several	  unsuccessful	  visits	  to	  a	  bank	  to	  
open	  an	  account	  things	  began	  to	  change	  only	  when	  he	  produced	  his	  visiting	  card.	  Another	  said	  
that	  he	  wanted	  to	  transfer	  his	  motorbike	  from	  his	  home	  state	  to	  Delhi.	  A	  friend	  had	  agreed	  to	  
handle	  the	  requisite	  paperwork	  but	  the	  man	  in	  charge	  wanted	  a	  bribe.	  The	  officer	  then	  phoned	  
a	  local	  official,	  told	  him	  of	  his	  IFS	  credentials	  and	  the	  paperwork	  was	  done	  without	  any	  money	  
changing	  hands.	   It	  must	  be	  admitted	   that	   ‘status’	   is	   not	   always	  deployed	  only	   to	  obtain	  what	  
ordinarily	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  right.	  On	  occasion	  it	   is	  also	  used	  to	  subvert,	   if	  unsuccessfully,	  the	  law.	  
On	  one	  occasion	  an	  officer	  attempted	  to	  use	  his	  office	  to	  obtain	  exemption	  from	  a	  state	  law	  and	  
failed.	  
                                                
87	  Khanna.	  May	  18,	  2001	  
88	  The	  Asoka	  Pillar	  is	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  and	  can	  only	  be	  used	  by	  an	  officer	  of	  Joint	  
Secretary	  or	  above.	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A	  very	  practical	  example	  of	  malleability	  and	  flexibility	  towards	  influences	  from	  beyond	  the	  local	  
culture	  was	  evident	  at	  a	  diplomat’s	  wedding	  I	  attended	  in	  Western	  India.	  The	  groom	  (the	  officer	  
who	  invited	  me)	  was	  asked	  about	  the	  historicity	  of	  his	  dress	  by	  another	  officer.	  Pointing	  to	  each	  
item	   of	   clothing	   the	   groom	   said:	   ‘The	   turban	   is	   my	   caste,	   this	   shirt	   is	   of	   our	   clan	   and	   this	  
cummerbund	  is	  Western	  …	  see	  we	  have	  India	  here!’89	  On	  a	  long	  train	  ride	  a	  coterie	  of	  diplomats	  
began	   taking	   it	   in	   turns	   to	   recite	  ghazals	   and	  doublets	   in	  Persian.90	   It	  was	  evidently	  a	   friendly	  
competition	   to	   demonstrate	   knowledge	   and	   ability	   which	   served	   no	   other	   purpose	   than	   to	  
demonstrate	   culture	   –	   just	   that	   the	   culture	  was	   high	   Persian,	   imported	   by	   the	  Mughals.	   Yet,	  
none	  of	  those	  who	  were	  	  knowledgeable	  in	  the	  language	  was	  Persian	  or	  even	  a	  Muslim.	  In	  India	  
Persian	  was	   once	  what	   English	   is	   today.	   Another	  members	   of	   the	   group	   said:	   ‘I	   come	   from	   a	  
Hindi-­‐speaking	  family.	  But	  I	  was	  sent	  to	  a	  school	  where	  all	  our	  elite	  go	  and	  so	  I	  made	  it	  a	  point	  to	  
learn	  English,	  to	  change	  my	  accent.	  So,	  all	  this	  is	  acquired’.	  English	  is	  indispensible	  to	  obtaining	  
work.	   But	   changing	   one’s	   accent	   is	   symbolic	   of	   ‘status’,	   that	   is	   mimicking	   those	   regarded	   as	  
superior	  if	  only	  in	  social	  terms.	  
	  
In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Indian	  diplomatic	  practice,	  Neumann	  suggests	  that	  the	  (Western)	  diplomat	  is	  
composed	  of	  three	  intermingling	  scripts.91	  
1. The	  bureaucratic	  script:	  a	  mundane	  technical	  worker	  who	  conforms	  with	  and	  submits	  to	  
the	  role	  that	  his	  office	  demands	  and	  is	  homebound.	  
2. The	  hero	  script,	  a	  narrative	  of	  life	  realized	  by	  the	  diplomat	  taking	  on	  travel	  and	  political	  
roles.	  	  
3. The	  script	  that	  makes	  the	  diplomat	  a	  diplomat:	  the	  script	  of	  the	  negotiator/mediator.	  
For	  Neumann	  the	  first	  two	  scripts	  are	  present	  in	  any	  Western	  person.	  But	  only	  the	  diplomat	  has	  
the	   third	   and	   for	   him	   the	   academic’s	   function	   is	   to	   study	   how	   the	   scripts	   are	   juggled	   for	   the	  
practice	   of	   international	   relations	   lies	   in	   this	   management.	   Neumann	   limits	   himself	   to	   the	  
Norwegian	  diplomatic	  service	  and	  is	  silent	  on	  how	  such	  a	  Western	  script	   is	  performed	  by	  non-­‐
Westerners	  or	  indeed	  whether	  it	  can	  be.	  
	  
                                                
89	  Interview	  with	  2004	  batch	  officer.	  
90	  Conversation	  with	  several	  officers	  of	  the	  2008	  batch.	  
91	  Neumann.	  2005.	  
Page	  67	  of	  227 
 
The	   discussion	   above	   suggests	   that	   the	   script	   present	   in	   any	   Indian	   person	   (as	   opposed	   to	   a	  
Westerner)	  is	  dharma	  (a	  unified	  cosmos	  in	  constant	  flux).	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  IFS	  shows	  that	  the	  
second	  and	  third	  items	  of	  Neumann’s	  script	  are	  absent	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Indian	  officers.	  As	  
most	  of	  the	  MEA	  come	  from	  relatively	  poor	  backgrounds	  and	  operate	  in	  an	  environment	  which	  
lacks	   support	   staff,	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   they	  operate	   is	   produced	  by	   their	   circumstances.	  Of	  
Neumann’s	  scripts,	  ironically,	  only	  the	  first	  one	  is	  applicable	  to	  Indian	  diplomats.	  
	  
Stemming	   from	  poverty	   there	   is	   another	   script	   –	  not	   found	  anywhere	   in	  Neumann’s	   theory	  –	  
that	  identifies	  the	  Indian	  diplomat.	  This	  is	  jugar,	  roughly	  translated	  as	  ‘to	  make	  do’	  in	  a	  number	  
of	   Indian	   languages.	  The	  wealthy	  do	  not	  need	   to	  make	  do.	  Only	   the	  poor	  have	   to.	   In	  practice	  
jugar	   is	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   Indian	   life.	   It	   also	   defines	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Indian	   diplomats	  
operate.	   In	  brief,	  the	  Indian	  officials	   involved	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐US	  nuclear	  negotiations	  said	  that	  the	  
US	  deployed	  a	  huge	  number	  of	  people	  at	  meetings	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  separate	  skills.	  On	  occasion	  
only	  two	  Indian	  diplomats	  had	  to	  negotiate	  with	  over	  50	  on	  the	  US	  side.	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  
this	   mismatch	   was	   the	   MEA’s	   shortage	   of	   staff.	   Explaining	   this,	   the	   Foreign	   Secretary’s	  
comments	   again	  demonstrate	   that	   Indians	  do	  not	  perceive	   themselves	   as	  different	   from	  non-­‐
Indians.	  He	  said:	  	  
‘the	   IFS	   is	   really	   less	   than	   700	   people;	   and	   when	   we	   look	   at	   comparable	  
countries,	   for	   every	   Indian	   diplomat,	   there	   are	   four	   Brazilian	   diplomats;	   for	  
every	   Indian	   diplomat,	   there	   are	   seven	   Chinese	   diplomats.	  Now,	  we	  might	   be	  
wonderful	  and	  very	  efficient,	  but	  we	  are	  not	  that	  efficient	  or	  that	  good.’92	  
The	  Ministry’s	  Historical	  division	  was	  shut	  down	  because	  of	  a	  manpower	  shortage.	  The	  Minister	  
has	  a	  staff	  of	  essentially	   two	  –	  one	  from	  the	   IFS	  and	  another	   from	  an	  allied	  service	  –	  which	   is	  
smaller	   than	   Algeria’s.	   An	   officer’s	   responsibility	   includes	   everything	   from	   arranging	   a	   visiting	  
dignitary’s	   paperwork	   to	   writing	   policy	   analysis	   papers.	   Given	   the	   workload	   at	   Headquarters,	  
embassies	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  communicate	  with	  officers.	  An	  officer	  says	  ‘we	  don’t	  respond	  
because	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  say,	  usually	  they	  want	  us	  to	  change	  something.’	  Working	  conditions	  
are	  poor.	  Sometimes,	  officers	  work	   in	   rooms	  without	   fans,	   leave	  alone	  air	  conditioners,	   in	   the	  
summer	   heat.	   A	   formal	   application	   for	   an	   air	   conditioner	   was	   never	   heard	   of.	   Bathrooms	  
attached	   to	  offices	  are	  often	  stacked	  with	   rotting	   files.	  Embassies	  complain	   that	  headquarters	  
                                                
92	  Fifteenth	  Report.	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  External	  Affairs.	  2006-­‐07.	  14th	  Lok	  Sabah.	  Lok	  Sabah	  
Secretariat.	  P.13	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never	  repy	  to	  their	  notes	  and	  memos	  so	  that	  the	  ambassador	  is	  left	  much	  to	  his	  own	  devices	  to	  
get	  things	  done.	  An	  ambassador	  says	  he	  cannot	  get	  a	  mobile	  phone	  when	  visiting	  Delhi	  and	  has	  
to	  use	  his	  wife’s	  phone.	  Given	  the	  paucity	  of	  resources,	  even	  the	  most	  successful	  officers	  have	  
to	  perform	  mundane	  tasks	  such	  as	  creating	  guest	  lists	  and	  checking	  on	  entertainment	  programs.	  
Essentially,	  there	  is	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  hard	  pressed	  but	  not	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  facilities	  –	  to	  
which	  they	  quickly	  become	  reconciled.	  The	  main	  irritant	  is	  that	  the	  social	  recognition	  that	  many	  
new	  candidates	  assumed	  would	  come	  with	  the	  job	  does	  not	  appear.	  
	  
The	  minority	  of	  diplomats	  who	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  most	  successful	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  exploit	  the	  
idea	  of	  ‘jugar’.	  They	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  make	  do	  effectively	  in	  propagating	  the	  core	  values	  of	  the	  
MEA	  and	   its	  aims	  with	  very	   little.	  Right	   from	  the	   start	  of	  one’s	   career	  people	  are	   selected	   for	  
their	  general	  outlook	  and	  placed	  in	  positions	  based	  on	  informal	  consultations	  among	  a	  handful	  
of	   people	   in	   the	   Ministry.	   It	   was	   unsurprising	   to	   me	   when	   the	   selections	   for	   the	   first	   duty-­‐
postings	   were	   announced.	   The	   people	  who	   in	  my	   opinion	  were	   the	  most	   focused	   on	   getting	  
their	  jobs	  done	  and	  willing	  to	  focus	  on	  that	  ‘event’	  by	  shelving	  other	  concerns	  were	  assigned	  to	  
the	   most	   demanding	   assignments.	   Already	   their	   reputations	   were	   being	   cut	   and	   the	   future	  




In	  de	  Certeau’s	  terms,	  the	  IFS	  is	  the	  native	  woman	  in	  the	  Writing	  of	  History.	  Very	  little	  is	  known	  
about	  what	  she	  thought.	  Her	  descendents	  evidently	  do	  not	  think	  they	  were	  conquered.	  Instead,	  
they	   use	   the	   techniques	   that	   the	   colonizers	   introduced	   to	   simply	   further	   native	   desires.	   A	  
significant	   desire	   is	   to	   escape	   poverty	   –	   both	   physical	   and	   social.	   But	   it	   is	   an	   error	   to	   posit	   a	  
distinction	   between	   self	   and	   ‘other’.	   The	   starting	   point	   is	   instead	   a	   unified	   cosmos	   –	   many	  
diplomats	   referred	   to	   their	   socio-­‐religious	   beliefs	   as	   being	   founded	   in	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘sanatandharm’,	  i.e.,	  the	  universal	  way,	  but	  actualized	  locally.	  It	  is	  why	  Foreign	  Minister	  Pranab	  
Mukherjee	  finds	  it	  inexplicable	  that	  ‘there	  should	  be	  any	  objection	  to	  us	  having	  friendly	  relations	  
with	  China	   and	   Japan	  and	   the	  US	   and	   Iran.	  We	  want	   to	  help	  ourselves	  by	  being	   friendly	  with	  
everyone.’93	  One	  set	  of	  relationships	  does	  not	  imply	  anything	  more	  or	   less	  than	  that	  particular	  
relationship.	  It	  does	  not	  exclude	  others.	  It	  explains	  why	  India	  has	  never	  understood	  the	  logoc	  of	  
                                                
93	  Interview.	  December	  2008	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‘blocs’	  or	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  ‘We	  have	  poor	  relations	  with	  Pakistan	  but	  that	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  they	  
should	   not	   gain	   a	   stake	   in	   our	   economy.	   If	   only	   they	   agreed	   to	   negotiate	   with	   us	   and	   open	  
borders,’	  says	  an	  ambassador.	  The	  specter	  of	  being	  misunderstood	  constantly	  plagues	  the	  IFS	  as	  
nations	  mistake	  a	  treaty	  or	  an	  agreement	  as	  significant	  of	  greater	  shifts	  or	  changes.	  ‘It’s	  like	  they	  
are	  reading	  tea-­‐leaves.	  An	  agreement	  is	  an	  agreement.	  Nothing	  more	  or	  less.	  Full	  Stop.’	  94	  Even	  
when	   the	   Indian	   diplomat	   is	   practising	   diplomacy,	   the	   moves	   are	   only	   superficially	   those	  
presumed	  by	  IR.	  Inside,	  in	  the	  mind	  the	  diplomat	  is	  however	  moving	  to	  a	  different	  style.95	  
	  
This	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   IFS	   is	   a	   distinctive	  modernity.	   But	   is	   this	   a	   derivative	  
discourse?	  Verifying	   this	   requires	   identifying	   the	   rationales	  of	   the	  present.	  What	   is	  discovered	  
about	   today	   provokes	   controversy	   because	   it	   is	   distinct	   from	   the	   literature.	   For	   the	   artist	  
ostranenie	   is	   a	  means	   of	   evoking	   a	   novel	   response	   beneficial	   in	   its	   own	   right	   and	   immensely	  
effective	   as	   Tolstoy’s	   horse	   demonstrates.	   For	   the	   literature	   there	   is	   a	   far	   more	   compelling	  
reason	   to	   investigate	   the	   present	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   past:	   modernist	   histories	   of	   non-­‐Western	  
modernity	  have	  little	  to	  say	  about	  those	  practices	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  practitioners	  themselves.	  It	  
is	  to	  the	  logics	  underpinning	  practices,	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  practitioners,	  that	  we	  now	  turn	  to.	  
	  
ENDS	  
                                                
94	  Interview	  with	  senior	  member	  at	  Headquaters	  
95	  Buchanan.	  1997.	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CHAPTER	  THREE:	  	  NON-­‐WESTERN	  SOURCES	  OF	  INDIAN	  DIPLOMATIC	  THEORY	  
	  
whatever	  is	  here	  may	  be	  found	  elsewhere,	  but	  what	  is	  absent	  from	  here	  does	  
not	  exist	  anywhere	  	  
	  	  –	  Mahābhārata,	  1.56.33	  
	  
It	  would	  not	  be	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  the	  people	  of	  India	  have	  learnt	  to	  
think	  and	  act	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Mahabharata.	  




This	   chapter	   and	   the	   next	   will	   explore	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   modernity	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	  
chapter.	  This	  will	  be	  done	  along	  two	  axes.	  This	  chapter	  will	  isolate	  the	  intellectual	  foundations	  of	  
Indian	   diplomatic	  modernity	   and	   the	   next	   chapter	  will	   identify	   the	   roots	   of	   Indian	   diplomatic	  
practice.	  This	  is	  because	  as	  a	  very	  senior	  Secretary	  level	  officer	  says:	  
‘Our	   ancient	  heritage	  has	  not	  been	   institutionalized	  but	   it	   is	   there	   in	  our	  own	  
lives,	   in	  our	   family	   lives,	   in	   the	   lives	  of	  our	  societies.	  MEA	   is	  not	   institutionally	  
something	  ancient.	  I	  know	  we’ve	  had	  colonialism,	  but	  the	  point	  is	  regardless	  of	  
our	   heritage	   not	   being	   institutionalized,	   it	   has	   survived	   in	   the	   sinews	   of	   our	  
society.	  We	  responded,	  we	  acted	  and	  reacted	  to	  colonial	  rule,	  to	  situations	  and	  
people	  that	  colonialism	  brought	  to	  us	  in	  our	  way.	  That’s	  our	  heritage,	  it’s	  what	  
shapes	   our	   official	   behaviour	   because	   we	   are	   the	   officials.	  We	   animate	   this	  
bureaucracy	  even	  though	  it	  might	  once	  have	  been	  alien.’2	  	  	  
This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  this	  ‘ancient	  heritage’	  whereas	  the	  next,	  the	  roots	  of	  institutions.	  Once	  
again	  this	  chapter	  moves	  from	  the	  diplomatic	  present	  along	  the	  lines	  practitioners	  suggest.	  They	  
all	  point	  to	  the	  Mahābhārata	  (Mb).	  The	  use	  of	  the	  text	  and	  its	  understandings	  today	  by	  Indian	  
diplomats	  are	  presented.	  This	  requires	  first	  developing	  a	  means	  of	  handling	  the	  text	  in	  the	  terms	  
of	   those	   who	   use	   it	   and	   then	   applying	   the	   method	   to	   the	   text	   to	   tease	   out	   the	   theoretical	  
notions	  embedded	  in	  the	  text.	  
                                                
1	  Dandekar.	  1954.	  P.2	  
2	  Interview	  with	  Secretary,	  Government	  of	  India	  in	  London.	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The	  Mahābhārata	  Today	  
	  
The	   local	   roots	   of	   the	   theoretical	   principles	   motivating	   Indian	   modernity	   are	   not	   difficult	   to	  
locate	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  practitioners	   themselves.	   In	  a	   lecture	   to	  new	  diplomats,	   India’s	   Foreign	  
Secretary	   Shiv	   Shankar	   Menon	   began	   by	   referring	   to	   a	   pillar	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   diplomatic	  
community	  and	   then	  switched	   to	  a	   text	  never	   investigated	  by	   IR	  as	  a	   repository	  of	  diplomatic	  
practice,	   much	   less	   a	   theory	   of	   diplomacy.	   In	   switching	   to	   this	   text,	   the	   arch-­‐practitioner	   of	  
Indian	  diplomacy	  returned	  home	  –	  because	  it	  was	  the	  only	  language	  of	  diplomacy	  his	  audience	  
was	  familiar	  with.3	  	  
	  
The	  text	  Menon	  began	  with	  was	  Nicholson’s	  Diplomacy.4	  Menon	  selected	  seven	  qualities	  from	  
the	   ‘Nicholson	  test’	   for	  the	   ideal	  diplomat.5	  They	  were:	  truthfulness,	  precision,	  calm,	  patience,	  
good	   temper,	   modesty	   and	   loyalty.6	   The	   reference	   to	   Nicolson	   would	   be	   accepted,	   even	  
expected,	  by	   IR.	  After	  all,	  Nicolson	   is	   regarded	  as	  having	  epitomised	   the	   ideal	  diplomat	  and	   is	  
viewed	  as	  an	  eminent	  theorist.7	  It	  would	  reassure	  Bull	  that	  an	  Indian	  Foreign	  Secretary	  refers	  to	  
Nicolson	  in	  a	  talk	  on	  ‘what	  qualities	  one	  looks	  for	  in	  a	  diplomat	  and	  whether	  these	  have	  changed	  
over	  time.’	  But	  for	  Menon,	  these	  qualities	  are	  ‘what	  your	  mother	  told	  you	  anyway.’	  So	  why	  do	  
diplomats	  need	  them?	  
‘These	  are	  the	  qualities	  which	  enhance	  your	  credibility	  as	  a	  diplomat.	  …	  Even	  if	  
you	  are	   threatening	   the	  use	  of	   force,	  which	   is	   the	  most	  extreme	  case	  of	  what	  
you	  may	  be	  asked	  to	  do,	  you	  are	  credible	  not	  because	  of	   the	  capability	   to	  use	  
force,	   but	   because	   what	   you	   say	   is	   credible.	   There	   is	   no	   point	   in	  making	   the	  
threat	  if	  you	  yourself	  are	  not	  credible.’	  
                                                
3	  A	  former	  diplomat	  said	  so	  in	  contemptuous	  terms.	  Interview.	  	  
4	  Nicolson.	  1964	  
5	  Sir	  Ernest	  Satow.	  1979.	  p.451	  
6	  Nicolson	  also	  mentions:	  intelligence,	  knowledge,	  discernment,	  prudence,	  hospitality,	  charm,	  industry,	  
courage	  and	  tact.	  Menon	  mentioned	  ‘precision’	  which	  Nicolson	  called	  ‘accuracy’.	  See	  Nicolson.	  
Diplomacy.	  P.67	  
7	  These	  values	  were	  for	  Nicolson	  and	  successive	  generations	  of	  theorists	  an	  amalgam	  of	  Graeco-­‐Roman	  
ethical	  values,	  the	  moral	  injunctions	  of	  the	  Enlightenment,	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  English	  
gentleman.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  epitomise	  Western	  civilisation.	  See	  H.	  Nicolson.	  1955.	  p.40-­‐80,	  162-­‐205;	  
‘Introduction’	  to	  Sir	  Horace	  Rumbold.	  The	  War	  Crisis	  in	  Berlin	  July-­‐August	  1914.	  2nd	  edn.	  London.	  
Constable.	  1944.	  p.xix	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In	  addition	  to	  ‘credibility,’	  Menon	  added	  two	  more	  virtues:	  ‘the	  ability	  to	  think	  for	  the	  other’	  and	  
‘remember	   that	   you	   are	   dealing	   with	   people.’	   The	   former	   is	   premised	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   a	  
negotiation	  can	  only	  work	  if	  both	  parties	  compromise	  and	  arrive	  at	  an	  acceptable	  conclusion.	  A	  
negotiation	  does	  not	  work	  if	  it	   is	  based	  on	  either	  lies	  or	  on	  force.	  Deploying	  ones	  ‘asymmetric’	  
power	  to	  force	  through	  an	  agreement	  makes	  it	  only	  meaningful	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  
	  
The	  virtues	  Menon	  dwelt	  upon	  and	  the	  other	  two	  come	  from	  the	  Mb.	  It	  provides	  other	  qualities	  
unmentioned	  by	  Nicolson:	  ‘high	  personal	  reputation’	  and	  ‘knowing	  everyone.’	  Menon’s	  speech	  
requires	  quoting	  at	  length:	  
‘It	  is	  interesting	  that	  when	  as	  an	  Indian	  diplomat	  you	  look	  back,	  in	  India,	  our	  first	  
earliest	  ideal	  sort	  of	  diplomat	  was	  Krishna	  in	  the	  Mb.	  For	  six	  months	  before	  the	  
Great	   War	   there	   was	   this	   intense	   period	   of	   diplomacy	   and	   tremendous	  
negotiation	   and	   mediation	   between	   all	   the	   mini-­‐states,	   tribes	   and	   dynasties.	  
Krishna	  was	  involved	  in	  most	  of	  them	  and	  the	  Mb	  goes	  into	  this	  in	  great	  detail.	  
It	  actually	  goes	  through	  the	  qualities	  that	  made	  Krishna	  a	  good	  diplomat.	  How	  
did	  he	  manage	   to	  achieve	  his	   goals?	  And	   this	   is	   interesting.	   They	   come	   to	   the	  
same	   list	   of	   seven	   virtues.	   It	   is	   almost	   identical.	   They	   used	   slightly	   different	  
words	  but	  basically,	  it	  is	  the	  same	  seven	  things	  that	  they	  think	  a	  diplomat	  should	  
be	  doing.	  He	  had	  two	  added	  advantages,	   if	  you	  read	  the	  Mb;	  one	  of	  them	  was	  
high	  personal	  reputation.	  It	  helps,	  if	  people	  think	  you	  are	  God	  or	  think	  that	  you	  
are	  special.	  More	  so,	  he	  personally	  knew	  everybody	  in	  every	  single	  royal	  family	  
that	  he	  was	  dealing	  with	   -­‐	   in	   those	  days,	   it	  was	   royal	   families.	  But	   for	  me,	   the	  
interesting	  thing	  is	  that	  here	  are	  two	  people	  separated	  over	  time	  by	  thousands	  
of	  years.	  Nicholson,	  early	  20th	  century,	  classical	  European	  diplomat;	  he	  was	  at	  
Versailles.	  Krishna	  in	  the	  Mb,	  2500	  years	  ago	  at	  least,	  in	  what	  is	  still	  a	  semi-­‐tribal	  
society	   and	   yet	   they	   both	   say	   the	   same	   thing;	   both	   describe	   the	   same	   set	   of	  
virtues	  for	  a	  diplomat.	  Which	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  remarkable	  continuity	  over	  
time,	  over	  space;	  that	  the	  qualities	  required	  of	  a	  diplomat	  over	  vastly	  different	  
cultures	  and	  over	  a	  very	  long	  period	  of	  historical	  time	  are	  much	  the	  same.’	  
	  
Menon’s	   lecture	  was	   also	   significant	   in	   terms	  of	   delivery.	  He	  did	  not	   introduce	  or	   explain	   the	  
text.	   He	   did	   not	   need	   to.	   In	   my	   role	   as	   teacher	   for	   two	   batches	   of	   IFS	   officers	   I	   discovered	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everyone	  knew	  the	  ins	  and	  outs	  of	  the	  Mb.	  One	  said:	  ‘No	  matter	  how	  English	  speaking	  we	  are,	  
this	   [the	  Mb]	   remains	  our	  basic	   [sic].	  Our	  history.’	   Furthermore,	   in	  private	   conversations	  with	  
some	   forty	   new	   diplomats	   not	   a	   single	   officer	   contradicted	   Menon’s	   opinions.	   To	   put	   this	  
knowledge	   in	   a	   European	   context	  makes	   it	   even	  more	   extraordinary.	   The	  Mb	   is	   a	   text	   some	  
2,500	  years	  old,	  yet	  Indians	  today	  know	  it	  intimately.	  The	  European	  equivalent	  would	  be	  a	  deep	  
familiarity	  with	   the	   Iliad	   and	   the	  Odyssey.	  Moreover,	   the	  Mb	  has	  been	  –	  at	   the	  very	   least	  –	  a	  
referential	   text	   for	   diplomats	   throughout	   the	   history	   of	   Indian	   diplomacy.	   India’s	   first	   Foreign	  
Secretary	  wrote:	  
‘…	   long	  before	  European	  diplomacy,	  and	  Europe	   itself,	  assumed	  shape,	   the	  art	  
of	  diplomacy	  had	  been	  developed,	  particularly	  in	  India	  …	  Take	  Krishna’s	  mission	  
as	  an	  envoy	  of	  the	  Pandavas	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  the	  Kauravas.	  Krishna	  says	  ‘I	  shall	  go	  
to	  the	  Court	  of	  the	  Kauravas	  to	  present	  your	  case	   in	  the	  best	   light	  and	  try	  and	  
get	   them	   to	   accept	   your	   demands,	   but	   if	   my	   efforts	   fail	   and	   war	   becomes	  
inevitable	  we	  shall	  show	  the	  world	  that	  we	  are	  right	  and	  they	  are	  wrong,	  so	  that	  
the	  world	  may	  not	  misjudge	  between	  us.’	  Here,	   in	  a	  nutshell,	   is	  the	  essence	  of	  
diplomacy,	  which	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  art	  of	  negotiation.	  Its	  primary	  purpose	  
is	  to	  avoid	  war,	  but	  if	  war	  should	  become	  inevitable	  the	  world	  should	  know	  who	  
was	  responsible	  for	  it.	  Even	  in	  Sri	  Krishna’s	  days,	  public	  opinion	  was	  a	  factor	  to	  
be	  taken	  into	  account.’8	  	  
	  
Evidently,	   from	   the	   time	   of	   Indian	   independence	   to	   today,	   the	  Mb	   has	   provided	   a	   trope	   for	  
Indian	  diplomats.	  The	  text	  is	  however	  not	  limited	  to	  providing	  the	  means	  for	  Indian	  diplomats	  to	  
orient	   themselves	   to	   the	   technicalities	   of	   ‘diplomacy’.	   The	  Mb	   is	   primarily	   a	   repository	   for	   a	  
philosophy	  of	  action	  played	  out	  in	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	  individual	  diplomats	  and	  the	  making	  of	  
Indian	  diplomatic	  policy.	  In	  short,	  if	  the	  purpose	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  fundamental	  canons	  governing	  
the	  decision-­‐making	  matrices	   in	   the	   spheres	  of	  opinion	  and	  act9	   then	   the	  Mb	   is	   indispensible.	  
This	   chapter	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   Mb	   not	   only	   represents	   the	   ‘highest	   levels	   of	   cultural	  
productions	   …	   common	   over	   long	   historical	   periods	   to	   two	   or	   more	   people,	   societies,	   or	  
territories’10	   but	   also	   that,	   in	   Nelson’s	   terms,	   the	   Mb	   is	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   canons	  
                                                
8	  Menon.	  1977.	  p.4-­‐5	  
9	  Nelson.	  1962.	  And	  	  Nelson.	  1972.	  p.123-­‐127	  
10	  Nielsen.	  2004.	  p.120.	  In	  stating	  this,	  Nielsen	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Weber	  and	  Durkheim/Mauss.	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governing	  the	  decision	  making	  matrices	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  opinion	  and	  act.11	  The	  Mb	  is	  a	  directive	  
system	  providing	  the	  symbolic	  economy	  of	  the	  civilization.12	  	  
	  
Civilizational	  analysis	  is	  the	  ideal	  tool	  to	  investigate	  the	  formation	  and	  meaning	  of	  this	  text	  along	  
routes	   proposed.	   Nielsen,	   in	   disengaging	   Nelson’s	   research	   question	   from	   a	   European	   orbit	  
notes	  that,	  ‘similar	  questions	  might	  be	  asked	  about	  Islam,	  Buddhism	  and	  others.	  How	  are	  they	  
to	   be	   brought	   under	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   faith	   structure	   emphasizing	   individual	   and	   collective	  
purgation	   of	   evil	   through	   conformity	   with	   a	   logos	   or	   world	   soul?	   Or	   are	   different	   categories	  
important	   to	   these	   faith	  structures?’13	  Given	   the	  paucity	  of	   such	  questions	  being	  posed	   in	   the	  
non-­‐Western	   world,	   it	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   Nelson	   himself	   mistakenly	   concluded	   that	   ‘the	  
immense	  variety	  of	  languages,	  social	  groups	  and	  prescriptive	  rituals	  in	  India	  stood	  in	  the	  way	  of	  
a	  full	  ventilation	  of	  the	  principal	  structures	  and	  a	  full	  rationalization	  of	  intelligence.	  The	  moves	  
to	  neutralization,	  generalization,	  universalization,	  rationalization	  were	  checked	  at	  every	  turn.’14	  
In	   other	   words,	   in	   India	   the	   transition	   from	   faith	   structures	   to	   the	   rational	   was	   impeded.	   In	  
particular,	   India	   was	   unable	   to	   harness	   the	   ‘scientific-­‐technological-­‐perspectival	   revolution’	  
which	   took	   place	   in	   Europe,	   making	   it	   a	   progressive	   society.	   India,	   in	   contrast,	   remained	   a	  
stationary	  society,	  until	  presumably	  contact	  with	  dynamic	  Europe.15	  	  
	  
Nelson’s	   analysis	   is	   neither	   novel	   nor	   correct.	   His	   reading	   is	   the	   product	   of	   a	   very	   particular	  
strand	  of	   European	  understanding	  of	   history	   and	  philosophy	  applied	   to	   India.	  As	   a	   corrective,	  
Nielsen	  notes	   that	   to	  apply	  Nelson’s	  method	   to	   the	  non-­‐Western	  world	   requires	  not	   just	  new	  
categories	   but	   a	   new	   system	   of	   analysis.	   This	   is	   required	   because	   colonialism	   converted	   pre-­‐
colonial	   systems	   of	   knowledge	   into	   raw	   data	   for	   European	   systems	   of	   historiography	   and	  
delegitimized	  pre-­‐colonial	   systems	  of	   knowledge	   though	   they	   continue	   to	   shape	  non-­‐Western	  
reality.16	   Rather	   than	   force	   Indian	   reality	   into	   European	   perspectives,	   a	   new	   technique	   of	  
analysis	  will	  be	  developed	  from	  Textures	  of	  Time.	  The	  analysis	  will	  adapt	  textures	  as	  a	  technique	  
to	  recover	  not	  pre-­‐colonial	  history	  from	  local	  texts	  but	  a	  philosophy	  of	  practice.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  
                                                
11	  Nelson.	  1962.	  
12	  Nelson1973.	  p.83.	  
13	  Nielsen.	  Benjamin	  Nelson’s	  Sociology	  of	  Civilizations.	  P.	  413	  
14	  Nelson.	  Ibid.	  p.88	  
15	  Nelson.	  Ibid.	  p.87-­‐88	  
16	  See	  Mantena.	  October	  2007.p.	  396-­‐408.	  
Page	  75	  of	  227 
 
analysis	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   criticisms	   of	  Mantena17	   and	   Nandy.18	   In	   applying	   the	   technique	   the	  
chapter	   will	   finally	   conclude	   by	   unraveling	   two	   controversies	   arising	   from	   the	   mismatch	  
between	  Indian	  diplomatic	  practice	  and	  the	  position	  of	  the	  academy.	  They	  are	  the	  notion	  that	  
both	   the	   rationality	   of	   modernity	   and	   that	   the	   conceptions	   of	   diplomatic	   modernity	   entered	  
India	  via	  colonialism.	  	  
	  
Managing	  the	  text	  
	  
In	  Textures	   the	  authors	  propose	   two	   tools:	   genres	  and	   texture.	   If	   European	   (or	  Europeanized)	  
eyes	   searched	   for	   a	   historical	   genre	   in	   classical	   Indian	   texts	   then	   they	   would	   conclude	   that	  
Indians	  wrote	  ahistorical	  myths.	  Textures	  however	  proposes	  that	  history	  was	  written	  in	  terms	  of	  
dominant	   genres	   at	   any	   given	   time	   and	   that	   these	   change.	   As	   genres	   are	   replaced	   they	  may	  
come	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   ‘literature’.19	   Examining	   a	   number	   of	   south	   Indian	   pre-­‐colonial	   texts	   the	  
authors	  find	  in	  them	  a	  conception	  of	  history	  recognisable	  to	  today’s	  academics.	  Textures	  points	  
out	  that	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  between	  history	  and	  myth	  is	  not	  what	  is	  true	  and	  false,	  but	  what	  
is	  factual	  and	  fictive.	  Textures	  argues	  the	  mythical	  in	  a	  text	  does	  not	  discredit	  a	  text’s	  historical	  
genre.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   understand	   the	   historical	   sensibilities	   of	   pre-­‐colonial	   society.	  
The	   reader,	   Textures	   argues	   knew	   what	   is	   real	   and	   false	   through	   the	   internal	   clues.	   This	   is	  
texture.	   It	   is	  a	  set	  of	   ‘subgeneric	  markers	  …	  shorthand	  for	  the	  diagnostic	  elements	  that	  enable	  
the	   reader	   to	   make	   distinctions	   within	   a	   genre	   …	   the	   clues	   left	   for	   the	   reader	   to	   find,	  
deliberately	   created	   as	   part	   of	   textual	   (and	   perhaps	   individual	   authorial)	   intention	   [and]	  
comprehensible	  to	  its	  intended	  audience.’20	  It	  is	  the	  search	  for	  the	  internal	  structuring	  of	  a	  text	  
to	  identify	  ‘historical’	  aspects.	  The	  ideal	  reader	  therefore	  is	  part-­‐and-­‐parcel	   in	  constructing	  the	  
text.	  Mantena’s	  critique	  of	  this	  is:	  ‘how	  do	  we	  know	  what	  makes	  up	  the	  cognitive	  world	  of	  the	  
reader?	  Surely,	  by	  employing	  the	  same	  criteria/categories	  (such	  as	  verifiability)	  to	  identify	  that	  
which	  is	  history,	  we	  attribute	  to	  readers	  the	  cognitive	  make-­‐up	  of	  modern	  historians.’	  
	  
                                                
17	  Ibid.	  
18	  Mantena,	  Ibid.,	  &	  Nandy.	  May,	  1995.	  
19	  Even	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition,	  the	  question	  of	  genre	  was	  always	  in	  flux.	  Only	  after	  the	  
professionalization	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  history	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  did	  a	  genre	  monopolize	  claims	  on	  
historical	  truth.	  
20	  Rao,	  et	  al.	  Textures.	  Introduction:	  A	  Palette	  of	  Histories.	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A	   means	   of	   tackling	   Mantena	   is	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   rationalisation	   challenge	   that	   myth	   faced	   in	  
antiquarian	  Greece.	  The	  challenge	  came	  on	  two	  fronts:	  history	  and	  philosophy.	  The	  distinction	  
being	  that	  the	  former,	  assumes	  the	  myth	  contained	  a	  kernel	  of	  truth,	  while	  the	  latter	  assumes	  
the	  myth	  contained	  a	  kind	  of	  truth.21	  History	  arose	  from,	  for	  example,	  Hesiod,	  who	  states	  that	  
the	  Muses	  do	  not	  always	  speak	  the	  truth,	  thereby	  constituting	  a	  realm	  of	  truth	  over	  which	  he	  
himself	   claims	  authority.	   It	  was	   the	  birth	  of	   the	  guild	  of	  historians	  and	   their	   claim	   to	   ‘truth.’22	  
Veyne	   characterised	   this	   as	   the	   devaluation	   of	   myth	   to	   a	   ‘lie’.23	   The	   second	   rationalisation	  
challenge	  was	  allegorical	   interpretation	   representing	   the	  critical	  methodology	  of	  philosophers.	  
In	   ancient	  Greece,	  Pausanias	  while	   rationalising	  myths	   concluded	   they	  encoded	  a	   truth	   in	   the	  
form	  of	  allegory	  and	  riddle.	  Pausanias	  began	  a	  sceptic	  but	  the	  process	  of	  study	  made	  him	  grow	  
to	   ‘hold	   a	   more	   thoughtful	   view	   of	   them.’24	   His	   ‘road	   to	   Damascus’	   provides	   the	   means	   to	  
manage	  Mantena’s	  critique.	  True,	  Pausanias	  created	  a	  dogma	  of	  interpretation	  by	  divorcing	  the	  
facts	   in	   a	   myth	   from	   the	   stories	   of	   history	   and	   he	   did	   this	   by	   minimally	   adhering	   to	   the	  
conventions	  of	  his	  own	  ‘program	  of	  truth’.25	  But,	  Pausanias	  did	  not	  revoke	  the	  myth.	  He	  did	  not	  
need	   to	   because	   he	  was	   not	   looking	   for	   verifiability,	  which	  Textures	   seeks.	   Pausanias	   did	   talk	  
about	   the	   past	   and	   from	   his	   position	   but	   without	   attempting	   to	   subsume	   the	   past	   into	   his	  
framework.	  An	  analogy	   is	  knowing	   full-­‐well	   that	  Lady	  Macbeth	   is	  a	   figment	  of	   the	   imagination	  
and	  still	  enquiring	  how	  many	  children	  she	  may	  have.26	  The	  emphasis	  is	  not	  on	  verifiable	  fact,	  but	  
on	  teasing	  out	  codes.	  These	  are	  a	  reality,	  they	  may	  even	  be	  historical	  reality	  but	  the	  latter,	  they	  
can	   only	   be	   found	   in	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   myth.	   As	   Veyne	   writes,‘“reality”	   is	   the	   child	   of	   the	  
constitutive	   imagination	   of	   our	   tribe.’27	   Furthermore,	   the	   exegesis	   Pausanias	   proposed	   was	  
founded	  upon	  constantly	  limiting	  the	  infringement	  of	  our	  own	  codes	  on	  the	  myth	  –	  as	  much	  as	  
possible.	  Reconceptualising	   the	  pre-­‐rupture	  past	   in	   the	  categories	  of	  a	  post-­‐rupture	  present	   is	  
                                                
21	  Veyne.	  1988.	  p.65,	  65-­‐69	  
22	  Veyne.	  P.30-­‐31,	  33	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  ‘professional	  investigators’(p.33).	  See	  Preus.	  1987.	  P.40-­‐55.	  
23	  In	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Lévi-­‐Strauss’s	  response	  to	  myth	  was	  to	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  mythic	  
consciousness	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  historical	  consciousness	  of	  the	  West	  (something	  that	  
Giambattista	  Vico	  attempted	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century;	  Ernst	  Cassirer,	  inspired	  in	  part	  by	  Vico,	  also	  tried	  
to	  provide	  a	  logic	  to	  myth).	  See	  Lévi-­‐Strauss.	  1966.	  Vico.	  1984;	  Cassirer.	  1946.	  
24	  Veyne.	  P.11	  
25	  Ibid.,	  P.21-­‐22,	  Chapter	  5	  
26	  Ibid.,	  P.98	  
27	  Ibid.,	  P.113	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not	  new.	  It	  is	  Ganeri	  assures	  us,	  ‘among	  the	  most	  characteristic	  hallmarks	  of	  Indian	  intellectual	  
practice.’28	  
	  
Reading	   the	   Mb	   in	   this	   manner	   –	   looking	   for	   the	   textures	   within	   the	   text	   to	   tease	   out	   not	  
verifiable	  fact,	  but	  the	  codes	  of	  a	  society	  –	  does	  not	  produce	  a	  lesser	  ‘truth’.	  It	  is	  for	  Nandy	  far	  
more	   consequential	   than	   verifiable	   truth	   because	   it	   offers	   ethical	   and	   therapeutic	   benefits	  
denied	  by	  historicization.29	  This	  is	  Nandy’s	  carefully	  delineated	  target.	  Nandy’s	  historicization	  is	  
a	  conquering	  force,	  striving	  to	  bring	  the	  past	  under	  its	  domain30	  which,	  predicated	  on	  secularism	  
and	  liberalism	  is	  convinced	  that	  all	  pasts	  are	  the	  same.	  Even	  alternative	  conceptions	  of	  the	  past	  
cannot	   escape.	   They	   are	   rendered	   the	   same	   through	   the	   deployment	   of	   an	   ‘imperialism	   of	  
categories.’31	  This	  is	  Enlightenment	  History.	  It,	  and	  not	  the	  past	  is	  the	  target	  for	  Nandy’s	  attack.	  
In	  fact	  the	  past,	  for	  Nandy,	  is	  the	  balm	  to	  the	  malaise	  of	  liberal-­‐secularist	  empirical	  historicism.	  
He	  explains	  this	  with	  the	  example	  of	  the	  clash	  between	  secularists	  and	  Hindu	  nationalists	  who	  
locked	   in	   a	   ‘“historical”	   battle	   understand	   each	   other	   perfectly’	   because	   the	   battleground	   is	  
empirical,	   verifiable	   history.32	   The	   cure	   to	   this	   ‘historical’	   battle	   is	   to	   negate	   empiricism	   by	  
returning	  to	  the	  ‘point	  of	  view’	  articulated	  in	  the	  example	  of	  Vivekananda	  managing	  the	  pain	  of	  
verifiable	   empirical	   ‘fact’	   by	   a	   ‘moral’	   accrued	   by	   a	   millennia	   old	   culture.	   The	   ‘moral’,	   is	   of	  
course,	  ‘ahistorical.’33	  The	  resolution	  to	  the	  clash	  is	  an	  affirmation	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  moral	  in	  
managing	  ‘fact’	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  affirms	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘timeless	  truths’	  which	  are	  anathema	  to	  
Enlightenment	   History	   which	   reduced	   them	   to	   either	   insanity	   or	   realpolitik.34	   Vivekananda’s	  
management	  of	   pain,	   an	   act	   of	   ‘principled	   forgetfulness,’	   is	   an	   abomination	   to	   Enlightenment	  
History’s	   purpose	  of	   laying	  bare	   the	  past	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   a	   frame	  of	   reference.	   This	   takes	   the	  
form	  of	   either	   a	   theme	  of	   return	   (so	   continuity	  or	   recovery),	   progress	  or	   stages	   (evolutionary	  
sequencing)	  says	  Nandy.35	  
	  
                                                
28	  Ganeri.	  2008.	  36,	  p.551–562.	  P.560	  
29	  Pomper.	  May,	  1995.	  P.4	  
30	  The	  striving	  went	  even	  beyond	  Nandy’s	  conception.	  There	  was	  a	  new	  science	  of	  source	  criticism	  which	  
graded	  the	  value	  of	  information	  to	  be	  controlled.	  See	  Jones.	  2001.	  
31	  Nandy.	  History’s	  Forgotten	  Doubles,pp.	  44-­‐66.	  P.53-­‐4	  
32	  Ibid.,	  P.64-­‐65	  
33	  Defined	  as	  ‘principled	  forgetfulness’	  and	  ‘timeless	  truths,’	  i.e.,	  ‘transcendental	  theories	  of	  the	  past’.	  
Ibid.,	  P.47-­‐51	  
34	  Ibid.,	  p.51	  
35	  Ibid.,	  P.48	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Nandy’s	  critique	  is	  only	  partially	  relevant	  –	  because	  following	  today’s	  understandings	  of	  the	  Mb,	  
it	  will	  be	  read	  for	  ‘tacit	  theories,’	  what	  Veyne	  calls	  ‘morals’	  and	  will	  not	  be	  mined	  for	  verifiable	  
truth.	  In	  fact,	  Nandy	  presents	  an	  Indian	  equivalent	  to	  Pausinias	  –	  Bose	  who	  studied	  the	  purānas.	  
After	   contextualising	  Bose	   in	   the	   relevant	  manner,	   i.e.,	   a	   society	   looking	   for	   its	  own	  empirical	  
verifiable	  history,	  Nandy	  states	  that	  Bose	  concluded	  the	  purānas	  were	  a	  type	  of	  history	  beyond	  
Enlightenment	   History’s	   comprehension.	   In	   short,	   Bose’s	   conclusions	   were	   Pausinias’.	   Indian	  
myths,	   like	  Greek	  myths,	   are	   important	   not	   because	   they	   abound	  with	   empirical	   facts,	  which	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  important,	  but	  because	  they	  are	  suffused	  with	  theories	  expressed	  in	  stories	  
of	  being	  and	  action.	  These	  are	  relevant,	  if	  only	  because	  they	  guided	  action	  until	  the	  very	  recent	  
past,	   as	  Nandy	   shows	   they	   did,	   through	  his	   concrete,	   contextualised	   examples.	  Now,	   in	   using	  
this	   method	   of	   argumentation	   and	   presentation,	   Nandy	   actually	   sanctifies	   the	   ‘historical	  
method’	  of	  Enlightenment	  History.	  Moreover,	  that	  Nandy	  uses	  the	  ‘historical	  method’	  to	  mount	  
his	  attack	  on	  Enlightenment	  History	  is	  testimony	  to	  the	  ‘historical	  method’s’	  independent	  value.	  
It	  can	  be	  used,	  as	  Nandy	  does,	  to	  craft,	  what	  we	  shall	  call,	  a	   ‘new	  history.’36	   It	   is	  new	  because	  
what	   it	   seeks	   are	   not	   ‘facts’	   but	   the	   identification	   of	   ‘morals’.	   Evidently	   this	   is	   to	   deal	   with	  
history	   from	   outside	   Enlightenment	   History37	   because	   it	   is	   not	   ‘facts’	   that	   are	   being	   sought.	  
Rather	   the	   subject	   matter	   now	   is	   morals,	   by	   definition,	   ‘timeless	   truths’	   or	   ‘theories	   of	  
transcendence.’	  	  
	  
Nandy’s	   charge	   however	   remains	   that	   this	   is	   simply	   historicising	   the	   ahistorical.	   What	   is	  
therefore	   required	   is	   to	   view	   these	   phenomena	   on	   their	   terms.	   That,	   should	   be	   the	   ‘new	  
history’s’	  framework.	  A	  key	  to	  devising	  a	  frame	  is	  provided	  by	  Nandy	  who	  uses	  two:	  describing	  a	  
past	  authorized	  by	   referring	   to	   sources38	  and	   ideational.	   Firstly,	  Nandy	  presents	  a	  narrative	  of	  
the	   past	   organised	   around	   the	   history	   of	   Enlightenment	   History	   in	   India	   and	   grounded	  
empirically:	  
When	  modern	  history	  first	  entered	  the	  Indian	  intellectual	  scene	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
the	  last	  century,	  many	  accepted	  it	  as	  a	  powerful	  adjunct	  to	  the	  kit-­‐bag	  of	  Indian	  
                                                
36	  Burke	  uses	  the	  term	  though	  his	  meaning	  is	  somewhat	  different	  to	  the	  use	  the	  term	  is	  put	  to	  here.	  See	  
Burke.	  2001.	  
37	  As	  defined	  by	  Nandy.	  See	  Doubles.,	  P.50	  
38	  Smith.	  2000.	  P.103-­‐108.	  p.103	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civilization.	   …	   The	   domination	   of	   that	   consciousness	   has	   now	   become,	   as	   the	  
confrontation	  at	  Ayodhya	  shows,	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  liability.39	  
Nandy’s	   article	   is	   also	   ideational	   because	   it	   seeks	   to	   counteract	   Enlightenment	   History	   by	  
offering	   an	   antidote	   from	   outside	   it	   –	   myths.	   This	   is	   understandable	   since	   myths	   are	  
incontestably	  part	  of	  India’s	  past	  and	  present	  (as	  Menon	  demonstrates).	  Nandy	  does	  this	  from	  
within	   and	   now.	   Even	   Bose,	  Westernised	   and	   steeped	   in	   psychoanalysis	   –	   a	   practice	   alien	   to	  
Indian	   civilization40	   –	   finds	   an	   eternal	   truth	   in	   the	   purānas.	   Bose	   is	   representative	   of	   his	  
ahistorical	  culture:	  ‘all	  times	  exist	  only	  in	  present	  times	  and	  can	  be	  decoded	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
contemporaneous.	   There	   is	   no	   past	   independent	   of	   us;	   there	   is	   no	   future	   that	   is	   not	   present	  
here	  and	  now.’41	  But	  Bose,	  essentially	  searched	  for	  textures	  using	  psychoanalysis.	  Why	  impose	  
this	   alien	   category	   on	   Indians?	   Secondly,	   self-­‐evidently	   Nandy’s	   uneducated	   masses	   are	  
ahistorical,42	  but	  what	  of	  the	  powerful?	  
	  
The	   powerful	   of	   course	  matter.	   And	   there	   are	   few	  more	   powerful	   than	   those	   who	   compose	  
bureaucracies	  today.	  To	  this	  the	  genealogist’s	  concern	  with	  today	  sets	  policy	  as	  an	  important	  –	  
perhaps	   the	  most	   significant	   –	   target	   for	   contemporary	   research	   especially	   because,	   as	   Shore	  
notes:	   ‘policy’	   is	   taken	  as	  an	  unproblematic	  given,	  without	   reference	   to	   sociocultural	   contexts	  
and	  there	  is	  a	  neglect	  of	  institutional	  complexity.	  Thirdly,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  public	  policy,	  but	  also	  the	  
academy	   which	   continues	   to	   use	   dichotomous	   frames	   (such	   as	   ‘state’	   versus	   ‘private’	   or	  
‘hegemonic’	  versus	  ‘subsumed’	  discourses).43	  Uncovering	  the	  complexity	  of	  policy	  processes,	  its	  
underlying	  rationales	  and	  their	  location	  in	  society	  is	  why	  this	  chapter	  began	  with	  Menon	  who,	  in	  
contradistinction	   to	   Enlightenment	   History	   invokes	   a	   timeless	   diplomatic	   theory	   across	   space	  
                                                
39	  Nandy,	  Doubles.,	  P.65	  
40	  Freud	  himself	  wrote	  in	  1914	  that	  ‘psychoanalysis	  is	  my	  creation;	  for	  ten	  years	  I	  was	  the	  only	  one	  
occupied	  with	  it	  …	  .’	  See	  Freud.	  1914;	  Psychoanalysis’	  roots	  are	  entrenched	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  
Enlightenment	  and	  Romanticist	  culture	  in	  Europe.	  See	  Bergmann.	  1993.	  p.929-­‐955;	  McGrath	  
demonstrates	  that	  psychoanalysis	  was	  a	  product	  of	  a	  crisis	  in	  Austrian	  liberal	  culture	  and	  internalised	  
liberalism,	  ‘psychologized’	  liberalism.	  See	  McGrath.	  1992.	  
41	  Nandy.	  Doubles.	  P.64	  
42	  Nandy	  asks	  rhetorically:	  ‘Why	  did	  the	  same	  history	  (of	  Ayodhya)	  not	  move	  millions	  of	  Indians	  for	  
hundreds	  of	  years,	  not	  even	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  Hindu	  nationalists	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  not	  even,	  
for	  that	  matter,	  the	  founders	  and	  ideologues	  of	  the	  same	  parties	  that	  are	  today	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  
temple	  movement?’	  Doubles.	  P.60-­‐61	  
43	  Wedel,	  Shore,	  Feldman,	  Stacy	  Lathrop.	  July	  2005.	  P.43;	  See	  also	  Kalb,	  van	  der	  Land,	  Staring,	  van	  
Steenbergen,	  Wilterdink.	  2000.	  p.8	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from	  the	  Mb.	  The	  means	  to	  uncover	  the	  morals	  of	  the	  Mb	  as	  understood	  by	  modern	  Indians	  is	  
to	  deploy	  the	  method	  developed	  to	  the	  text.	  
	  
Application:	  The	  Mahābhārata	  
	  
A	  vast	  and	  totally	  novel	  text	  to	  IR,	  the	  Mb	  requires	  a	  simple	  introduction,	  thru	  an	  analogy	  of	  a	  
single	  word.	  To	  say	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘sincerity’	  has	  been	  valuable	  through	  many	  ages	  and	  in	  many	  
cultures	   is	   banal.	   Thus,	   for	   Rousseau	   and	   the	   European	   Enlightenment,	   sincerity	   meant	  
authenticity,	   revealing	   the	   secrets	   of	   one’s	   heart.	   In	   the	  Mb	   however,	   sincerity	   takes	   no	   less	  
than	   thirteen	   forms,	   including	   impartiality,	   self-­‐control,	   toleration	   and	   non-­‐violence.44	   No	  
wonder	   then	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   method	   termed	   textures,	   the	   first	   generation	   of	  
Westerners	   to	   analyse	   the	   Mb	   declared	   it	   to	   be	   ‘literary	   unthing’	   (literarisches	   Unding),45	   a	  
‘monstrous	  chaos’	  (ungeheuerliches	  Chaos).46	  Yet,	  it	  obviously	  was	  in	  demand	  throughout	  India.	  
Archaeological	   investigations	   show	   that	   the	   text	   was	   spread	   throughout	   India	   and	   in	   several	  
languages.	  Despite	  the	  vast	  linguistic	  and	  geographical	  landscape	  over	  which	  the	  Mb	  was	  spread	  
it	   acquired	   an	   overwhelming	   unity	   including	   patterns	   of	   agreement	   and	   disagreement	   in	  
readings	  and	  in	  passages	  included	  or	  not	  included.	  Archival	  work	  points	  conclusively	  to	  a	  single	  
written	   ‘text’	  of	   a	  Mb	  existing	  at	   some	  point	   in	   the	  ancestry	  of	   these	  manuscripts.47	   It	  means	  
that	  the	  main	  storyline	  remains	  unchanged	  and	  it	  was,	  and	  remains,	  interwoven	  into	  the	  fabric	  
of	  Indian	  cultural	  and	  social	  life.48	  The	  Mb	  has	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  educating	  Indian	  peoples,	  in	  
structuring	  and	   informing	  their	   imagination	  and	  sensibilities	   in	   fundamental	  ways.	  The	  Mb	  not	  
only	   gave	   Indians	   grand	   heroes	   and	   villains,	   thrilling	   stories,	   and	   profound	   crises;	   it	   schooled	  
them	   in	   cosmology,	   philosophy,	   theology,	   and	   ethics,	   and	   through	   it	   all	   it	   legitimized	   and	  
inculcated	   ethical	   and	   political	   patterns	   fundamentally	   important	   to	   what	   is	   called	   ‘Hindu’	  
                                                
44	  Mb	  12.156.3—26.	  
45	  Winternitz	  1908-­‐22,	  1:272.	  1962	  (Quoted	  in	  Hiltebeitel	  Introduction.)	  
46	  Oldenberg	  1922,	  p.1.	  	  
47	  See	  Sukthankar’s	  “Prolegomena”	  to	  the	  critical	  edition,	  Sukthankar	  et	  al.,	  The	  Mahabharata,	  vol.	  1,	  
xxxiv,	  liv-­‐v,	  lxxxviii-­‐xci.	  The	  amount	  of	  unity	  that	  exists	  particularly	  between	  geographically	  remote	  
traditions	  which	  often	  have	  discrepant	  traditions	  intervening	  between	  them	  such	  as	  Kashmir	  and	  Kerala,	  
can	  be	  explained	  only	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  fixed	  text	  antecedent	  to	  those	  manuscripts,	  an	  archetype.	  
For	  the	  variations	  which	  exist	  can	  be	  explained	  as	  later,	  particular	  innovations	  resulting	  from	  various	  
dynamic	  factors	  in	  the	  tradition,	  while	  the	  unity	  cannot	  be	  explained	  ,	  generally	  ,	  as	  parallel	  independent	  
invention.	  
48	  Dunham.	  1991.	  Chapter	  I.	  1991	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civilisation,49	  a	  viewpoint	  which	  can	  be	  traced	  from	  Dahlman.50	  Yet	  the	   inability	  of	  non-­‐Indians	  
to	  comprehend	  the	  Mb	  persisted	  as	  scholars	  took	  it	  to	  be	  an	  encyclopaedia	  of	  things	  Indian	  as	  
they	  existed,	  before	  being	  precipitated	  into	  the	  epic,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  defining	  things	  as	  
they	   exist	   today.	   It	   is	   what	   the	   culture	   thinks	   of	   itself.51	   This	   was	   the	   first	   move	   towards	  
discovering	  the	  texture	  of	  the	  documents.	  Yet,	  no	  explanation	  exists	  of	  if,	  and	  how,	  the	  present	  
is	  connected	  to	  the	  ancient	  myths,52	  in	  what	  manner	  and	  most	  simply:	  why?	  
	  
The	   first	   texture	   is	   that	   Indians	   designate	   the	   Mb	   in	   terms	   very	   different	   to	   those	   used	   by	  
Europeans.	   None	   of	   these	   terms	   can	   be	   translated	   as	   epic.	   Indians	   designate	   the	  Mb	   itihāsa,	  
which	  might	  be	  broadly	  translated	  as	  ‘chronicle’.	  The	  Sanskrit	  word	  –	  part	  of	  the	  modern	  lexicon	  
–	   is	   ironical.	  A	   literal	   translation	  of	   itihāsa	   is:	   ‘Thus	  (iti),	   indeed	  (hā),	   it	  was	  (asa).’	   Itihāsa	   is	  an	  
irony,	  because	  implicit	   is	  the	  notion	  that	   it	  could	  have	  been	  many	  other	  things.	   In	  defining	  the	  
Mb’s	   literary	   canon	   thus,	   Indians	   introduce	   a	   contingency	   unfound	   in	   Enlightenment	   History.	  
This	  contingency	  is	  a	  defining	  texture	  of	  the	  Mb.	  The	  term	  for	   ‘history’	   in	  the	  modern	  sense	  in	  
some	  of	  India’s	  vernacular	  languages	  has	  been	  derived	  from	  this	  word	  –	  a	  greater	  irony	  because	  
itihāsa	  in	  the	  sense	  it	  is	  used	  by	  Indians	  clearly	  means	  the	  ‘Once	  upon	  a	  time’	  of	  Western	  story	  
telling.53	   Itihāsa	   is	  narrative	  which	  has	  been	  transformed	  by	  editing	   into	  a	  sacred	  narrative	  –	  a	  
morality	  tale.	  The	  Mb	  is	  generally	  accepted	  as	  the	  longest	  poem	  in	  the	  world	  and	  it	  boasts	  that	  
all	  knowledge	  is	  contained	  within	  its	  some	  75,000	  verses.	  In	  the	  opening	  section,	  the	  text	  states	  
that	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  four	  aims	  of	  man	  (dharma,	  artha,	  kama,	  moksa)	  ‘whatever	  is	  here	  may	  be	  
found	  elsewhere,	  but	  what	  is	  absent	  from	  here	  does	  not	  exist	  anywhere’.54	  Fitting	  a	  quart	  into	  a	  
thimble,	  this	  chapter	  uses	  condensed	  quotes.	  
	  
Divided	   into	   several	   books,	   the	   entire	  Mb	   is	   cast	   in	   the	   form	  of	   narrative	   discourse,	   although	  
more	  than	  half	  of	  it	  is	  primarily	  didactic	  or	  descriptive.	  Here	  lies	  another	  texture.	  The	  manner	  of	  
                                                
49	  Fitzgerald.	  1991.	  p.151	  
50	  See	  Dahlman.	  1895	  &	  1899.	  Dahlman	  saw	  the	  Mb	  as	  ‘die	  Erzieherin	  des	  Volkes	  zu	  höheren	  religiösen	  
und	  sittlichen	  Ideen,	  Lehrerin	  des	  Volkes’	  (the	  tutor	  of	  the	  people	  for	  higher	  religious	  and	  moral	  ideas,	  the	  
schoolmarm	  of	  the	  people,	  Genesis	  …	  p.142).	  
51	  Dimock,	  Jr.	  1974.	  
52	  Brockington.	  1998.	  
53	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  translate	  itihāsa	  differently	  by	  dividing	  the	  compound	  thus:	  iti-­‐hāsa,	  which	  can	  be	  
rendered	  ‘So?	  Derision!’,	  i.e.	  So	  it	  could	  never	  have	  been!	  This	  is	  nearer	  in	  sense	  to	  the	  ‘Once	  upon	  a	  time’	  
and	  used	  in	  speech.	  
54	  Mb	  1.56.33,	  repeated	  at	  18.5.38,	  following	  the	  same	  first	  line	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presentation	  is	  example	  after	  example	  to	  illustrate	  a	  moral	  point.	  Through	  descriptions,	  the	  Mb	  
lays	   out	   a	   code	   of	   conduct	   which	   will	   be	   termed	   dharma.	   That	   dharma	   is	   introduced	   in	   this	  
manner	   is	   a	   clue	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   dharma.	   As	   White	   remarks:	   ‘Narrative	   might	   well	   be	  
considered	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  problem	  of	  general	  human	  concern,	  namely,	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  
translate	   knowing	   into	   telling,	   the	   problem	   of	   fashioning	   human	   experience	   into	   a	   form	  
assimilable	   to	   structures	   of	  meaning	   that	   are	   generally	   human	   rather	   than	   culture	   specific’.55	  
Narrativization,	  White	  insists,	  is	  also	  a	  moralizing,	  and	  when	  narrativity	  is	  present,	  morality	  or	  a	  
moralizing	  impulse	  is	  present	  too.	  This	  is	  a	  humdrum	  matter	  for	  the	  readers	  of	  the	  Mb.	  It	  makes	  
the	  constant	  refrain:	  ‘where	  there	  is	  dharma,	  there	  is	  victory,’	  testifying	  to	  the	  basic	  moralizing	  
impulse	  behind	  the	  discourse	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  epic.	  i.e.,	  behind	  its	  specific	  way	  of	  talking	  about	  
violent	   death	   and	   all-­‐engulfing	   ruin.	   The	   operation	   of	   this	   code	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   diplomacy	  
takes	  up	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  book.	  One	  of	  the	  many	  things	  the	  Mb	  does	  is	  demonstrate	  
the	  variety	  of	  manners	  in	  which	  dharma	  is	  operationalised	  in	  diplomacy.	  
	  
In	  Nelson’s	  terms,	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  ‘structure	  of	  consciousness’	  in	  Indian	  civilization	  is	  dharma.	  
An	  ancient	  category,	  it	  continues	  to	  inform	  the	  mentalities	  of	  modern	  Indians.	  Used	  assuredly	  by	  
Indians,	   (India’s	   former	  Foreign	  Minister,	   the	  man	  who	   initiated	  nuclear	  negotiations	  with	   the	  
United	   States	   keeps	   a	   note	   on	   dharma	   on	   his	   desk),	   the	   term	   continues	   to	   confuse	   foreign	  
observers.	  Kakar	  argues,	   ‘the	  role	  of	  myths,	  especially	  those	  of	  religious	  derivation,	   in	  defining	  
and	  integrating	  the	  traditional	  elements	  and	  common	  features	  of	  identity	  and	  society	  in	  Hindu	  
India	   cannot	   be	   overestimated.’56	   This	   is	   a	   long	   way	   from	   Creel	   who	   applies	   a	   type	   of	  
Enlightenment	  History	  to	  Indian	  metaphysics	  when	  he	  ‘mines’	  texts	  for	  self-­‐defined	  philosophy.	  
Finding	   none,	   Creel	   argues	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   dharma	   is	   symbolically	   vital	   but	   conceptually	  
empty;	   that	  while	  neo-­‐Hinduism	  certainly	  has	   ideology,	   it	  has	  not	  developed,	  and	   it	   is	   implied	  
may	   never	   develop,	   a	   tradition	   of	   hard-­‐headed	   philosophical	   reflection	   on	   ethical	   questions.	  
Creel’s	  central	   contribution	   is	   to	  demonstrate	  clearly	   that	   for	  contemporary	  Hinduism	  there	   is	  
no	   philosophy	   of	   dharma	   even	   though	   one	   would	   think	   there	   ought	   to	   be.	   (The	   negative	  
conclusion	   suggests	   that	   the	   status	   of	   dharma	   in	   modern	   India	   should	   be	   studied	   social	  
scientifically	  rather	  than	  philosophically,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  path	  which	  Creel	  follows.)	  In	  the	  final	  
                                                
55	  Mehta.	  1990.	  p.	  262	  
56	  Kakar.	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section,	  Creel	  exhibits	  Hindu	  thought’s	  systematic	  inadequacy.57	  His	  investigations	  are	  however	  
limited	  by	  his	  lack	  of	  texture,	  an	  assumption	  –	  that	  it	  was	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Indian	  cosmos	  to	  
present	   ‘philosophy’	  as	  understood	  in	  Western	  terms.	  For	  Creel,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Mb	  is	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  approach	  the	  form	  and	  manner	  of	  European	  philosophical	  texts.	  There	  is	  nothing	  like	  a	  
‘categorical	   imperative’	   in	   the	  Mb.	  What	   is	   found	   instead	  are	  a	   series	  of	   events	  woven	   into	  a	  
narrative.	  Not	  only	   is	   it	  delusive	  to	  cast	  the	  Mb	  as	   inadequate	  because	   it	  does	  not	  approach	  a	  
set	   of	   conditions	   imposed	   upon	   the	   text	   but	   it	   counterproductive	   to	   dismiss	   a	   text	   which	  
patently	   serves	   to	   organise	   thought	   and	   action	   for	   Indians	   themselves.	   It	   is	  why	  Doniger	   and	  
Derrett	  write:	  	  
‘While	  historians	  and	  anthropologists	  discuss	  the	  emergence	  of	  Pakistan,	  India,	  
Bangladesh	  and	  Sri	  Lanka	  into	  the	  nuclear	  age	  …	  Out	  understanding	  of	  them	  is	  
not	   so	   immediately	   relevant.	   Their	   conception	   of	   themselves	   is	   all	   important.	  
Herein	  tradition	  is	  made	  and	  remade,	  and	  the	  dramatic	  events	  in	  India	  stress	  the	  
vital	   importance	  of	   discovering	  what	   is	  DUTY.	  …	   the	   innate	   sense	  of	   propriety	  
(not	  ‘fairness’)	  which	  is	  called	  dharma!	  Uganda,	  South	  Africa,	  South	  America	  and	  
Iron	   Curtain	   countries	   have	   no	   dharma:	   and	   one	   of	   the	   consequences	   is	  
notorious.	   India’s	   dharma	   owes	   nothing	   to	   freedom	   movements	   or	  
Independence.’58	  
	  
Predating	   the	   modern	   Indian	   state,	   one	   of	   the	   origins	   of	   dharma	   is	   the	   Mb.	   Hiltebeitel	   has	  
uncovered	  a	  texture	  located	  within	  the	  text.	  The	  Mb	  is	  an	  education	  in	  dharma.	  It	  is	  specifically	  
for	   the	  King	  Yudhisthira	  but	  given	  the	   text’s	  dissemination	   it	  has	  also	  served	  to	  educate	  many	  
others.	   Secondly,	   the	  dissemination	  of	   the	   text	  may	  have	  not	  been	   incidental	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  
design.	   Another	   texture	   of	   the	   text	   is	   the	   very	  metre	   of	   its	   composition,	   the	  anustubh	  metre	  
which	  was	  associated	  with	  the	   low	  caste,	  and	  hence	  numerically	  much	   larger,	  śūdras.	   It	  would	  
explain	   why	   a	   complex	   and	   long	   story	   came	   to	   be	   prevalent	   throughout	   the	   Indian	  
subcontinent.59	  The	  text	  will	  be	  penetrated	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  Yudhisthira	  despairs	  about	  his	  
education	  stating:	  
‘Whether	   we	   know	   or	   do	   not	   know	   dharma,	   whether	   it	   is	   knowable	   or	   not,	  
dharma	   is	   finer	   than	   the	   finest	   edge	   of	   a	   sword	   and	  more	   substantial	   than	   a	  
                                                
57	  Creel.	  1977	  
58	  Doniger	  &	  Derrett.	  Introduction.	  
59	  Sharma.	  2000.	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mountain.	  On	  first	  sight,	  it	  appears	  clear	  and	  solid	  like	  a	  town;	  on	  a	  close	  logical	  
look,	  it	  vanishes	  from	  view.’60	  	  
The	  viewpoint	  is	  replicated	  endlessly	  in	  the	  text,	  not	  least	  by	  sages	  who	  state:	  ‘Were	  there	  only	  
one	  shastra,	  (instrument)	  and	  only	  one	  means	  of	  gaining	  the	  Good,	  the	  situation	  would	  be	  clear;	  
but	  there	  are	  may	  shastra-­‐s,	  and	  by	  describing	  ‘the	  Good’	  in	  different	  ways,	  they	  have	  hidden	  its	  
meaning.’61	  Essentially,	  within	  the	  Mb	  the	  word	  dharma	   is	  a	  repository	  for	  all	  that	  is	  good.	  It	  is	  
both	  nature	  and	  nurture,	  i.e.,	  it	  is	  present	  in	  humans	  and	  also	  attainable	  by	  humans.	  The	  Mb	  in	  
no	  certain	  terms	  states:	  
‘All	   the	   sayings	   of	  dharma	   are	  with	   a	   view	   of	   nurturing,	   cherishing,	   providing	  
more	   amply,	   enriching,	   increasing,	   enhancing,	   all	   living	   beings:	   in	   one	   word,	  
securing	  their	  prabhava.	  Therefore,	  whatever	  has	  the	  characteristic	  of	  bringing	  
that	  about	  is	  dharma.	  That	  is	  certain.’62	  	  
The	  centrality	  of	  dharma	  is	  attested	  to	  in	  several	  passages	  in	  the	  Mb:	  
‘All	   the	   sayings	   of	  dharma	   are	  with	   a	   view	   to	   supporting,	   sustaining,	   bringing	  
together,	  and	  in	  their	  togetherness	  upholding,	  all	  living	  beings,	  securing,	  in	  one	  
word,	  their	  dharma.	  Therefore,	  whatever	  has	  the	  characteristic	  of	  doing	  that,	  is	  
dharma.	  That	  is	  certain.’63	  
Furthermore,	  
‘Whatever	  has	  its	  beginning	  in	  justice,	  that	  alone	  is	  called	  dharma;	  whatever	  is	  
unjust	  and	  oppressive	  is	  adharma.	  This	   is	  the	  rule	  settled	  by	  those	  who	  can	  be	  
respected.’64	  
The	  text	  also	  states	  in	  a	  long	  passage	  that	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  of	  leading	  a	  life.	  No	  manner	  of	  
living	   is	   denigrated	   and	   none	   is	   put	   forward	   as	   better	   than	   others.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   the	   sage	  	  
Brihaspati	  who	  recites	  the	  many	  ways	  of	  living:	  
‘Some	  people	  praise	  conciliation	  and	  friendliness.	  Some	  others	  praise	  strenuous	  
effort.	   Some	   praise	   neither	   the	   one	   nor	   the	   other	   exclusively.	   And	   there	   are	  
those	  who	  praise	  both.	  
                                                
60	  Mb.	  Shantiparvan.	  260.12-­‐3	  
61	  Ibid.	  287.10	  
62	  Ibid.	  	  109.10	  
63	  Ibid.	  109.11	  
64	  Mb.	  Vanaparvan.	  131.11	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Some	  people	  praise	  sacrificial	  rites;	  and	  some	  praise	  total	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  
world.	  There	  are	  those	  who	  praise	  only	  ‘giving’;	  and	  there	  are	  those	  who	  praise	  
only	  ‘receiving’.	  
Some	   people,	   leaving	   everything,	   are	   given	   to	   silence	   and	   meditation.	   Some	  
others	  praise	  obtaining	  a	  kingdom	  after	  much	  fight	  and	  destruction,	  though	  with	  
the	  aim	  of	  protecting	  the	  people.	  And	  there	  are	  those	  who	  do	  self-­‐reflection	  in	  
solitude.	  
However,	  after	  observing	  this	  variety	  and	  reflecting	  deeply,	  the	  learned	  and	  the	  
wise	  have	  concluded	  that	  not	  to	  be	  aggressive	  towards	  other	  beings	  is	  dharma	  
in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  good	  and	  the	  saintly.’65	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  irony	  encompassed	  in	  the	  word	  itihāsa	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  Mb	  unlocks	  another	  
texture.	  It	  is	  indeed	  ironic	  that	  the	  sage	  concludes	  that	  non-­‐violence	  is	  dharma	  because	  the	  Mb	  
is	  about	  a	  great	  war.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  paradox	  because	  the	  Mb	  is	  also	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  dharma	  
in	   difficult	   situations	   –	   situations	   antithetical	   to	  dharma,	   i.e.,	  adharma.	   The	   text	   is	   constantly	  
punctuated	  with	   such	  apparent	  paradoxes.	  They	  are	  actually	   texture,	  means	   to	  understanding	  
the	   meaning	   of	   dharma.	   Given	   the	   literary	   means	   the	   text	   uses,	   the	   method	   of	   capturing	  
dharma	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  some	  of	  the	  main	  paradoxes	  presented	  in	  the	  text.	  Four	  in	  particular	  will	  
be	  investigated.	  They	  are:	  	  
1. Declaring	  the	  sacrosanct	  position	  of	  the	  vow	  while	  undermining	  it.	  
2. Espousing	  non-­‐violence	  while	  waging	  war.	  
3. Forwarding	  life	  thru	  death.	  
4. The	  merits	  of	  social	  order	  while	  showing	   its	  undoing	  or	  the	  wilful	   forgetting	  of	  
everything.	  
These	  apparent	  paradoxes	  were	  first	  viewed	  as	  such,	  with	  the	  conclusion	  by	  those	  alien	  to	  the	  
texture	  of	  the	  Mb	  that	  the	  text	  was	  an	  unthing.	  This	  quality	  is	  precisely	  what	  makes	  the	  Mb	  what	  
it	  is,	  it	  encapsulates	  the	  Mb’s	  very	  message:	  that	  the	  maintenance	  of	  order	  is	  dependent	  not	  on	  
the	  nature	  of	  that	  order	  but	  on	  resolving	   immediate	  and	  individual	  situations.	  As	  the	  passages	  
above	  demonstrate	  –	  without	  ever	  using	   the	   term	  –	   the	  central	  notion	  of	  dharma	   is	   that	   it	   is	  
context	   specific.	   This	   has	   been	   central	   to	   the	   civilization,	   making	   it	   distinct	   from	   Europe.66	  
                                                
65	  Mb.	  Adiparvan	  156.10-­‐29	  
66	  For	  a	  history	  of	  ‘context’	  in	  Europe	  see.	  Burke.	  2002	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Dharma	  does	  not	  move	  on	  a	  definite	  path.	  It	  changes	  colour	  according	  to	  the	  position	  and	  mode	  
of	   incidents.	  Dharma	   is	   the	  guideline	   for	  determination	  –	  not	  all	  we	  want	   in	   life	  –	   it	   is	   virtue.	  	  
Non	  violence,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  great	  virtue	  –	  this	  has	  been	  proclaimed	  in	  the	  epic	  but	  not	  always	  
put	  into	  practice.	  The	  epic	  is,	  after	  all,	  is	  the	  story	  of	  a	  great	  war.67	  
	  
In	  times	  of	  strife	  –	  which	  the	  Mb	  describes	  –	  reliability	  is	  given	  renewed	  impetus.	  The	  Mb	  hence	  
dwells	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  vow	   or	   promise	   before	   destabilising	   the	   concept	   demonstrating	  
that	  even	  such	  a	  central	  concept	   is	  not	  quite	  so	  central	  relative	  to	  dharma.	  To	  make	  the	  point	  
that	  keeping	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  one’s	  vow	  does	  not	  always	  conform	  to	  dharma,	  Krsna	  tells	  the	  story	  
of	  an	  inverse	  case:	  a	  very	  cruel	  act	  of	  killing	  by	  hunter	  named	  Balaka	  who	  shot	  a	  blind	  beast	  he	  
had	  never	  seen	  before,	  yet	  was	  nonetheless	  carried	  off	  to	  heaven	  because	  the	  beast	  had	  vowed	  
to	   kill	   all	   creatures.	   Underlying	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   blind	   beast	   is	   resistance	   of	   the	  
universalising	  concept	  of	  ahimsa	  upon	  which	  the	  epic	  rests.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  clearer	  than	  from	  a	  
glance	   at	   the	   uncertain	   status	   the	  Mb	   accords	   it	   among	   the	   ‘highest	  dharmas.’	   As	   Hiltebeitel	  
notes,	  ahimsa	  and	  anrasamsya	  are	  both	  the	  ‘highest	  dharma.’	  Yudhisthira,	  who	  has	  every	  right	  
to	  be	  confused	  on	  this	  issue	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  makes	  the	  ‘highest	  dharma’	  of	  the	  king	  his	  
first	  and	  most	  enduring	  question	  to	  Bhisma.68	  Of	  the	  fifty-­‐four	  instances	  Hiltebeitel	  finds	  in	  the	  
Mb,	  the	  tally	  of	  the	  different	  excellences	  said	  to	  be	  the	  ‘highest	  dharma’	  includes	  more	  than	  25	  
categories	  and	  numerous	  sub-­‐categories.	  These	  also	  include	  individual	  dharmas.	  	  
	  
This	   texture	   leads	   Hiltebeitel	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   highest	   dharma	   seems	   to	   be	   knowing	   the	  
highest	  dharma	  for	  whatever	  particular	  situation	  one	  is	  in,	  and	  recognizing	  that	  situation	  within	  
an	  ontology	   that	   admits	   virtually	   endless	   variation	  and	  deferral	   in	  matters	  of	   formulating	   and	  
approaching	   ‘the	  highest.’69	   This	   is	   the	   fourth,	   apparent	  paradox:	  of	   simultaneously	  upholding	  
and	  deconstructing	  social	  order.	  If	  the	  Mb	  states	  different	  things	  about	  the	  highest	  dharma,	  it	  is	  
anrasamsya	  that	  has	  the	  most	  occurrences.	  This	  quality	  is	  especially	  promulgated	  to	  Yudhisthira	  
at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  epic.	  Here	  there	  is	  a	  dramatic	  inclusion	  of	  those	  whom	  the	  caste	  system	  
would	  exclude.	  It	  is	  the	  undoing	  of	  the	  very	  social	  system	  which	  the	  entire	  Mb	  for	  some	  75,000	  
verses	  has	  been	  describing	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  reinforcing.	  	  
	  
                                                
67	  Frawley.	  1995.	  p.25-­‐39	  
68	  12.56.2;	  161.48;	  353.8	  
69	  Hiltebeitel.	  2001.	  P.208	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The	   primacy	   of	   presentism	   and	   conducting	   oneself	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   current	   is	   clear	   in	  
another	   texture:	   it	   is	   the	   last	   story	  of	   the	   text,	   the	   closing	   lesson.	  At	   the	  very	  end	  of	   the	  Mb,	  
Yudhishthira	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  stray	  dog	  as	  he	  alone	  walks	  into	  heaven.	  The	  king	  of	  the	  gods	  
bars	   his	   way,	   since	   caste	   law	   regards	   dogs	   as	   unclean,	   the	   animal	   equivalent	   of	   Dalits	   (the	  
people	  who	  have	  been	  various	  referred	  to	   in	  the	  past	  as	  Untouchables,	  Scheduled	  Castes,	  and	  
Harijans).	   Yudhishthira	   refuses	   to	   enter	   unless	   the	   dog	   comes	   in	   too.	   In	   the	   very	   act	   of	  
insistence,	   the	   dharma	   King	   chooses	   to	   forget	   all	   that	   society	   says	   is	   right	   and	   proper.	   He	   is	  
praised	   for	   this	   and	   the	   dog	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   a	   disguised	   form	   of	   the	   god	   Dharma,	   dharma	  
incarnate.	   Attempting	   some	   dialogie	   between	   civilizations	   Doniger	   has	   translated	   the	  
momentous	   significance	   of	   this	   passage	   into	  Western	   terms.	   In	   the	  Western	   canon,	   Doniger	  
writes,	  the	  incarnation	  itself	  is	  astounding,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  God	  of	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  taking	  
the	  form	  of	  a	  pig.	  But	  the	  king’s	  willingness	  to	  include	  the	  dog	  among	  those	  ‘who	  are	  devoted	  to	  
one,’	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  is	  equally	  astounding	  and	  quite	  ‘wonderful.	  …	  When	  we	  realise	  by	  the	  epic’s	  
end	  that	  he	  departs	  this	  world	  through	  his	  noncruelty	  toward	  a	  dog,	  we	  see	  that	  it	  has	  been	  a	  
long	  and	  painful	  lesson’	  and	  that	  the	  lesson	  is	  that	  even	  the	  highest	  rules	  of	  society	  are	  subject	  
to	  context	  which	  is	  the	  ultimate	  determinant	  for	  action.70	  	  
	  
A	  final	  note	  on	  the	  general	  notion	  of	  dharma	  arises	  from	  the	  Mb	  presenting	  a	  cosmos	  where	  the	  
operations	  of	  a	   variety	  of	  dharmas	   is	   a	   given.	  How	  do,	   in	   such	  a	   cosmos	  differing,	   sometimes	  
opposing	   dharmas	   relate	   to	   each	   other?	   More	   specifically,	   how	   should	   people	   of	   different	  
dharmas	   act	   when	   they	   come	   into	   conflicting	   situations?	   This	   too	   is	   set	   out	   in	   the	   following	  
passage	  from	  the	  Mb.	  
‘If	   one	  dharma	   is	   destructive	   of	   another	   dharma,	   then	   it	   is	  wickedness	   in	   the	  
garb	  of	  dharma,	  and	  not	  dharma.	  Only	  that	   is	  dharma	   truly	  that	   is	  established	  
without	  denigrating	  and	  opposing	  another	  dharma.	  
In	  case	  there	  is	  conflict	  between	  one	  dharma	  and	  another,	  one	  should	  reflect	  on	  
their	   relative	   weight,	   and	   then	   act	   accordingly;	   what	   does	   not	   denigrate	   and	  
obstruct	  others	  is	  dharma.’71	  
As	   the	  Mb	  progresses	   the	   text	  states	   firstly	   the	  centrality	  of	  dharma	   to	   life,	   the	  multiplicity	  of	  
human	   beliefs	   and	   ways	   of	   living	   and	   that	   these	   are	   all	   valid.	   Finally,	   it	   concludes	   that	   the	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  Doniger.	  2006	  
71	  Mb.	  Adiparvan	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essence	   of	   human	   life	   iare	   relations	   and	   that	   the	   pursuance	   of	   relationships	   in	   a	   manner	  
conducive	   to	   all	   practitioners	   is	   central	   to	   living.	   In	   short,	   dharma	   is	   the	   art	   of	   maintaining	  
relationships,	  of	  navigating	  a	  crowded	  a	  world.	  
	  
The	  means	   to	  operationalised	   relationships	   in	   terms	  of	  dharma	   are	  also	   set	  out.	   Since	  desires	  
are	   inescapable,	   the	   individual,	   the	  Mb	   insists,	  must	   know	   one’s	   desires.	   The	   individual	  must	  
know	  oneself.	  Clarity	  of	  purpose	   is	  the	  first	  step	  to	  maintaining	  equable	  relationships	  with	  the	  
rest	  of	  society.	  The	  Mb	  approaches	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  social	  good	  in	  the	  following:	  
‘Those	  who	  have	  thought	  deeply	  are	  of	  the	  view	  that	  dharma	  is	  what	  is	  done	  for	  
all	  beings	  with	  one’s	  heart	  and	  mind.	  Therefore,	  let	  one	  do,	  with	  one’s	  heart	  and	  
mind,	  what	  is	  good	  for	  all	  beings.’72	  
The	  statement	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  good	  for	  all	  beings?	  And	  the	  answer	  is:	  
‘What	  he	  does	  not	  find	  agreeable	  when	  done	  by	  others	  unto	  him,	  that	  he	  should	  
not	   do	   unto	   others.	   He	   must	   know	   that	   what	   is	   unhappy	   for	   him	   cannot	   be	  
happy	  for	  others.	  
Whatever	   is	  not	  agreeable	   to	  him,	   that	  he	   should	  not	  do	  unto	  others.	   This,	   in	  
brief,	  is	  dharma;	  all	  else	  is	  only	  selfishness.’73	  
The	  Mb	  equates	  knowing	  oneself	  with	  dharma.	  Quite	  simply	  the	  Mb	  argues	  that	  doing	  good	  for	  
all	   is	   directly	   related	   to	   knowing	   what	   is	   good	   for	   oneself.	   Not	   knowing	   oneself	   produces	  
confusion	   for	   those	   surrounding	   the	   self,	   creates	   conflict	   and	   is	   a	   suboptimal	   manner	   of	  
conducting	   human	   relationships.	   As	   Krsna	   himself	   explains	   to	   Arjuna,	   ‘Dharma	   is	   so	   called	  
because	  it	  upholds	  and	  supports	  the	  life	  of	  people.	  Only	  that	  which	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  sustain	  is	  
dharma.’74	  
	  
The	  centrality	  of	  dharma	  to	  human	  life	  raises	  the	  question:	  Can	  dharma	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Mb	  be	  
the	   basis	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	   code	   of	   action?	   The	   question	   is	   pertinent	   both	   for	   the	   hyper-­‐
flexibility	   of	   dharma	   and	   the	   deep	   thought	   it	   requires.	   The	   former	   is	   the	   notion	   that	   even	  
socially	  accepted	  dharma	  might	  be	  overturned	  at	  any	  moment	  and	  by	  any	  individual	  given	  the	  
circumstances.	  The	  latter	  is	  that	  given	  the	  variety	  of	  events	  and	  situations	  that	  require	  gauging	  
                                                
72	  Ibid.	  157.1	  
73	  Ibid.	  157.2-­‐5	  
74	  (Karna	  p.49).	  (p.264)	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and	  weighing	   before	   action	   is	   taken	   there	   is	   the	   ever	   present	   spectre	   of	   paralysis.	  Hence	   the	  
question:	  Can	  dharma	  provide	  the	  rationale	  for	  action	  or	  is	  it	  simply	  a	  philosophical	  exercise?	  
	  
The	  Mb	  deals	  with	  these	  questions	  by	  first	  giving	  ‘time’	  and	  ‘place’	  the	  predominant	  position	  in	  
terms	  of	  decision	  making:	  	  
‘The	   sages	   have	   in	   the	   treaties	   relating	   to	   dharma,	   wealth	   and	   material	  
prosperity,	  and	  ultimate	  human	  freedom,	  too,	  considered	   ‘time’	  and	   ‘place’	   to	  
be	  the	  prime	  factors	  in	  human	  achievements.	  
The	  one	  who,	  after	  examining	  their	  true	  import,	  uses	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘time’	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  is	  harmonious	  gains	  the	  fruits	  of	  his	  aspirations.’75	  
It	   is	   within	   these	   two	   coordinates,	   time	   and	   place,	   that	   dharma	   and	   human	   life	   takes	   place.	  
Within	   these	   limits	   Yudhisthira	   explicates	   the	   problem	   of	   action	   in	   a	   world	   without	   any	  
fundamental	   imperative	   for	   action.	   In	   the	   excerpts	   quoted	   below,	   Yudhisthira	   systematically	  
questions	   all	   the	   classical	   sources	   of	   dharma	   and	   the	   impossibility	   of	   action	   in	   a	   world	   of	  
multiple	  realities.	  He	  says:	  
‘The	  learned	  declare	  the	  Veda	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  dharma.	  But	  the	  Veda	  change	  
according	  to	  each	  cycle	  of	  Time	  …	  different	  dharma	  for	  different	  capacities.76	  
Neither	  can	  one	  ascertain	  dharma	  by	  a	  mere	  reading	  of	  the	  vedic	  texts.77	  
There	  is	  one	  kind	  of	  dharma	  for	  a	  person	  in	  an	  equable	  situation,	  and	  of	  another	  
kind	  for	  one	   in	  distress;	  how	  can	  a	  reading	  of	   the	  Veda	  alone	  decide	  what	  the	  
dharma	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  distress	  shall	  be?78	  
As	   regards	   the	   smrti,	   they	   were	   derived	   from	   the	   Veda,	   and	   could	   not	   be	  
authoritative	  only	   if	   the	  Veda	  were	   so;	   but	  when	   the	  Veda	  was	  not	   free	   from	  
ambiguity,	   nor	   authoritative	   for	   every	   situation,	   how	   could	   the	   smrti	   be	   so?	  
Often	  conflicting	  with	  each	  other,	  where	  was	  the	  force	  in	  either?79	  
As	   for	   cultured	   conduct	   being	   the	   standard	   of	   dharma,	   it	   suffered	   from	   the	  
fallacy	  of	  the	  circularity	  of	  definition;	  the	  conduct	  of	  good	  men	  is	  called	  dharma,	  
                                                
75	  Shantiparvan	  137.23-­‐24	  
76	  Shantiparvan	  260.12-­‐13	  
77	  Shantiparvan	  260.3	  
78	  Shantiparvan	  260.4	  
79	  Ibid.	  260.9-­‐10	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and	  good	  men	  are	  those	  whose	  conduct	  reflects	  dharma.	  With	  this	  fallacy	  in	  its	  
definition,	  ‘cultured	  conduct’	  could	  not	  be	  a	  proof	  of	  dharma.’80	  
	  
Furthermore,	  there	  is	  no	  single	  code	  for	  conduct	  beneficial	  to	  all	  in	  equal	  measure,	  or	  applicable	  
to	   all	   in	   all	   circumstances.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   very	   thing	   that	   helped	   some	   rise	   acted	   to	  
obstruct	   others.81	   This	   is	   why	   Yudhisthira	   concludes	   by	   stating:	   ‘None	   could	   see	   anywhere	  
conduct	  that	  would	  be	  uniformly	  good	  for	  all,’82	  and	  that,	  ‘The	  same	  act	  is	  dharma	  or	  adharma	  
for	   different	   people,	   depending	   on	   ‘time’,	   ‘place’	   and	   the	   ‘person	   concerned’’.	   Ultimately	  
Yudhisthira	  poses	  the	  most	  fundamental	  question:	  	  
‘All	  things	  of	  this	  world	  are	  shot	  through	  with	  truth	  and	  untruth,	  how	  does	  one	  
distinguish	  one	  from	  the	  other?	  What	   is	   truth?	  What	   is	  untruth?	  At	  what	  time	  
shall	  one	  speak	  the	  truth	  and	  at	  what	  time	  may	  one	  speak	  the	  untruth?’83	  
	  
It	   is	   indicative,	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   a	   texture,	   that	   the	  Mb	   breaks	   from	   the	   usual	   practice	   of	   precise,	  
descriptive	   answers.	   Instead,	   there	   is	   no	   answer	   to	   Yudhisthira’s	   question.	   This	   is	   significant	  
because	   the	  Mb,	   as	   Hiltebeitel	   notes,	   is	   the	   education	   of	   Yudhisthira.	   There	   is	   no	   categorical	  
reply	   to	   this	   most	   fundamental	   of	   questions	   about	   taking	   action	   in	   a	   world	   shot	   thru	   with	  
relativity.	   There	   is	   no	   device	   such	   as	   a	   ‘categorical	   imperative’	   to	   disperse	   the	   problem	   of	  
relativity.	   The	   threat	   of	   paralysis	   posed	   by	   relativity	   is	   however	   dealt	   with	   two	   opposing	  
perspectives:	  
‘Reasoning	  is	  not	  stable	  …	  the	  substance	  of	  dharma	  is	  as	  deep	  as	  a	  cave.	  Where	  
the	  masses,	  the	  people	  have	  trodden,	  that	  is	  the	  way.84	  
One	   should	   depend	   upon	   one’s	   intelligence	   to	   decide	   between	   dharma	   and	  
adharma	  and	  act	  accordingly.’85	  
And	  
‘Dharma	  and	  cultured	  conduct	  arise	  from	  intelligence	  and	  it	  is	  from	  intelligence	  
that	   they	  are	  known.	   It	   is	  by	   recourse	   to	   intelligence,	   learning	  different	   things	  
from	  different	  people,	  and	  not	  by	  depending	  only	  upon	  one	  branch	  of	  dharma	  
                                                
80	  Ibid	  260.5	  
81	  Ibid.	  260.18-­‐19	  
82	  Ibid.	  260.17	  
83	  Ibid.	  109.2-­‐3	  also	  160.1-­‐2	  
84	  Vanaparvan.	  313.117	  
85	  Shantiparvan.	  141.102	  
Page	  91	  of	  227 
 
that	   one	   should	   illumine	   one’s	   path86	   …	   the	   Good	   must	   be	   free	   from	   doubt,	  
which	  indeed	  it	  is.’87	  
In	  another	  passage,	  Bhisma	  –	  one	  of	  Yudhisthira’s	  brothers	  –	  attacks	  an	  overwhelming	  reliance	  
on	  sensory	  perception	  as	  the	  guide	  to	  action:	  ‘Thinking	  they	  are	  learned,	  they	  are	  however	  like	  
children	  in	  the	  reasoning	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  test	  –	  that	  of	  direct	  sense	  perception.	  It	  is	  only	  
long	  practice	  and	   living	  one’s	   life	   in	   its	  many	  expression	   that	  one	  can	  have	   insight	   into	   reality	  
there	   is	  no	  other	  way.’88	   In	  short,	  action	   falls	   into	   two	  categories:	   the	  herd	   instinct	  or	  actively	  
engaging	   society,	   reflecting	   on	   engagements	   and	   negotiating	   a	   course	   of	   action	   beneficial	   to	  
both	  the	  actor	  and	  society.	   It	   is,	   in	  short,	   the	  mentality	  which	  motivated	  Menon	  when	  he	  said	  
one	  must	  think	  for	  the	  negotiating	  partner.	  This	  mentality	   is	  described	  in	  practice	  and	  in	  great	  
detail	  in	  the	  Mb.	  
	  
The	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  Mahābhārata	  
	  
The	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  will	  be	  introduced	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Indians	  
were	  conceptually	  aware	  of	  a	  diplomacy	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  exists	  today	  but	  millennia	  before	  
the	   arrival	   of	   the	   Europeans	   and	   secondly	   to	   show	   how	   the	  metaphysic	   of	   dharma	   could	   be	  
operationalised	  in	  the	  hypothetical,	  or	  real,	  situations	  (the	  distinction	  is	  irrelevant)	  presented	  in	  
the	  Mb.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Mb	  presents	  its	  philosophy,	  diplomacy	  is	  also	  
presented	  as	  a	  practice	  which	  generate	  whirling	  eddies	  of	  practice,	  inestimably	  complicating	  the	  
operation	   of	   dharma.	   These	   complications	   are	   set	   out	   in	   considerable	   detail,	   which	   explains	  
why,	   even	   though	   about	   a	   great	   war,	   a	   considerable	   part	   of	   the	   Mb	   is	   expended	   on	   the	  
diplomacy	   preceding	   the	   war.	   The	   Mb	   also	   ascribes	   a	   central	   role	   to	   diplomacy	   in	   terms	   of	  
personality.	  The	  leading	  God	  in	  the	  text	  –	  Krsna	  –	  conducts	  the	  diplomacy.	  To	  the	  surrounding	  
characters,	  that	  is,	  the	  protagonists,	  Krsna	  appears	  as	  a	  man89	  though	  there	  are	  suspicions	  that	  
he	   is	  a	  God	  (revealed	   in	  the	  theosophanies	  of	  Gita	  to	  Arjuna	  alone).	  Diplomacy	   is	  necessitated	  
because	  two	  branches	  of	  a	  family,	  the	  Pandavas	  and	  Kauravas	  are	  in	  conflict.	  They	  have	  a	  choice	  
                                                
86	  Ibid.	  142.3-­‐7	  
87	  Ibid.	  287.15	  
88	  Anushasanaparvan	  162.6-­‐7	  
89	  There	  are	  also	  theosophanies	  at	  Mb	  10.6	  (to	  Asvatthamam),	  12.51	  (to	  the	  dying	  Bhisma).	  See	  Laine	  
1989.	  Hiltebeitel.	  1976.	  126-­‐127	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between	  Krsna	  and	  his	  armies.90	  The	  former	  is	  chosen	  by	  the	  Pandavas.	  The	  choice	  is	  pregnant	  
with	  meaning.	  The	  Pandavas	  are	  the	  ‘good’	  and	  their	  virtue	  leads	  them	  to	  know	  that	  a	  man	  of	  
quality	  –	  as	  Krsna	  most	  certainly	   is	  –	   is	   far	  superior	  to	  vast	  armies.	  With	  the	  choice	  made,	  the	  
political	   situation	  between	  the	   factions	  disintegrates.	  Krsna	  makes	  a	   final	  attempt	  at	  peace	  by	  
planning	   an	   embassy	   to	   the	   Kaurava	   court.	   It	   is	   here,	   even	   before	   diplomacy	   has	   gotten	  
underway,	  that	  the	  Mb	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  text	  had	  a	  complex	  understanding	  
of	  human	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
As	  Krsna	  makes	  his	  way	  to	  the	  Kauravas,	  their	   leader	  Duryodhana	  plots	  perfidy	  to	  prevent	  the	  
embassy	  from	  succeeding.	  He	  tells	  his	  father:	  Listen	  to	  me	  attentively	  (and	  I	  shall	  tell	  you)	  what	  
a	  great	  deed	  have	   I	   thought	  of.	   I	   shall	   imprison	  Krsna,	  who	   is	   the	   last	   refuge	  of	   the	  Pandavas.	  
When	  he	  will	  be	  imprisoned,	  all	  the	  Vrsnis	  and	  the	  Pandavas,	  and	  all	  our	  Earth	  become	  subject	  
to	  me.	  And	  he	  will	  come	  tomorrow	  morning.91	  The	  father	  reproaches	  his	  son,	  reminding	  him	  of	  
an	  ambassador’s	  immunity:	  Never	  tell	  me	  this,	  o	  ruler	  of	  men,	  this	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  
eternal	   law	  (dharma)!	  You	  see,	  Krsna	  will	  come	  here	  as	  ambassador,	  besides	  he	   is	  our	  relative	  
and	   he	   is	   always	   dear	   to	   us.92	   Of	   note	   is	   that	   the	   first	   order	   of	   argumentation	   against	  
Duryodhana	  is	  not	  familial,	  but	  Krsna’s	  diplomatic	  status.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  ‘mining’	  for	  verifiable	  
fact	  to	  state	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  theory	  it	  is	  justifiable	  to	  state	  that	  a	  very	  modern	  concept	  is	  being	  
articulated.	  The	  concept	  of	  immunity	  for	  ambassadors	  predates	  the	  Mb	  to	  another	  Indian	  text,	  
the	  Arthasastra.	  The	  text	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Indian	  canon	  because	  it	  was	  lost	  and	  
only	  rediscovered	  in	  1909.	  Though	  popularized	  in	  the	  West	  as	  India’s	  answer	  to	  Machiavelli,	  the	  
text	   remains	   –	   relative	   to	   the	   Mb	   –	   unknown.	   However,	   the	   Artha	   does	   provide	   detailed	  
information	  about	  diplomatic	  protocol,	  stating	  that	  ambassadors	  came	  in	  three	  categories:	  
1. Ambassador	   Plenipotentiary,	   whose	   task	   was	   to	   conduct	   the	   affair.	   He	  
possessed	   complete	   powers	   of	   a	   Minister	   and	   was	   able	   to	   negotiate	  
independently	  and	  act	  on	  his	  own	  and	  according	   to	  circumstances.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  
category	  that	  Krsna	  falls.	  
2. Ambassador	   with	   limited	   power.	   Not	   allowed	   to	   deviate	   from	   instructions	   or	  
exceed	  the	  authority	  invested	  in	  him.	  
                                                
90	  Nath	  provides	  a	  useful	  overview	  about	  military	  thinking	  in	  the	  Mb.	  See	  Nath.	  1990.	  
91	  Mb.	  Mahavanaparvan.	  86.17-­‐18	  
92	  Ibid.	  86.17-­‐18	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3. Ambassador-­‐messenger	  who	  was	  a	   special	  messenger.	  His	  duties	  were	   to	  only	  
transfer	  (in	  the	  Mb	  orally)	  the	  entrusted	  message	  and	  to	  return	  with	  an	  answer.	  
He	  was	  not	  empowered	  to	  negotiate	  at	  all.93	  
These	   are	   mentioned	   not	   because	   they	   are	   programmatic	   to	   Indian	   ‘myth’	   (this	   particular	  
political	   text,	   as	   opposed	   to	  myth	  was	   lost)	   but	   because	   the	   Artha	   provides	   a	   context	   to	   the	  
practices	  of	  diplomacy.	  Krsna	   is	  a	  negotiator	  and	  uses	   four	  methods	  of	  negotiating.	  These	  are	  
laid	  out	  in	  the	  Artha	  and	  are:	  
1. Peaceful	  negotiations	  –	  initial	  contact	  with	  Duryodhana.	  
2. Bribery	  –	  offering	  the	  kingdom	  to	  Karna	  
3. Sowing	  dissension	  –	  pitting	  Duryodhana’s	  mother	  against	  him.	  
4. Open	  warfare	  –	  given	  the	  failure	  of	  1,	  2	  and	  3.	  
	  
To	   begin	   with,	   Krsna	   pays	   courtesy	   visits,	   displays	   great	   care	   and	   tact.	   Later	   he	   resorts	   to	  
persuasion,	  trying	  to	  convince	  Duryodhana.	  Even	  the	  persuasion	  takes	  forms.	  Krsna	  speaks	  in	  a	  
friendly	  manner	   with	   praise	   and	   epithets94	   but	   when	   invited	   to	   partake	   in	   a	  meal,	   drink	   and	  
entertainment	   Krsna	   refuses.	   Questioned	   as	   to	   why	   he	   refused	   entertainment	   Krsna’s	   reply	  
clarifies	  his	  position.	  He	  did	  not	  mean	  to	  be	  discourteous.	  ‘Ambassadors	  enjoy	  meals	  and	  accept	  
honours	  only	  after	  they	  have	  achieved	  their	  aim.	  Therefore	  only	  then,	  when	  my	  aim	  would	  be	  
achieved,	  you	  will	  be	  able,	  o	  descendents	  of	  Bharata,	   to	  honour	  me	  and	  my	  companions	  with	  
your	  hospitality.’	  Realizing	  that	  he	  is	  not	  making	  any	  headway	  Krsna	  changes	  tactics	  –	  but	  very	  
slightly.	  He	  gradually	  begins	  to	  warn	  Duryodhana	  of	  the	  coming	  danger	  from	  the	  Pandavas	  are	  
strong.	  	  It	  is	  not	  weakness	  but	  strength	  that	  makes	  them	  strive	  for	  peace.	  Krsna	  states:	  ‘Would	  
you	   like	   to	  get	  yourself	  on	   the	  bed	  of	  heroes?	  Really	  you	  shall	  obtain	   it,	  with	  your	  councilors.	  
Just	  wait	  a	  little	  longer	  and	  the	  great	  battle	  will	  start.’95	  At	  the	  meeting	  is	  present	  Duryodhana’s	  
mother	   who	   has	   from	   the	   start	   been	   against	   the	   war	   and	   councils	   her	   son	   thus.	   Another	  
councilor,	  who	  convinced	  of	  Duryodhana’s	  mindset	  –	  dharma	  –	   is	  convinced	  by	  Krsna’s	  speech	  
but	   fails	   to	   adequately	   debate	   the	   issue	   with	   his	   king.	   The	   meeting	   ends	   in	   failure	   with	  
Duryodhana	  storming	  out.	  Noting	  this	  failure	  of	  Duryodhana’s	  courtiers	  to	  adequately	  brief	  their	  
king,	  Krsna’s	  closing	  speech	  states:	  ‘This	  is	  the	  gravest	  fault	  of	  all	  the	  elders	  of	  the	  Kuru	  race	  that	  
you	  have	  not	  seized	  and	  restrained	  this	  king,	  who	   is	  making	  evil	  enjoying	  his	  authority.	   I	   think	  
                                                
93	  Altekar.	  P.300,	  326.	  	  
94	  Mb.	  Mahaparvan.	  5.122.7	  
95	  Ibid.	  152.2	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the	   time	  has	   come	   for	   this,	   o	   chastiser	   of	   foes.	  And	   if	   this	   is	   done	  now,	   then	  everything	  may	  
come	  to	  a	  peaceful	  end.’96	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Duryodhana,	  Krsna’s	  activities	  are	  a	  paragon	  of	  diplomatic	  virtue.	  He	  understands	  
completely	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  mission	  –	  maintaining	  peace.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  dictates	  
his	   highly	   moral	   behaviour.	   As	   he	   enters	   the	   opposing	   domain,	   Krsna	   moves	   through	   the	  
ritualistic	   procedures	   expected	   of	   an	   ambassador.	   He	   pays	   courtesy	   visits	   –	   which	   double	   as	  
intelligence	   gathering,	   though	   like	   any	   good	  diplomat,	   Krsna	  does	  not	   stoop	   to	   any	  untoward	  
means.	  Ultimately,	  even	  as	  Krsna	  departs,	  his	  embassy	  a	  failure,	  he	  makes	  one	  last	  attempt	  to	  
negotiate.	  He	  does	  so	  by	  trying	  to	  sow	  dissent	  in	  the	  Kaurava	  ranks.	  Krsna	  discloses	  to	  a	  member	  
of	  the	  Kauravas	  called	  Karna	  that	  he	  is	  the	  senior	  most	  Kaurava,	  not	  Duryodhana.	  Krsna	  offers	  to	  
help	  make	  Karna	  king	  of	  the	  Kauravas	  and	  so	  avert	  the	  war	  that	  Duryodhana	  is	  set	  to	  cause.	  If	  
Karna	  accepts,	  says	  Krsna,	  then	  peace	  will	  be	  concluded	  on	  this	  day	  itself.97	  Karna,	  having	  been	  
raised	  not	  to	  be	  a	  king,	  though	  by	  birth	  he	  is,	  refuses	  Krsna	  and	  this	  last	  attempt	  at	  peace	  fails.	  	  
	  
After	  his	  failure,	  Krsna	  himself	  speaks	  about	  the	  four	  methods	  of	  politics	  (stated	  above)	  telling	  
Yudhisthira:	   ‘At	   first,	   o	   king,	   I	   used	   all	   the	   possible	   means	   for	   the	   reconciliation,	   striving	   to	  
preserve	  the	  close	  fraternal	  friendship	  between	  them	  and	  us,	  in	  order	  to	  avid	  splitting	  the	  Kuru	  
race	  and	  for	  the	  prosperity	  of	  all.	  When	  the	  reconciliation	  with	  them	  was	  rejected,	  I	  had	  made	  
the	   second	   attempt	   –	   to	   cause	   the	   split	   among	   them,	   and	   also	   mentioned	   your	   feats,	  
accomplished	  by	  you	  in	  relations	  both	  with	  men	  and	  gods.	  And	  when	  Duryodhana	  neglected	  my	  
reconciling	  speeches	   then	   I	   tried	   to	  split	   them	  ….	  To	  prevent	   the	  division	  of	   the	  Kuru	  people	   I	  
also	  told	  them	  about	  your	  readiness	  to	  offer	  them	  a	  gift.’	  Ultimately,	  Krsna	  informs	  Yudhisthira	  
that	  Duryodhana	  was	  told	  that	  the	  Pandavas	  would	  be	  content	  with	  just	  five	  villages.	  This	  most	  
minimal	  of	  demands	  is	  made	  to	  ensure	  peace.	  But,	  even	  this,	  what	  is	  a	  token	  gift	  in	  exchange	  for	  
giving	  up	  a	  kingdom,	  was	  rejected.	  Krsna	  notes:	  ‘Though	  he	  was	  told	  this,	  this	  impious	  man	  did	  
not	  want	  to	  give	  even	  these.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  consider	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  left	  now,	  to	  use	  the	  fourth	  
means	  that	  is	  the	  severe	  punishment	  for	  these	  adharmic	  peoples.’98	  The	  phrase	  used	  for	  ‘severe	  
punishment’	  is	  dandam	  caturtham,	  i.e.,	  the	  fourth	  and	  most	  sever	  means	  of	  politics	  –	  war.	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  Ibid.	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The	  use	  of	  adharmic	  by	  Krsna	  is	  significant.	  The	  decision	  by	  the	  negotiator	  that	  the	  people	  he	  is	  
negotiating	  with	  are	  adarmic	  is	  the	  signal	  to	  war.	  The	  decision,	  in	  this	  instance,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
negotiator’s	  judgment.	  The	  negotiator’s	  judgment	  arises	  from	  his	  having	  attempted	  to	  arrive	  at	  
a	  solution	  befitting	  of	  dharma	  which	  is	  –	  crucially	  –	  dependent	  on	  the	  negotiators	  own	  position	  
in	  time	  and	  space.	  In	  this	  case	  Krsna,	  a	  God,	  wants	  to	  avoid	  mass	  slaughter	  (though	  the	  people	  
he	  represents	  are	  motivated	  by	  other	  aims).	  That	  Krsna	   is	  willing	  to	  wage	  war	  shows	  that	  war	  
was,	  ultimately,	   an	  acceptable	  method	  of	  maintaining	  dharma.	   Thus,	   the	  Mb	  operates	  on	   the	  
principle	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   reject	  war	   but	   simultaneously	   those	   of	  dharma	   continuously	  
strive	   to	  permanently	   avoid	  war,	   especially	   aggressive	  war.99	  As	  Mackenzie	  Brown	  articulates,	  
‘ancient	   Hindu	   political	  wisdom	   of	   the	   first	  millennium	  B.C.	   is	   still	   a	   good	   key	   to	   the	   political	  
thinking	   of	   Asiatic	   peoples’	   because	   in	   that	   ancient	   system,	   ‘a	   precise	   code	   of	   international	  
relations	  and	  power	  diplomacy	  was	  worked	  out.’100	  	  
	  
Ideals	  are	  the	  essence	  of	  morality	  tales	  such	  as	  the	  Mb	  myth.	  However,	  what	  is	  moral?	  What	  is	  
the	   manner	   of	   acting	   in	   the	   specific	   context	   of	   diplomacy?	   What,	   in	   short,	   are	   the	   accrued	  
notions	  of	  proper	  diplomatic	  behavior?	  The	  question	  will	  be	  answered	  by	  briefly	  setting	  out	  the	  
qualities	  Krsna	  embodies,	  i.e.,	  his	  dharma.	  Krsna	  makes	  his	  own	  opinions,	  specific	  to	  diplomacy	  
know	   during	   the	   negotiations.	   His	   comment	   is	   brief	   but	   it	   could	   be	   programmatic	   for	   any	  
existing	  diplomatic	  service.	  Krsna	  says:	  	  
Making	   efforts	   to	   establish	   peace	   here	   I	   would	   not	   arouse	   blame	   amongst	  
people.	   And	   if	   I	  manage	   to	   achieve	   peace	  with	   the	   Kauravas	   in	   a	   proper	  way	  
without	  harming	   the	  profits	  of	   the	  Pandavas,	   then	  my	  good	  would	  have	  great	  
importance	  and	  the	  Kauravas	  would	  escape	  great	  danger.101	  	  
Evidently,	  Krsna	  regards	  his	  mission,	  dedicated	  to	  peace,	  as	  an	  honourable	  aim	  and	  realizes	  his	  
responsibility	   to	   the	   people	   whose	   confidence	   is	   precious	   to	   him.	   Krsna	   directly	   tells	   the	  
Kauravas:	  Let	  peace	  come	  between	  the	  Kauravas	  and	  the	  Pandavas	  –	  with	  this	  cherished	  motive	  
did	   I	   come	  here,	  o	   the	  offspring	  of	  Bharata,	   just	   to	   try	   to	  achieve	  without	   feat	  of	  arms	  of	   the	  
glorious	  heroes.102	  In	  part	  Krsna	  is	  successful,	  though	  the	  overall	  mission	  fails.	  He	  convinces	  the	  
Kaurava	  leader’s	  father	  to	  avert	  himself	  from	  the	  battle	  and	  to	  save	  his	  relatives	  and	  the	  people	  
                                                
99	  Altekar.	  Op	  cit.	  p.292	  
100	  Mackenzie	  Brown.	  
101	  Mb.	  Mahaparvan.	  91.19	  
102	  Ibid.	  93,3	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of	   Earth.	   Krsna	   councils	   for	   peace	   knowing	   the	   consequences	   of	   war.	   The	   context	   for	   these	  
comments	  is	  an	  idea	  expounded	  by	  Krsna	  immediately	  before	  the	  war:	  asakta	  Karman	  or	  action	  
without	  attachment.	  
	  
It	  is	  for	  Brodbeck	  a	  ‘comprehensive	  deconstructive	  philosophy	  of	  deliberate	  behaviours.	  As	  such,	  
when	  this	  technique	  is	  applied,	  it	  applies	  to	  all	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  deliberate	  behaviours	  of	  
the	   person	   applying	   it.’103	   In	   practice	   this	   would	   mean,	   for	   example,	   a	   warrior	   may	   kill	   his	  
relatives	   and	   teachers	   without	   suffering	   the	   normal	   consequences	   of	   such	   actions,	   i.e.,	  
psychological	  trauma	  in	  this	  life	  and	  spiritual	  demerit	  in	  the	  next.	  As	  well	  as	  being	  the	  originator,	  
communicator	  of	  the	  technique	  of	  asakta	  karman,	  Krsna	   is	  also	   its	  most	  excellent	  practitioner.	  
Krsna’s	  attitude	  to	  action	  is:	  For	  me	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  be	  done,	  nothing	  in	  the	  three	  worlds	  to	  
be	  obtained;	  even	  so	  I	  move	  in	  karman	  …	  Actions	  do	  not	  stain	  me.	  I	  do	  not	  delight	  in	  the	  fruit	  of	  
actions.	  Whoever	  perceives	  me	  in	  this	  way	  is	  not	  bound	  by	  karmans.’104	  Textually,	  the	  claim	  that	  
Krsna	   acts	   asakta	   is	   intended	   to	   provide	   an	   example	   for	   people	   to	   follow,	   a	   guide	   to	   acting	  
asakta,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  guarantee	  both	  of	  the	  possibility	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  so	  acting.	  The	  attachment	  
to	   be	   shed	   is	   specifically	   attachment	   to	   the	   fruits	   of	   one’s	   actions:	   one	  must	   act	   out	   of	   duty,	  
rather	  than	  to	  achieve	  something	  one	  desires.	  It	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  Krsna’s	  caste	  obligations.	  He	  
is	  a	  ksatriya	  with	  a	  network	  of	  class	  and	  kinship	  loyalties	  which	  inform	  and	  frame	  his	  actions	  but	  
at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  as	  being	  a	  man,	  he	   is	  God	  Almighty.105	  Brodbeck	  has	  demonstrated	  
that	  the	  ideals	  that	  Krsna	  embodies	  –	  non	  attachment	  –	  are	  realised	  only	  when	  Krsna	  behaves	  as	  
a	   divine	   being.	   His	   divine	   actions	   are	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   the	   dharma	   he	   is	   meant	   to	  
encapsulate.	  However,	   it	   is	  significant	   that	  as	  a	  human	  Krsna	   is	  not	  always	  able	  to	  keep	  to	  his	  
dharma.	  106	  
	  
For	   almost	   the	   entire	   narrative	   of	   the	  Mb,	   Krsna’s	   divinity	   is	   not	   a	   theme	   expounded	   by	   the	  
narrators.	  When	  the	  subject	  comes	  up,	   it	   is	  generally	  kept	  at	  the	   level	  of	  the	  characters	   in	  the	  
drama.	  Throughout	  the	  war	  Krsna’s	  divinity	  serves	  as	  provocative	  rumour107,	  underpinning	  the	  
Pandavas	  hope	  that	   they	  can	  win	  and	  the	  Kauravas’	   fear	   that	   they	  might	   lose.	  Krsna	   is	  special	  
                                                
103	  Brodbeck.	  2004.	  p.84	  
104	  3.22	  
105	  Mb	  5.129	  
106	  Brodbeck.	  2003.	  	  
107	  At	  Mb	  12.271	  when	  the	  war	  is	  over,	  Yudhisthira	  asks	  Bhisma	  whether	  or	  not	  Krsna	  is	  the	  highest	  Lord.	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because	  it	  is	  he	  who	  makes	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  sides.	  Hence	  the	  line:	  ‘where	  there	  
is	  Krsna,	  there	  is	  victory.’108	  However,	  to	  one	  unversed	  in	  the	  texture	  of	  the	  Mb	  there	  appear	  to	  
be	  contradictions.	  To	  start	  with,	  why	  does	  the	  unattached	  Krsna	  take	  such	  an	  interest	   in	  these	  
family	   squabbles?	   Krsna	   claims	   that	   he	   owes	   the	   same	   loyalty	   to	   the	   Kauravas	   as	   to	   the	  
Pandavas.	  Krsna	  is	  neutral:	  neither	  he	  personally	  nor	  his	  tribe	  stand	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  outcome.	  
Others	  are	  embroiled	   in	  a	   terrific	  mess,	   their	  honour	  at	   stake,	   their	  wives	  abused	  and	  estates	  
confiscated,	   they	   are	   necessarily	   involved	   in	   the	  war,	   but	   Krsna	   is	   detached	   enough	   to	   act	   as	  
mediator.	   Krsna	   does	   not	   have	   the	   option	   of	   inaction	   because	   he	   (unlike	   Baladeva’s	   non-­‐
participation)	  does	  not	  endorse	  the	  renunciation	  of	  action.	  Krsna’s	  karmayoga	  positions	  itself	  in	  
opposition	  to	  Baladeva.	  In	  taking	  part,	  albeit	  only	  as	  a	  charioteer,	  Krsna	  is	  embodying	  one	  of	  the	  
basics	   of	   his	   theory	   asakta	   karman,	   that	   inactivity	   should	   be	   shunned.	   But	   how	   does	   Krsna	  
conceive	  of	  his	  activity,	  given	  that	  he	  does	  not	  stand	  to	  gain?	  What	  is	  he	  participating	  for?	  
	  
Krsna’	   private	   cogitations	   on	   this	   matter	   are	   not	   explored	   by	   the	   epic,	   yet	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  
reconstruct	   a	   political	   philosophy	   embodied	   by	   Krsna’s	   behaviour.	   This	   work	   has	   been	   done	  
most	  thoroughly	  by	  More,	  who	  tries	  to	  unite	  Krsna’s	  philosophy	  with	  his	  ksatriya	  biography	  as	  
given	  in	  the	  Mb,	  and	  argues	  that	  his	  divinity	  grew	  out	  of	  popular	  respect	  for	  this	  philosophy.109	  
More	   presents	   Krsna’s	   political	   vision	   as	   anti-­‐imperialistic	   and	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   local	  
autonomy.	   Particularly	   important	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   More’s	   analysis	   of	   Yudhisthira’s	   rajasuya	  
yajna,	  performed	  under	  Krsna’s	  instigation	  and	  supervision,	  in	  which	  he	  highlights	  the	  defeat	  of	  
the	  expansionist	  Karasamdha	  and	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  local	  chieftains	  he	  had	  imprisoned.	  	  
	  
Krsna’s	   people,	   the	   Vrsnis,	   have	   lost	   their	   ancestral	   lands	   and	   been	   forced	   to	   relocate	   to	  
Dvaraka.110	  Krsna	  therefore	  has	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  of	  the	  disruptive	  effect	  such	  expansionism	  
can	   have,	   and	   his	   removal	   of	   Jarasamdha	   (who	   forced	   Krsna’s	   people	   to	   move)	   with	   the	  
assistance	  of	   the	  Pandavas	   is	  presented	  by	  More	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	   rather	   than	   just	   the	  
settling	  of	  an	  old	  score.	  As	  Krsna	  says	  to	  Jarasamdha:	  ‘We,	  attendant	  to	  the	  afflicted,	  have	  come	  
here	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  occasioning	  the	  prosperity	  of	   [our]	  relations,	  to	  restrain	  you,	  the	  cause	  of	  
their	  ruin.’111	  Duryodhana	  is	  cut	  from	  the	  same	  cloth	  as	  Jarasamdha,	  being	  keen	  to	  annexe	  the	  
                                                
108	  6.21.	  12d	  
109	  More.	  1995.	  P.19-­‐21	  
110	  (Mb	  2.13).	  
111	  2.20.12	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territory	  of	  others	  and	  defend	  it	  militarily.	  Krsna	  having	  replaced	  an	  imperialist	  with	  a	  federalist,	  
now	  sees	  that	  federalist	  threatened	  by	  another	  imperialist,	  and	  once	  again	  steps	  in.	  
	  
Though	  More	  might	  be	  criticised	  for	  finding	  anachronistically	  reconstructing	  a	  texture	  to	  Krsna’s	  
politics	  from	  a	  modern	  humanistic	  perspective,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  to	  explain	  those	  politics	  in	  the	  
context	   of	   ancient	   India.	   The	   Mb	   was	   created	   in	   the	   context	   of	   population	   expansion,	  
urbanisation,	  and	   increasing	  social	   interaction	  between	  groups.	  Centralisation	  and	  subjugation	  
would	  have	  been	  live	  issues:	  tribal	  ways	  of	  life	  would	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  disturbing	  and	  often	  
violent	   interactions.	   It	   is	  against	   this	  background,	  and	   in	   response	   to	   Jarasamdha,	   that	  Krsna’s	  
ideas	   of	   lokasamgraha,	   the	   holding-­‐together	   of	   world(s),	   are	   to	   be	   understood.	   He	   views	   an	  
ideal,	   prosperous	   life	   as	   dependent	   on	   an	   idealised	   network	   of	   reciprocal,	   respectful	   and	  
mutually	  beneficial	  interactions	  with	  one’s	  close	  kin	  and	  other	  social	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  
devas.	   Krsna’s	   activism	   is	   conservative:	   he	   wants	   to	   ensure	   the	   continuity	   of	   existing	   human	  
ecologies	   (lokas),	   which	   he	   sees	   as	   being	   newly	   vulnerable	   to	   disruption	   by	   varna	  
miscegenation,112	  by	  removal	  of	  locally	  traditional	  power	  structures,	  and	  by	  neglect	  of	  oblations	  
to	  the	  devas.113	  
	  
Because	  lokasamgraha	  is	  of	  great	  value,	  great	  pains	  must	  be	  taken,	  when	  necessary,	  to	  remove	  
the	   disruption	   threatening	   it.	   As	   More	   explains,	   Krsna	   appreciates	   that	   the	   end	   justifies	   the	  
means:	   he	   urges	   the	   Pandavas	   to	   resort	   to	   dastardly	   tricks	   in	   order	   to	   defeat	   their	   enemies,	  
disregarding	   existing	   conventions	   of	   chivalry.	   He	   thus	   has	   a	   flexible	   attitude	   to	   dharma.114	  
Duryodhana	   justifies	   his	   aggressive	   imperialism	   by	   citing	   Brhaspati,	   saying	   that	   the	   quest	   for	  
victory	   takes	  him	  above	  dharma	   and	  adharma.115	   Likewise	  Krsna,	   to	   counter	   that	   imperialism,	  
rises	   above	   the	   dharmas	   of	   chivalry,	   depending	   instead	   on	   niti,116	   a	   situation-­‐sensitive,	  
improvisatory	   strategic	   sense.	   It	   seems	   that	   some	   aspects	   of	   ksatriyadharma	   (the	   dharma	   of	  
                                                
112	  (1:38-­‐44)	  
113	  (3:10-­‐11)	  
114	  (see	  also	  Mb	  8.49,	  9.59).	  
115	  ‘Brhaspati	  said	  that	  the	  business	  of	  kings	  is	  other	  than	  the	  business	  of	  folk,	  and	  therefore	  [his]	  own	  
profit	  is	  always	  zealously	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  by	  the	  king.	  The	  conduct	  of	  the	  ksatriya	  is	  directed	  to	  victory.	  
He	  in	  his	  own	  conduct,	  be	  it	  dharma	  or	  adharma’	  (Mb	  2.50:	  14-­‐15)	  
116	  The	  word	  does	  not	  occur	  in	  the	  Bhagavadagita,	  but	  is	  certainly	  applicable	  to	  Krsna’s	  methods,	  and	  is	  
discussed	  in	  Mb	  12.59	  and	  the	  Arthasastra.	  See	  Kangle	  1965.	  p.3-­‐6.	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warriors)	  were	  out	  of	  date:	  armies	  had	  become	  larger,	  weaponry	  more	  advanced,	  and	  more	  was	  
now	  at	  stake.	  
	  
More’s	   account	   of	   Krsna’s	   political	   philosophy	   is	   plausible	   both	   textually	   and	   historically,	  
providing	   an	   explanation	   of	   his	   activity	   in	   terms	   not	   of	   short-­‐term	   or	   personal	   goals	   but	   of	  
maintaining	   the	  background	   conditions	   for	   satisfactory	  human	  existence.	   It	  matches	   very	  well	  
with	   the	  attitude	  Krsna	  urges	  Arjuna	   to	  adopt.	  However,	   this	  political	  philosophy	  of	  Krsna’s	   is	  
never	  made	  explicit	  in	  the	  Mb,	  which,	  in	  accounting	  for	  Krsna’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  war,	  implies	  
his	  friendship	  with	  Arjuna	  just	  as	  strongly.	  Krsna	  in	  encouraging	  the	  Pandavas	  to	  insist	  upon	  the	  
return	   of	   their	   kingdom,	   appeals	   more	   readily	   to	   their	   ksatriya	   honour	   than	   he	   does	   to	   the	  
political	  implications	  of	  their	  not	  doing	  so.	  	  
	  
Likewise	  earlier,	  when	  he	  co-­‐opted	  them	  to	  remove	  Jarasamdha,	  he	  sold	  the	  scheme	  to	  them	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  benefits	  to	  their	  status	  and	  prestige	  within	  the	  ksatriya	  community,	  rather	  than	  by	  
expounding	  his	  political	  vision.	  Because	  this	  ad	  hominem	  verbal	  behaviour	  is	  fully	  explicable	  as	  
Krsna’s	   niti,	   More’s	   reconstruction	   of	   his	   political	   philosophy,	   though	   faultless,	   is	   nowhere	  
actually	  demonstrable.	  Hence	  we	  cannot	  simply	  conclude	  that	  Krsna	  perceives	  all	  his	  actions	  in	  
terms	  of	  lokasamgraha,	  and	  is	  thus	  asakta.	  Even	  were	  Krsna	  to	  expound	  the	  philosophy	  outlined	  
above,	  this	  would	  not	  tell	  us	  about	  his	  attachment	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  
imagine	  that	  he	  is	  particularly	  attached	  to	  a	  certain	  philosophy.	  Or	  perhaps,	  again,	  it	  would	  lead	  
us	  to	  imagine	  that	  he	  is	  appealing	  to	  laudable	  sounding	  principles	  as	  cover	  for	  his	  attachment	  to	  
the	   Pandavas,	   Arjuna	   in	   particular.	   In	   a	   way,	   not	   talking	   about	   his	   motivations	   suggests	   that	  




A	   genealogy	   of	   current	   practices	   by	   definition	  must	   untangle	   the	   controversy	   it	   produces	   by	  
tracing	  the	  history,	  understood	  as	  the	  underlying	  rationales	  underpinning	  today’s	  practices.	  For	  
diplomatic	  modernity	   the	  Mb	   is	   a	   central	   text	   because	   of	   the	   centrality	   current	   practitioners	  
attribute	  to	  it	  and	  more	  generally	  because	  it	  permeates	  the	  intellectual	  reality	  of	  Indian	  society.	  
Furthermore	  the	  analysis	  must	  be	  done	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  practitioners	  –	  that	  is	  the	  object	  of	  
investigation	   (diplomats	   and	   their	   craft)	   and	   the	   literature,	   since	   its	   pronouncements	   on	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diplomacy	  generate	  the	  controversy.	  Unfortunately,	  past	  attempts	  to	  analyse	  the	  Mb	  have	  been	  
from	  a	  philological	   perspective	   –	   not	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	   the	  Mb	  being	   a	  morality	   tale,	   a	  
repository	  of	  knowledge	  or	  of	  how	  it	  informs	  the	  logics	  underpinning	  practice.	  The	  investigation	  
in	   keeping	  with	   Nelson’s	   and	   Nielsen’s	   notion	   of	   putting	   the	   same	   questions	  which	  motivate	  
European	  civilizational	  analysis	  to	  non-­‐Western	  civilizations117	  crafted	  the	  technique	  of	  textures	  
so	  that	  an	  analysis	  of	  local	  texts	  was	  not	  unravelled	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  alien	  categories.	  These	  
had	  rendered	  the	  Mb	  an	   ‘unthing’	  devoid	  of	  any	  philosophical	  merit.	  Yet,	   it	   inspires	  diplomats	  
and	   to	  undo	   this	   controversy	   the	  analysis	  exposed	   in	   the	  Mb	   the	   system	  of	   spiritual	  direction	  
which	  provides	  the	  symbolic	  economy	  of	  Indian	  civilization.118	  This	  is	  dharma	  and	  it	  provides	  the	  
rationale	   for	   a	   user-­‐specific	   method	   of	   acting.	   The	   axes	   for	   action	   are	   the	   location	   of	   the	  
practitioner	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  Dharma	   is	  about	  negotiating	  a	  crowded	  world.	  Not	  overcoming	  
difference	   –	   in	   fact	   to	   overcome	   another’s	   dharma	   is	   often	   antithetical	   to	   the	   principles	   of	  
dharma.	  A	  multilayered	  concept,	  dharma	  however,	  ultimately	  puts	  the	  user	  at	  the	  centre.	   It	   is	  
the	   user’s	   good	   (within	   expanding	   and	   concentric	   circles	   of	   ‘good’	   as	   judged	   by	   the	   user	   and	  
society	  of	  which	  the	  user	  is	  inextricably	  enmeshed)	  which	  is	  the	  guide	  to	  action.	  	  
	  
This	   rationale	   informs	   the	  main	   diplomat	   in	   the	  Mb,	   Krsna.	  Within	   the	   person	   of	   Krsna,	   it	   is	  
evident	  that	  though	  he	  strives	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  personally	  motivated	  justifications	  he	  fails.	  
Therein	   lies	   another	   principle	   of	   dharma	   –	   it	   is	   by	   definition	   not	   attainable;	   only	   something	  
which	  can	  inform	  thought	  and	  action.	  As	  a	  spiritualist	  wrote	  in	  a	  European	  philosophical	  journal:	  
‘Thus,	   it	   is	  evident	  that	   Indian	  spirituality	   is	  based	  upon	  a	  strong	  foundation	  of	  
realism.	   It	   sees	  no	  conflict	  between	  spirituality	  and	   the	  ordinary	  values	  of	   life.	  
Hinduism	  is	  by	  no	  means	  otherworldly	  or	  anti-­‐social	  in	  the	  usual	  sense	  of	  these	  
words.	   Indian	   thinkers	   have	   come	   to	   grips	   with	   reality,	   whose	   meaning,	  
however,	  changes	  at	  different	  stages	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  soul.	  They	  have	  
reflected	  upon	  and	   faced	  man’s	   real	  problems	  of	   life,	   from	  his	   first	  wandering	  
into	  the	  realm	  of	  phenomena	  to	  his	  final	  liberation,	  and	  have	  exhorted	  him	  first	  
to	  idealize	  the	  real	  and	  then	  to	  realize	  the	  ideal.’119	  
	  
                                                
117	  Nielsen.	  Benjamin	  Nelson’s	  Sociology	  of	  Civilizations.	  P.	  413	  
118	  Nelson.	  1973.	  p.83.	  
119	  Swami	  Nikhilananda.	  Apr.	  -­‐	  Jul.,	  1959.	  p.66	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An	  example	  of	   the	   relation	  between	   real	   and	   ideal	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   text	   and	   its	  delivery	   is	   the	  
God-­‐man	  Krsna	  whose	  actions	  are	  not	  verifiable	  truth,	  and	  that	  he,	  Enlightenment	  History	  tells	  
us,	  could	  not	  have	  existed,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  negate	  the	  meanings	  ensconced	  in	  his	  interactions.	  
It	  is	  his	  very	  divinity	  which	  reinforces	  the	  ideal	  in	  a	  situation.	  Krsna’s	  diplomacy	  also	  provides	  a	  
symbolic-­‐economy	   lodged	   deep	   in	   Indian	   civilization	   informing	   modern	   day	   practice.	   On	  
occasion	   it	   befuddles	   and	   confuses	   non-­‐Indian	   negotiating	   partners	   as	   happened	   with	   when	  
former	  Indian	  Foreign	  Minister	  Jaswant	  Singh	  was	  negotiating	  the	  diplomatic	  timetable	  with	  the	  
Americans.	   An	   Indian	   diplomat	   suggested	   drawing	   up	   the	   schedule	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
astrological	  calendar.	  Far	  from	  being	  locked	  in	  the	  past	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  Mb	  obviously	  continue	  
to	  inform	  action.	  	  
	  
In	  short,	  the	  controversy	  that	  this	  chapter	  attempted	  to	  unravel	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  non-­‐Westerns	  
lacked	   a	   conception	   of	   diplomatic	   theory.	   This	   chapter	   demonstrated	   that	   India	   possesses	   a	  
civilizational	   notion	   for	   the	   practices	   of	   today	   in	   the	  Mb.	   That	   this	   text	   cannot	   be	   completely	  
demythologized	   is	   irrelevant120	   since	  what	   is	   of	   note	   is	   not	   empirical	   fact,	   but	   the	   conceptual	  
repertoire	   of	   diplomacy	   –	   something	   found	   in	   abundance	   in	   the	   Mb.	   However,	   these	   non-­‐
Western	  conceptions	  do	  not	  imply	  that	  this	  was	  the	  start	  of	  a	  long	  march	  to	  ‘modernity’	  or	  what	  
post-­‐colonialists	   call	   ‘alternative	   modernities’.	   To	   argue	   that	   would	   be	   to	   fall	   into	   the	   same	  
teleological	  trap	  Nandy	  criticises.	  The	  past,	  as	  Nandy	  reminds	  us,	  is	  full	  of	  contradictions,	  lapses,	  
folds	   and	   repetitions.	   Instead,	   all	   that	   has	   been	   argued	  here	   is	   that	   there	   existed	   in	   the	   local	  
culture	  certain	  conceptions	  about	  both	  practice	  and	  the	  theories	  underpinning	  those	  practices	  
which	   existed	   independently	   of	   the	   colonial	   moment	   and	   in	   fact	   long	   predated	   it.	   The	   next	  
chapter	  will	  explore	  whether	  the	  same	  holds	  for	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  diplomacy.	  
	  
ENDS	  
                                                
120	  Hiltebeitel.	  P.270	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CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  	  NON-­‐WESTERN	  SOURCES	  OF	  INDIAN	  DIPLOMATIC	  PRACTICE	  
	  
The	  great	  challenge	  to	  an	  historical	  anthropology	  is	  not	  merely	  to	  know	  how	  
events	  are	  ordered	  by	  culture,	  but	  how,	  in	  that	  process,	  the	  culture	  is	  
reordered.	  How	  does	  the	  reproduction	  of	  a	  structure	  become	  its	  
transformation?	  	  
	  
–	  Marshall	  Sahlins1	  
	  
You	  see	  we	  do	  not	  know	  power.	  We	  have	  not	  held	  power	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  We	  
knew	  it	  and	  how	  to	  handle	  it	  …	  but	  we’ve	  been	  out	  of	  practice	  for	  …	  what	  …	  a	  
thousand	  years?	  
	  
–	  K.	  Shankar	  Bajpai,	  	  
Chairman	  National	  Security	  Advisory	  Board	  
	  and	  	  





The	  previous	  chapter	   identified	  the	   logics	  underpinning	  the	  practices	  of	  today	  as	  expressed	  by	  
the	  practitioners	  themselves	  by	  analysing	  the	  Mb,	  a	  text	  which	  has	  informed	  Indian	  thought	  for	  
at	   least	   two	   millennia.	   The	   investigation	   of	   that	   document	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   present	   was	  
performed	   to	   identify	   the	   component	   in	   the	   culture	   central	   to	   the	   self-­‐constitution	   of	   the	  
society,2	   that	   is,	   the	   civilization’s	   metaphysic.	   However	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   indicate	  
inflexibility	  or	  stasis.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  metaphysic	  to	  manage	  change	  during	  the	  moments	  of	  
contact	   with	   alien	   systems.	   The	   metaphysic	   may	   also	   be	   altered,	   erased	   or	   subsumed	   or	   a	  
combination	  of	  these	  possibilities	  may	  occur.	  What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  since	  the	  cultural	  signifiers	  
civilizational	  analysis	  is	   interested	  in	  are	  highly	  tenacious	  the	  means	  of	  their	  modification	  must	  
necessarily	  be	  epic.	  These	  are	  what	  Nelson	  calls	  transcivilizational	  encounters	  –	  those	  occasions	  
when	  the	  central	   frame,	  or	  metaphysic	  of	  a	  civilization	   is	  affected	  by	  another	  civilization.3	  The	  
coming	   of	   the	   Mughals	   was	   such	   a	   moment	   solidifying	   an	   era	   in	   which,	   as	   India’s	   National	  
Security	  Adviser	  says,	  locals	  lost	  touch	  with	  power.	  	  
                                                
1	  1981.	  	  P.8	  
2	  Castoriadis.	  1987.	  
3	  Cox.	  2001;	  Sternberg.	  2001.	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In	  India	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  the	  Mb	  was	  subsumed	  –	  at	  least	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  This	  was	  how,	  in	  
Sahlins’	   terms	  the	  process	  or	   intercivilizational	  contact	  between	  Mughals	  and	   locals	   reordered	  
the	  local	  culture.	  It	  was	  also	  during	  the	  Mughal	  period	  that	  first	  diplomatic	  contact	  with	  Europe	  
took	   place.	   An	   epoch	   imbued	   with	   significance	   by	   the	   academy	   as	   it	   was	   supposedly	   the	  
inauguration	  of	  the	  age	  of	  modern	  diplomacy	  in	  India.	  As	  Eisenstadt	  writes,	  modernity	  is	  ‘a	  new	  
civilization	   of	   a	   new	   great	   tradition,’4	   the	   latter	   because	  modernity	   is	   also	   ‘a	  mutation	   of	   the	  
European	  legacy	  into	  a	  more	  global	  and	  dynamic	  pattern.’5	  Ultimately,	  ‘they	  (Westerners)	  enjoy	  
historical	  precedence	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  basic	  reference	  point	  for	  others.’	  In	  IR	  Bull	  notes	  the	  
origins	   of	   the	  modern	   international	   system	   lie	   in	   the	  West	   and	   that	   despite	   the	   rise	   of	   non-­‐
Western	  cultures,	  the	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  will	  remain,	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  weighted	  in	  
favour	  of	  the	  West.6	  
	  
In	   contrast	   to	   this	   hegemonic	   position,	   the	   chapter	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   Europeans	  
encountered	   a	   well	   established	   diplomatic	   system	   and	   it	   was	   a	   language	   which	   they	   could	  
understand,	  if	  not	  speak	  because	  the	  manner	  and	  style	  of	  diplomacy	  were	  indecipherable.	  And	  
so,	   the	   British	   became	   eager	   students	   of	   local	   customs,	   manners,	   practices	   and	   ways,	  
enthusiastically	  converting	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	  ambitions.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  British	  
ejected	  some	  long	  held	  prejudices.	  In	  short,	  this	  chapter	  adds	  to	  the	  previous	  chapter	  by	  arguing	  
that	  there	  already	  existed	  in	  addition	  to	  local	  theories	  also	  local	  practices	  into	  which	  the	  British	  
inserted	   themselves.	   In	   presenting	   the	   argument,	   the	   chapter	   intends	   to	   demonstrate	   that	  
contrary	   to	   the	   notion	   that	   diplomacy	   was	   introduced	   by	   the	   British	   or	   that	   diplomacy	   was	  
inflected	  by	  European	  culture,	  what	  actually	  happened	  was	   the	   reverse.	  The	  entire	  process	  of	  
exploration	   of	   will	   be	   conducted	   using	   Nelson’s	   typology.	   Not	  meant	   to	   be	   a	   comprehensive	  
classificatory	   device,	   it	   requires	   modification	   to	   take	   note	   of	   local	   characteristics.	   As	   Nielsen	  
writes,	   ‘Indeed,	   for	   [Nelson’s	   typology]	   to	   have	   a	   wider	   applicability,	   it	   requires	   considerable	  
conceptual	  differentiation	  and	  historical	  specification.’7	  Central	   to	  the	  typology	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	  
limited	   to	   cognitive	   processes	   but	   actually	   investigate	   the	   manifestation	   of	   the	   structures	   of	  
                                                
4	  Eisenstadt.	  1978.	  p.	  172.	  
5	  Arnason.	  P.29	  
6	  Bull.	  P.316-­‐317	  
7	  Nielsen,	  International	  Sociology	  vol.16,	  no.3.	  p.410	  
Page	  104	  of	  227 
 
consciousness	  as	  historical	   ‘phenomenologies’	  of	  experience	  and	  expression.8	   It	   is	  why	  Nelson	  
himself	   focused	   on	   key	   personalities	   to	   trace	   changes	   in	   his	   structures	   of	   consciousness.	  
Similarly	   this	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   leading	   edge,	   the	   actual	   agents	   of	   transcivilizational	  
encounters.	  
	  
A	   caveat	   is	   necessary.	   Though	   the	   British	   were	   the	   first	   Europeans	   to	   attempt	   diplomatic	  
relations	   with	   India	   they	   were	   not	   the	   first	   to	   negotiate.	   The	   first	   Europeans	   were	   the	  
Portuguese	   however	   two	   factors	   ensured	   that	   they	   played	   a	   passing	   role	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	  
diplomacy	  in	  the	  Indian	  subcontinent.	  First,	  they	  never	  negotiated	  with	  the	  centre	  –	  that	  is	  the	  
Mughal	   Emperor	   –	   and	   instead	   negotiated	   with	   local	   chiefs.9	   Secondly	   they	   were	   quickly	  
displaced	   by	   the	   British.	   The	   consequence	   of	   these	   two	   factors	   is	   that	   modern	   practices	   of	  
diplomacy	  and	  decision	  making	  were	  well	  established	  before	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  Europeans.	  
	  
In	  short,	  the	  chapter	  will:	  
1. Introduce	   Mughal	   state	   culture	   in	   particular	   their	   theory	   of	   the	   state	   and	  
bureaucratic	  and	  diplomatic	  practices	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  already	  existed	  
a	  system	  not	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  modernity	  supposedly	  invented	  in	  Europe.	  	  
2. Anthropologically	  analyse	  the	  diplomatic	  contacts	  between	  Mughals	  and	  British	  
from	  the	  latter’s	  perspective	  to	  show	  that	  if	  there	  was	  any	  cultural	  transference	  
it	  was	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Europeans.	  
	  
The	  state	  of	  diplomacy	  in	  Mughal	  India	  
	  
The	   rationale	   and	   practices	   of	   the	  Mughal	   state	   around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   British	  
though	  Islamic	  were	  not	  so	  dissimilar	  in	  terms	  of	  practice	  so	  as	  to	  bar	  locals	  from	  participating.	  
Their	  codes	  are	  best	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Ain-­‐I	  Akbari,	  the	  third	  volume	  of	  the	  Akbar-­‐nama	  ‘by	  far	  the	  
greatest	   work	   in	   the	   whole	   series	   of	   Muhammedan	   histories	   of	   India.’	   Much	   more	   than	   a	  
                                                
8	  Nelson.	  1981.	  p.203-­‐05	  
9	  Though	  Akbar	  made	  an	  unsuccessful	  attempt	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  Portuguese	  King	  Philip	  II	  in	  1582	  
to	  create	  an	  alliance	  against	  the	  Ottomans.	  See	  Maktubat-­‐i-­‐Allami.	  Pp.	  37-­‐9.	  The	  letter	  is	  dated	  Rabiul	  
evvel,	  900	  A.H./March-­‐April.	  1582.	  Also	  see	  E.	  Rehatsek,	  ‘A	  Letter	  of	  the	  Emperor	  Akbar	  Asking	  for	  the	  
Christian	  Scriptures,’	  The	  Indian	  Antiquity,	  April	  1887,	  pp.	  135-­‐139.	  For	  another	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
purpose	  of	  this	  embassy	  see	  M.S.	  Renick,	  ‘Akbar’s	  First	  Embassy	  to	  Goa:	  Its	  Diplomatic	  and	  Religious	  
Aspects,’	  Indica,	  1970,	  vol.	  i.	  pp.	  46-­‐47.	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history,	  it	  contains	  the	  Ain-­‐I,	  that	  is	  mode	  of	  governing	  of	  Akbar	  and	  is	  ‘in	  fact	  the	  Administration	  
Report	  and	  Statistical	  Return	  of	  his	  government.’10	  	  The	  books	  are	  composed	  by	  Abul	  Fazl11	  who	  
starts	  his	  description	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  need	  and	  hence	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
monarch.	  The	  passage	  sets	  out	   the	  reasons	  of	  state	  which	  are	  different	   from	  dharma.	  Though	  
local	  traditions	  of	  dharma	  were	  displaced	  by	  an	  economic	  notion	  of	  the	  world	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
practice	  were	  concerned	  with	  maintaining	  order.	  	  
	  
Abul	  Fazl	  sets	  out	  the	  reason	  for	  state	  for	  the	  Mughal	  Empire	  by	  stating	  that:	  
‘No	  dignity	   is	  higher	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  God	   than	   royalty;	  and	   those	  who	  are	  wise,	  
drink	   from	   its	   auspicious	   fountain.	   A	   sufficient	   proof	   of	   this,	   for	   those	   who	  
require	  one,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   royalty	   is	  a	   remedy	   for	   the	  spirit	  of	   rebellion,	  and	  
the	   reason	  why	   subjects	   obey.	   Even	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  word	  Padshah	   shows	  
this;	   for	   pad	   signifies	   stability	   and	   possession,	   and	   shah	  means	   origin,	   lord.	   A	  
king	   is	   therefore,	   the	  origin	  of	   stability	  and	  possession.	   If	   royalty	  did	  not	  exist.	  
The	   storm	   of	   strife	   would	   never	   subside,	   nor	   selfish	   ambitions	   disappear.	  
Mankind,	  being	  under	   the	  burden	  of	   lawlessness	  and	   lust,	  would	   sink	   into	   the	  
pit	  of	  destruction;	  the	  world,	  this	  great	  market	  place,	  would	  lose	  its	  prosperity,	  
and	  the	  whole	  earth	  become	  a	  barren	  waste.	  But	  by	  the	  light	  of	  imperial	  justice,	  
some	   follow	   with	   cheerfulness	   the	   road	   of	   obedience,	   whilst	   others	   abstain	  
from	  violence	  through	  fear	  of	  punishment;	  and	  out	  of	  necessity	  make	  choice	  of	  
the	   path	   of	   rectitude.	   Shah	   is	   also	   a	   name	   given	   to	   one	   who	   surpasses	   his	  
                                                
10	  See	  Blochmann.	  
11	  Was	  Akbar’s	  minister	   and	   friend,	   born	   in	  Agra	   in	   14	   Jan.	   1551.	  His	   father	  was	  persecuted	   for	   having	  
professed	  Mahdawi	   ideas,	   i.e.,	   ideas	   preached	   by	   a	   group	   of	   highly	   educated	   men	   of	   great	   oratorical	  
powers	  who	  assumed	  a	  hostile	  position	  to	  the	   learned	  men	  of	   the	  court.	  At	   the	  Court	   the	   learned	  men	  
were	   all	   staunch	   Sunnis	  who	  believed	   it	   their	   duty	   to	   keep	   the	   king	   in	   line	  with	  God.	   The	  persecutions	  
which	  his	  (Fazl’s)	  father	  had	  to	  suffer	  did	  not	  fail	  to	  make	  a	  lasting	  impression	  on	  him.	  Abu	  l-­‐Fazl	  learned	  
toleration,	  the	  practice	  of	  which	  in	  later	  years	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  Akbar’s	  friendship	  for	  him.	  …	  he	  began	  
to	   teach	   long	  before	   the	  age	  of	   20.	  Meanwhile	  Akbar	   at	   first	  was	  merely	   annoyed	  at	   the	   ‘Pharaoh	   like	  
pride’	  of	  the	  learned	  at	  court.	  Theological	  wranglings,	  loss	  of	  etiquette	  even	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Emperor	  etc.	  
all	   turned	  Akbar	   against	   the	   learned	   at	   court.	  Whether	   to	  heal	   or	   persecute	   (thereby	   create	   fractions).	  
Abu	   l	   Fazl	   at	   last	   persuaded	   the	   emperor	   that	   a	   subject	   ought	   to	   look	   upon	   the	   king	   not	   only	   as	   the	  
temporal,	  but	  also	  as	  the	  only	  spiritual	  guide.	  In	  1578	  Abu	  raised	  the	  issue	  and	  created	  a	  storm.	  By	  1589	  
Akbar	  had	  founded	  a	  new	  religion	  the	  Din-­‐i	  Ilahi	  or	  the	  ‘Divine	  Faith’	  whose	  chief	  tenet	  was	  one	  God	  and	  
that	   Akbar	   was	   His	   viceregent	   on	   earth.	   In	   1598	   Fazl	   went	   on	   his	   first	   active	   service.	   He	   then	   rose	   to	  
beomce	  a	  military	  commander	  and	  died	  in	  battle	  on	  12	  August,	  1602.	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fellows;	   it	   is	   also	   a	   term	   applied	   to	   a	   bridegroom	   –	   the	   world,	   as	   the	   bride,	  
bethroes	  herself	  to	  the	  King,	  and	  becomes	  his	  worshipper.’	  
	  
Central,	   then	   to	  Mughal	   statecraft	   is	  maintaining	   ‘stability	   and	  possession’	   so	   that	   ‘the	  world,	  
this	  great	  market	  place’	  does	  not	  ‘lose	  its	  prosperity’.	  Maintaining	  this	  economic	  order	  required	  
a	   king	   worthy	   of	   his	   title.	   ‘Silly	   and	   short-­‐sighted	  men	   cannot	   distinguish	   a	   true	   king	   from	   a	  
selfish	   ruler.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   former	   [a	   large	   treasury,	   a	   numerous	   army,	   clever	   servants,	  
obedient	  subjects,	  an	  abundance	  of	  wise	  men,	  a	  multitude	  of	  skilful	  workmen,	  and	  a	  superfluity	  
of	  means	  of	  enjoyment]	  are	  lasting;	  but	  in	  that	  of	  the	  latter,	  of	  short	  duration.	  The	  former	  does	  
not	   attach	   himself	   to	   these	   things,	   as	   his	   object	   is	   to	   remove	   oppression	   and	   provide	   for	  
everything	  which	  is	  good.’	  
	  
A	   central	   conflict	   with	   dharma	   was	   in	   terms	   of	   rationale:	   Islam	  melded	   the	   human	   with	   the	  
divine	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  Emperor.	  It	  made	  temporal	  success	  divine.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  belief	  
that	  the	  divine	  acted	  thru	  the	  Emperor.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  the	  Mughal	  Emperor	  worshipped	  the	  
sun	  as	  the	  visible	  representative	  of	  God	  and	  as	  the	  immediate	  source	  of	  life.	  Hence,	  wrote	  Abul	  
Fazl,	   ‘Royalty	   is	   a	   light	   emanating	   from	   God,	   and	   a	   ray	   from	   the	   sun,	   the	   illuminator	   of	   the	  
universe,	   the	   argument	   of	   the	   book	   of	   perfection,	   the	   receptacle	   of	   all	   virtues.’12	   As	   Akbar	  
himself	   said	   ‘We,	  by	  virtue	  of	  our	  being	   the	  shadow	  of	  God,	   receive	   little	  and	  give	  much.	  Our	  
forgiveness	  has	  no	  relish	  for	  vengeance.’13	  
	  
Abul	   Fazl	   also	   sets	  out	   in	  detail	   the	   requirements	  of	   the	  Heavenly	  King.	   The	   first	   ten	  qualities	  
may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  those	  possessed	  by	  an	  Emperor	  who	  is	  the	  finger	  of	  God.	  Abul	  Fazl	  then	  adds	  
two	   more	   qualities	   which	   suggest	   that	   though	   the	   Emperor	   was	   the	   finger	   of	   God,	   in	   the	  
temporal	   world	   he	   was	   expected	   to	   perform	   his	   duties	   only	   in	   concert	   with	   his	   courtiers.	   In	  
other	  words,	  the	  office	  of	  Mughal	  Emperor,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Akbar,	  had	  become	  the	  head	  of	  an	  
established	  group	  of	  advisers	  and	  the	  Emperor	  had	  twelve	  duties	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Akbar	  Nama.14	  
	  
The	  Mughal	  state	  was	  therefore,	  in	  theory,	  radically	  different	  from	  local	  conceptions	  of	  rulership	  
and	  dharma.	   Islam	  offered	  a	  hierarchy	  which	  was	  given	  permanence	  and	  authority	   from	  God.	  
                                                
12	  See	  Blochmann.	  Vol.	  I.	  p.	  1-­‐10.	  
13	  See	  Blochmann.	  Vol.	  III.	  Chapter	  xviii.	  P.136	  
14	  Ibid.	  chapter	  lxxxi.	  p.680-­‐1	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The	  Mb	  too	  offers	  structures,	  such	  as	  caste,	  which	  were	  perhaps	   far	  more	   invasive	   in	  practice	  
than	  Mughal	  social	  systems.	  However,	  the	  ordering	  finger	  of	  God	  imbued	  Mughal	  polity	  with	  a	  
sacred	  right	  –	  faith	  –	  redolent	  of	  Christian	  European	  civilization.	  This	  similarity	  permits	  Nelson’s	  
categories	   to	   be	   applied	   effectively.	   In	   Nelson’s	   terms	  Mughal	   polity	   is	   consciousness	   type	   2	  
(faith	  structure)	  while	  the	   local	  culture	  of	  dharma	  would	  be	  a	  mixture	  of	  consciousness	  type	  1	  
(magical)	  and	  3	  (rationalised).	  
	  
Though	  a	  faith	  based	  structure,	  the	  divine	  will,	  which	  was	  enacted	  thru	  the	  body	  of	  the	  Emperor	  
could	  only	  function	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  advisers.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  Akbar,	  the	  system	  of	  governance	  and	  
advice	   had	   coagulated	   into	   a	   large	   and	   established	   bureaucracy	   –	   the	  Mansabdari	   system	   or	  
rank	   in	   a	   general	   sense.15	   Though	  a	   system	   founded	  on	   faith,	   it	  was	  a	  bureaucratic	   apparatus	  
and	   the	   precursor	   to	  modern	   bureaucracies	   in	   India.	   This	   bureaucracy	   is	  what	   conducted	   the	  
foreign	  relations	  of	  the	  Mughal	  Empire.	  
	  
Mansabdars	  were	  organised	  by	  status	  rather	  than	  wealth	  and	  etiquette	  reflected	  and	  reinforced	  
hierarchies.16	   The	   imperial	   service	   of	   the	   Mughals	   functioned	   within	   the	   framework	   of	  
regulations	  and	   royal	  decrees	  and	  ordinances.	  There	  were	   in	  addition	   to	   the	  King’s	  household	  
several	   departments	   which	   officers	   of	   the	   government	   managed	   at	   the	   centre	   and	   in	   the	  
provinces	   according	   to	   established	   manuals	   called	   dastur-­‐ul-­‐amal.	   This	   departmentalised	  
system,	  even	  though	  limited	  in	  extent,	  tended	  to	  impart	  to	  the	  Mughal	  officials	  certain	  qualities	  
of	  public	  service.	  But	  they	  were	  not	  public	  servants	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  All	  of	  these	  
officials	  were	  organizationally	  embedded	  in	  a	  regular	  mode	  of	  ranking,	  the	  mansabdari	  system.	  
Officers	  were	   graded	   and	  paid	   according	   to	   the	  number	  of	   troops	   and	  horses	   expected	   to	  be	  
maintained	  and	  supplied	  and	  as	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  service	  were	  governed	  by	  no	  fixed	  
principle	   of	   contract	   or	   covenant,	   they	   could	   be	   appointed	   or	   dismissed	   at	   will	   as	   personal	  
servants.17	   To	   clarify:	  All	   nobles	  were	  mansabdars,	  but	   all	  mansabdars	  were	  not	  nobles.18	   The	  
Mansabdari	   system	   became	   a	   complex	   and	   interconnected	   system	   with	   no	   clear	   borders	  
demarcating	  function.	  This	  was	  ensured	  by	  the	  interpenetration	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  army,	  
                                                
15	  Aziz.	  p.2	  
16	  Singh.	  2004.	  p.72	  
17	  Misra.	  1977.	  p.55	  
18	  Ibid.	  p.	  184	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nobility	  and	  officials.	  Akbar	  organised	  the	  administrative	  machinery	  on	  a	  military	  basis	  and	  there	  
were	  hardly	  any	  officers	  of	  state	  who	  did	  not	  have	  a	  mansab.	  
	  
The	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   Mughal	   bureaucracy	   was	   impeded	   by	   its	   ‘failure	   to	   organise	   well-­‐
defined	   institutions	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  democratic	   principles	   of	   Islam.’19	   Thus	   though	   the	  
Ain-­‐I	  Akbari	   stresses	   the	  need	  and	  purpose	  of	  ministers,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  no	   legal	   sanction	  
was	  accorded	  to	  them	  as	  representatives	  of	  the	  people	  and	  responsible	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  will	  of	  
the	  Emperor	  ultimately	  decided	  policy.	  In	  Akbar’s	  time	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Grand	  Vizier	  (the	  senior	  
most	  official	  position)	  was	  reduced	  because	  it	  was	  perceived	  he	  had	  too	  much	  power.20	  Below	  
the	   Grand	   Vizier	   came	   four	   ministers	   who	   denoted	   the	   general	   layout	   of	   the	   Mughal	   court.	  
Notably,	  there	  is	  no	  foreign	  minister	  but	  this	  did	  not	  preclude	  foreign	  relations,	  the	  despatching	  
of	  ambassadors	  and	  their	  reception	  or	  the	  negotiation	  of	  binding	  treaties.	  The	  four	  ministers	  in	  
order	  of	  precedence	  were:	  
1. Diwan,	  also	  called	  Vizier,	  responsible	  for	  revenue	  and	  finance.	  
2. Mir	  Bakhshi	  responsible	  for	  administration	  and	  army	  organisation.	  
3. Sadr,	  head	  of	  ecclesiastical	  and	  judicial	  departments.	  
4. Mir	  Saman	  Chief	  Executive	  Officer	  in	  charge	  of	  factories	  and	  stores	  of	  the	  State.21	  
	  
Though	  originating	  in	  the	  final	  two	  qualities	  required	  of	  an	  Emperor,	  the	  mansabdari	  system	  was	  
the	  means	   for	  conducting	  diplomacy	  by	   the	  Mughal	  Empire.	  While	  Ambassadors	  were	  directly	  
appointed	   by	   the	   Emperor	   and	   carried	   his	   imprimatur	   and	   visiting	   Ambassadors	   dealt	   were	  
received	  by	  the	  Emperor	  the	  actual	  work	  of	  negotiations	  was	  conducted	  by	  senior	  members	  of	  
the	  mansabdar.	  It	  was	  this	  organisation	  –	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  the	  
Mughal	  Emperor	  –	  that	  conducted	  foreign	  relations	  with	  the	  English.	  
	  
Motivated	   by	   faith,	   the	   mansabdari	   bureaucracy	   however	   conducted	   a	   diplomacy	   concerned	  
with	   matters	   temporal.	   This	   section	   briefly	   outlines	   Mughal	   diplomacy	   to	   illustrate	   that	   the	  
practice	   of	   modern	   Indian	   diplomacy	   has	   a	   well	   established	   local	   lineage.	   Diplomacy	   under	  
Akbar	   was	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   policies	   and	   practices	   of	   his	   forefathers.	   Diplomats	   were	  
selected	  by	  the	  Emperor,	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  mansabdars	  and	  the	  messages	  they	  carried	  were	  
                                                
19	  UN	  Day.	  P.30	  	  
20Ibid.	  P.35	  
21	  Ibid.	  P.39	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personally	   from	   the	   Emperor	   but	   decided	   upon	   after	   consultations	   with	   the	   mansabdars.	  
Ambassadors	  were	  to	  be	  accorded	  the	  respect	  due	  to	  agents	  of	  a	  powerful	  entity.	  Similarly,	  the	  
Mughal	   court	  was	   also	   expected	   to	   accord	   similar	   treatment	   to	   visiting	   envoys.	   The	   lack	   of	   a	  
foreign	   office	   did	   not	   preclude	   diplomacy.	   It	   was	   purely	   the	   realm	   of	   royalty.	   A	   13th	   century	  
document	  by	  Adab-­‐ul-­‐Harb	  stated	  that	  ambassadors	  must	  be	  nobles.	  The	  Mughals	  kept	  with	  the	  
principle	  indicating	  the	  highly	  prestigious	  position	  of	  diplomacy.22	  
	  
One	   example	   is	   selected	   from	   the	   Ain-­‐I-­‐Akbari	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   despite	   the	   lack	   of	   a	  
dedicated	   foreign	  office	   the	  Mughal	  Empire	  had	  established	  procedures	   to	  perform	  diplomacy	  
and	  conduct	  negotiations	  with	  an	  entity	  similar	  in	  power	  and	  status	  to	  itself.	  In	  the	  16th	  and	  17th	  
centuries	  the	  rival	  to	  the	  Mughal	  Empire	  was	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  the	  bone	  of	  contention	  
between	   India	   and	   Iran	  was	  Qandahar	   –	   a	   buffer	   zone	   between	   the	   two	   empires.	   A	   series	   of	  
communications	   and	   envoys	  were	   used	   to	   ensure	   that	   relations	   across	   the	   zone	   did	   not	   spill	  
over	  into	  conflict.	  
	  
The	  first	  steps	  were	  taken	  early	  in	  Akbar’s	  reign,	  when	  his	  guardian	  Bairam	  Khan	  sent	  Shah	  Ghazi	  
Sultan	  as	  envoy	  to	  Iran’s	  Shah	  Tahmasp.23	  Bairam	  Khan	  saw	  the	  necessity	  of	  establishing	  cordial	  
relationship	   with	   the	   Safavi	   court,	   especially	   now	   when	   the	   boy-­‐king	   Akbar	   was	   beset	   with	  
difficulties	   and	   required	   the	   Shah’s	   moral	   support.	   Shah	   Tahmasp	   received	   the	   envoy	   with	  
honour	   and	   in	   1562	   sent	   his	   cousin	   Sayyid	   Beg	   on	   embassy	   to	   Akbar	   with	   a	   letter	   offering	  
condolences	   for	   the	  death	  of	   the	  Emperor	  Humayun	  and	  congratulations	  on	  his	  accession	  and	  
emphasizing	  the	  necessity	  of	  cementing	  the	  bond	  of	  friendship	  between	  the	  two	  kingdoms.24	  In	  
1564	  Akbar	  received	  another	  envoy	  from	  Shah	  Tahmasp	  who	  came	  with	  a	  letter	  and	  rarities	  of	  
Iran.25	  Early	   in	  November,	  1572,	  during	  his	  march	   from	  Sirohi	   to	  Patan,	  Akbar	   received	  Yar	  Ali	  
Beg,	  envoy	  from	  Sultan	  Muhammad	  Kudabanda,	  Shah	  Tahmasp’s	  eldest	  son	  in	  the	  coming	  war	  
of	  succession	  in	  Persia.	  He	  carried	  a	  letter	  which	  intended	  to	  ‘to	  recall	  ancient	  relations	  and	  to	  
renew	  friendship	   in	  order	  that	  by	  the	  help	  of	  such	  divine	  glory	  he	  might	  act	  vigorously	  against	  
the	   princes	   of	   Turan.	   Another	   object	   was	   that	   he	   might	   repose	   in	   peace	   and	   be	   without	  
                                                
22	  Nizami.	  1978.	  P.327-­‐328	  
23	  In	  Akbar	  Nama	  Vol	  III	  chapter	  CIV,	  we	  learn	  he	  was	  born	  on	  22	  Feb.	  1514	  succeeded	  his	  father	  on	  24	  
may	  1524.	  See	  Blochmann.	  P.896.	  
24	  See	  Akbar	  Nama	  vol	  II.	  Chapter	  XLII,	  p.262	  &	  for	  letter	  chapter	  XLIII.	  See	  Blochmann.	  p.263-­‐267.	  
25	  Akbar	  Nama	  vol.	  II	  chapter	  LIV,	  See	  Blochmann.	  p.358.	  
Page	  110	  of	  227 
 
apprehension	  of	  the	  strokes	  of	  the	  world-­‐conquering	  armies.’26	  The	  death	  of	  Shah	  Tahmasp	   in	  
1576	  was	  the	  signal	  for	  the	  outbreak	  of	  civil	  war	  and	  anarchy,	  followed	  by	  a	  succession	  of	  weak	  
rulers,	   during	   which	   diplomatic	   intercourse	   between	   the	   Mughal	   Empire	   and	   Persia	   was	  
stopped.	  But	  under	  Shah	  ‘Abbas	  (1587-­‐1629)	  a	  closer	  contact	  was	  established	  between	  Agra	  and	  
Isfahan.	  	  
	  
The	   Ain-­‐I-­‐Akbari	   records	   that	   in	   1591	   Shah	   ‘Abbas	   sent	   his	   envoy	   Yadgar	   Sultan	   Rumlu	   who	  
arrived	  at	  the	  Mughal	  court	  on	  16	  May	  with	  choice	  presents	  and	  a	  supplicatory	  letter	  to	  Akbar	  
asking	   for	  military	   help.	   Akbar	   could	   not	   agree	   to	   send	   an	   auxiliary	   force	   for	   the	   recovery	   of	  
Khurasan	  from	  the	  Uzbegs.	  This	  was	  contrary	   to	  his	  noble’s	  suggestions.	  They	  wanted	  to	  clear	  
the	   debt	   Akbar’s	   father	   and	   grandfather	   owed	   to	   the	   Safavi	   dynasty.	   Demonstrating	   the	  
supreme	  power	  of	  the	  Emperor	  in	  foreign	  relations,	  Akbar	  refused	  to	  follow	  counsel	  because	  he	  
did	  not	  consider	   it	  politic	  to	  go	  against	  the	  powerful	  Uzbeg	  king	  with	  whom	  he	  was	   in	  alliance	  
and	  whose	  hostility	  would	  be	  a	  menace	  at	  the	  frontier.	  Yadgar	  Sultan	  remained	  in	  Akbar’s	  court	  
for	  three	  and	  a	  half	  years.27	  On	  2	  December,	  1594,	  Akbar	  gave	  him	  leave	  and	  sent	  with	  him	  Ziya-­‐
ul-­‐mulk	  Qazvini	  and	  Abu	  Nasir	  Khvafi	  as	  envoys	  to	  the	  Shah	  with	  curiosities	  of	  Hindusthan	  and	  a	  
letter	   full	   of	   instructions	   and	   written	   in	   a	   most	   patronising	   spirit	   which	   reminds	   one	   of	   the	  
letters	   that	   Shah	   Tahmasp	  had	   addressed	   to	  Akbar’s	   father,	   the	   Emperor	  Humayun.28	   Akbar’s	  
envoys	  were	  given	  a	  splendid	  reception	  at	  Qazvin	  by	  Shah	  ‘Abbas.	  They	  remained	  in	  Persia	  until	  
1597-­‐8	  when	   they	   obtained	   leave	   and	   the	   Shah	   sent	  Minuchihr	   Beg	  with	   a	   letter	   and	   choice	  
presents	   to	   the	   Mughal	   court.	   The	   capture	   of	   Qandahar	   by	   the	   Mughals	   did	   not	   sever	   the	  
diplomatic	  connection.	  The	  envoy	  arrived	  at	  the	  Mughal	  court	  in	  November,	  1598.	  In	  his	   letter	  
the	  Shah	  referred	  to	  his	  activities	  against	  the	  Uzbegs	  in	  which	  he	  expected	  Akbar’s	  good	  wishes	  
and	  support.	  Next	  year	  Shah	  ‘Abbas	  sent	  from	  Herat	  Mirza	  ‘Ali	  Beg	  on	  embassy	  to	  Akbar	  with	  a	  
letter	  informing	  him	  of	  this	  victory	  in	  Hurasan	  after	  the	  death	  of	  ‘Abdullah	  Khan.	  ‘Ali	  Beg	  arrived	  
at	   court	   on	   11	  March,	   1599,	   and	   both	   he	   and	  Minuchihr	   Beg	   remained	   in	   court	   until	   4	   April,	  
1601,	  when	  they	  obtained	   leave.	  Akbar	  sent	  with	   them	  his	  own	  envoy	  Ma‘sum	  Khan	  Bhakkari	  
and	  they	  arrived	  in	  Persia	  in	  1602.	  Ma‘sum	  Khan	  remained	  at	  the	  Safavi	  court	  for	  more	  than	  a	  
year	  and	  returned	  in	  1604.	  	  
	  
                                                
26	  Akbar	  Nama.	  Vol	  ii.	  See	  Blochmann.	  P.	  534	  
27	  Akbar	  Nama.	  Vol.	  iii.	  Chapter.	  CIV	  See	  Blochmann.	  P.893-­‐901	  	  
28	  Akbar	  Nama.	  Vol.	  iii.	  Chapter.	  Cxix.	  See	  Blochmann.	  P.1007-­‐1022	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In	  short,	  Mughal-­‐Ottoman	  relations	  in	  terms	  of	  practice	  bore	  all	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  modernity.	   It	  
was	  marked	  by	  established	  procedures	  and	  rules.	  As	  in	  modern	  India,	  relations	  were	  marked	  by	  
personal	  communications	  at	  the	  highest	  level.	  Ambassadors	  were	  tasked	  with	  obtaining	  specific	  
goals,	  stationed	  at	  the	  foreign	  capital	  for	  extended	  periods	  of	  time	  and	  decisions	  were	  made	  by	  
the	   Emperor	   –	   and	   on	   occasion	   against	   the	   advice	   of	   the	   mansabdars.	   There	   was	   also	   an	  
established	  procedure	  of	  delivering	  gifts	  and	  writing	  letters	  in	  a	  particular	  style.	  
	  
The	  coming	  of	  authentic,	  modern,	  European	  Diplomacy	  
	  
The	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  India	  today	  and	  Mughal	  diplomacy	  is	  that	  the	  bureaucratic	  
apparatus	   was	   regarded	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   ruler’s	   body.	   It	   was	   this	   that	   the	   British	  
penetrated.	   The	   first	   attempts	   were	   by	   Sir	   Thomas	   Roe	   sent	   by	   King	   James	   to	   the	   court	   of	  
Akbar’s	   son,	   Emperor	   Jahangir	   in	   1614.29	   Roe’s	   visit	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   Mughals	   had	   an	  
established	   set	   of	   practices	   for	   foreign	   visitors,	   including	   ambassadors.	   Upon	   landing	   in	   Surat	  
mid-­‐September	   1615,	   Roe	   immediately	   collided	   with	   the	   Mughals	   who	   had	   never	   received	  
anything	  other	  than	  traders	  of	  the	  East	  India	  Company.	  A	  week	  passed	  before	  Roe	  could	  set	  foot	  
on	  India	  because	  he	  insisted	  that	  as	  an	  ambassador	  he	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  customs	  examination,	  
while	  Zulfikar	  Khan	  the	  Governor	  of	  Surat	  was	  equally	  adamant	  that	  by	  the	  traditions	  of	  Surat	  he	  
was.30	  Roe	  responded	  by	  threatening	  to	  despatch	  a	  messenger	  direct	  to	  the	  Emperor	  to	  inform	  
him	  of	  the	  ‘barbarous	  usage	  of	  me,	  being	  ambassador	  to	  a	  mighty	  King	  in	  league	  with	  him,	  and	  
come	  a	   far	   journey	  upon	  his	   royal	  word.’	   The	  Governor	   responded	  with	  a	  messenger	   to	   insist	  
that	  Roe	  pay	  him	  a	  formal	  visit	  before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  Emperor’s	  court.	  Roe	  refused	  stating:	  
‘it	  was	  too	  late	  to	  offer	  me	  Curtesyes,	  especially	  under	  pretence	  of	  dishonouring	  
my	  Master:	  That	  it	  was	  the	  Custome	  of	  Europe	  to	  visit	  those	  of	  my	  quality	  first,	  
and	   that	   I	   durst	   not	   breake	   yt	   in	   penaltye	   of	   my	   head,	   haveinge	   expresse	  
Command	  from	  my	  Master	  to	  Mayntayne	  the	  Honor	  of	  a	  free	  king,	  and	  to	  visit	  
none	  but	  such	  as	  first	  did	  that	  respect	  due	  to	  his	  Majestie	  and	  that	  therefore	  I	  
would	  never	  doe	  vt.’31	  	  
The	  Governor	  acceded	  and	  Roe	  was	  able	  to	  convince	  the	  Mughal	  governor	  that	  he	  was	  indeed	  
an	   ambassador.	   Roe	   was	   received	   as	   such	   by	   the	   Emperor	   who	   showed	   him	   a	   courtesy	   and	  
                                                
29	  According	  to	  the	  articles	  of	  agreement.	  See	  Birdwood	  &	  Foster.	  1893.	  pp.	  446	  
30	  The	  Embassy	  of	  Sir	  Thomas	  Roe.	  1899.	  vol.	  i.	  p.54	  
31	  Ibid.	  p.53	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favour	   which	   though	   befitting	   an	   Ambassador	   was	   possibly	   also	   due	   to	   the	   two	  men	   having	  
struck	  a	  chord.32	  
	  
After	   some	   time	   in	   the	  Mughal	   court,	   Roe	  disclosed	   the	  object	   of	   his	  mission.	   To	   negotiate	   a	  
commercial	  treaty	  ‘which	  should	  place	  the	  position	  of	  the	  English	  in	  India	  on	  a	  firm	  and	  lasting	  
basis	  and	  secure	  them	  against	  all	  oppression	  by	  the	  provincial	  officials.’33	  The	  English	  wanted	  a	  
treaty	  or	  a	   comprehensive	  grant	  of	  privileges.	  His	  negotiations	  were	  however	  unsuccessful.	   In	  
August	  1617	  he	  wrote	  ‘Neyther	  will	  this	  overgrowne	  elephant	  descend	  to	  article	  or	  bynde	  him	  
selfe	   reciprocally	   to	   any	  prince	  upon	   termes	  of	   equality,	   but	  only	  by	  way	  of	   favour	   admit	  our	  
stay	  so	  long	  as	  it	  either	  likes	  him	  or	  those	  that	  governe	  him.’34	  And	  in	  1618,	  three	  years	  after	  his	  
arrival,	  Roe	  writes	  that	  ‘I	  am	  infinitely	  weary	  of	  this	  unprofitable	  imployment	  …	  I	  am	  weary;	  yt	  it	  
is	   impossible,	   and	   I	  will	   not	   stay	   yow	   an	   hower’.35	   Roe	   finally	   received	   limited	   permission	   for	  
Englishmen	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  country	  to	  conduct	  trade.	  ‘In	  other	  words,	  Roe	  completely	  failed	  in	  
his	  negotiation’	  but	  not	  because	  the	  Mughal	  Empire	  did	  not	  understand	  what	  the	  British	  wanted	  
–	  it	  was	  just	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  accede	  to	  a	  treaty.36	  
	  
The	  second	  attempt	  by	  the	  English	  to	  conduct	  diplomacy	  was	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  first.	  
The	   diary	   of	   Niccolao	  Manucci	   provides	   a	   detailed	   glimpse	   of	   the	   bureaucratized	   procedures	  
encountered	  during	  the	  diplomatic	  mission	  by	  Ambassador	  Lord	  Bellomont,	  sent	  by	  King	  Charles	  
II.	   The	   first	   substantive	  difference	  between	  Roe’s	   visit	   and	  Bellomont’s	  was	  at	   the	  moment	  of	  
arrival.	   Like	   Roe,	   Bellomont	   too	   arrived	   in	   Surat	   but	   received	   a	   very	   different	   welcome.	   The	  
Mughal	   Empire	   –	   at	   least	   at	   the	   port	   of	   Surat	   –	   had	   acclimatized	   to	   the	   arrival	   of	   English	  
ambassadors.	   Manucci	   notes	   that	   ‘When	   the	   governor	   of	   Surat	   heard	   of	   the	   ambassador’s	  
arrival,	  he	  ordered	  his	  secretary	  to	  pay	  him	  a	  visit.	  The	  message	  thus	  brought	  was	  that	  rumour	  
said	  he	  had	  come	  as	  ambassador,	  therefore	  he	  was	  requested	  to	  state	  whether	  this	  was	  true	  or	  
                                                
32	  ‘The	  King’	  wrote	  Roe.	  ‘never	  used	  any	  Ambassador	  with	  so	  much	  respect.’	  See	  The	  Embassy	  of	  Thomas	  
Roe.	  1899.	  vol.	  i.	  p.112	  
33	  Foster.	  England’s	  Quest	  of	  Eastern	  Trade.	  P.283.	  For	  the	  nineteen	  articles	  constituting	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  
proposed	  treaty	  see	  Pinkerton.	  1811.	  vol.	  iii.	  P.8	  
34	  Letter	  to	  the	  English	  Ambassador	  at	  Constantinople,	  21	  August,	  1617:	  Add.	  MS	  6115,	  f.	  207	  
35	  The	  Embassy	  of	  Sir	  Thomas	  Roe	  to	  India.	  London.	  OUP.	  1926.	  p.470	  
36	  C.R.	  Wilson.	  P.	  vi.	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not.	   It	   was	   necessary	   for	   him	   (the	   governor)	   to	   send	   a	   report	   to	   the	   emperor	   Xaaiahan	  
(Shahjahan),	  then	  ruling	  over	  the	  empire	  of	  the	  Great	  Mogul.’37	  	  
	  
The	  Ambassador	  was	  given	   leave	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  Mughal	  court	  but	  was	  suddenly	  taken	   ill	  and	  
died	  on	  20th	  June	  1656	  within	  days	  of	  his	  arrival	  in	  India.38	  His	  death	  exposes	  the	  hollowness	  of	  
the	   academy’s	   position	   that	   the	   locals	   were	   unfamiliar	   with	   the	   practices	   of	   diplomacy	   for	  
though	   the	  death	   took	  place	   in	   a	   relatively	  unpopulated	  area	   in	  between	   two	   cities,	   the	   local	  
Mughal	  officials	  responded	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  demonstrated	  that	  even	  in	  the	  hinterland,	  and	  in	  
death,	   the	   they	   were	   fully	   cognizant	   with	   the	   procedures	   to	   be	   followed	   in	   such	   an	   unlikely	  
event.	  The	  death	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  was	  an	  official	  hierarchy	  which	  extended	  all	  the	  
way	  to	  the	  Emperor.	  Manucci	  writes:	  
‘We	  carried	  the	  body	  at	  once	  to	  a	  sarae	  called	  Orel	  [Hodal],	  between	  Agrah	  and	  
Dihli,	  and,	   it	  being	  already	   late,	  we	  did	  not	  bury	  him	  that	  night.	  The	  official	  at	  
the	  sarae	  sent	  notice	  to	  the	  local	  judicial	  officer,	  who	  hastened	  to	  the	  spot,	  and,	  
putting	  his	  seal	  on	  all	  the	  baggage,	  laid	  an	  embargo	  upon	  it.	  I	  asked	  him	  why	  he	  
seized	  and	  sealed	  up	   those	  goods.	  He	  answered	  me	   that	   it	  was	   the	  custom	  of	  
that	   realm,	   and	   that	   he	   could	   no	   release	   the	   things	   until	   an	   order	   came	   from	  
court,	  they	  being	  the	  property	  of	  an	  ambassador.’39	  
	  
Though	   the	   bureaucratic	   apparatus	   had	   swung	   into	   operation	   it	   was	   open	   to	   abuse	   by	   the	  
mansabdars	  themselves.	  An	  account	  from	  a	  few	  days	  later	  details	  this.	  About	  a	  week	  after	  the	  
death,	  write	  Manucci:	  
‘two	   Englishmen	   appeared	  …	  dressed	   after	   the	   fashion	   and	   in	   the	   costume	  of	  
the	  country,	  men	   in	   the	  service	  of	   the	  king	  Shahjahan.	  They	   informed	  me	  that	  
they	   had	   come	   under	   the	   king’s	   orders	   to	   carry	   away	   the	   property	   of	   the	  
ambassador,	  which	  lapsed	  to	  the	  crown.	  To	  that	  I	  retorted	  by	  asking	  if	  they	  bore	  
any	   order,	   whereupon	   they	   laughed	   …	   .	   Many	   a	   time	   did	   I	   entreat	   them	   for	  
God’s	  sake	  to	  make	  over	  to	  me	  what	  was	  mine;	  but	  …	  they	  scoffed	  at	  me,	  and	  
said	  ‘Shut	  your	  mouth;	  if	  you	  say	  a	  word	  we	  will	  take	  your	  horse	  and	  your	  arms	  
away.’	  The	  belongings	  were	  removed	  to	  Delhi	  ‘where	  the	  Englishmen	  deposited	  
                                                
37	  Manucci.	  1965.	  Chapter	  xvii.	  P.59.	  
38	  Ibid.	  p.69	  
39	  Ibid.	  p.	  70	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the	  property	  in	  a	  sarae,	  put	  seals	  on	  the	  room	  doors,	  and	  told	  me	  to	  go	  about	  
my	  business.	  …	  I	  expressed	  my	  astonishment	  that	  they	  should	  lock	  up	  in	  a	  sarae	  
room	  property	  that	  they	  said	  belonged	  to	  the	  king.	  I	  asked	  them	  angrily	  whether	  
the	   king	   had	   no	   other	   place	   in	  which	   to	   store	   the	   goods	   he	   owned;	   but	   they	  
knew	  quite	  well	   that	  the	  property	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  them,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  
taking	  the	  king’s	  name	  in	  vain,	  solely	  in	  order	  that	  they	  might	  get	  hold	  of	  other	  
people’s	  goods.40	  
Though	  it	  achieved	  less	  than	  Roe’s	  mission,	  Lord	  Bellomont’s	  mission	  did	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
Mughal	   Empire	   was	   not	   only	   familiar	   with	   ambassadors	   but	   now	   recognised	   English	  
Ambassadors	   and	   accorded	   them	   the	   courtesies	   due	   to	   people	   of	   their	   rank.	   Secondly,	   the	  
Ambassador,	  as	  an	  envoy	  of	  a	  King	  dealt	  with	  the	  Mughal	  Emperor	  and	  even	  in	  death	  decisions	  
pertaining	  to	  his	  body	  could	  only	  be	  made	  by	  the	  Emperor.	  However,	  the	  impunity	  with	  which	  
the	   English	   officers	   in	   the	   Emperor’s	   service	   were	   able	   to	   deceive	   Manucci	   highlights	   that	  
corruption	  was	  very	  much	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  Mughal	  bureaucratic	  apparatus.	  
	  
The	   final	   envoy	   from	   England	  was	   Sir	  William	  Norris.	   Inexplicably,	  Norris	   chose	   to	   break	  with	  
established	   custom	   and	   landed	   at	  Masulipatam	   on	   25	   September,	   1699.	   This	   was	   out	   of	   line	  
with	  established	  landing	  procedures	  and	  Norris	  had	  to	  make	  his	  way	  to	  Surat	  –	  the	  landing	  point	  
of	  his	  predecessors.	  In	  1700	  he	  reached	  Surat	  and	  nearly	  a	  year	  passed	  before	  he	  was	  able	  to	  set	  
out	   for	   the	   Mughal	   camp	   in	   January	   1701.	   Upon	   arriving	   at	   the	   court,	   the	   Mughal	   Emperor	  
Aurangzeb	  reminded	  Norris	  of	  an	  offer	  made	  by	   letter	  by	  the	  English	  to	  protect	  the	  seas	  from	  
pirates.	  Aurangzeb	  made	   this	  an	   indispensible	   condition	   to	   the	  granting	  of	  any	   treaties	   to	   the	  
British.41	  Unable	  to	  meet	  the	  Mughal	  requirements,	  Norris	  departed	   in	  November	  1701	  having	  
achieved	  no	  treaty	  or	  bettered	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  British	  in	  India	  in	  any	  manner.	  The	  incident	  
did	   illustrate	   that	  Mughal	  diplomacy	  was	   familiar	  with	   ambassadors,	   protocol	   and	  negotiating	  
treaties	  along	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  conditionality.	  
	  
The	  next	  attempt	  by	  the	  English	  to	  conduct	  diplomacy	  with	  the	  centre	  was	  the	  Surman	  Embassy	  
in	  1714	  to	  acquire	  through	  a	  Mughal	  document	  –	  a	  firman	  –	  to	  hold	  thirty	  eight	  villages	  around	  
Calcutta	   from	  which	   the	  British	  could	  extract	   taxes.	  That	   they	  wanted	  a	   firman,	   i.e.,	   a	  binding	  
                                                
40	  Ibid.	  chapter	  xix.	  P.84-­‐85	  
41	  Hunter.	  History	  of	  India.	  Vol.	  ii.	  P.355-­‐357	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document	  granted	  by	  the	  Emperor	  himself	  to	  a	  supplicatory	  power	  is	   indicative	  of	  the	  British’s	  
willingness	   to	   acquiesce	   to	   local	   practices.	   The	   British	   were	   well	   aware	   of	   various	   grades	   of	  
imperial	  documents	  and	  it	  was	  specifically	  a	  firman	  that	  they	  wanted.	  Rather	  than	  forcing	  their	  
own	  codes,	  they	  specifically	  wanted	  the	  legal	  codes	  of	  the	  Mughal	  Empire.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  earlier	  missions,	  the	  Embassy	  was	  composed	  of	  commoners	  already	  stationed	  
in	  India	  as	  opposed	  to	  nobles	  sent	  out	  from	  England.42	  There	  was	  talk	  of	  including	  Manucci	  but	  
he	  was	  regarded	  as	  too	  old.	  The	  requirement	  for	  the	  Embassy	  arose	  from	  developments	  in	  the	  
decades	  between	  Roe	  and	  Norris’s	  missions	  when	  the	  ‘English	  extended	  their	  settlements	  along	  
both	  coasts	  of	   India’	   thru	  a	   series	  of	   local	  agreements	  with	  Governors	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  
Mughal	  Emperor.	  Similarly,	  the	  English	  in	  India	  were	  employed	  by	  the	  East	  India	  Company	  (EIC)	  
and	  acted	  for	  their	  Crown.	  The	  Charter	  of	  1683	  made	  the	  EIC	  ‘not	  a	  private	  adventurer,	  but	  an	  
incorporated	  society	  invested	  with	  certain	  sovereign	  powers	  by	  the	  Sovereign	  of	  Great	  Britain.’43	  
Meanwhile,	   during	   the	   period	   the	   EIC	   was	   establishing	   itself	   to	   trade	   in	   Bengal	   the	   Mughal	  
Empire	  was	   dissolving.	   It	  meant	   that	   the	   English	   to	   safeguard	   their	   trade	   had	   to	   fortify	   their	  
bases	   in	   India.	   ‘But	   fortified	   settlements	   cost	   money	   to	   keep	   up	   and	   must	   be	   supported	   by	  
revenues.	   Consequently,	   they	  must	   needs	   approach	   the	  Mughal,	   for	   the	   land	   in	   India	  was	  his	  
alone,	  and	  it	  was	  his	  to	  make	  grants	  of	  territory	  great	  or	  small.’44	  	  
	  
The	  Surman	  Embassy,	   led	  by	   John	  Surman	   took	  place	  over	   three	  years.	  A	  detailed	  diary	  along	  
with	  all	  the	  allied	  documents	  of	  the	  Embassy	  provides	  a	  photographic	  record	  of	  how	  the	  British	  
negotiated	  with	   the	  Mughal	  Empire.	   Though	   the	  British	  were	  willing	   to	  be	   subsumed	   into	   the	  
established	  order,	  at	  first	  they	  met	  with	  little	  success.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  their	  being	  influenced	  by	  
Europeans	  and	  thru	  them	  Indians	  who	  claimed	  to	  know	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  how	  to	  
negotiate.	   It	   was	   a	   ruse.	   The	   Indian	   informants	   were	   most	   likely	   motivated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	  
secure	  the	  gifts	  the	  English	  had	  brought.	  These	  gifts	  were	  brought	  because	  it	  was	  supposed	  that	  
the	  Mughal	   Emperor’s	   imprimatur	   could	  be	  bought.	   In	   this	   they	  were	   completely	   deceived.	   It	  
was	   only	   after	   Surman	   removed	   himself	   from	   the	   influence	   of	   the	  Armenian	   padres,	   stopped	  
trying	  to	  bribe	  his	  way	  into	  Court	  and	  began	  following	  established	  Mughal	  codes	  and	  procedures	  
                                                
42	  Ibid.	  vol.	  ii.	  P154-­‐55	  
43	  Fifth	  Report	  on	  East	  India	  Affairs.	  1812.	  p.vi	  
44	  Wilson.	  1983.	  p.x	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(which	   he	   already	   knew)	   did	   he	   start	   succeeding.	   The	   final	   agreement	  met	   nearly	   all	   of	   their	  
requirements	  and	  it	  was	  granted	  under	  the	  Mughal	  code.	  
	  
The	  Surman	  Embassy	  travelled	  under	  the	  Union	  Jack	  –	  as	  fully	  accredited	  negotiators	  on	  behalf	  
of	  Great	  Britain.45	   Just	   as	   Englishmen	   served	   the	  Mughal	   Empire,	   the	   Indian	   interpreter	  Cojah	  
Seerhaud	  demanded	  parity	  with	  his	   companions	   and	  was	  also	   given	  a	   flag.46	  As	   agents	  of	   the	  
Crown	  they	  were	  keen	  to	  maintain	  their	  standing	  and	  took	  great	  care	  in	  the	  appearance	  of	  their	  
party.	  In	  this	  they	  matched	  the	  Mughal	  Court’s	  concern	  with	  dress	  and	  the	  formality	  of	  court.47	  
‘Considering	  Everybody	  Ought	  to	  make	  a	  handsome	  appearance’	  the	  party	  procured	  the	  finest	  
clothes	  available	  and	  even	  provided	  themselves	  with	  palanquins	  plated	  with	  silver.48	  The	  convoy	  
for	  the	  four	  envoys	  was	  a	  hundred	  and	  sixty	  bullock	  wagons	  each	  creaking	  under	  a	  load	  of	  more	  
than	   half	   a	   ton.49	   Much	   of	   this	   was	   presents	   for	   the	   Court	   but	   a	   large	   part	   was	   private	  
merchandise.50	  A	  still	  larger	  retinue	  of	  servants	  followed	  the	  embassy	  including	  a	  trumpeter	  and	  
six	   soldiers,	   a	   clockmaker,	   four	   smiths,	   ten	   carpenters,	   thirty	   spadesmen	   and	   twelve	   hundred	  
porters	   along	   with	   wagoners	   and	   drivers.51	   Given	   the	   size	   of	   the	   retinue,	   this	   was	   a	   major	  
undertaking	  which	   is	   some	   indication	   of	   the	   importance	   the	   British	   gave	   the	  mission	   and	   the	  
Emperor.	  
	  
Early	  in	  the	  Embassy,	  Seerhaud	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  ‘unless	  he	  had	  the	  Entire	  management	  of	  the	  
Durbar	   he	   would	   not	   proceed’	   placing	   the	   Englishmen	   in	   a	   difficult	   situation.	   As	   interpreter,	  
Seerhaud’s	   role	   was	   essential	   to	   the	   party	   and	   his	   demands	   could	   not	   be	   dismissed	   without	  
consideration.52	   He	   wanted	   to	   control	   the	   Embassy’s	   access	   to	   court	   and	   to	   further	   this	   aim	  
Seerhaud	  produced	  a	  letter	  from	  an	  Armenian	  Padree	  called	  Daniel,	  who	  claimed	  to	  be	  familiar	  
with	   Delhi,	   in	   which	   the	   Padree	   offered	   his	   assistance	   to	   the	   Embassy	   and	   recommend	   two	  
Mughals	  at	  court	  –	  Caundora	  (also	  spelt	  as	  Khan	  Dauran)	  and	  Salabat	  Khan	  –	  and	  that	  they	  could	  
be	  approached	  only	  by	  other	   friendly	  Armenians.	  Upon	  entering	  Delhi	   in	   July	  1715	   they	  were	  
                                                
45	  Wilson.	  1983.	  P.9	  
46	  Ibid.,	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  Manucci.	  1965.	  P.87	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  Wilson.	  1983	  P.12	  
49	  Ibis.	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  Irvine.	  p.46-­‐47	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  1983.	  P.7,	  8,	  275	  
52	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advised	  by	  another	  Padree	  and	  concerned	  with	  ‘Aggrandizing	  their	  appearance’	  they	  scattered	  
money	  as	  they	  entered	  the	  city	  thinking	  this	  was	  the	   local	  custom.53	  Surman	  reports	  that	  they	  
were	  met	  by	  Salabat	  Khan	  who	  took	  them	  to	  Khan	  Dauran	  ‘who	  received	  us	  very	  Civilly	  assuring	  
us	  of	  his	  protection	  and	  good	  Services.’	  Surman	  continued	  ‘The	  great	  favour	  Khan	  Dauran	  is	   in	  
with	  the	  King	  gives	  us	  hopes	  of	  Success	  in	  this	  undertaking,	  He	  assures	  us	  of	  his	  protection	  and	  
says	   the	  King	  has	   promis’d	   us	   great	   favours.’54	   The	  next	   day	   Surman	   records	   that	   he	  met	   ‘his	  
Majesty’,	   refers	   to	   Khan	   Dauran	   as	   their	   ‘Patron’	   and	  most	   tellingly	   ‘We	   are	   Assured	   by	   our	  
friends	  that	  the	  Vizier	  is	  only	  titular,	  the	  Executive	  power	  lying	  Chiefly	  in	  the	  other;	  So	  that’	  he	  
explained	  himself	  to	  his	  superiors	  at	  Fort	  William	  that	  ‘what	  we	  are	  now	  about	  to	  doe,	  is	  Entirely	  
our	  Interest.	  For	  which	  reason	  Agreed	  that	  we	  first	  visit	  Khan	  Dauran;	  next,	  the	  Vizier;	  and	  Last	  
of	   all	   Tuccurrub	  Caun.’55	   Seerhaud	  was	   able	   to	  win	   Surman’s	   confidence	  by	   ensuring	   that	   the	  
Embassy	  was	   received	   in	  Delhi	  and	   that	  his	   contacts	  were	  able	   to	  promise	  access	   to	  Court.	   In	  
doing	   so,	   the	   British	   purposefully	   ignored	   the	   established	   rituals	   and	   protocols	   of	   the	  
mansabdari	  system.	  It	  was	  to	  cost	  them	  dearly	  in	  terms	  of	  wealth	  and	  time.	  
	  
Having	   established	   themselves,	   the	   British	   prepared	   their	   petition	   under	   the	   advice	   of	   Khan	  
Dauran	  who	  was,	  wrote	  the	  Embassy	  to	  their	  controllers	  in	  Fort	  William,	  ‘the	  main	  instrument	  of	  
our	  affairs.’	  In	  addition,	  Surman	  wrote	  that	  ‘the	  methods	  we	  are	  at	  present	  taking,	  is	  consistent	  
and	   the	   advice	   &	   Councill	   of	   Zeyau-­‐d-­‐din	   Khan’	   who	   was	   introduced	   to	   the	   party	   by	   Khan	  
Dauran.56	  Furthermore,	  Surman	  records	  that	  ‘As	  for	  our	  business	  we	  were	  resolved	  not	  to	  go	  to	  
the	  Vizier	  …	   as	   Khan	  Dauran	  himself	   directed.’57	  Under	   the	   advice	   of	   these	   two,	   the	   embassy	  
made	   its	   first	   error.	   Instead	   of	   proceeding	   to	  meet	   the	   Vizier	   –	   who	   was	   the	  most	   powerful	  
authority	  after	  the	  Emperor	  –	  the	  British	  paid	  visits	  to	  several	  minor	  officials.	  Under	  advice	  they	  
agreed	   to	   deliberately	   insult	   the	   Vizier	   by	   first	   visiting	   his	   younger	   brother’s	   deputy.58	   The	  
consequence	  was	  that	  the	  requests	  of	  the	  British	  were	  not	  brought	  to	  the	  Emperor’s	  notice.	  It	  is	  
clear	   from	  the	  embassy’s	  correspondence	  that	  the	  Emperor’s	  mind	  was	  elsewhere	  at	  the	  time	  
and	   in	  a	  desperate	  attempt	   to	  ensure	   that	   their	  party	  was	  not	   forgotten	  by	   the	  Emperor	   they	  
                                                
53	  Ibid.	  p.52;	  See	  also	  p.100	  for	  the	  letters	  of	  introduction	  from	  the	  Padree	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  Ibid.	  1983	  p.	  54	  
55	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  Ibid	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  Ibid	  p.126	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resolved	   that	   ‘our	   best	   policy	   is	   to	   be	   always	   near	   the	   King	   …	   that	   we	   might	   Even	   then	  
negotiating	  our	  business.’59	  
	  
In	   August	   1715	   the	   party	   prepared	   their	   petition	   for	   the	   Emperor	   in	   Persian	   not	   English.	   The	  
petition	  was	  shown	  to	  an	  official	  who	  condensed	  the	  document	  and	  made	  other	  modifications	  
without	   changing	   the	   tenor	   of	   the	   document.60	   On	   Khan	   Dauran’s	   instructions	   the	   petition,	  
along	  with	  a	  sizeable	  gift,	  was	  prepared	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	  the	  Emperor	   in	  November.	  A	   letter	  
confirms	   that	   the	   main	   conduit	   for	   consultations	   between	   the	   British	   and	   Khan	   Dauran	   was	  
Seerhaud	   –	   who	   had	   initially	   introduced	   the	   two	   parties	   to	   each	   other.61	   Mughal	   protocol	  
demanded	   that	   the	   petition	   be	   handed	   to	   the	   Vizier	   and	   that	   he	   would	   forward	   it	   to	   the	  
Emperor.	  The	  British	  instead	  chose	  to	  give	  the	  petition	  to	  Khan	  Dauran	  who	  was	  a	  deputy	  bakshi	  
or	  treasury	  officer.	  Khan	  Dauran	  did	  submit	  the	  document	  in	  December	  but	  it	  was	  returned	  with	  
the	  orders	   that	   it	   be	  examined	  and	  noted	  upon	  by	   the	  officers	  of	   the	   treasury.62	   For	   the	   first	  
time	  Surman’s	  diary	   records	  a	  hint	  of	  displeasure	  with	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   things	  have	  been	  
proceeding.	  He	  writes	  ‘for	  altho’	  our	  affairs	  are	  fallen	  into	  the	  Patronage	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  able	  
men	  in	  this	  Court	  to	  dispatch	  them	  if	  He	  pleases,	  yet	  his	  dilatory	  method	  of	  proceeding	  is	  such	  
as	  must	  make	  us	  pursue	  our	  designs	  with	  patience	  …	  .’63	  Surman	  was	  also	   informed	  that	  Khan	  
Dauran	  required	  further	  gifts.64	  
	  
After	   consideration,	   the	   treasury	   returned	   the	   petition	   in	   a	   most	   peculiar	   form.	   The	   key	  
demands	  of	  the	  British	  were	  ignored	  –	  that	  is	  a	  firman	  regarding	  Bengal.	  The	  first	  article	  of	  the	  
British	  petition	  requested	  a	  firman	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  ‘English	  Company	  pay	  no	  Custom,	  in	  
Indostan,	  Suratt	  Excepted.’	  There	  was	  no	  reply	  to	  this.	  On	  other	  points	  the	  treasury	  stated	  it	  had	  
either	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  various	  matters	  or	  that	  it	  could	  not	  comment	  on	  particular	  demands	  
because	   it	   fell	   outside	   the	   treasury’s	   jurisdiction.	   So	   in	   response	   to	   the	   second	   article	   which	  
stated:	  	  
‘In	   Calcutta	   ye	   Company	   have	   a	   Settlement	   D:	   Calcutta,	   Govindpore,	   and	  
Sootaluty	  (dihi	  Kalikata,	  Govindpur	  and	  Sutanuti);	  which	  3	  towns	  being	  near	  ye	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Factory,	  His	  deceased	  Highness	  Azzimuth	  Sha	  gave	  to	  be	  rented	  by	  ye	  Company.	  
The	   rent	   of	   these	   3	   towns	   abovementioned,	   according	   to	   ye	   Kings	   books,	  
amounts	  to	  1194.14,	  and	  Something	  more;	  which	  is	  yearly	  paid	  into	  ye	  Treasury.	  
We	  humbly	  petition,	   that	  ye	  renting	  off	  Severall	  other	   towns,	   that	  are	  near	  ye	  
above	   towns;	   and	   whose	   rent	   amounts	   to	   near	   or	   about	   800	   rupees	  may	   be	  
granted	  to	  ye	  Company,	  That	   the	  Rent	  shall	  be	  yearly,	  and	  duely	  paid	   into	  the	  
Kings	   treasury	   by	   us;	   and	   that	   particular	   care	   shall	   be	   taken,	   to	   make	   them	  
flourish.’	  
	  
The	  reply	  from	  the	  treasury	  was:	  
	   ..	  The	  particulars	  off	  these	  towns	  are	  nott	  in	  ye	  books,	  neither	  were	  they	  given	  
from	  the	  King.	  They	  have	  a	  Perwanna	  under	  Izzut	  Cauns	  Seal	  for	  them	  pursuant	  
to	   Azzimuth	   Sha’s	   Nishaun:	   By	   which	   it	   appears	   3	   Towns	   Culcutta	   &c.	   In	   ye	  
purgunna	   of	   Ammerdabad,	   and	   Subaship	   of	   Bengall	   have	   been	   bought	   from	  
Munoredutt	   &	   other	   Jemidars	   and	   a	   Bill	   off	   Sale	   obtained,	  when	   ye	   Daun	   off	  
Bengall	  gave	  them	  possession.	  As	  for	  ye	  Other	  Towns	  we	  have	  nott	  their	  names	  
by	  which	  to	  render	  An	  Account.	  The	  Duan	  may	  be	  wrote	  to,	  That	  An	  Account	  be	  
sent	  to	  Court.’65	  
Faced	  with	  what	   can	   only	   be	   termed	   as	   bureaucratic	   opposition	   and	   certainly	   understood	   as	  
such	  by	   the	  British	  –	  Surman	  comments	   that	   the	   Indians	  expected	   further	  gifts	  –	   they	  had	  no	  
choice	  but	  to	  proceed	  with	  submitting	  their	  petition	  to	  the	  Emperor.	  This	  was	  returned	  swiftly	  
and	  met	  none	  of	  the	  British	  requests.	  
	  
Within	   days,	   a	   second	   petition	   was	   drawn	   up	   and	   sent	   to	   Khan	   Dauran	   for	   presentation.	   To	  
make	  sure	  that	   it	  progressed,	  a	  series	  of	  presents	  were	  also	  enclosed	  with	  the	  document.	  This	  
too	  was	  unsuccessful.	   The	  primary	  demand	  of	   a	   firman,	   Surman	   informed	  his	   superiors,	   ‘By	   a	  
mistake	   of	   the	  mutsuddys	  was	   omitted.’	   It	   could	   have	   been	  bureaucratic	   oversight.	   The	   diary	  
does	  not	  dwell	  upon	  it.	  But	  it	  was	  the	  most	  important	  demand	  made	  by	  the	  British	  and	  one	  that	  
required	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   Emperor.	   However,	   Surman	   was	   dealing	   with	   lower	   ranking	  
officials	  who	  had	  neither	  the	  authority	  nor	  the	  power	  to	  grant	  what	  was	  wanted.	  It	  is	  therefore	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feasible	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  omission	  was	  deliberate	  indicating	  that	  this	  was	  how	  the	  minions	  
of	  the	  Mughal	  Court	  dealt	  with	  requests	  that	  it	  did	  not	  want	  to	  deal	  with.66	  
	  
Faced	  with	  what	  amounted	  to	  a	  blockade	  the	  Embassy	  began	  to	   fester.	  The	  negotiators	  could	  
not	   understand	   why	   they	   had	   not	   made	   any	   progress	   since	   in	   their	   minds	   they	   were	   being	  
advised	  by	  powerful	  and	  influential	  Mughals.	   In	  their	  minds	  the	  English	  no	  doubt	  also	  felt	  that	  
they	   were	   following	   Mughal	   practice	   and	   customs	   –	   not	   as	   prescribed	   –	   but	   as	   practice	  
demanded	  it.	  Presumably,	  their	  breaking	  with	  Court	  protocol	  was	  not	  because	  they	  wanted	  to	  
cause	  offence,	  after	  all	  the	  British	  were	  the	  petitioners,	  but	  because	  they	  thought	  that	  this	  was	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  business	  was	  conducted.	  Ultimately,	  Surman	  wrote	  with	  alacrity	  that	  when	  
their	  chief	  adviser,	  Khan	  Dauran	  was	  ‘put	  in	  mind	  of	  our	  Petition,	  He	  was	  very	  surprizingly	  asked	  
what	   Petition?	   have	   I	   not	   done	   all	   your	   business	   …	   .’67	   Surman	   continued	   ‘This	   strange	  
forgetfulness	   made	   us	   in	   very	   pathetick	   terms	   inquire	   what	   we	   might	   expect	   after	   so	   many	  
promises	  of	  having	  our	  business	  effected	  to	  our	  satisfaction	  when	  we	  had	  so	  long	  and	  patiently	  
waited	  and	  been	  at	  so	  great	  an	  expense	  to	  be	  thus	  answered	  was	  very	  surprizing,	  and	  What	  we	  
did	  not	  nor	  could	  not	  expect	  in	  the	  least.’	  
	  
Learning	  from	  experience,	  Surman	  notes	  that:	  
‘daily	  experience	  might	  convince	  us	  of	  the	  strange	  carriage	  and	  forgetfulness	  of	  
that	  great	  man’	  and	  he	  received	  this	  ‘further	  light,	  Viz.t	  that	  Khan	  Dauran	  had	  
been	  advised	  by	  his	  own	  Mustsuddies,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  his	  business	  to	  perswade	  
the	   King	   to	   sign	   our	   Petition	   contrary	   to	  what	   He	   had	   formerly	   desired,	   but	  
that	  it	  was	  better	  to	  get	  signed	  upon	  it	  Cootbulmooluck	  whose	  business	  it	  was,	  
as	  Vizier	  to	  advise	  the	  King	  what	  things	  were	  proper	  to	  be	  granted	  us,	  We	  find	  
this	   was	   chiefly	   levelled	   against	   our	   Petition	   for	   Divy	   island	   and	   the	   ground	  
round	  Calcutta	  now	  desired.	  We	  were	  in	  hopes	  that	  in	  case	  We	  could	  have	  got	  
those	   Petitions	   granted	   us	   by	   the	  means	   of	   Khan	   dauran	   tht	   afterwards	   the	  
Vizier	  would	  not	   gain	   say	  or	   at	   least	   by	   a	   little	   bribery	   it	  might	  have	  passed,	  
there	  has	  been	  severall	  endeavours	  made	  to	  get	  an	  opportunity	  to	  speak	  with	  
Khan	  Dauran	  so	  as	   to	  convince	  him	  but	  none	  has	  been	  procureable,	  We	   fear	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the	   Petition	   in	   this	   interim	   may	   be	   gone	   in	   and	   will	   come	   out	   signed	   as	  
beforementioned.’68	  
His	  prediction	  was	  correct.	   In	  March	   the	  Emperor	   returned	   the	  British	  petition	   for	   the	   second	  
time	  with	  precise	  directions	  that	   it	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  Vizier.69	  The	  advice	  was	  sound	  but	  the	  
English	  would	  not	  take	  it	  and	  clung	  obstinately	  to	  their	  original	  and	  erroneous	  views.	  The	  next	  
steps	   the	   British	   took	  were	   to	   fall	   back	   on	   an	   older	   stereotype	   –	   that	   the	  means	   to	   conduct	  
business	  with	  the	  centre	  was	  thru	  bribery.	  The	  British	  therefore	  mounted	  a	  major	  campaign	  to	  
win	   over	   various	   Mughal	   officials	   by	   buying	   them.70	   They	   attempted	   to	   bribe	   minor	   officials	  
including	  clerks	  because,	  Surman	   thought	   the	   ‘Duanny	  Writers,	  who	  att	   that	   time	  wrote	  what	  
they	  pleased	  on	  Each	  Phird:	  According	  to	  which	  naturally	  flowed	  the	  Kings	  Assent	  or	  denyall.’71	  	  
	  
Convinced	  that	  the	  means	  to	  negotiate	  was	  to	  bribe	  everyone,	  they	  did	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  of	  
what	  the	  Emperor	  himself	  instructed	  them	  to	  do	  –	  deal	  only	  with	  the	  Vizier	  whose	  prerogative	  it	  
was	   to	   deal	   with	   foreign	   embassies.	   In	   choosing	   to	   ignore	   the	   advice,	   the	   British	   became	  
distracted,	  squabbled	  amongst	  themselves	  and	  attracted	  an	  even	  greater	  number	  of	  hangers-­‐on	  
keen	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   largesse	   of	   the	   British	   party.	  When	   the	   British	   next	   submitted	  
their	   petition	   they	  again	  offered	  bribes.	   To	   the	  diwan-­‐i-­‐khailisah	   they	  offered	   seven	   thousand	  
rupees;	   to	   the	  head	   clerk,	   Bhog	  Chand,	   ten	   thousand	   rupees;	   and	   to	   the	   subordinates	   twelve	  
hundred.72	  Knowing	  the	  British	  were	  keen	  to	  buy	  people,	  the	  people	  responded	  by	  feeding	  them	  
with	   favourable	   reports	   about	   the	   progress	   of	   their	   petition	   in	   the	   hope	  of	   extracting	   further	  
payoffs.73	  
	  
Not	  till	  July	  15,	  1716	  did	  they	  discover	  that	  they	  had	  been	  deceived	  throughout	  the	  proceedings	  
and	   that	   the	   treasury	   was	   no	   more	   favourably	   disposed	   towards	   them	   than	   before.	   Their	  
requests	  for	  a	  firman	  had	  been	  refused.	  Instead	  what	  the	  minor	  officials	  had	  done	  was	  agree	  to	  
the	  British	  petition	  but	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  Husbul	  Hoocum	  which	  was	  very	  different	  from	  a	  
firman.	   The	   latter	   carried	   weight	   throughout	   the	   Empire	   as	   it	   was	   issued	   directly	   from	   the	  
Emperor.	  It	  was	  essential	  that	  the	  British	  have	  such	  a	  document	  because	  they	  needed	  to	  show	  it	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to	   the	   various	  Mughal	   governors	   they	   dealt	   with	   in	   the	   far	   corners	   of	   the	  Mughal	   Empire.	   A	  
Husbul	  Hoocum	  would	  not	  convince	  them.	  
	  
As	  far	  as	  the	  servants	  of	  the	  Court	  were	  concerned,	  they	  of	  course	  were	  unable	  –	  by	  their	  own	  
practice	   –	   to	   grant	   a	   firman	   unless	   the	   petitioner	   personally	   approached	   the	   Vizier	   who	  
consented	  to	  receive	  him,	  consider	  his	  proposal	  and	  then	  order	  his	  bureaucracy	  to	  process	  the	  
demand	  with	  whatever	  modifications	  he	  saw	  fit.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  junior	  Mughals	  the	  British	  
were	   dealing	   with	   had	   no	   intention	   of	   giving	   up	   the	   handsome	   presents	   that	   were	   being	  
distributed.	  In	  effect,	  the	  British	  were	  granted	  not	  a	  treaty	  as	  they	  wanted	  but	  simply	  an	  order	  
which	   was	   understood	   by	   both	   the	   British	   and	   the	   Mughals	   as	   an	   entirely	   different	   type	   of	  
document	  which	   lacked	   the	   binding	   powers	   of	   a	   treaty.74	   At	  wits	   end,	   Surman	   threatened	   to	  
leave	  Delhi.	   At	   another	   point	   he	   thought	   of	   going	   to	   the	  Vizier,	   towards	  whom	  he	   had	   taken	  
particular	  care	  not	  to	  offend,	  but	  still	  felt	  that	  he	  lacked	  any	  influence.75	  
	  
Disgusted	  with	   their	   lack	   of	   progress,	   events	   in	  Western	   India	   came	   to	   the	   assistance	   of	   the	  
Embassy.	   The	   governor	  of	   the	  port	   at	   Surat,	  Haidar	  Quli	   Khan	  wrote	   to	   the	   Emperor	   that	   the	  
English	   were	   seriously	   discontented	   and	   that	   if	   they	   were	   not	   speedily	   satisfied	   they	   would	  
withdraw	  and	  Surat	  would	  suffer	  a	  loss	  in	  trade	  and	  piracy.	  Always	  concerned	  with	  the	  state	  of	  
the	  seas	  and	  the	  Western	  port	  –	  it	  was	  the	  main	  trading	  port	  with	  the	  Arab	  and	  European	  world	  
and	   religiously	   significant	   because	   it	   was	   where	   the	   Haj	   departed	   from.	   The	   letters	   were	  
delivered	  to	  the	  Emperor	  and	  also	  Khan	  Dauran.	  For	  four	  days	  nothing	  happened.	  Then	  suddenly	  
the	   Embassy	   was	   granted	   access	   to	   Khan	   Dauran.	   This	   was	   the	   first	   time	   a	   member	   of	   the	  
Embassy	  was	  granted	  a	  private	  meeting	  with	  Dauran.76	  The	  Embassy	  also	  records	  on	  the	  27th	  of	  
August	  –	  just	  days	  after	  the	  letters	  from	  Surat	  had	  arrived:	  ‘Visited	  the	  Grand	  Vizier’.77	  Perhaps,	  
Surman	  was	  embarrassed	  at	  making	  much	  more	  of	  the	  visit	  in	  his	  diary	  given	  that	  he	  had	  taken	  
great	  pains	  in	  earlier	  letters	  to	  explain	  why	  he	  had	  not	  approached	  the	  Vizier	  directly.	  	  
	  
Yet	  more	  delays	  led	  to	  further	  ructions	  within	  the	  British	  party	  and	  on	  November	  9th,	  Seerhaud	  –	  
who	   originally	   suggested	   the	   course	   of	   action	   that	   the	   party	   had	   been	   following	   for	   some	   17	  
                                                
74	  Ibid	  p.156	  
75	  Ibid	  p.157,	  p.126	  
76	  Ibid	  p.166-­‐167	  
77	  Ibid	  p.	  167	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months	   –	   ‘confessed,	   that	   the	   Seal	   cannot	   be	   given,	   without	   our	   petitions	   First	   going	   to	   the	  
Vizier,	   and	   receiving	   his	   perusal	   and	   Approbation.’	   The	   next	   day’s	   entry	   records	   ‘The	   Phirds	  
(firmans)	   were	   all	   carried	   to	   the	   Grand	   Vizier	   from	   the	   Duanny,	   who	   according	   to	   his	   kind	  
disposition,	  After	  perusing	  them,	  Ordered	  the	  Duan	  Colsa	  to	  carry	  them	  immediately	  to	  the	  King	  
and	  get	  them	  Signed,	  which	  was	  done	  accordingly.’	  Surman	  added	  in	  the	  most	  casual	  of	  terms,	  
‘For	  the	  Vizier	  as	  is	  usuall	  making	  a	  mark	  to	  petition,	  so	  his	  Majesty	  Signed	  his	  Assent	  to	  all	  that	  
those	  papers	  contained.’78	  Yet	  the	  Vizier’s	  role	  was	  not	  yet	  complete.	  Surman	  reported	  that:	  
‘before	   they	   could	   proceed	   any	   farther	   there	   was	   a	   necessity	   to	   receive	   the	  
Vizier’s	  approval,	   accordingly	   it	  was	   carried	   there	  yesterday,	  and	  was	   received	  
very	  candidly	  but	  pursuant	  to	  custom	  must	  again	  go	  to	  the	  King,	  but	  that	  there	  
might	  be	  no	  loss	  of	  time	  the	  Vizier	  kindly	  ordered	  the	  Duan	  Colsa	  to	  carry	  them	  
himself	  thither	  and	  get	  them	  signed,	  which	  was	  accordingly	  done,	  so	  I	  hope	  now	  
they	  are	  pretty	  well	  passed,	  next	  Follows	  the	  Vizier’s	  Signing	  and	  then	  we	  shall	  
get	  the	  orders	  for	  drawing	  up	  the	  Phirmaund	  which	  as	  soon	  as	  received	  we	  shall	  
Dispatch	  …	  .’79	  
	  
Having	  finally	  accepted	  Mughal	  codes	  for	  petitioning	  the	  empire	  and	  following	  its	  customs,	  the	  
British	   case	   was	   processed	   rapidly.	   The	   rapidity	   with	   which	   their	   case	   was	   being	   dealt	   with	  
caught	  the	  Embassy	  off-­‐guard.	  So	  much	  so	  that	  Surman	  wrote:	  	  
‘We	  might	  have	  Expected	  the	  Vizier	  in	  whose	  power	  itt	  was,	  would	  have	  stop’d	  
our	  business	  on	  this	  occasion	  or	  caused	  many	  delays	  the	  Sure	  way	  to	  squeeze	  a	  
Sum	  of	  money,	  which	  must	  have	  been	  very	  larger.	  Butt	  he	  has	  behaved	  himself	  
with	   far	  more	  generosity,	  Our	  papers	  no	  sooner	   reaching	  his	  hands,	   than	   they	  
received	   dispatch;	   which	   encourages	   us	   to	   believe	   he	   will	   not	   be	   hereafter	  
troublesome.’80	  	  
Yet	   the	  Embassy	  was	  not	   fully	   able	   to	   cast	  of	   its	  perceptions	   that	   the	  only	  way	  of	   conducting	  
business	  was	  thru	  bribes.	  It	  was	  their	  perversely	  ignoring	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  actions	  and	  
falling	  back	  to	  their	  set	  belief	  that	  Khan	  Dauran	  and	  bribery	  were	  the	  two	  keys	  to	  unlocking	  the	  
Mughal	   Court	   that	   caused	   the	   next	   set	   of	   delays	   which	   had	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   imperial	  
firmans	   but	   the	  doctor	   in	   the	  British	  party.	   The	  Emperor,	  having	  benefitted	   from	   the	  doctor’s	  
                                                
78	  Ibid	  p.180	  
79	  Ibid	  p.181	  
80	  Ibid	  p.	  183	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attendance,	  was	   loath	  to	  see	  him	  go.	  Yet	  again	  the	  British	  turned	  to	  Khan	  Dauran	  who	  proved	  





Unlike	   the	   Chinese	   Empire,	   the	  Mughal	   Empire	  was	   conducting	   diplomacy	  with	   peer-­‐empires	  
and	   not	   just	   vassal	   states	   long	   before	   the	   English	   arrived.	   It	   meant	   that	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	  
English	   arrival	   the	   India	   possessed	   a	   sophisticated	   set	   of	   diplomatic	   practices	   which	   were	  
motivated	  by	  what	  Nelson	  classed	  a	  ‘faith’	  based	  consciousness.	  The	  Mughals	  also	  possessed	  a	  
bureaucracy	   to	   operate	  within	   the	  diplomatic	   system	  of	   the	   time.	   It	  was	   this	   that	   the	   English	  
sought	   to	   connect	   to	   and	   were,	   after	   some	   failures,	   able	   to	   with	   the	   Surman	   Embassy	   and	  
surviving	   records	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   bureaucratic	   execution	   of	   Mughal	   diplomacy	   is	  
remarkably	  similar	  to	  modern	  practice	  –	  down	  to	  official	  corruption.	  
	  
What	  this	  Mughal	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  does	  is	  challenge	  three	  notions.	  The	  first	  is	  Eisenstadt’s	  
idea	  that	  Europe	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  modern	  practices.	  Interconnected	  with	  that	  is	  Bull’s	  assumption	  
that	   the	   culture	   of	   diplomacy	   is	   weighted	   in	   favour	   of	   Europe.	   The	   actual	   practice	   of	   Anglo-­‐
Indian	   diplomacy	   was	   in	   fact	   weighted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Mughals.	   The	   English	   wanted	   to	   be	  
assimilated	  into	  the	  Mughal	  system	  of	  conducting	  business.	  That	  the	  English	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  
was	  due	  to	  there	  being	  nothing	   in	  the	  Mughal	  diplomatic	  canon	  which	  was	  cognitively	  new	  to	  
the	  English.	  The	  English	  understood	  the	  principles	  of	  Mughal	  diplomacy.	  It	  suggests	  that	  though	  
distinct	   civilizations,	   England	   and	   the	  Mughals	   had	   evolved	   similar	  means	   and	   conceptions	   of	  
diplomacy.	  The	  differences	  were	  one	  of	  practice.	  These	  the	  English	   learnt.	   In	  short,	   the	  British	  
were	  enthusiastic	   to	   imbibe	   the	   cultural	   repertoire	  of	   the	  Mughal	   Empire	  even	   if	   at	   first	   they	  
were	  mistaken	  about	  its	  nature.	  
	  
Anglo-­‐Indian	   diplomacy	   also	   reveals	   the	   flaws	   in	   several	   other	   positions.	   In	   revising	   these	  
positions	   the	   history	   of	  Mughal	   diplomacy	   also	   exposes	   the	   hollowness	   of	   the	   assumption	   of	  
non-­‐Western	   diplomacy	   cannot	   make	   any	   meaningful	   contribution	   to	   diplomatic	   theory.	   The	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most	  significant	  challenge	  Mughal	  history	  poses	   is	  to	  Neumann’s81	  argument	  that	  diplomacy	   is	  
often	  understood	  as	  a	   ‘third	   culture’	  which	  mediates	  between	  other	   cultures,	  with	  diplomatic	  
culture	   being	   the	   intersubjective	   set	   of	   symbols	   and	   practices	   that	   make	   specific	   interaction	  
possible.	  He	  starts	  with	  a	  distinction	  made	  by	  Taylor	  on	  consensus	  and	  intersubjectivity.	  Taylor	  
writes:	  
‘When	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  consensus	  we	  speak	  of	  beliefs	  and	  values	  which	  could	  be	  
the	   property	   of	   a	   single	   person,	   or	  many,	   or	   all;	   but	   intersubjective	  meanings	  
could	  not	  be	  the	  property	  of	  a	  single	  person	  because	  they	  are	  rooted	   in	  social	  
practice.	   The	   actors	  may	   have	   all	   sorts	   of	   beliefs	   and	   attitudes	  which	  may	   be	  
rightly	   thought	  of	  as	   their	   individual	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes,	  even	   if	  others	  share	  
them	  […]	  But	  what	  they	  do	  not	  bring	  into	  the	  negotiations	  is	  the	  set	  of	  ideas	  and	  
norms	   constitutive	   of	   negotiations	   themselves.	   These	   must	   be	   the	   common	  
property	   of	   the	   society	   before	   there	   can	   be	   any	   question	   of	   entering	   into	  
negotiation	  or	  not.	  Hence	  they	  are	  not	  subjective	  meanings,	  the	  property	  of	  one	  
or	  some	  individuals,	  but	  rather	  intersubjective	  meanings,	  which	  are	  constitutive	  
of	  the	  social	  matrix	  in	  which	  individuals	  find	  themselves	  and	  act.’	  
And	  Der	  Derian	  defines	  diplomacy	  as:	  
‘Above	   and	   before	   all	   else,	   diplomacy	   is	   a	   system	  of	   communication	   between	  
strangers,	  It	  is	  the	  formal	  means	  by	  which	  the	  self-­‐identity	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  
is	  constituted	  and	  articulated	  through	  external	  relations	  with	  other	  states.	  Like	  
the	   dialogue	   from	   which	   it	   is	   constructed,	   diplomacy	   requires	   and	   seeks	   to	  
mediate	   otherness	   through	   the	   use	   of	   persuasion	   and	   force,	   promises	   and	  
threats,	  codes	  and	  symbols.’82	  	  
	  
However,	   as	   the	   history	   of	   Anglo-­‐Indian	   diplomacy	   reveals,	   there	  was	   no	   common	  diplomatic	  
practice.	   No	   ‘third	   culture’	   evolved	   out	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Indian	   negotiations.	   Nor	   did	   there	   exist	  
Taylor’s	  ‘society’	  whose	  common	  property	  was	  ‘international	  society’.	  Indeed	  diplomacy	  may	  be	  
constitutive	  of	  the	  international	  ‘social	  matrix’	  that	  Taylor	  refers	  to	  and	  diplomacy	  is	  certainly	  a	  
‘social	   practice’	   but	   the	   specific	   practices	   of	   Anglo-­‐Indian	   diplomacy	   do	   not	   offer	   any	  
‘intersubjectivity’.	   The	   ‘social	   matrix’	   was	   a	   Mughal	   matrix	   which	   had	   been	   developed	   from	  
                                                
81	  Unpublished	  manuscript	  distributed	  by	  the	  author.	  Neumann.	  April	  2008.	  
82	  Der	  Derian	  defines	  diplomacy	  as	  such.	  1993.	  P.244.	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Mughal-­‐Ottoman	   relations	   amongst	   others.	   The	   English	   and	   the	  Mughals	   did	   not	   craft	   a	   new	  
matrix.	   Instead	   the	  English,	   though	  sovereign	   representatives,	  not	  only	  practiced	  Mughal	   style	  
diplomacy	  by	  negotiating	  for	  a	  Mughal	  firman	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  also	  acceded	  to	  Mughal	  law.	  
	  
The	  corollary	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  intersubjective	  meanings	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Indian	  negotiations	  is	  that	  
there	   was	   instead	   consensus.	   However,	   consensus,	   argues	   Neumann,	   is	   a	   result	   of	   semantic	  
struggles	  between	  truth	  claims.	   In	  the	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  with	  the	  Mughal’s,	  Surman	  short-­‐
circuited	  the	  struggle	  by,	  ultimately,	  agreeing	  to	  following	  Mughal	  practices.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Surman	  
was	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  ‘myth’	  of	  being	  able	  to	  buy	  ones	  way	  in	  the	  Mughal	  court	  which	  dated	  
back	   to	   the	   time	   of	   Sir	   Thomas	   Roe.	   If	   a	   myth	   is	   a	   precondition	   for	   understanding83	   –	   the	  
precursor	   to	   communicating	   which	   is	   the	   art	   of	   diplomacy	   according	   to	   Der	   Derian	   –	   then	  
Surman’s	   skill	   lay	   in	   overcoming	   that	   particular	  myth.	   In	   any	   case,	   the	   British	   arrived	   in	  Delhi	  
seeking	   to	  operate	  within	   the	   ‘social	  matrix’	  of	   the	  Mughals.	  They	  wanted	   to	  negotiate	   in	   the	  
Mughal	   manner,	   follow	  Mughal	   customs	   and	   the	   entire	   point	   of	   the	   Embassy	   was	   to	   secure	  
Mughal	  documents.	  	  
	  
The	   Mughal	   interregnum	   saw	   the	   operation	   of	   a	   diplomatic	   practice	   which	   originated	   in	   an	  
Islamic	   credo.	   These	  practices	  demonstrate	   that	   locals	  were	   familiar	  with	  diplomacy	  as	   an	  art	  
and	   lays	   to	   waste	   the	   delusive	   myth	   of	   modernity	   spreading	   out	   of	   Europe.	   Yet	   under	   the	  
Mughals	  the	  various	  notions	  of	  practice	  arising	  out	  of	  dharma	  were	  subsumed.	  This	  was	  to	  be	  
compounded	  under	  the	  British	  who	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  monopolise	  diplomatics	  in	  India	  went	  from	  
acceding	   to	   Mughal	   law	   to	   assuming	   their	   mantle	   in	   1857	   and	   diplomatically	   incorporated	  
independent	   Indian	   states	   into	   the	   British	   Empire.	   Unquestionably,	   the	   British	   spread	  
themselves	   out	   throughout	   the	   Indian	   sub-­‐continent.	   It	   is	   perhaps	   why	   the	   literature	   on	  
diplomacy	   invests	   colonialism	  with	   such	   transformative	   power.	   It	   is	   to	   these	   transformations,	  
engendered	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  European	  modernity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Western	  diplomacy	  that	  
we	  turn	  to	  next.	  
	  
ENDS	  
                                                
83	  Sahlins.	  1981;	  Lincoln.	  1989.	  2002.	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Juxtaposing,	   in	   the	   manner	   of	   ostranenie,	   the	   literature	   on	   diplomacy	   with	   the	   fieldwork	  
produced	  the	  problématique	  of	  whether	  the	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  diplomacy	  existed	  in	  South-­‐
Asia	  before	  the	  entry	  of	  Europe.	  Approaching	  the	  problem	  genealogically,	  the	  previous	  chapters	  
argued	   that	   not	   only	   did	   diplomacy	   exist	   in	   practice	   but	   that	   there	  was	   also	   a	   theory	   arising	  
from	   a	   philosophy	   of	   action	   (dharma).	   However,	   the	   only	   way	   of	   finally	   resolving	   the	  
controversy	   of	   where	   the	   logics	   of	   today’s	   practice	   emerge	   from	   lies	   in	   investigating	   what	  
actually	  transpired	  during	  the	  period	  of	  intercivilizational	  contact	  amongst	  actual	  practitioners	  –	  
both	   Indian	   and	   British.	   It	   is	   to	   ascertain	   the	   actual	   impact	   of	   modern,	   European	   diplomacy	  
upon	  the	  prevailing	  systems	  and	  peoples.	  
	  
In	   performing	   this	   act	   of	   verification	   what	   emerges	   is	   that	   the	   British	   appropriated	   local	  
practices.	  However	  they	   imbued	  local	  practices	  with	  a	  dynamic	  which	  was	  new.	  The	   literature	  
suggests	   that	   the	  British	   introduced	  Western	  modernity.	  They	  did.	   It	  was	  the	  animating	  spirit,	  
the	   dynamo	   of	  Western	  modernity,	   which	   insinuated	   itself	   into	   existing	   diplomatic	   practices	  
thereby	   displacing	   dharma.	   The	   alien	   metaphysic	   was	   directly	   opposed	   to	   dharma	   which,	  
though	  subsumed,	  had	  animated	  the	  Mughal	  state	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  non-­‐Muslim	  personnel	  it	  
relied	   upon.	   In	   contrast	   to	   dharma	   the	   European	   dynamic	   was	   one	   founded	   on	   a	   self/other	  
binary	  divide.	  The	  idea	  was	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  Europe.1	  Hegel	  as	  the	  preeminent	  exponent	  of	  
this	  metaphysic	   and	  one	  who	  played	  a	  decisive	   role	   in	  manufacturing	   ‘India’	   in	   the	  European	  
mind	  is	  quoted.	  He	  noted	  that:	  
Each	   is	   for	   the	  other	  the	  middle	  term	  through	  which	  each	  mediates	   itself;	  and	  
each	   is	   for	   himself,	   and	   for	   the	  other,	   an	   immediate	  being	  on	   its	   own	  accord,	  
which	   at	   the	   same	   time	   is	   such	   only	   through	   this	   mediation.	   They	   recognise	  
themselves	  as	  mutually	  recognising	  one	  another.	  2	  	  
At	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  conception	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  self.	  The	  self	  knows	  itself	  not	  simply	  in	  terms	  
of	  itself,	  or	  another,	  but	  the	  ‘other’.	  Such	  a	  conception	  ripped	  apart	  the	  dharmic	  cosmos	  of	  an	  
                                                
1	  Rousseau	  was	  already	  conceptualizing	  alienation	  long	  before	  Hegel.	  See	  Lichtheim.	  1968.	  
2	  von	  Hegel.	  1977.	  P.112	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undivided	   whole.	   If	   the	   rationale	   underpinning	   the	   Mughals	   was	   Islam	   and	   the	   glory	   of	   the	  
divine	   thru	   its	   material	   manifestations	   then	   the	   underlying	   metaphysic	   underpinning	   British	  
diplomacy	  was	  even	  more	  alien	  to	  the	  masses	  they	  encountered.	  In	  short,	  it	  was	  the	  ‘othering’	  
of	  India.3	  Hegel	  was	  explicit	  about	  how	  this	  was	  done,	  writing	  that	  ‘as	  soon	  as	  he	  [a	  European]	  
crosses	   the	   Indus,	   he	   encounters	   the	   most	   repellent	   characteristics,	   pervading	   every	   single	  
feature	  of	   society.’4	   The	   Indus	  being	  a	   river	   in	   today’s	  Pakistan	  where	   the	  people	   called	   Indic	  
(from	  the	  river)	   lived.	  As	  Inden	  demonstrates,	  this	  repulsion	  was	   inherent	  to	  the	  dynamic	  of	  a	  
metaphysic	  founded	  on	  ‘othering’	  because	  it	  is	  a	  technique	  of	  the	  self,	  the	  European,	  to	  remove	  
the	  depraved	  from	  within.	  It	  became	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  ‘Orient,’	  a	  conceptual	  
assumption,	  devoid	  of	  empirical	  evidence.5	  In	  terms	  of	  diplomacy	  it	  was	  not	  always	  like	  this.	  In	  
Surman’s	   time	   the	   dynamic	   was	   not	   of	   opposition,	   but	   tessellation.6	   That	   approach	   was	  
abandoned	  due	  to	  ‘othering’	  becoming	  organising	  principle	  for	  the	  British	  in	  India.	  	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   diplomacy	   the	   impact	   was	   the	   erasure	   of	   local	   diplomacy	   and	   the	   European	  
interregnum	   saw	   what	   is	   inevitable	   of	   all	   practices	   motivated	   by	   binary	   logic	   systems:	   the	  
extermination	  of	  the	  ‘other’.	  The	  skewed	  nature	  of	  British	  society	  in	  India	  enhanced	  this	  binary	  
logic.	  Predominantly	  mercantile	  and	  military,	  British	  society	  rendered	  the	  ‘other,’	  i.e.,	  the	  locals,	  
as	   no	  more	   than	   a	   cash-­‐cow	   and	   viewing	   them	   as	   irreconcilably	   alienated,	   as	   sub-­‐human	   (if	  
human	  at	  all)	  and	  therefore	  open	  to	  outright	  violence.	  This	  organised	  the	  practice	  of	  diplomacy.	  
Prevalent	   notions	   of	   reciprocity	   and	   communication	   were	   erased	   by	   a	   new	   militarized-­‐
diplomacy.	  Secondly,	  Mughal	  diplomacy	  was	  an	  extension	  of	   the	   royal	  person.	   In	  British	   India	  
diplomacy	  was	   also	   of	   the	   body	   –	   but	   founded	   on	   the	   irreconcilable	   separation	   of	   bodies.	   In	  
short,	  the	  British	  not	  only	  ensured	  that	  diplomacy	  was	  conducted	  solely	  by	  themselves	  and	  for	  
                                                
3	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘other’	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  academy	  and	  this	  organising	  category	  is	  central	  precisely	  
because	  of	  the	  instrumental	  role	  it	  plays	  in	  shaping	  the	  academy’s	  society’s	  ways	  of	  perception.	  This	  is	  the	  
perception	  of	  Western	  modernity.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  specifically	  British	  enterprise.	  ‘The	  theme	  of	  “the	  Other”	  –	  
and	  specially	  what	  constitutes	  the	  otherness	  of	  “the	  Other”	  –	  has	  been	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  work	  of	  
every	  major	  twentieth-­‐century	  Continental	  philosopher,’	  writes	  Richard	  J.	  Bernstein.	  See	  Bernstein.	  P.68;	  	  
Gasché	  goes	  even	  further	  stating	  that	  ‘Western	  philosophy	  is	  in	  essence	  the	  attempt	  to	  domesticate	  
Otherness,	  since	  what	  we	  understand	  by	  thought	  is	  nothing	  but	  such	  a	  project.’	  See	  Gasché.	  1986.	  p.101.	  
4	  Hegel.	  1956.	  P.173.	  He	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  make	  a	  sharp	  and	  essential	  difference	  between	  India	  and	  
Europe.	  His	  intellectual	  world	  derived	  from	  Johann	  Gottfried	  Herder	  and	  Friedrich	  Schlegel.	  See	  von	  
Glasenapp.	  1960.	  pp.	  14-­‐32;	  and	  Halbfass.	  pp.	  86-­‐103.	  
5	  Inden.	  1986.	  P.401-­‐446	  
6	  The	  insertion	  was	  real.	  In	  the	  1780s	  one-­‐third	  of	  British	  men	  were	  leaving	  all	  their	  possessions	  to	  local	  
women	  but	  the	  figures	  rapidly	  fell	  as	  notions	  of	  race	  took	  hold.	  See	  Dalrymple.	  
Page	  129	  of	  227 
 
themselves	  but	  also	  in	  opposition	  to	  a	  body	  of	  humanity	  –	  the	  locals.	  This	  construction	  was	  the	  
European	  contribution.	   It	  was	  activated	  thru	  the	  ordering	  category	  of	   ‘race’.7	  A	  symptom	  of	  a	  
metaphysic	   expressed	   in	   the	   totalizing	   language	   of	   science.	   This	   then	   was	   the	   practical,	  
biological	   and	   totalizing	   birth	   of	   the	   ‘other’.	   The	   British	   contribution	  was	   no	  more.	   Their	   Raj	  
operationalised	   its	   metaphysic	   thru	   the	   existing	   circuits	   of	   the	   Empire.	   Mughal	   practices	  
continued	  but	  they	  were	  put	  to	  a	  uses	  unforeseen	  by	  their	  inventors.	  As	  Ali	  writes,	  ‘the	  survivals	  
of	   the	  Mughal	  Empire	  were	  subverted	   to	  a	  new	  use,	  and	  not	  employed	   to	   resurrect	  anything	  
resembling	  the	  old	  Empire.	  That	  empire	  had	  its	  own	  inequities,	  but	  these,	  to	  be	  fair	  to	  it,	  were	  
of	  a	  different	  form	  and	  content	  altogether.’8	  
	  
This	  chapter	  will	  trace	  the	  actual	  processes	  of	  diplomatic	  contact	  thru	  the	  men	  who	  were	  at	  the	  
leading	   edge	   of	   Anglo-­‐Indian	   contact.	   Nelson’s	   method	   reminds	   us	   that	   ‘macro’	   concepts	   –	  
colonialism,	  Britain,	  the	  ‘other,’	  dharma,	  alienation	  –	  are	  only	  as	  real	  as	  the	  actual	  experience	  of	  
human-­‐beings	  in	  real	  ‘micro’	  situations.	  Bottom	  up	  analysis	  can	  reveal	  macro	  concepts	  but	  their	  
impact	   on	   international	   relations	   is	   only	   significant	   if	   the	   targets	   for	   analysis	   themselves	   are	  
significant.	  This	   is	  why	  the	  entire	  project	   focuses	  on	  the	  makers	  of	   international	  politics.	  They	  
provide	   the	  entry	  point	   into	   the	   concrete	   study	  of	  processes	   in	   an	  era	  nearly	  exhausted	  by	  a	  
plethora	  of	  Indologists.	  This	  is	  why	  this	  chapter	  relies	  on	  extant	  work	  in	  particular	  Fisher,	  Eaton,	  
Peers,	  Subrahmanyam,	  Alam	  and	  Dirks.	  
	  
British	  rationales	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  local	  diplomacy	  
	  
The	   extant	   work	   on	   British	   rationales	   in	   South	   Asia	   argues	   identifies	   two	   guiding	   principles:	  
wealth	  extraction	  and	  a	  fundamental	  insecurity	  about	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  former	  brought	  
them	  to	  India	  which	  in	  turn	  produced	  a	  fundamental	  insecurity	  about	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  it.	  
Feeding	  each	  other,	  these	  two	  propelled	  the	  EIC	  into	  redefining	  diplomacy	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  India.	  
Under	   the	   Company,	   diplomacy	   became	   a	  militarized	   tool	  which	   always	   carried	   the	   threat	   of	  
war.	  It	  was	  perhaps	  even	  warped	  into	  a	  form	  unlike	  what	  was	  practiced	  in	  Europe.	  The	  purpose	  
being	  neither	  to	  communicate	  or	  negotiate	  but	  to	  subjugate.9	  These	  rationales	  were	  enabled	  by	  
                                                
7	  Of	  course	  race	  is	  just	  another	  myth	  of	  Western	  modernity,	  historically	  contingent	  and	  constantly	  in	  flux.	  
See	  Wilson.	  2003.	  P.11;	  on	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  science	  in	  India	  see:	  Cohn.	  1990.	  P.	  224-­‐54.	  
8	  Ali.	  1975.	  p.396	  
9	  Tilly.	  1975.	  P.	  31;	  McNeill.	  1982.	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the	  metaphysic	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  which	  sanctioned	  locals	  as	  alien,	  different	  and	  therefore	  beyond	  
the	  usual	  codes	  of	  society.	  
	  
It	   permitted	  wealth	   extraction	   to	   become	   the	   leitmotif	   of	   the	   British	   Raj.	   Terms	   such	   as	   the	  
‘drain	  of	  wealth’	  and	  ‘Annual	  Plunder’	  were	  mentioned	  as	  early	  as	  1783	  in	  The	  Ninth	  Report	  of	  
the	  Select	  Committee.10	   In	  his	   study	  of	   the	  Report,	  Dutt’s	  Economic	  History	  of	   India	  explicates	  
the	  nature	  and	  size	  of	  this	  drain	  of	  wealth.	  Britain	  formalized	  its	  demands	  early	  on.	  From	  Bengal	  
–	  where	   the	  Surman	  Embassy	  established	  a	   foothold	  –	   it	   took	   four	   forms.	  Termed	   ‘articles	  of	  
tribute,’	  they	  were:	  the	  ‘investment,’	  which	  was	  the	  ‘clear	  acknowledged	  Tribute	  from	  Bengal	  to	  
England,’	  the	  ‘direct	  Tribute’	  from	  the	  other	  British	  bases	  in	  India,	  private	  transfers	  and	  finally,	  
the	   transfer	  of	   income	   from	   trade	   to	  England.11	  Clive’s	   successor	  as	  Governor	  put	   the	   impact	  
clearly:	  
‘Whatever	  sums	  had	  formerly	  been	  remitted	  to	  Delhi	  were	  amply	  reimbursed	  by	  
the	  returns	  made	  to	  the	  immense	  commerce	  of	  Bengal	  …	  How	  widely	  different	  
from	  these	  are	  the	  present	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Nabob’s	  dominions!	  …	  Each	  of	  
the	   European	   Companies,	   by	  means	   of	  money	   taken	   up	   in	   the	   country,	   have	  
greatly	  enlarged	  their	  annual	  Investments,	  without	  adding	  a	  rupee	  to	  the	  riches	  
of	  the	  Province.’12	  	  
The	  economist	  Habib,	  using	  conservative	  calculations	  suggests	  that	  ‘the	  tribute	  amounted	  to	  9	  
percent	   of	   GNP	   –	   a	   crippling	   drain	   for	   any	   economy.’13	   Esteban	   in	   a	   careful	   estimate	   of	   net	  
transfers	  between	  India	  and	  Britain	  between	  1772-­‐1820	  writes	  ‘seemingly	  negligible	  magnitudes	  
in	  terms	  of	  national	  income	  can	  reveal	  their	  significance	  when	  placed	  in	  a	  meaningful	  context.’14	  
In	  extracting	   tribute	   the	  British	  were	   in	   reality	  no	  different	   from	  other	  empires	  as	  Khoury	  and	  
Kennedy	   demonstrate.15	   Yet	   the	   European	   insisted	   that	   they	   were	   different.16	   Their	   binary	  
dynamic	  could	  have	   it	  no	  other	  way.	  Their	   identity	  required	  them	  to	  be	  ontologically	  different	  
from	  Asians.	  Khoury	  and	  Kennedy	  write:	  	  
                                                
10	  Unmentioned	  were	  other	  British	  extractions	  which	  went	  not	  to	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  but	  to	  other	  parts	  
of	  the	  world	  in	  service	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  For	  instance	  the	  Rs.6	  million	  extracted	  from	  Oudh	  to	  Iraq.	  See	  
Litvak.	  2000.	  
11	  Guha.	  1996.	  p.137-­‐139	  
12	  Verelst.	  1776.	  appendix	  p.117	  
13	  Habib.	  1995.	  p.304	  
14	  Esteban.	  2001.	  p.69	  
15	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	  Asia,	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Vol.	  27,	  no.2,	  2007.	  P.214	  
16	  Whereas	  there	  was	  actually	  continuity.	  See	  Marshall.	  1987.	  172.	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‘This	  conviction	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  European	  efforts	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  
before	  to	  contrast	  themselves	  with	  “Oriental	  despotisms,”	  presenting	  their	  own	  
states	   and	   societies	   as	   progressive,	   liberal,	   and	  modern	  while	   portraying	   their	  
counterparts	  to	  the	  east	  as	  static,	  oppressive,	  and	  archaic.’17	  	  
Being	  better	  meant	  the	  locals	  were	  worse.	  They	  could	  be	  exploited	  and	  unlike	  local	  empires	  the	  
impact	   of	   the	   Europeans	  was	   relatively	   traumatic	   because	   they	  drained	   away	  wealth.	   Khoury	  
and	  Kennedy	  continue:	  
‘The	  Raj	  coerced	  its	  subjects	  and	  squeezed	  wealth	  from	  them.	  India	  garrisoned	  
one	  of	  the	  largest	  armies	  in	  the	  world	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  a	  massive	  force	  
that	  differed	  markedly	  from	  the	  increasingly	  nationalized	  armies	  of	  Europe.	  Like	  
other	   agrarian	   empires	   the	   Raj	   relied	   mainly	   on	   land	   revenues.	   On	   various	  
occasions	   its	  demands	  pushed	  peasants	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  disaster,	  and	  beyond.18	  
The	  British	  also	  assessed	  “home	  charges”	  on	  India,	  an	  annual	  transfer	  of	  millions	  
of	  pounds	  to	  the	  British	  treasury.’19	  
	  
The	  second	  expression	  of	  the	  binary	  logic	  was	  fear	  of	  the	  ‘other’.	  Fear	  produced	  insecurity	  and	  
it	  became	  an	  ‘empire	  of	  opinion,’20	  traced	  by	  Peers	  to	  Malcolm	  who	  wrote:	  ‘The	  only	  safe	  view	  
that	  Britain	  can	  take	  of	  her	  empire	   in	   India	   is	  to	  consider	   it,	  as	   it	  really	   is,	  always	   in	  a	  state	  of	  
danger.’21	  Malcolm	  was	   indicative	   of	   British	   opinion.	   In	   1845	   it	   was	   said	   of	   him:	   ‘No	  man	   …	  
better	  understood	  the	  habits	  and	  feelings	  of	  our	  subjects	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  world	  than	  Sir	  John	  
Malcolm.’22	  This	  fundamental	  and	  central	  insecurity	  dominated	  other	  officials	  who	  also	  believed	  
that	   the	  only	  method	  of	  dealing	  with	   their	   insecurities	  was	   to	  permanently	   rely	  on	   the	  army.	  
Munro,	   for	   instance,	   remarked	   that	   ‘in	   this	   country	   we	   always	   are,	   and	   always	   ought	   to	   be	  
prepared	   for	   war’23	   and	  Metcalf	   echoed	   this,	   writing,	   ‘the	  main	   object	   of	   all	   the	   Acts	   of	   our	  
Government	  [is]	  to	  have	  the	  most	  efficient	  army	  that	  we	  can	  possibly	  maintain.’24	  The	  ‘empire	  
of	  opinion’	  argued	   that	  British	  domination	   rested	  not	  upon	  actual	  military	  prowess,	  but	  upon	  
                                                
17	  Khoury	  &	  Kennedy.	  2007.	  P.214	  
18	  Davis.	  2001.	  
19	  Bayly.	  1988.	  P.116.	  
20	  Peers.	  1995.	  P.9	  
21	  Malcolm.	  Vol.	  II.	  P.76	  
22	  [anon],	  ‘The	  Military	  Constitution	  of	  our	  Indian	  Empire,’	  United	  Services	  Journal.	  (1845,	  no.3):p.237	  
23	  Munro	  to	  Canning,	  14	  Oct	  1820.	  In	  Glieg.	  1830.	  II.	  P.52	  
24	  Metcalf’s	  memo,	  nd.	  (1815/16?)	  J.W.Kaye.	  Life	  and	  correspondence	  of	  Lord	  Metcalfe.	  London:	  Smith,	  
Elder	  and	  co.	  1858.	  I.	  442n	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the	   conviction	   that	   the	   Indian	   people	   had	   of	   British	   omnipotence.	   One	   contemporary	   of	  
Malcolm	  wrestled	  with	   defining	   this	   ‘empire	   of	   opinion’	   and	   concluded	   that	   ‘it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
attach	   definite	   meaning,	   unless	   it	   be	   the	   opinion	   of	   our	   ability	   to	   crush	   all	   attempts	   at	  
insurrection.’25	   A	   very	   similar	   definition	   was	   reached	   by	   Ochterlony	   who	   argued	   that	   he	  
understood	  ‘empire	  of	  opinion’	  to	  mean	  ‘above	  all	  the	  Military	  strength	  of	  the	  Rulers,	  remains	  
unexhausted	  and	  invincible.’26	  Ironically,	  though	  the	  British	  embarked	  upon	  a	  ‘general	  offensive	  
against	   Oriental	   governments’,	   they	   simultaneously	   adopted	  what	   they	   considered	   to	   be	   the	  
characteristics	   of	   those	   governments	   –	   specifically	   the	   premium	   placed	   on	   the	   military	   –	   in	  
constructing	  their	  own	  systems	  of	  rule.27	  	  
	  
This	  mentality	  produced	  the	  British	  ‘garrison	  state’	  which	  Peers	  defines	  as	  a	  prevalence	  of	  the	  
military	   within	   the	   decision	   making	   process,	   the	   prioritisation	   of	   the	   military	   in	   terms	   of	  
resource	   allocation	   and	  placing	   the	   emphasis	   ‘on	  using	   the	   threat	   or	   application	   (usually	   in	   a	  
very	  public	  way)	  of	  military	  force	  as	  a	  means	  of	  securing	  political	  and	  strategic	  objectives.’28	  The	  
potency	  of	  Anglo-­‐Indian	  militarism	  derived	   from	  the	  cohesiveness	  and	   insularity	  of	   the	  British	  
community	   in	   India.	   The	   military	   dominated	   this	   community.	   An	   estimate	   of	   the	   European	  
population	  of	  India	  in	  1830	  lists	  36,409	  officers	  and	  soldiers,	  3,550	  civilian	  employees	  of	  the	  EIC,	  
and	   2,149	   Europeans	   not	   formally	   attached	   to	   either	   the	   Company	   or	   the	   military.29	   Unlike	  
Britain	  the	  only	  public	  opinion	  which	  counted	  in	  India	  was	  the	  tiny	  expatriate	  community	  and	  it	  
was	  resolutely	  opposed	  to	  retrenchments.30	  ‘The	  persistence	  of	  a	  militarized	  state	  in	  India	  was	  
assured	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  a	  consensus	  that	  British	  rule	  could	  never	  depend	  for	  its	  survival	  
upon	   the	   willing	   cooperation	   or	   passive	   acquiescence	   of	   the	   Indian	   people.’31	   Hence,	   while	  
there	   might	   not	   have	   been	   an	   officially	   sanctioned	   ideology	   of	   expansion,	   for	   much	   of	   the	  
period	  up	  to	  1858,	   institutionally,	  culturally,	  and	   ideologically	   there	  was	  a	  predilection	  for	  the	  
use	  of	  force,	  and	  when	  this	  was	  coupled	  to	  the	  financial	  appetites	  of	  the	  burgeoning	  army	  there	  
was	  often	  little	  alternative	  to	  expansion.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  conquest	  was	  inevitable.	  But	  as	  
                                                
25	  [anon].	  United	  Services	  Journal.	  1831.	  	  
26	  Ochterlony	  to	  Court,	  1825	  in	  Ochterlony.	  1964.	  p.435	  
27	  Bayly.	  1988.	  p.5	  
28	  Peers.	  1995.	  
29	  Marshall.	  1992.	  p.182	  
30	  Harline	  &	  Mandler.	  1993.	  p.44-­‐70	  
31	  Peers.	  1995.	  P.244	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one	   commentator	   reflected,	   ‘During	   these	   sixty	   years	   India	   has	   had	   Governors-­‐general	   of	   all	  
qualifications	  and	  temperaments,	  yet	  very	  few	  of	  them	  have	  avoided	  war.’32	  
	  
Since,	  ‘the	  British	  were	  never	  in	  a	  position	  to	  subdue	  completely	  all	  potential	  threats,	  alliances	  
were	   crucial	   and	   the	   army	   played	   a	  major	   role.’33	   Sanctioned	   by	   the	   Empire’s	   firmans	   to	   the	  
Surman	  Embassy,	   British	   rule	   in	  Bengal	   however	   rapidly	   assumed	  a	  binary	   logic.	   It	  meant	   ‘an	  
absolute	   government,	   founded	   not	   on	   consent	   but	   on	   conquest.’34	   The	   implication	   for	  
diplomacy	   was	   its	   militarisation.	   The	   aim	   was	   to	   conquer	   the	   ‘other’	   and	   the	  means	   was	   to	  
capture	  the	  Mughal	  Empire	  and	  its	  provincial	  ruler’s	  ‘sovereignty’.	  Fisher	  notes	  that	  by	  the	  mid-­‐
eighteenth	   century	   virtually	   all	   of	   the	   regional	   courts	   of	   India	  de	   facto	   governed	   their	   states	  
independently	   from	  the	  Mughal	  Emperor.	  Nevertheless,	   they	  remained	  nominally	  subordinate	  
to	  his	  sovereignty.	  The	  rituals	  of	  these	  regional	  courts	  acknowledged	  Mughal	  sovereignty	  even	  
as	  the	  Rulers	  themselves	  governed	  autonomously.	  This	  was	  why	  a	  regional	  Ruler	  dispatched	  a	  
wakīl	  rather	  than	  an	  ilchī	  or	  safīr	  (a	  representative	  rather	  than	  a	  full	  ambassador	  who	  could	  only	  
be	  dispatched	  by	  the	  Emperor).35	  
	  
Sovereignty	  also	  serves	  to	  expose	  the	  fundamental	  impossibilities	  and	  corruption	  that	  the	  alien	  
metaphysic	  produced	  in	  the	  British.	  Fisher	  notes	  that	  the	  Company	  developed	  a	  ‘peculiar	  role	  ...	  
with	   respect	   to	   both	   the	   British	   and	   the	  Mughal	   sovereigns	   and	   to	   other	   Indian	   Rulers.’36	   In	  
1772	  the	  practice	  of	  operating	  within	  Mughal	  sovereignty	  was	  regularised	  when	  the	  Company	  
formally	  acknowledged	  Mughal	  sovereignty.	  Yet,	  simultaneously	  the	  Company	  never	  considered	  
giving	  up	  the	  British	  crown’s	  sovereignty.	  They	  could	  not	  give	  up	  the	  latter	  because	  an	  identity	  
founded	  on	  the	  ‘other’	  required	  it	  to	  maintain	  the	  self.	  Instead	  of	  investing	  themselves	  in	  India,	  
they	   chose	   deception	   and	   agreed	   that	   to	   make	   their	   dual	   sovereignty	   known	   would	  
unnecessarily	   excite	   the	   people	   against	   the	   Company.37	   It	   was	   a	   plan	   of	   administering	   the	  
                                                
32	  Chapman.	  1853.	  180.	  
33	  Peers.	  1995.	  P.8	  
34	  Stephen.	  1883.	  See	  also	  Mehta.	  2000.	  
35	  See	  ‘Extraterritoriality:	  The	  concept	  and	  its	  application	  in	  Princely	  India’.	  Indo-­‐British	  Review,	  15,	  2	  
(December	  1988):	  103-­‐22	  
36	  Fisher.	  1990.	  P.430	  
37	  Minutes	  of	  18	  November	  1814,	  Bengal	  Secret	  Consultations	  [BSC]	  18	  November	  1814,	  no.	  19.	  Quoted	  in	  
Fisher.	  1990.	  P.430	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country	  under	  what	  Clive	  called	  ‘the	  masked	  system,’	  that	  is	  administering	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  
Company,	  while	  maintaining	  the	  sham	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Mughal.38	  
	  
Having	   corrupted	   the	   Company,	   the	   metaphysic	   also	   dehumanized	   the	   ‘other’.	   It	   made	   the	  
British	   all	   the	   more	   willing	   to	   break	   contracts,	   eschew	   diplomacy	   and	   resort	   to	   war	   with	   a	  
people	   sanctioned	   as	   beyond	   the	   pale.	   The	  British	   breached	   Surman’s	   contract	   and	  began	   to	  
encroach	   on	   the	   local	   Mughal	   nawab	   Siraj-­‐ud-­‐Daula’s	   sovereignty.	   As	   a	   British	   sea	   captain	  
wrote:	  
‘The	  injustice	  to	  the	  Moors	  consists	  in	  that,	  being	  by	  their	  courtesy	  permitted	  to	  
live	   here	   as	  merchants	  we	   under	   pretence	   protected	   all	   the	  Nabob’s	   servants	  
that	   claimed	   our	   protection,	   though	   they	   were	   neither	   our	   servants	   nor	   our	  
merchants,	   and	   gave	   our	   dustucks	   or	   passes	   to	   numbers	   of	   natives	   to	   trade	  
custom	   free,	   to	   the	   great	   prejudice	   of	   the	   Nabob’s	   revenue;	   nay,	   more,	   we	  
levied	   large	  duties	  upon	  goods	  brought	   into	  our	  districts	   from	  the	  very	  people	  
that	   permitted	   us	   to	   trade	   custom	   free,	   and	   by	   numbers	   of	   impositions	   …	  
caused	  eternal	  clamour	  and	  complaints	  against	  us	  at	  Court.’39	  
It	   prompted	   the	   Nawab	   to	   capture	   the	   British	   Fort	   William	   in	   1756.	   This	   was	   a	   bargaining	  
counter	   to	  negotiate	  with	   the	  presumptuous	  EIC,	  not	   to	  eject	   them	  –	  after	  all	   they	  had	  been	  
permitted	   to	   establish	   themselves	   because	   the	   Nawab’s	   Emperor	   had	   granted	   a	   firman	  
permitting	   it.40	   The	   British	   response	   however	   was	   unexpected.	   They	   retook	   it	   by	   storm	   and	  
without	  negotiation.	  In	  doing	  so	  the	  Company	  ‘adopted	  a	  basic	  psychological	  maxim	  about	  the	  
conduct	  of	  war.	  This	  was	  always	  to	  force	  the	  pace	  and	  to	  seek	  battle	  with	  the	  “country”	  armies	  
and	  never	   to	   reject	   it	  when	  offered	  by	   the	  other	   side.’41	  Within	  a	   few	  months,	  Clive	  went	  on	  
famously	  to	  force	  a	  showdown	  at	  Plassey.	  The	  British	  military	  victory	  resulted	  in	  the	  Company	  
replacing	  Siraj-­‐ud-­‐Daula	  with	  their	  own	  nawab,	  Mir	  Jafar.	  Though	  Plassey	  was	  no	  great	  battle	  in	  
military	   terms,	   its	   political	   consequences	   were	   momentous	   for,	   though	   not	   intended	   at	   the	  
time,	   the	   British	   victory	   eventually	   resulted	   in	   the	   British	   seizing	   the	  diwani	   –	   or	   the	   right	   of	  
                                                
38	  Fifth	  Report	  on	  East	  India	  Company	  Affairs.	  1812.	  p.vii	  
39	  Captain	  Rennie.	  Reflections	  on	  the	  loss	  of	  Calcutta.	  1756.	  India	  Office	  Records.	  British	  Library.	  Quoted	  in	  
Dirks.	  P.4	  
40	  Bryant.	  April	  2004.	  p.448	  
41	  Madras	  to	  Colonel	  Campbell,	  14	  April	  1765,	  P/251/52,	  p.	  291,	  OIOC;	  Colonel	  Muir	  to	  Hastings,	  28	  April	  
1781:	  “spirited	  Resolves	  and	  brisk	  Actions	  Generally	  serve	  better	  [in	  this	  country]	  than	  Slow	  Counsels	  and	  
too	  Circumspect	  a	  Conduct,”	  f.	  81,	  Add.	  MSS	  29119,	  BL;	  Quoted	  in	  Bryant.	  April	  2004.	  
Page	  135	  of	  227 
 
direct	   rule	  –	   in	  1765.42	  With	   it,	   the	  richest	  and	  militarily	  most	  secure	  province	   in	   India	  passed	  
into	   Company	   hands	   enabling	   it	   to	   bankroll	   the	   eventual	   conquest	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
subcontinent.43	  
	  
The	  practices	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  binary	  logic	  became	  hegemonic	  as	  the	  British	  elevated	  military	  
power	   above	   and	  beyond	  diplomacy	   to	   subjugate	   the	   ‘other’.	  Orme,	   a	   Company	   civil	   servant	  
and	  the	  first	  military	  historian	  of	  the	  British	  in	  India,	  wrote	  in	  the	  1760s:	  ‘Inactivity	  or	  retreat	  in	  
war	  is	  never	  in	  Indostan	  imputed	  to	  prudence	  or	  stratagem,	  and	  the	  side	  which	  ceases	  to	  gain	  
success	   is	   generally	   supposed	   to	   be	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   ruin.’44	   Clive,	   the	   architect	   of	   the	   battle	  
wrote	   in	  1765:	   ‘The	   Influence	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	   in	   India	   is	   founded	   in	  some	  degree	  on	  our	  
effective	  Power	  but	  more	  perhaps	  on	  the	  Credit	  of	  former	  Successes	  and	  the	  Reputation	  of	  our	  
Arms.’45	  It	  was	  this	  willingness	  to	  use	  military	  power	  to	  manage	  their	  insecurities	  which	  resulted	  
in	  the	  British	  establishing	  themselves	  in	  Bengal.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  British	  sought	  to	  alleviate	  their	  
insecurities	  in	  Bengal	  by	  using	  war	  to	  extract	  not	  just	  the	  powers	  of	  sovereignty,	  but	  sovereignty	  
itself	  and	  to	  raise	  themselves	  to	  the	   level	  of	  a	  state.46	  Upon	  seizing	  the	  diwani,	  Clive	  wrote	  to	  
inform	   the	   Directors	   that	   the	   Company	   now	   ‘became	   the	   Sovereigns	   of	   a	   rich	   and	   potent	  
kingdom,’	  not	  only	  the	   ‘collectors	  but	  the	  proprietors	  of	  the	  nawab’s	  revenues.’47	  A	  few	  years	  
later	  Dirks	  notes	  that	  in	  ‘elevating	  the	  Company	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	  state,	  Hastings	  was	  concerned	  
to	   declare	   British	   sovereignty	   over	   all	   of	   the	   Company’s	   possessions,	   and	   to	   assert	   that	   “the	  
British	  sovereignty,	  though	  whatever	  channels	  it	  may	  pass	  into	  these	  provinces,	  should	  be	  all	  in	  
                                                
42	  The	  treaty	  between	  the	  Company	  and	  Siraj-­‐ud-­‐daula	  of	  February	  1757	  permitted	  fortifying	  in	  Calcutta.	  
Treaty	  with	  Mir	  Jafar	  on	  15th	  July	  1757	  made	  Bengal	  responsible	  for	  financing	  British	  wars;	  Treaty	  with	  Mir	  
Kasim	  of	  27th	  September	  1760	  made	  the	  Company	  partners;	  Mir	  Jafar	  on	  10th	  July	  1763	  specified	  Bengal’s	  
military	  contributions	  to	  Company;	  Treaty	  of	  February	  1765	  with	  Najm-­‐ud-­‐daula	  stated:	  I	  will	  only	  
maintain	  such	  (troops)	  as	  are	  absolutely	  necessary	  for	  the	  dignity	  of	  my	  own	  person	  and	  government,	  and	  
the	  business	  of	  my	  collections	  throughout	  the	  provinces.	  Quoted	  in	  Fifth	  Report.	  P.	  viii-­‐ix	  
43	  Orme.	  History	  of	  the	  Military	  Transactions,	  86–87;	  Hill,	  Bengal,	  1756–7;	  Calcutta	  to	  Court,	  14	  July	  1757,	  
pp.	  507–17,	  E/4/23,	  Oriental	  and	  India	  Office	  Collections.	  British	  Library.	  Henceforth	  OIOC.	  BL;	  “Major	  
Corneille’sJournal	  of	  an	  Expedition	  to	  India	  in	  1754,”	  p.	  162,	  MSS	  Eur.	  B215,	  OIOC;	  Gopal.	  1963.	  P.	  106.	  
44	  Orme,	  History	  of	  the	  Military	  Transactions,	  278.	  Another	  ex-­‐Company	  man	  suggested	  that	  the	  Indians	  
were	  already	  beaten	  in	  their	  minds	  when	  faced	  by	  a	  successful	  general,	  such	  as	  Clive,	  because	  they	  
believed	  that	  God	  was	  behind	  him:	  Scrafton.	  1770.	  Pp.	  115–16.	  
45	  To	  Colonel	  Caillaud,	  17	  November	  1765,	  pp.	  25–27,	  Clive	  MSS,	  222,	  Nat.	  Lib.	  of	  Wales;	  See	  Bengal	  to	  
Court,	  20	  March	  1776,	  pp.	  87–88,	  E/4/35,	  OIOC.	  BL.	  
46	  For	  a	  Mughal	  perspective	  on	  this	  period	  in	  Bengal	  see:Abdul	  Majed	  Kahn,	  The	  Transition	  in	  Bengal	  1756-­‐
1775:	  A	  Study	  of	  Saiyid	  Muhammed	  Reza	  Khan.	  1969,	  
47	  Quoted	  in	  Cohn.	  1996.	  p.59	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all.”’48	  As	  Hastings	  encouraged	   in	  early	  1773,	   the	   ‘sovereignty	  of	   this	   country	   [be]	  wholly	  and	  
absolutely	  vested	  in	  the	  Company,’	  and	  that	  he	  be	  the	  sole	  “instrument”	  of	  this	  sovereignty.’49	  
	  
Within	  decades	  of	  their	  conquest	  in	  Bengal,	  the	  British	  metaphysic	  had	  become	  hegemonic	  and	  
it	  demanded	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  India	  also	  be	  denied	  sovereignty.	  To	  secure	  their	  aims	  they	  relied	  
on	  militarized-­‐diplomacy.	  The	  difference	  with	  the	  Nawab’s	  diplomacy	  was	  one	  of	  degree	  but	  it	  
was	  momentous.	  The	  British	   injected	  into	  the	  local	  system,	  which	  relied	  on	  a	  show	  of	  force,	  a	  
type	  of	  diplomacy	  indistinguishable	  from	  force.	  As	  noted,	  ‘the	  Company	  in	  the	  later	  eighteenth	  
century	   presumed	   that	   not	   only	   the	   Mughal	   Emperor	   but	   also	   many	   of	   the	   Indian	   regional	  
Rulers	   with	   whom	   it	   dealt	   held	   sovereignty.’50	   By	   1815,	   Hastings	   was	   saying	   that:	   ‘In	   all	  
intercourse,	   the	   Resident	   should	   consider	   himself	   as	   the	   Ambassador	   from	   the	   British	  
Government	  to	  an	  acknowledged	  Sovereign.’51	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  Ambassadors	  was	  not	  that	  
of	   local	  diplomats.	  British	  diplomacy	  was	  not	  about	  a	  show	  of	  force	  to	  then	  discuss	  terms	  but	  
the	  combined	  deployment	  of	  the	  military	  and	  diplomacy	  with	  the	   latter	  as	  a	   junior	  partner	  to	  
totally	  subjugate	  the	  princely	  states.	  Fisher	  notes	  that	  as	  the:	  
‘Company	  gained	  military	  ascendency	  over	  successive	  regions	  in	  India,	  its	  views	  
on	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Indian	  rulers	  changed.	  Treaties	  with	  the	  Indian	  rulers	  
transferred	   from	   them	   to	   the	   Company	   various	   rights	   normally	   held	   by	   a	  
sovereign.	   Nevertheless,	   British	   practice	   often	   reduced	   some	   of	   these	   very	  
‘sovereigns’	  to	  the	  de	  facto	  status	  of	  puppets	  or	  virtually	  confined	  them	  within	  
their	  own	  palaces.’52	  
	  
The	  British	  innovation	  was	  to	  introduce	  rationalities	  founded	  on	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  the	  ‘other’.	  
It	  played	  havoc	  with	  prevailing	  notions	  of	  diplomacy	  only	  because	  of	   the	  extent	  of	   its	   impact.	  
This	   was	   possible	   only	   because	   the	   British	   were	   able	   to	   harness	   the	   Empire’s	   diplomatic	  
                                                
48	  Dirks.	  P.185	  Quotes	  Glieg,	  Memoirs	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  Right	  Honorable	  Warren	  Hastings,	  First	  Governor	  
of	  Bengal.	  London.	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1841,	  vol.	  2.	  p.50	  
49	  Dirks.	  P.187.	  Quotes	  Rev.	  G.R.Glieg,	  Memoirs	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  Right	  Honorable	  Warren	  Hastings,	  First	  
Governor	  of	  Bengal.	  London.	  Richard	  Bentley,	  1841,	  vol.	  1.	  p.290	  
50	  Fisher.	  P.442	  
51	  Political	  Letter	  from	  governor-­‐General	  to	  Court	  of	  directors,	  15	  August	  1815,	  Papers	  respecting	  a	  
Reform	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  …	  Nawaub	  Vizier…1st	  January	  1808	  to	  31	  December	  1815	  (london:	  EI	  
Co.	  1824),	  853.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher	  p.444	  
52	  E.g.	  Governor-­‐General	  Dalhousie	  accepted	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  Indian	  Rulers	  even	  as	  he	  annexed	  their	  
states	  in	  violation	  of	  explicit	  treaty	  rights.	  Governor-­‐General’s	  Minute	  of	  18	  June	  1855,	  FPC,	  28	  December	  
1855,	  No.	  319.	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conduits	  to	  serve	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  the	  Raj.	  The	  British	  diplomatic	  apparatus	  was	  the	  Residency	  
system.	  It	  absorbed,	  wholesale,	  local	  practices	  and	  talent.	  This	  was	  possible	  because	  of	  an	  initial	  
tessellation	  between	  the	  Mughals	  and	  British	  indicating	  the	  multiple	  births	  of	  modern	  practices.	  
Tessellation	   is	   forwarded	   as	   the	   category	   to	   describe	   early	   Indian	   and	   European	   practices	  
because	  of	   the	  easy	  comprehension	  by	  Europeans	  of	   Indian	  practice.	  One	  such	  European	  was	  
Correia,	   the	   secretary	   to	   the	   Portuguese	   Viceroy	   Afonso	   de	   Albuquerque.	   Correia	   quotes	   a	  
Portuguese	  witness,	  amongst	  others,	  to	  describe	  the	  Mughal	  embassy	  at	  the	  Gujarati	  court.	  His	  
chapter	  is	  titled:	  Como	  o	  Badur	  ouvio	  a	  embaixada	  do	  Rey	  dos	  Mogores,	  e	  a	  reposta	  que	  deu,	  e	  
o	  que	  mais	  recreceu’	  i.e.,	  ‘How	  Bahadur	  listened	  to	  the	  embassy	  of	  the	  King	  of	  the	  Mughals	  and	  
the	  answer	  that	  he	  gave,	  and	  what	  happened	  after.’53	  Correia’s	  reports	  tally	  with	  the	  exchange	  
of	   embassies	   and	   letters	   between	   Humayun	   and	   Bahadur	   Shah,	   noted	   both	   in	   Gujarati	   and	  
Mughal	   chronicles,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   in	   Portuguese	   chronicles,	   on	   the	   other.54	   Besides	  
Correia,	  the	  exchange	  of	  letters	  is	  well	  attested	  in	  Barros	  and	  Diogo	  do	  Couto’s	  Décadas.	  These	  
letters	  are	  also	  confirmed	  by	  Indian	  historians:	  Chaube	  quotes	  the	  Mirat-­‐i-­‐Sikandari,	  and	  other	  
sources	  and	  gives	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  letters55	  as	  does	  the	  Akbar	  Nama.56	  	  
	  
From	   these	   early	   and	   near	   identical	   understandings	   of	   diplomacy	   the	   British	   developed	   the	  
Residency	  system	  because	  it	  could	  be	  slotted	  into	  the	  existing	  Mughal	  system	  of	  ceremony	  and	  
precedence.57	  The	  origins	  were	  twofold.	  Fisher	  notes	  that	  in	  Europe:	  
‘the	   institution	   of	   permanent	   diplomatic	   missions	   had	   only	   developed	   during	  
the	  early	  sixteenth	  century.	  Prior	  to	  that	  time,	  embassies	  had	  been	  exchanged	  
between	  major	   European	   states	   but	   the	   cost	   and	   the	   regular	   ‘disputes	   about	  
precedence	   and	   ceremonial	   …	   led	   to	   the	   appointment	   of	   agents	   or	   residents,	  
who	  were	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  same	  ceremonial	  honours	  as	  ambassadors.’58	  The	  
title	  ‘Resident’	  continued	  in	  Europe	  till	  the	  end	  of	  the	  18th	  century.	  Thus,	  when	  
                                                
53	  Correia,	  III.	  1975.	  Pp.	  587-­‐591.	  See	  also	  Desoulieres.	  1988.	  
54	  Akbar-­‐Nama,	  I.	  See	  Blochmann.	  pp.294-­‐5;	  Tabaqat-­‐i-­‐Akbari	  in	  Elliot	  and	  Dowson,	  pp190-­‐1;	  Mirat-­‐i-­‐
Sikandari,	  in	  Bayley’s	  History	  of	  India	  …	  Gujarat,	  pp.	  375	  -­‐81,	  who	  also	  quotes	  a	  collection	  of	  Persian	  
letters	  in	  the	  British	  Museum.	  
55	  Chaube,	  pp.	  238-­‐9	  
56	  Akbar	  Nama.	  See	  Blochmann.	  pp.	  294	  to	  296	  
57	  Fisher.	  1991.	  P.49	  
58	  Satow.	  1961.	  p.165;	  See	  also	  Fisher.	  1984.	  p.	  399.	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agents	  of	  the	  Company	  were	  sent	  to	  reside	  at	  the	  courts	  of	  India’s	  major	  princes	  
in	  the	  1760s,	  the	  title	  of	  Resident	  fit	  their	  understanding	  of	  their	  own	  role.’59	  
This	  system	  did	  not	  differ	  to	  any	  extent	  that	  it	  was	  incomprehensible	  to	  the	  Mughals.	  In	  fact,	  it	  
fit	  into	  the	  prevailing	  Mughal	  cosmos	  which:	  
‘likewise	  had	  diplomatic	  conventions	  and	  regulations	  to	  which	  the	  Company	  had	  
to	  conform.	  Ambassadors	  were	  regularly	  sent	  from	  one	  sovereign	  to	  another.60	  
At	   a	   lower	   lever,	   agents,	   wakīls	   were	   exchanged	   among	   high	  Mughal	   officials	  
and	  were	  sent	  to	  represent	  a	  high	  official	  at	   the	   Imperial	  court	   in	  his	  absence.	  
Since	  the	  Company	  accepted	  Mughal	  sovereignty	  in	  1772,	  the	  designation	  of	  its	  
representatives	   as	   Residents,	   translated	   as	   wakīls	   in	   the	   Persian,	   instead	   of	  
Ambassadors,	  fit	  into	  Mughal	  practice	  as	  well.’61	  
The	  Residents	  were,	   therefore,	   to	  begin	  with	  diplomats	   as	   classically	  understood	  by	  both	   the	  
British	  and	  the	   locals.	   Islam’s	   Indo-­‐Persian	  Relations	   in	  describing	  Mughal	  diplomatic	  practices	  
notes	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  Residency	  system	  as	   it	  developed	   in	  Europe	  with	  the	  system	  
which	  developed	  in	  medieval	  India,	  where	  there	  was	  no	  system	  of	  having	  permanent	  diplomatic	  
missions	  as	   is	   the	  case	  with	  modern	  states.62	  European	  observers	  of	  ancient	   Indian	  diplomacy	  
were	  able	  to	  comprehend	  it	  easily.	  
	  
The	  Resident	  was	   thus	  –	   in	   theory	  –	   the	  diplomat	  of	  a	  power	  subordinate	   to	   the	  Mughal.	  The	  
Residency	  system	  was	  initially	  the	  diplomatic	  arm	  of	  ‘a	  regional	  state,	  powerful	  but	  treated	  on	  
the	   basis	   of	   equality	   by	   other	   regional	   powers.’	   Early	   on,	   many	   of	   these	   Residents	   were	  
deployed	  at	   the	   request	  of	   local	  powers	  and	  on	   their	  part,	  many	  princes	  maintained	  wakīls	   in	  
Calcutta,	  Bombay	  or	  Madras	  to	  represent	  them.63	  The	  ‘political	  line’	  served	  more	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  
body	   as	   understood	   by	   the	   locals	   than	   as	   the	  means	   for	   first	  militarized-­‐diplomacy	   and	   then	  
indirect	  control	  over	  the	  regional	  states	  of	  India.64	  The	  British	  effectively	  terminated	  the	  equality	  
                                                
59	  Fisher.	  1984.	  p.393	  
60	  Eg.	  Jahangir.	  1968.	  
61	  Fisher.	  P.399-­‐400	  
62	  Indo-­‐Persian	  Relations.	  Pp.226	  
63	  Letter	  from	  Shuja	  uddaula,	  Bengal	  Secret	  Consultations	  30	  September	  1772;	  Bombay	  Government	  to	  Lt.	  
Col.	  Upton,	  3	  January	  1777,	  Eur	  Mss.	  Addl	  28987,	  British	  Museum;	  Arzee	  from	  Vakeel	  of	  Ranna	  of	  Gohad,	  
Bengal	  Secret	  Consultations	  6	  December	  1779,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Office;	  Governor	  General	  to	  
David	  Anderson,	  4	  November	  1781,	  Bengal	  Secret	  Consultations	  10	  December	  1781,	  Eur	  Ms	  Addl	  13612,	  
British	  Museum.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher.	  P.401	  
64	  Fisher	  P.401-­‐02	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and	   reciprocity	   afforded	   to	   all	   regional	   players	   operating	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   Mughal	  
sovereignty.	   This	   transformation	   followed	   the	   Company’s	   transformation	   from	   a	   body	   of	  
merchants,	   to	   that	   of	   a	   regional	   power,	   to	   that	   of	   primus	   inter	   pares	   among	   India’s	   rulers	  
nominally	   under	   the	   Mughal	   Emperor	   to	   finally	   the	   transformation	   of	   local	   diplomacy	   by	  
militarized-­‐diplomacy	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  cessation	  of	  local	  diplomacy	  as	  the	  British	  Raj	  
seized	   sovereignty	   from	   the	   Empire.	   The	   process	   culminated	   in	   1877	  when	   the	   British	   seized	  
sovereignty	  from	  the	  Mughals,	  Victoria,	  the	  British	  Queen	  took	  the	  title	  of	  ‘Empress	  of	  India’	  and	  
the	  new	  imperial	  rulers	  organized	  the	  Imperial	  Assembly.	  
	  
Tessellation	  between	  Europe	  and	   India	  was	  not	   limited	   to	  understandings	  and	  conceptions.	   It	  
took	  place	   in	  a	  multitude	  of	  ways.	  Most	  significant	  were	  the	  near	   identical	   staffing	  policies	  of	  
the	  Raj	  and	  Empire.	  The	  inflection	  of	  Western	  modernity	  to	  the	  established	  order	  was	  race,	  the	  
category	  applied	   to	  ensure	   locals	   could	  never	  hold	  policy	  making	  positions.	  Nevertheless,	   like	  
the	   mansabdari	   system	   with	   its	   heavy	   reliance	   on	   military	   men	   the	   Company	   too	   relied	   on	  
soldiers.	   The	   bulk	   of	   the	   Company’s	   ‘political’65	   officers	   came	   from	   the	  military	   and	   between	  
1823	   and	   1857	  military	   officers	  made	   up	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   Residents.	   The	  military	   reached	   its	  
apogee	   in	   the	   late	  1830s,	  early	  1840s	  when	  some	  80	  annual	  offices	  were	   in	  military	  hands	  as	  
opposed	  to	  some	  30	   in	  civilian.66	   In	  part	  this	  was	  because	  the	  supply	  of	  civil	  servants	  was	   less	  
than	   military	   officers.	   But	   this	   was	   because	   many	   more	   soldiers	   were	   sent	   to	   India	   than	  
administrators.	   On	   average,	   37	   writers	   (entry	   level	   appointment	   in	   the	   civil	   service)	   as	  
compared	  to	  258	  cadets	  were	  sent	  from	  London	  annually	  between	  1802	  and	  1833.67	  Unlike	  the	  
Mughals	  who	  gained	  status	  from	  arms	  the	  British	  sent	  officers	  because	  they	  were	  cheaper	  than	  
civil	   servants.	   ‘[W]ere	   it	   not	   for	   the	   explicit	   and	   repeated	   orders	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Directors	   in	  
London,	  far	  more	  officers	  would	  apparently	  have	  been	  appointed	  in	  the	  political	  and	  other	  lines	  
of	  the	  civil	  service.’68	   In	  1808,	  for	  example,	   ‘The	  Court	  [of	  Directors]	  observed	  that	  altho’	  they	  
had	  not	   absolutely	  prohibited	   the	  nomination	  of	  Military	  Officers	   to	  be	  public	  Residents	   they	  
nevertheless	   should	  have	  great	   satisfaction	   in	   seeing	   those	  Situations	  occupied	  by	  Civilians.’69	  
                                                
65	  ‘‘Political’	  meant	  diplomatic	  in	  the	  old	  East	  Indian	  Company	  lexicon,	  and	  a	  ‘political’	  was	  a	  Resident,	  
Political	  or	  Assistant	  Political	  officer	  employed	  in	  that	  line.’	  See	  Hogben.	  1981.	  p.752	  
66	  Fisher.	  1984.	  P.407	  
67Cohn.	  1966.	  p.103	  	  
68	  Fisher.	  1984.	  P.408	  
69	  Personal	  Records,	  12:479,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Officer.	  See	  also	  Political	  Letters	  to	  Bombay	  31	  
August	  1804	  and	  29	  August	  1810,	  Eur	  Ms	  C.198,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Office.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher.	  1984.	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Such	   directives	   ceased	   between	   1812	   and	   1840	   but	   expression	   of	   the	   Director’s	   prejudice	  
against	  military	  officers	  was	   later	   renewed.	  One	  of	   their	  complaints	  against	  Governor	  General	  
Ellenborough	   (1842-­‐44),	  and	  apparently	  a	   factor	   in	  his	   recall	  by	   the	  Court,	  was	  his	   large	  scale	  
use	  of	  military	  officers	  in	  civil	  employment.70	  Overall,	  Fisher	  finds,	  between	  1764	  and	  1858	  the	  
military	  made	  up	  52.7	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  annual	  offices	  of	  Resident	  and	  in	  the	  less	  prestigious	  
office	  of	  Political	  Agent,	  57.9	  percent.71	  
	  
Though	   the	   senior	   most	   positions	   were	   reserved	   for	   Whites,	   these	   men	   had	   next	   to	   no	  
knowledge	  of	  European	  theory	  or	  training.	  They	  were	  however	  intent	  on	  learning	  local	  systems	  
and	  practices.	  In	  terms	  of	  practice	  then,	  diplomacy	  remained	  a	  local	  affair	  though	  it	  was	  put	  to	  
uses	   invented	   by	   the	   British.	   Residents	   learnt	   on	   the	   job,	   through	   their	   insertion	   into	   the	  
prevailing	  diplomatic	   system.	   Fisher	  has	   found	  only	  one	  example	   in	  his	   analysis	  of	   the	  period	  
from	  1764	  to	  1858	  of	  a	  member	  of	  the	  political	  line	  seeking	  to	  educate	  himself	  about	  the	  theory	  
of	   international	   law	   and	   diplomatic	   practice.	   Residents	   did	   have	   libraries	   but	   on	   only	   one	  
occasion	  did	  an	  officer	  express	  an	  intention	  to	  educate	  himself	  about	  his	  profession.	  
‘It	  has	  long	  been	  my	  wish	  to	  form	  a	  collection	  for	  a	  Diplomatic	  Library	  …	  I	  have	  
already	   pursued,	   I	   can	   scarcely	   say	   studied,	   a	   translation	   of	   Grotius	   (without	  
notes);	   some	  Puffendorf	  with	  Barbeyrac’s	  Commentaries;	   (the	  French	  Edition);	  
Burlamaqui,	  Vattel,	  Marten,	  and	  Ward.	  
Ward	  …	   is	   amongst	  Mr.	   Eliphinstone’s	  books	   at	  Nagpore.	   I	   am	  aware	   that	   the	  
most	   useful	   kind	   of	   work	   for	   a	   diplomatic	   character	   are	   the	   memoirs	   and	  
correspondence	   of	   public	   ministers,	   and	   almost	   the	   only	   fund	   of	   practical	  
knowledge	  on	   the	  subject	  –	  mere	  etiquettes	  and	   formalities	  may	  undoubtedly	  
be	  reduced	  to	  rules	  in	  Europe,	  but	  books	  which	  treat	  of	  them	  can	  be	  of	  little	  use	  
in	  India.’72	  
                                                
70	  Even	  though	  the	  total	  number	  of	  military	  in	  the	  service	  actually	  declined	  during	  his	  administration,	  
Ellenborough	  regarded	  this	  as	  the	  major	  factor	  in	  his	  quarrel	  with	  the	  Directors,	  Ellenborough	  to	  
Wellington	  9	  June	  1842	  cited	  in	  Broadfoot.	  1888.	  p.195.	  See	  Ellenborough’s	  letters	  to	  Claud	  Clerk	  dated	  29	  
July	  1842,	  3	  May	  1843	  and	  16	  April	  1843	  for	  his	  requent	  rewards	  of	  political	  posts	  for	  military	  officers,	  
Claud	  Clerk	  Collection,	  Eur	  Ms	  D.538/39,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Office.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher.	  1984.	  P.409	  
71	  Fisher.	  1984.	  P.411	  
72	  Richard	  Jenkins,	  Resident	  at	  Nagpur	  to	  Sydenham,	  12	  May	  1810,	  Nagpur	  Residency	  Private	  Letter	  Book,	  
Eur	  Ms	  E.111,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Office.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher.	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Finding	  ‘themselves	  in	  a	  diplomatic	  world	  largely	  unfamiliar	  and	  alien	  to	  them’73	  the	  Residents	  
found	  it	  more	  profitable	  to	  immerse	  themselves	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  Indian	  diplomacy	  rather	  than	  
to	  rely	  on	  the	  textbooks	  of	  European	  theory.	  No	  matter	  how	  familiar	  they	  became,	  they	  could	  
not	  manage	   the	   complex	   systems	   of	   the	   Empire	   and	   hence	   they	   relied	   on	   a	   crucial	   layer	   of	  
diplomat	   intermediaries.	   They	  were	   the	  munshī	   (from	  Arabic,	   ‘one	  who	   creates,	   produces,	  or	  
composes’).	  A	  Munshī	  was	  not	   just	  proficient	   in	  Persian	   (the	   language	  of	   the	  Mughal	  Empire)	  
and	   English,	   making	   him	   mediator	   and	   spokesman	   but	   was	   also	   a	   key	   personage	   in	   the	  
formulation	  of	  tactics	  to	  further	  British	  policy.74	  	  
	  
Excavating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  munshī	  in	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  British	  India	  is	  essential	  to	  understanding	  
the	  nature	  of	  British	  modernity	  in	  South	  Asia.	  The	  task	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  British	  subsuming	  
Indians	   to	   the	   tactics	   of	   diplomacy	   and	   excluded	   them	   from	   policy.	   Hence	   the	  munshī	   rarely	  
appears	  in	  the	  official	  histories	  of	  the	  day.	  However	  Fisher	  has	  compiled	  an	  extensive	  index	  of	  
the	  identities	  and	  service	  records	  of	  523	  of	  them	  between	  1764-­‐1857	  from	  which	  he	  concludes:	  
‘it	   is	  clear	  how	  much	  the	  Company	  relied	  on	  this	  traditional	   Islamicized	  service	  
elite	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  gain	  mastery	  of	  the	  Persianate	  court	  ritual.	  By	  analysing	  the	  
backgrounds	  of	  these	  Indian	  subordinates,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  prime	  qualification	  
for	  appointment	  as	  Munshī	  was	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Persianate	  conventions	  of	  the	  
diplomatic	  world	  of	  India.’	  
	  
That	   munshīs	   were	   essential	   to	   the	   running	   of	   the	   British	   Raj	   is	   uncontested.	   What	   is	   of	  
significance	  however	   is	   their	   cognitive	   capacity	  of	   so	  easily	   transferring	   from	   local	  masters	   to	  
working	  for	  the	  British	  who	  self-­‐defined	  themselves	  as	  fundamentally	  removed	  from	  the	  locals?	  
It	   indicates	  that	  though	  the	  British	  saw	  a	  divided	  world,	  the	  locals	  did	  not.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  
difference	  was	  one	  of	  perception.	  Though	  subsumed	  by	  the	  theologically	  driven	  Mughal	  state,	  
dharma	   survived	   in	   the	   cultural	   circuits	  of	   the	   society	  and	   it	  was	   from	  here	   that	   the	  munshīs	  
emerged,	  Persianised	  themselves	  and	  served	  the	  Empire.	  However,	  they	  never	  forgot	  their	  local	  
cultural	   systems.	   What	   this	   meant	   in	   practice	   was	   that	   the	   Europeans	   metaphysic	   with	   its	  
attendant	   forms	  of	  differentiation,	  actualized	   thru	   ‘race,’	  was	  alien	   to	   the	   locals	  who	  saw	  the	  
British	  as	  just	  another	  ruling	  body,	  one	  that	  could	  provide	  employment,	  no	  different	  from	  other	  
                                                
73	  Fisher.	  1990.	  p.421	  
74	  Men	  such	  as	  Warren	  Hastings	  found	  them	  altogether	  indispensible.	  See	  Alam	  &	  Alavi.	  2001.	  P.	  13–14.	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masters.	  If	  the	  local	  approach	  is	  the	  benchmark	  for	  ‘rationalization’	  then	  Nelson	  was	  wrong	  to	  
presume	  it	  was	  Europe	  which	  was	  rationalized.	  
	  
The	  survival	  of	  dharma	  amongst	  the	  diplomats	  of	  the	  Empire	  can	  be	  found	  in	  their	  educational	  
material.	  Munshīs	  were	  trained	  in	  a	  Persianate	  system,	  but	  operating	  in	  the	  subcontinent	  it	  was	  
significantly	   modified.	   The	   educational	   matter,	   ‘fell	   into	   a	   branch	   of	   knowledge	   that	   was	  
regarded	  as	  secular,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  distinctly	  this-­‐worldly	  and	  largely	  devoid	  of	  religious	  
or	   theological	   connotations.’75	   It	   explained	   why	   a	   number	   of	   their	   authors	   and	   practitioners	  
were	  non-­‐Muslim	  locals.76	  The	  court	  too	  aided	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  dharma.	  It	  expressed	  itself	  
in	   a	   secularised	   Islam	   in	   Akbar’s	   court	   and	   a	   pragmatic	   view	   of	   the	   functions	   of	   rulership.	  
Sovereignty,	   according	   to	   Akbar’s	   son	   was	   a	   ‘gift	   of	   God,’77	   not	   necessarily	   given	   to	   enforce	  
God’s	   law	   but	   rather	   to	   ‘ensure	   the	   contentment	   of	   the	   world.’78	   Such	   ideas,	   scattered	  
throughout	   Jahangir’s	   reign	   document	   the	   Tuzuk	   and	   other	   sources,	   indicate	   continued	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  temporal	  power,	  stripped	  of	  the	  theocratic	  trappings,	  in	  Indian	  
Islamic	  political	  thought.	  
	  
By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Europeans	  the	  locals	  were	  practiced	  in	  not	  regarding	  the	  new	  with	  derision.	  
In	  keeping	  with	  the	  contextual	  rationale	  of	  dharma,	  locals	  readily	  modified	  themselves	  to	  serve	  
their	  own	  purposes	  under	  the	  Empire.	  The	  education	  material	  of	  the	  munshīs	  who	  Persianised	  
themselves	  is	  testimony	  to	  this	  and	  given	  the	  long	  reliance	  on	  munshīs,	  such	  material	  pervaded	  
the	  Mughal	  Empire.79	  One	  of	  these	  texts	  is	  with	  us	  today	  through	  Nurul	  Hassan	  who	  was	  Indian	  
ambassador	  to	  Moscow.	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam	  show	  that	  the	  use	  of	  Persian	  did	  not	  impede	  
Hindus.	   ‘Their	   achievements	   in	   the	   new	   language	   were	   soon	   recognized	   as	   extraordinary.	  
Hindus	  had	  already	  begun	  to	   learn	  Persian	   in	  Sikandar	  Lodi’s	  time,	  and	   ‘Abdul	  Qadir	  Badayuni	  
                                                
75	  On	  the	  secular	  outlook	  of	  Emperor	  Akbar	  on	  matters	  relating	  to	  this	  world	  see	  Goswamy	  &	  Grewal.	  
1967;	  On	  Jahangir’s	  secular	  outlook	  see	  Alvi.	  1989.	  
76	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam.	  P.61	  
77	  Quoted	  by	  Nizami.	  1981.	  Pp.	  174.	  
78	  Jahangir,	  Tazuk,	  vol.	  I,	  p.	  15.	  
79	  In	  the	  reign	  of	  Aurangzeb	  there	  was	  the	  Nigarnamah-­‐’I	  Munshi	  (Munshi’s	  Letterbook)	  (See	  Hasan.	  1952.	  
P.258-­‐263)	  concerned	  with	  how	  to	  train	  a	  munshī	  and	  what	  he	  ought	  to	  know.	  During	  Jahangir’s	  period	  
there	  was	  the	  Insha’-­‐I	  Harkaran	  a	  book	  which	  was	  translated	  into	  English	  by	  the	  Company	  and	  printed	  as	  a	  
model	  text	  for	  its	  own	  early	  administrators.	  See	  Balfour.	  1781.	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mentions	  a	  Brahmin	   (high	   caste	  Hindu)	  who	   taught	  Arabic	   and	  Persian	   in	   this	  period.80	   There	  
was	   an	   ideal	   type	  of	  munshī	   and	  a	  passage	   from	  a	   celebrated	   letter	  written	  by	  Chandrabhan	  
‘Brahman’81	  to	  his	  son	  explains	  it:	  
‘The	  main	   thing	   is	   to	   be	   able	   to	   draft	   in	   a	   coherent	  manner,	   but	   at	   the	   same	  
time	  good	  calligraphy	  possesses	   its	  own	  virtues	  and	   it	  earns	  you	  a	  place	   in	  the	  
assembly	  of	   those	  of	  high	  stature.	  …	  And	   together	  with	   this,	   if	   you	  manage	   to	  
learn	   accountancy	   [siyaq],	   and	   scribal	   skill	   [navisindagi],	   that	   would	   be	   even	  
better.	  For	  scribes	  who	  know	  accountancy	  as	  well	  are	  rare.	  A	  man	  who	  knows	  
how	   to	  write	   good	   prose	   as	  well	   as	   accountancy	   is	   a	   bright	   light	   even	   among	  
lights.	  Besides,	  a	  munshī	  should	  be	  discreet	  and	  virtuous.	  I,	  who	  am	  among	  the	  
munshī	   of	   the	   court	   that	   is	   the	   symbol	   of	   the	   Caliphate,	   even	   though	   I	   am	  
subject	   to	   the	   usual	   errors,	   am	   still	   as	   an	   unopened	   bud	   though	   possessing	  
hundreds	  of	  tongues.’	  
He	   then	   lists	   a	   full	   and	   coherent	   set	   of	   texts	   on	   statecraft	   and	   moralia,	   accountancy	   and	  
epistolography,	  history	  and	  chronicles	  and	  poets	  both	  old	  and	  new.	  Munshīs	  also	  appreciated	  
Persian	  renderings	  of	   local	   texts	  and	  traditions.	   Indeed	  many	  Hindu	  scriptures	  and	  other	   Indic	  
texts	   were	   rendered	   into	   Persian	   and	   joined	   the	   cultural	   repertoire	   of	   the	   typical	   munshī.82	  
Some	  were	  also	  written	  by	  Hindus.83	  The	  ‘moral	  universe’	  of	  the	  Munshī	  can	  be	  explicated	  from	  
their	  autobiographies	  and	  Subrahmanyam	  and	  Alam	  do	  this	  with	  reference	  to	  Munshī	  Nik	  Rai,84	  
concluding	  that	  Nik	  Rai	  ‘comfortably	  straddles	  a	  diversity	  of	  cultural	  and	  literary	  heritages,’	  and	  
that	   this	   ‘is	   a	   comfort	   that	  we	   shall	   find	   in	   later	   characters	   of	   the	   eighteenth	   century.’	   They	  
mention	   ‘composite	   culture,’	   since	   though	   operating	   in	   a	  Muslim	  world	   Nik	   Rai	   ‘is	   of	   course	  
                                                
80	  11‘Abd	  al-­‐Qadir	  Badayuni,	  Muntakhab	  al-­‐Tavarikh,	  vols.	  1	  and	  3	  ed.	  Maulavi	  Ahmad	  ‘Ali,	  and	  vol.	  2	  ed.	  
Munshi	  Ahmad	  ‘Ali	  and	  N.	  Lees	  (Calcutta:	  Asiatic	  Society	  of	  Bengal,	  1865–8),	  323.	  Quoted	  in	  Alam.	  P.62	  
81	  A	  noted	  munshī,	  Hindu	  and	  rated	  only	  second	  to	  the	  mir	  munshi	  himself,	  Sheikh	  Abu’l	  Fazl	  ibn	  Mubarak.	  
See	  Muhammad	  ‘Abdul	  Hamid	  Faruqui,	  Chandra	  Bhan	  Brahman:	  Life	  and	  Works	  with	  a	  Critical	  Edition	  of	  
his	  Diwan	  (Ahmadabad:	  Khalid	  Shahin	  Faruqi,	  1966).	  Quoted	  in	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam.	  P.62	  
82	  Compare	  Gopal	  bin	  Govind’s	  preface	  to	  his	  Persian	  translation	  of	  the	  Ramayana,	  Bibliothèque	  Nationale	  
de	  France,	  Paris,	  Ms.	  Blochet,	  I,	  22.	  Quoted	  in	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam.	  P.63	  
83	  See	  Siddiqui.	  1959.	  Pp.	  282–7.	  This	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  similar	  texts;	  for	  another	  example,	  see	  Munshi	  
Nandram	  Kayasth	  Srivastav,	  Siya	  q	  n	  a	  m	  a	  h	  (lithograph;	  Lucknow:	  Nawalkishor	  Press,	  1879),	  and	  for	  a	  
survey	  of	  such	  “administrative	  and	  accountancy	  manuals,”	  Habib.	  1999.	  P.	  470–1.	  
84	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam	  rely	  on	  a	  single	  manuscript	  of	  Nik	  Ram’s	  work,	  the	  text	  entitled	  Tazkirat	  al-­‐
Safar	  va	  Tuhfat	  al-­‐Zafar	  (Account	  of	  Travels	  and	  the	  Gift	  of	  Success),	  copied	  by	  a	  Ram	  Singh,	  at	  the	  behest	  
of	  Lala	  Hazari	  Mal,	  who	  may	  have	  been	  from	  the	  author’s	  own	  family,	  on	  10	  Zi-­‐qada	  AH	  1146	  (April	  1734)	  
in	  Hyderabad.	  See.	  Salar	  Jang	  Museum	  and	  Library,	  Hyderabad,	  Accession	  no.	  4519,	  Mss.	  No.	  7.	  Quoted	  in	  
Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam.	  P.	  64	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aware	   that	   he	   is	   not	   a	   Muslim,	   and	   that	   the	   story	   of	   Rama	   is	   part	   of	   his	   own	   heritage.’	  
Simultaneously,	  Nik	  Rai	   admired	  and	   imitated	   the	   great	  Mir	  Munshī	   Sheikh	  Abu’l	   Fazl	   and	  he	  
was	  surely	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  matter.	  Fazl	  had	  come	  by	  this	  time	  to	  stand	  for	  a	  point	  of	  view	  in	  
which	   ecumenical	   learning	   and	   religious	   pluralism	  were	   given	   a	   high	   standing.	   ‘A	   specifically	  
Mughal	  political	  and	  literary	  tradition	  thus	  had	  come	  to	  exist	  by	  the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century,	  
one	  that	  differed	  from	  its	  Central	  Asian	  and	  Iranian	  counterparts.	  …	  The	  philosophical	  universe	  
within	  which	  he	  [Nik	  Rai]	  conceives	  of	  all	  matters	  is	  impregnated	  with	  Persian,	  and	  with	  all	  the	  
richness	  of	  the	  ‘secular’	  tradition	  that	  Indo-­‐Persian	  represented	  by	  the	  seventeenth	  century.’85	  
The	  ‘composite	  culture’	  of	  Nik	  Rai	  is	  clearly	  evidenced	  in	  his	  writings.	  Though	  steeped	  in	  Mughal	  
culture,	  he	  remained	  enough	  of	  a	  ‘Hindu’	  to	  find	  it	  distasteful	  that	  Aurangzeb,	  ‘in	  consideration	  
of	  matters	  external	  to	  spirituality	  …	  made	  a	  mosque	  from	  a	  temple’.	  With	  irony	  Nik	  Rao	  writes:	  
‘Look	  at	  the	  miracle	  of	  my	  idol-­‐house,	  o	  Sheikh.	  That	  when	  it	  was	  ruined,	  it	  became	  the	  House	  
of	  God.’86	  
	  
These	   munshīs,	   locals	   but	   operating	   within	   a	   Mughal	   political	   universe,	   under	   Mughal	  
‘sovereignty’	  and	  in	  a	  cultural	  world	  ‘impregnated’	  with	  the	  Persian	  language	  and	  customs	  were	  
as	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam	  note	  of	  a	   ‘composite	  culture’.	   It	  was	  not	  to	  continue.	  The	  British	  
replaced	  it	  with	  a	  two-­‐tier	  society	  with	  themselves	  as	  the	  superior,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘other’.	  
This	   was	   achieved	   by	   the	   British	   harnessing	   local	   practices.	   Foremost	   amongst	   these	   was	  
intelligence,	  crucial	  to	  any	  diplomatic	  service	  but	  essential	  to	  a	  militarized-­‐diplomacy.	  Yet	  even	  
here,	  the	  British	  did	  not	  add	  anything	  to	  the	  Empire’s	  repertoire.	  	  
	  
All	  diplomatic	   systems	  have	  an	   intelligence-­‐gathering	  component	   to	   them.	   It	  was	  no	  different	  
for	   the	  Mughals	   and	   the	   British	   appropriated	   this	   system.	  Whole	   scale	   co-­‐opting	   also	  meant	  
that	   the	   British	   fell	   foul	   of	   the	   same	   problems	   which	   plagued	   the	   Mughals.	   The	   Anglicised	  
system	   also	   rendered	   impossible	   aspirations	   and	   freedoms	   enjoyed	   under	   the	  Mughals.	   This	  
denial	   of	   possibilities	   was	   the	   very	   opposite	   of	   what	   modernity	   is	   viewed	   as	   offering	   in	   the	  
period	  by	  the	  academy.	  Once	  again,	  the	  impact	  of	  Western	  modernity	  was	  a	  regression.	  	  
	  
The	  Mughal	  information	  gathering	  network	  was	  the	  akhbār	  nawīs	  which:	  
                                                
85	  Alam	  and	  Subrahmanyam.	  P.71	  
86	  Ibid.,	  P.67	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‘from	  the	  Mughal	  period	  down	  to	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  [has]	  continued	  as	  the	  
medium	  by	  which	  changing	  kinds	  of	  information	  have	  been	  gathered,	  conveyed,	  
and	  presented.	   Each	  period	  has	  had	   its	   own	  definitions	  of	   information	  and	   its	  
own	   role	   for	   the	  akhbār	  nawīs.	   The	   continuities	   and	   the	   changes	   in	   this	  office	  
thus	  reflect	  the	  shifting	  political	  world	  of	  India	  for	  nearly	  five	  centuries.’87	  	  
The	  etymology	  of	  akhbār	  nawīs	  is	  the	  Arabic	  root	  kh-­‐b-­‐r,	  ‘to	  know.’	  [It]	  came	  to	  denote:	  ‘news,	  
information,	   advices,	   intelligence;	   notification,	   announcement;	   report,	   rumour,	   fame;	   story,	  
account.’88	   And	   nawīs	   means	   ‘writer’.89	   Just	   as	   the	   Mughals	   drew	   upon	   extant	   forms	   but	  
reformulated	   them	   to	   arrive	   at	   a	   definition	   of	   ‘information’	   and	   the	   means	   to	   control	   it	  
compatible	  with	  their	  own	  cultural	  and	  political	  values,90	  so	  too	  did	  the	  Company.	  	  
	  
The	  origins	  of	  the	  system	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  Ā’īn-­‐I	  Akbarī	  which	  lays	  out	  detailed	  prescription	  
for	  their	  use.91	  One	  type	  of	  akhbār	  nawīs	  was	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  from	  the	  provinces	  to	  the	  
Mughal	   imperial	   centre.	   Here	   as	   well,	   Akbar	   established	   the	   original	   model.92	   However,	   the	  
Mughal	   centre	   had	   to	   constantly	  modify	   its	   system	   because	   the	  writers	   got	   co-­‐opted	   by	   the	  
regions	  they	  reported	  on.	  First	  Emperors	  appointed	  sawānih	  nigār	  (‘untoward	  events	  writer’)	  to	  
the	   provinces	   –	   apparently	   incognito.93	   Later	   this	   official	   took	   charge	   of	   the	   provincial	   postal	  
system	   (dāk)	   thus	   revealing	  his	   official	   status.94	  …	   to	   assume	   the	   incognito	   function,	   Emperor	  
Aurangzeb	  appointed	  khufya	  nawīs	  (‘concealed	  writers’),	  to	  report	  directly	  to	  the	  court.95	  
	  
                                                
87	  Fisher.	  1993.	  p.82	  
88	  Steingass.	  1973.	  p.	  446.	  	  
89	  Fisher.	  1993.	  
90	  This	  process	  largely	  reflected	  how	  the	  Mughals	  worked	  in	  general:	  building	  a	  distinctive	  patrimonial-­‐
bureaucratic	  empire	  by	  synthesizing	  elements	  from	  pan-­‐Islamic	  institutions,	  imperial	  Persian	  models	  
(especially	  from	  the	  Safawid	  court,	  established	  I50I),	  their	  own	  dynastic	  traditions	  from	  Central	  Asia,	  and	  
the	  administrative	  forms	  they	  found	  in	  India.	  See	  Blake.	  I979.	  
91	  A'in	  IO	  of	  Book	  Two.	  We	  cannot	  know	  if	  Akbar's	  court	  diary	  functioned	  in	  exactly	  this	  way	  (since	  the	  
Mughal	  archives	  have	  apparently	  not	  survived	  before	  the	  seventeenth	  century).	  Here	  I	  follow	  
Blochmann's	  translation.	  See	  Blochmann.	  vol.	  i.	  pp.	  268-­‐9.	  
92	  Jahangir.	  1909.	  pp.	  247-­‐8.	  Yusuf	  Husain	  Khan	  says	  Akbar	  established	  a	  waqi	  'a	  nawis	  in	  each	  province	  
from	  1586,	  'Seventeenth	  Century	  Waqai'	  in	  the	  Central	  Records	  Office,	  Hyderabad,'	  Islamic	  Culture	  28,	  3	  
Uuly	  I954):	  460.	  For	  an	  excellent	  survey	  of	  the	  Mughal	  informa-­‐	  tion	  systems	  seeJagdish	  Narayan	  Sarkar,	  
'Newswriters	  of	  Mughal	  India,'	  in	  S.	  P.	  Sen	  (ed.),	  The	  Indian	  Press	  (A	  Collection	  of	  Papers	  Presented	  at	  the	  
4th	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  the	  Institute)	  (Calcutta,	  1967),	  pp.	  10-­‐45.	  Quoted	  in	  Fisher.	  1993.	  P.50	  
93	  Siddiqi.	  1972.	  p.	  54.	  
94	  See	  Khan.	  1924.	  p.	  17I.	  
95	  Fisher.	  1993.	  p.51	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During	   the	   period	   of	   Mughal	   dissolution	   provincial	   governors	   made	   themselves	   hereditary	  
rulers	  of	   their	   region.	  Regional	  courts	  modelled	  themselves	  on	  the	  Mughals	  and	  became	   local	  
hubs	   in	   a	   network	  of	   political	   information.	   Each	   ruler	   extended	  his	   akhbār	  nawīs,	  wakīls,	   and	  
other	  agents	  into	  the	  other	  major	  courts	  of	  the	  time.	  Further,	  each	  ruler	  posted	  akhbār	  nawīs	  in	  
the	  territories	  under	  his	  control.	  Conversely,	  each	  court	  became	  the	  object	  of	  manipulation	  and	  
scrutiny	   by	   the	   numerous	   akhbār	   nawīs	   and	  wakīls	   stationed	   there	   by	   rival	   and	   allied	   rulers.	  
Thus,	   the	  modified	   institution	  of	   the	  akhbār	  nawīs	  reflected	  an	  altered	  political	  context.96	  The	  
growing	  role	  of	  the	  English	  East	  India	  Company	  in	  India	  led	  to	  their	  becoming	  the	  target	  of	  the	  
akhbārāt	  sent	  to	  the	  Maratha	  Peshwā	  (ruler).	  In	  1775,	  the	  Peshwā’s	  akhbār	  nawīs	  warned:	  
The	  English	  chiefs	  have	  sent	  couriers	  to	  inspect	  the	  palaces	  and	  forts	  and	  all	  the	  
country	  leading	  to	  the	  Deccan.	  After	  getting	  the	  information	  they	  intend	  at	  the	  
end	  of	   the	   rainy	   season	   to	  march	   towards	   Jhansi	   and	  Kalpi.	   Please	  order	   your	  
mokasadars	  [‘official	  holding	  revenue	  shares	  from	  villages’]	  not	  to	  allow	  the	  dak	  
of	  the	  English	  couriers	  to	  be	  posted	  anywhere;	  slay	  them	  wherever	  found.97	  
In	  1779	  an	  akhbār	  nawīs	  reported	  to	  the	  Peshwā	  that,	  ‘Hasting	  …	  posted	  relays	  of	  palki-­‐bearers	  
[sedan	  chair	  carriers]	  to	  the	  number	  of	  350	  men,	  from	  Calcutta	  to	  Kotah.’98	  These	   intelligence	  
systems	  were	   historically	   aware	   and	   updated	   old	   intelligence.	   Eight	   years	   later	   the	   Peshwā’s	  
newswriter	  reported	  the	  Company	  had	  upgraded	  the	  system:	  ‘The	  English	  have	  set	  up	  a	  camel-­‐
post	   in	   the	  place	  of	   runners,	   from	  Lucknow	  to	  Delhi,	   in	  order	   to	  get	   the	  quickest	  news	  of	   the	  
Emperor’s	  Court	  and	  Sindhia’s	  camp.’99	  
	  
In	   establishing	   its	   own	   system	   of	   information	   gathering	   and	   dissemination,	   the	   Company	  
subordinated	   the	   akhbār	   nawīs	   to	   the	   Residency	   system,	   itself	   produced	   by	   the	   tessellation	  
between	   India	   and	   Europe.	   However,	   the	   British	   also	   ensured	   that	   locals	   were	   firmly	   placed	  
below	   the	   British	   Residents.	   In	   the	   early	   days	   of	   its	   diplomacy,	   the	   Company	   simply	   adapted	  
parts	   of	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   pattern.	   It	   requested	   respectable	   Indians	   to	   attend	   the	   regional	   and	  
Mughal	   Imperial	   courts	   as	   akhbār	   nawīs	   and	   wakīls,	   to	   compile	   or	   collect	   akhbārāt,	   and	   to	  
represent	   its	   interests.	   The	   Company's	   orientation	   and	   needs	   were,	   however,	   different	   from	  
                                                
96	  P.53	  
97	  Sarkar.	  1953.	  p.	  88.	  
98	  Sewak	  Ram's	  letter	  from	  Calcutta	  26	  March	  I779,	  Sarkar,	  Persian	  Records,	  pp.	  96-­‐8.	  
99	  5	  Feb.	  1787,	  ibid.,	  p.	  154.	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those	  of	  other	   regional	   rulers.	  The	  main	  difference	  was	   in	   the	  creation	  and	  perpetuation	  of	  a	  
two-­‐tiered	  system	  whereby	  locals	  could	  never	  hold	  positions	  of	  authority.	  
	  
In	  contrast	  the	  Mughal	  civil	  servant,	  influenced	  by	  the	  civilizational	  dynamic	  of	  dharma	  did	  not	  
perceive	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  divided	  humanity.	  This	  explained	  their	  easy	  ability	  to	  transition	  into	  the	  
service	  of	  the	  new	  power	  yet	  they	  clearly	  carried	  with	  them	  expectations	  and	  traditions	  going	  
back	   to	  Mughal	  models.	   In	   I770,	   the	   Nā’ib	   Nāzim	   (Deputy	   Governor)	   of	   Bengal	   took	   it	   upon	  
himself	  to	  instruct	  the	  Company	  as	  to	  the	  ‘proper’	  forms	  for	  an	  intelligence	  agency:	  	  
‘It	  is	  an	  ancient	  custom	  in	  Hindostan	  and	  has	  always	  been	  adopted	  by	  Emperors	  
that	   whenever	   it	   was	   expedient	   to	   appoint	   officers	   of	   the	   crown	   upon	   any	  
urgent	  business	  three	  persons	  selected	  under	  the	  officers,	  namely,	  the	  Darogha	  
[manager],	   the	   writer	   of	   occurrences	   [wāqi	   ‘a	   nawīs],	   and	   writer	   of	   reports	  
[sawānih	  nigār]	  and	  besides	  this	  another	  channel	  of	  intelligence	  was	  secured	  by	  
a	  proper	  distribution	  of	  hircarrahs	  [messengers]	  as	  a	  check	  upon	  the	  others	  that	  
no	   connections	   might	   be	   privately	   formed	   or	   Partialities	   shown	   to	   particular	  
people.	   The	   three	   public	   officers	   wrote	   a	   separate	   detail;	   and	   the	   hircarrahs	  
kept	  a	  secret	  diary	  of	  the	  transactions	  of	  the	  officers.	  I	  would	  recommend	  that	  
in	   the	   present	   case	   the	   same	   method	   be	   pursued,	   and	   three	   persons	   be	  
appointed	   of	   good	   capacity	   who	   might	   not	   be	   influenced	   by	   prejudice	   or	  
diverted	  from	  their	  duty	  by	  connections	  and	  friendships...	  .’100	  	  
The	   Company	   followed	   his	   advice	   and	   appointed	   the	   agents	   he	   nominated	   and	   placed	   great	  
importance	   on	   information	   from	   locals.101	   If	   reports	   from	   a	   region	   diminished,	   the	   Company	  
complained	   about	   it.102	   Another	   reason	  why	   Indians	   sought	   employment	   under	   the	   British	   is	  
because	  they	  had	  jobs	  to	  offer.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  Indians	  perceived	  the	  British	  as	  just	  another,	  
not	  the	  ‘other’.	  In	  1782,	  one	  of	  the	  Emperor’s	  high	  officials	  offered	  to	  shift	  his	  allegiance	  to	  the	  
Company.	   Ghulām	  Muhammad	   Khān,	   who	   identified	   himself	   as	   the	  Manager	   of	   the	  Mughal	  
Imperial	  Intelligence	  Office	  wrote:	  I	  am	  an	  old	  Servant	  of	  his	  Majesty	  and	  am	  employed	  by	  His	  
                                                
100	  Persian	  Corr.,	  Trans.	  of	  Recd	  and	  Issued	  I770,	  no.	  48,	  pp.	  15-­‐I6.	  
101	  Persian	  Correspondence,	  Translation	  of	  Persian	  Letters	  Received	  and	  Issued	  1770,	  no.52.	  pp.	  184-­‐5	  
102	  E.g.	  To	  Vizier,	  27	  Feb.	  1767,	  Persian	  Corr.,	  Copy	  of	  Ltrs	  Issued	  1766-­‐67,	  no.	  70,	  p.	  30.	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Majesty	  Shah	  Allum	  in	  giving	  him	  Intelligence	  received	  from	  every	  quarter	  of	  Hindustan.	  …	  I	  am	  
desirous	  to	  engage	  in	  your	  Service.103	  
	  
Each	   Resident	   maintained	   under	   him	   an	   intelligence	   service	   and	   ‘Intelligence	   Office’.	   Their	  
activities	   were	   clearly	   understood	   by	   the	   locals.	   The	   Poona	   court	   in	   1795	   objected	   to	   the	  
Resident's	   appointment	  of	   a	  newswriter	   to	   that	   court.	   In	   the	  Resident’s	  words,	   the	  proposed	  
newswriter	  ‘being	  an	  Intelligent	  person	  likely	  to	  give	  me	  valuable	  good	  Information	  ...	  the	  vague	  
objections	  of	  the	  Durbar	  seem	  dangerous	  in	  Precedent	  as	  liable	  to	  an	  unlimited	  Extension.’104	  If	  
one	   ruler	   could	   exclude	   a	   Company	   newswriter,	   so	   could	   they	   all.	   The	   Company	   therefore	  
insisted	  on	  this	  appointment.	  A	  newswriters	  life	  was	  not	  an	  easy	  one.	  He	  was	  subject	  to	  severe	  
pressure	  from	  the	  court	  on	  which	  he	  reported.	  The	  akhbār	  nawīs	  at	   Jaipur	  [wrote	   in	  the	  third	  
person]	   should	   he	   be	   dismissed	   from	   the	   Company’s	   service	   and	   protection:	   …	   the	   Court	   of	  
yepoor	  will	  wreak	   its	   vengeance	  by	   imprisonment	   and	   seizure	  of	   his	   household,	   for	  opposing	  
the	   orders	   and	   the	   acts	   in	   general	   of	   …	   that	   Government	   …	   .105	   The	   Company’s	   intelligence	  
services	  were	  also	  threatened	  by	  co-­‐option.	  The	  Wazīr	  of	  Kabul	  proposed	  that	  the	  Company’s	  
newswriter	  in	  Peshawar	  share	  information	  with	  him.	  The	  Company	  immediately	  rejected	  this.106	  
Additionally,	   an	   akhbār	   nawīs	   or	   other	   agent	   at	   Calcutta	   could	   obtain	   for	   a	   ruler	   valuable	  
advanced	   word	   of	   the	   Resident’s	   orders.	   In	   1844,	   the	   Awadh	   ruler	   and	   his	   court,	   and	   even	  
members	   of	   the	   Residency	   staff,	   learned	   the	   Governor	   General’s	   secret	   instructions	   to	   the	  
Resident	  before	  the	  Resident	  himself.	  The	  Resident	  complained:	  	  
‘[A]	   copy	   of	   this	   identical	   letter	   arrived	   at	   Lucknow	   three	   days	   before	   the	  
original	  reached	  me	  and	  its	  contents	  were	  actually	  known	  to	  the	  King,	  Minister	  
and	   one	   or	   two	   others	   before	   I	   was	   myself	   aware	   of	   them....	   [M]y	   Head	  
Intelligence	  Writer,	  previously	   to	   the	  perusal	  of	   the	  original,	   read	  out	   to	  me	  a	  
letter	  which	  tallied	  with	  it	  nearly	  word	  for	  word....	  ‘107	  	  
	  
                                                
103	  This	  was	  his	  second	  'petition'	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  the	  first	  having	  elicited	  no	  response.	  From	  
Ghulam	  Muhammad	  Khan,	  24	  May	  1782,	  Persian	  Corr.,	  Trans.	  of	  Ltrs	  Recd,	  vol.	  19,	  no.	  25,	  pp.	  55-­‐7.	  
104	  Rsdt	  Poona	  to	  Gov.	  Gen.	  21	  Feb.	  1795,	  FPC	  23	  March	  I795,	  no.	  I	  I.	  
105	  Humble	  Petition	  of	  Motee	  Loll,	  4Jan.	  1833,	  FPC	  12	  March	  1833,	  no.	  12.	  
106	  Rsdt	  Delhi	  to	  Secy	  to	  Govt,	  9	  July	  i815,	  FPC	  26	  July	  i815,	  no.	  62.	  
107	  Envoy	  to	  King	  of	  Oude	  to	  Secy	  to	  Govt	  of	  India,	  Foreign	  Department,	  31	  Aug.	  1844,	  FPC	  5	  Oct.	  1844,	  no.	  
155.	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From	  the	  1700s	  to	  the	  seizure	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  1858	  diplomacy	  was	  inflected	  by	  the	  pernicious	  
dynamic	  of	  Western	  modernity.	  It	  transformed	  a	  system	  of	  communication	  and	  negotiation	  into	  
an	   extension	  of	  war,	   alienated	   a	   unified	   cosmos	   and	   rendered	   the	  possibilities	   of	   the	   Empire	  
impossible.	   However,	   this	   was	   only	   possible	   by	   the	   British	   easily	   comprehending	   the	   basic	  
principles	  of	  local	  diplomacy.	  What	  they	  had	  to	  learn	  was	  the	  style,	  but	  not	  its	  practice.	  Fisher	  
notes	  that	  while	  Mughal	  forms	  and	  means	  persisted	  until	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  and	  that	  
their	   functioning	   apparently	   encountered	   similar	   problems	   of	   ‘local	   collusion’	  which	   troubled	  
the	   Mughal	   Empire.	   Essentially	   the	   systems	   remained	   the	   same	   and	   modifications	   were	  
superficial.	  Adding	  Christian	  dates	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Hijri	  dates	  to	  the	  akhbārāt	  for	  the	  British	  no	  
more	   Europeanized	   India	   than	   did	   Indian	   numerals	   Indianize	   Europe.108	   Mughal	   diplomatic	  
systems	   and	   tools	   were	   appropriated	   by	   the	   British	   but	   put	   to	   uses	   unforeseen	   by	   their	  
inventors.	  
	  
British	  Innovations	  to	  Local	  Diplomacy	  
	  
Having	   inserted	   themselves	   into	   the	   diplomatic	   structures	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   Empire,	   the	  
British	  attempted	  to	  innovate	  by	  imposing	  their	  cultural	  norms.	  They	  usually	  failed	  and	  Eaton’s	  
research	   is	   indicative.	   The	   EIC	   attempted	   to	   transform	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘gift’	   and	   its	   place	   in	  
diplomacy	   in	   India.	  Within	  a	  broad	  tessellation	  of	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘gift’	  there	  were	  two	  views.	   In	  
the	   prevailing	   Indian	   cosmos	   the	   ‘gift’	   was	   used	   to	   form	   and	   maintain	   Mughal	   polity.	  
Subordinates	   ‘offered	  valuable	  tributes	  –	  nazr,	  and	  received	   in	  return	  khil’at	  –	  robes	  minutely	  
graded	   in	   terms	   of	   rank	   and	   occasion	   from	   the	   wardrobe	   of	   the	   ruler,	   signifying	   a	   certain	  
incorporation	   into	   the	  king’s	  body	  as	  well	   as	   the	  body	  politic.’109	   Kingly	   charisma	  consisted	   in	  
giving	  ‘excessively’	  –	  kings	  styled	  themselves	  as	  the	  ‘embodiment	  of	  hospitality.’110	   In	  contrast	  
the	   Company	   viewed	   the	   inlaying	   of	   its	   employees	   into	  Mughal	   gift	   rituals	   with	   anxiety	   and	  
suspicion.	  They	  saw	  ‘these	  practices	  as	  bribery	  and	  extortion	  innate	  to	  ‘Oriental	  despotism.’’111	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter	   lay	  the	  Company	  officials’	  abuse	  of	  the	  Mughal	  gift.	   In	  response	  to	  
‘escalating	   charges	   of	   corruption,’	   the	   Regulating	   Act	   of	   1773	   barred	   British	   officials	   from	  
                                                
108	  Roberts.	  1985.	  P.28	  
109	  Buckler.	  1992;	  Gordon	  &	  Hambly.	  2000.	  Quoted	  in	  Eaton.	  Fall	  2008.	  P.819	  
110	  Mir	  Muhammad	  Taqi	  ‘Mir,’	  Zikr-­‐i	  Mir:	  The	  Autobiography	  of	  the	  18th-­‐century	  Mughal	  Poet:Mir,	  C.	  M.	  
Naim,	  trans.,	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999,	  p.	  124.	  Here	  he	  refers	  to	  his	  patron	  Asaf	  ud-­‐daula,	  
nawab	  of	  Awadh,	  to	  be	  discussed	  below.	  See	  Brand.	  1997.	  Quoted	  in	  Eaton.	  P.819	  
111	  McLane.	  1993.	  p.	  43.	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receiving	   land,	   money,	   and	   jewels	   from	   Indians.112	   Under	   the	   ‘reformed’	   gift	   regime,	   ‘gifts	  
[were]	   allowed	   .	   .	   .	   to	   have	   legal	   validity	   .	   .	   .	   only	   if	   they	   were	   given	   for	   reasons	   deemed	  
satisfactory	  in	  British	  courts	  of	  law,	  which	  proposed	  new	  taxonomies	  of	  gifts	  and	  new	  ideas	  of	  
political	  expediency.’113	  	  
	  
Hastings’	  wanted	  to	  replace	  Mughal	  gifting	  with	  a	  type	  of	  gift,	  which	  in	  design	  and	  in	  symbolic	  
value	  was	  English	  –	  the	  painted	  portrait.	  In	  Britain,	  portraits	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  strengthening	  
kinship	  networks:	   two-­‐dimensional	   images	  were	  believed	   to	  convey	  a	   certain	  presence	  of	   the	  
absent	  donor	  through	  the	  mediation	  of	   likeness.114	  The	  dissemination	  of	  portraits	  extended	  to	  
the	   diplomatic	   realm,	   and	   no	   ambassador	   quitted	   Britain	   without	   likenesses	   of	   the	   reigning	  
monarch.	   While	   these	   canvases	   evoked	   his	   presence,	   they	   did	   not	   stand	   in	   for	   the	   absent	  
sovereign	   (as	   in	   France),	   a	   practice	   that	   the	   British	   abhorred	   as	   ‘despotic.’115	   In	   keeping	  with	  
British	   tradition,	   Hastings’	   promoted	   his	   own	   portraits-­‐as-­‐gift	   because	   he	   ‘believed	   that	   the	  
British	  rulers	  of	  Bengal	  must	  conduct	  a	  foreign	  policy	  within	  a	  diplomatic	  system	  comparable	  to	  
that	   of	   Europe,’	   he	   attempted	   to	   ground	   this	   in	   extant	   Indian	   notions	   of	   diplomacy	   as	   being	  
‘face-­‐to-­‐face	  relations.’116	  To	  do	  so,	  Hastings	  supplemented	  English	  ideas	  of	  diplomacy	  with	  his	  
interpretation	  of	  Akbar’s	  munificent	  artistic	  practices.	  Ab’l	  Fazl	  recorded:	  	  
‘His	  Majesty	  himself	  sat	  for	  his	  likeness	  and	  also	  ordered	  to	  have	  the	  likenesses	  
taken	  of	  all	  of	  the	  grandees	  in	  the	  realm.	  An	  immense	  album	  was	  thus	  formed;	  
those	  who	  had	  passed	  away	  have	  received	  new	  life	  and	  those	  who	  are	  still	  alive	  
have	  immortality	  promised	  them.’117	  	  
Hastings	  ordered	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  sections	  on	  art	  from	  Akbar’s	  chronicle,	  the	  Ain-­‐i-­‐Akbari,	  
and	   he	   collected	   as	   many	   miniatures	   from	   Akbar’s	   studio	   as	   possible	   and	   sent	   the	   English	  
landscape	   painter	   Hodges	   to	   portray	   the	   forts,	   cities,	   and	   monuments	   from	   Akbar’s	   reign.	  
However,	   this	   practice	   had	   little	   to	   do	   with	   portrait-­‐exchange	   and	   so	   Hastings	   attempted	   to	  
import	  a	  radically	  new	  conception	  of	  gifting	  into	  extant	  practice.	  	  
	  
                                                
112	  Eaton.	  P.819	  
113	  Dirks.	  1992.	  p.	  200.	  
114	  Lippincott.	  1995.	  
115	  Eaton.	  P.820	  
116	  Marshall.	  1999.	  p.	  6.	  
117	  Blochmann.	  Vol.	  I.	  p.	  115.	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Instead	   of	   following	   Company	   orders	   to	   reform	   local	   custom,	   traditional	   custom	   became	   a	  
means	   for	   locals	   to	   express	   diplomatic	   discontent	  with	   the	   Raj.	   In	   the	   1770s	   Awadh	  was	   the	  
target	   of	   British	   expansion.	   The	   nawab	   of	   Awadh	   Asaf	   ud-­‐daula	   had	   threatened	   to	   write	   to	  
George	  III	  if	  the	  Company	  did	  not	  reduce	  his	  payments,	  forcing	  Hastings	  to	  spend	  five	  months	  in	  
the	  capital,	  Lucknow.118	  Shortly	  after	  Hastings’	  arrival	  the	  heir	  to	  the	  Mughal	  throne	  fled	  from	  
Delhi	   to	   take	   refuge	   at	   Lucknow,	   where	   he	   sat	   to	   the	   English	   painter	   Zoffany,	   brought	   by	  
Hastings,	  prompting	  Asaf	   to	  do	  the	  same.119	  However,	  Asaf	  quickly	  disposed	  of	  his	  portrait	  by	  
giving	  it	  to	  a	  disgraced	  Company	  official,	  as	  a	  gesture	  of	  contempt	  for	  the	  Company’s	  policy.	  The	  
Governor-­‐General	   left	   Lucknow	   having	   failed	   to	   reach	   a	   new	   agreement	   and	   horrified	   at	   the	  
lavish	  entertainments	  Asaf	  had	  organized	  for	  him,	  which	  had	  the	  effect	  of	   increasing	  Awadh’s	  
debts	  to	  the	  Company.120	  Yet,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  one	  of	  the	  court’s	  poets,	  this	  had	  been	  a	  fabulous	  
epoch	   characterized	   by	   lavish	   gifting:	   “At	   the	   time	   of	   his	   [Hastings’]	   departure,	   the	   exalted	  
nawab	  gave	  gifts	  to	  Hastings’	  men	  in	  such	  large	  numbers	  that	  no	  one	  could	  ever	  imagine.	  Every	  
person	  of	  any	  note	  was	  given	  a	  horse,	  an	  elephant	  and	  a	  fine	  robe.”121	  Asaf	  wanted	  to	  project	  
the	  image	  of	  an	  exalted	  emperor	  who	  gives	  to	  his	  subordinates	  and	  allies	  in	  dazzling,	  potlatch-­‐
like	   public	   displays	   of	   munificence,	   but	   this	   contradicted	   Hastings’	   notions	   of	   parsimonious	  
governance.	  
	  
In	  contrast,	  continuities	  between	  the	  Empire	  and	  the	  Raj	  were	  more	  lasting.	  The	  incipient	  pan-­‐
Indianism	  of	   the	  Empire	  was	  spurred	  on	  by	  the	  perpetual	   insecurities	  of	   the	  Raj	  which	  had	  to	  
extend	   itself	   to	   safeguard	   itself.	   As	   it	   expanded,	   it	   sought	   to	   gather	   information	   across	   India,	  
frequently	   applying	   great	   pressure	   to	   obtain	   information	   at	   massive	   risk	   to	   the	   informants.	  
From	  about	  1775,	  for	  example,	  the	  Nawāb	  of	  Arcot	  sent	  akhbār	  nawīs	  to	  Calcutta.122	  Arcot	  had	  
effective	   newswriters	   and	   informants	   in	   the	   courts	   of	   the	   Marathas,	   Hyderabad,	   and	   the	  
Mysore	  rulers	  [and]	  news	  from	  hostile	  courts	  did	  not	  come	  easily.	  The	  Nawāb	  asserted	  that	  by	  
                                                
118	  Calendar	  of	  Persian	  Correspondence.	  1911.	  vol.	  5,	  20	  May	  1781.	  Asaf	  wanted	  the	  Resident	  Bristow	  to	  
be	  recalled;	  if	  Hastings	  did	  not	  comply,	  he	  also	  threatened	  to	  write	  to	  the	  British	  Prime	  Minister.	  Quoted	  
in	  Eaton.	  P.827	  
119	  It	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  Zoffany’s	  normal	  practice	  to	  take	  five	  or	  six	  sittings	  for	  a	  portrait,	  which	  was	  also	  
continued	  at	  the	  court	  of	  Lucknow.	  See	  Hastings,	  Diary,	  Hastings	  Papers	  BL:	  Add	  Ms.39,879.	  
120	  Hastings	  Papers	  BL:	  Add	  Ms.	  29,121,	  3	  May	  1784.	  
121	  Mir	  Muhammad	  Taqi	  ‘Mir,’	  Zikr-­‐i	  Mir,	  p.	  124.	  
122	  E.g.	  From	  the	  Nawāb	  of	  Arcot	  28	  Sept.	  1775,	  Persian	  Corr.,	  Copies	  of	  Ltrs	  Recd,	  vol.	  4,	  no.	  i6,	  pp.	  21-­‐3.	  
In	  sending	  such	  news	  reports	  to	  Calcutta,	  the	  Nawāb	  may	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  ingratiate	  himself	  with	  the	  
Governor	  General	  so	  as	  to	  overrule	  the	  Governor	  of	  Madras,	  an	  explicit	  opponent	  of	  the	  Nawāb.	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disclosing	  the	  intelligence	  he	  was	  putting	  ‘the	  life	  of	  his	  newswriter	  …	  at	  stake.’123	  In	  fishing	  for	  
information,	  the	  British	  cast	  their	  nets	  more	  widely	  than	  the	  Mughals	  and	  regional	  rulers	  had.	  A	  
Company	  official	  urged	  Residents	   to	   report	  virtually	  everything	  about	   the	  world	   the	  Company	  
was	  entering:	  
The	   utility	   of	   collecting	   every	   possible	   information	   respecting	   the	   disposition,	  
genius,	   talents,	   character,	   connections,	   views,	   interests,	   revenues,	   military	  
strength,	   and	   even	   domestic	   history	   of	   those	   Princes	   or	   people,	   with	   whose	  
affairs	   our	   own	   happens	   to	   be	   interwoven	   or	   related,	   either	   immediately	   or	  
remotely,	  must	  also	  equally	  clear.124	  
In	  doing	   so,	  undoubtedly,	   the	  already	  peripatetic	   locals	   the	  British	   relied	  upon	   formed	  a	  new	  
notion	  of	  the	  political-­‐geography	  of	  India	  in	  a	  colonized	  globe.	  This	  extended	  to	  local	  rulers.125	  
For	  the	  first	  time	  a	  series	  of	  princes	  mounted	  direct	  diplomatic	  initiatives	  to	  the	  British	  Queen	  in	  
London.	  More	   than	  30	  direct	  embassies	   to	   the	  British	   court	   in	   London	  as	  a	  means	  of	   seeking	  
recourse	  to	  the	  unfair	  practices	  of	  British	  officials	  in	  India.	  Though	  embarrassing	  to	  the	  British,	  
local	   diplomatic	  missions	   to	   London	  were	   never	   forbidden.	   To	   do	   so	  would	   have	   denied	   the	  
sovereignty	  which	  underpins	  diplomacy	  and	  which	  local	  rulers	  possessed	  before	  the	  British	  took	  
them	   for	   all	   practical	   purposes.	   These	   ‘counterflows’	  were	   of	   course	  minor	   to	   the	   diplomatic	  
onslaught	  of	  the	  Company	  but	  in	  mounting	  their	  missions,	  locals	  learnt	  how	  to	  take	  advantage	  
of	  European	  inventions	  such	  as	  printing	  by	  publishing	  cheap	  pamphlets	  to	  circulate	  their	  views	  
and	   learnt	   how	   to	   lobby	   the	   bodies	   within	   the	   British	   parliamentary	   system.	   Some	   secured	  
advantages	   for	   local	   rulers	  but	   they	  were	  subsumed	  by	  the	  Company’s	  overriding	  rationale	  of	  
militarily	   accruing	   sovereignty	   in	   India.	   It	   was	   within	   this	   new	   diplomatic	   consciousness	   of	   a	  
colonized	  globe	  that	  the	  West’s	  rationality	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  achieved	  its	  zenith.	  
	  
The	   achievements	   of	   ‘othering’	   took	   two	  distinct	   forms:	  maintaining	   the	   racial	   purity	   of	   their	  
own	  diplomatic	  service	  and	  subsuming	  all	  diplomacy	  to	  British	  diplomats.	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	  
first	   axis	   was	   put	   forward	   in	   1782	   when	   the	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Company’s	   armies,	  
wrote:	   ‘At	   present,	   excepting	   at	   the	   Court	   of	   the	   Nizam,	   we	   are	   obliged	   to	   depend	   on	  
Intelligence	  coveyed	   to	  us	   thro’	  black	  agents	  as	   the	  views	  of	  every	  other	  Power	  of	  Hindostan	  
                                                
123	  From	  the	  Nawab	  of	  Arcot,	  3	  Sept.	  i777,	  Persian	  Corr.,	  Copies	  ofLtrs	  Recd,	  vol.	  9,	  no.	  2I,	  pp.	  30-­‐2.	  
124	  Soon	  after	  Richard	  Sulivan	  wrote	  this,	  he	  himself	  began	  a	  brief	  and	  controversial	  career	  as	  a	  Resident	  
at	  Arcot	  and	  then	  Hyderabad.	  Sulivan.	  p.	  31.	  
125	  See	  Fisher.	  2004	  
Page	  153	  of	  227 
 
and	  whose	  reports	  it	  is	  but	  too	  natural	  to	  suppose	  are	  calculated	  to	  suit	  their	  own	  Interests.’126	  
Others	  agreed,	  citing	  Indians	  lack	  of	  judgement	  and	  fidelity.127	  The	  old	  notion	  of	  local	  corruption	  
first	   evidenced	   during	   the	   Surman	   Embassy	   continued.	   One	   Resident	   wrote	   ‘…	   it	   is	   vain	   to	  
expect	   honesty	   from	   any	   Native	   Servant,	   who	   is	   not	   placed	   beyond	   the	   Reach	   of	   ordinary	  
Temptation.’128	  Apparently	  no	  lessons	  about	  negotiating	  with	  locals	  had	  been	  learnt	  from	  1717.	  
This	   institutional	  racism	  plainly	  marked	  the	  Residency	  system.	   In	  1791	  the	  Resident	  at	  Nagpur	  
died.	  Both	  his	   chief	   Indian	  assistant	  and	   the	  young	  British	   lieutenant	  –	  a	  purely	  military,	  non-­‐
political	  man	  –	   sought	   to	  assume	   the	   functions	  of	   the	  Resident.	  Each	  wrote	   independently	   to	  
the	   Governor	   General	   asserting	   his	   right	   to	   replace	   the	   late	   Resident.	   The	   Governor	   General	  
immediately	  decided	  to	  support	  the	  British	  lieutenant.	  The	  Indian,	  rather	  than	  allow	  himself	  to	  
be	  demoted	  to	  the	  ‘Character	  of	  Common	  News	  Writer,’	  resigned	  the	  Company’s	  service.129	  	  
	  
The	  second	  axis	  was	  the	  British	  slowly	  removing	  the	  function	  of	  political	  communication	  from	  
the	  rulers’	  newswriters	  and	  representatives	  and	  transferring	  them	  to	  its	  Residents.	  Beginning	  in	  
1793,	   the	  Company	  eventually	   induced	  some	  fifty-­‐five	  states	   to	  agree	  by	   treaty	   to	  channel	  all	  
foreign	   political	   contacts	   through	   the	   Resident.130	   A	   typical	   treaty	   read:	   the	   ruler	   in	   question	  
abjured	   any	   ‘negotiation	   or	   political	   correspondence	   with	   any	   European	   or	   Native	   power	  
without	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   said	   Company.’131	   On	   their	   part,	   rulers	   sought	   to	   avoid	   such	  
restrictions	  on	   their	   foreign	   relations.	  Rulers	  clearly	  maintained	  akhbār	  nawīs	   in	  all	   the	  courts	  
and	   states	   of	   interest	   to	   them,	   well	   beyond	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Company	   to	   prohibit.132	   In	  
practice,	  however,	  the	  Company	  expected	  all	  states	  to	  observe	  this	  restriction	  from	  as	  early	  as	  
the	  Resident	  could	  enforce	  it.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Nagpur,	  for	  example,	  that	  Rājā	  would	  not	  conclude	  
a	   treaty	  prohibiting	  all	   communication	  until	   1826,	   yet	   the	  Company	  nevertheless	   forbade	   the	  
                                                
126	  Eyre	  Coote	  to	  Governor	  General	  in	  Council	  i6	  Jan.	  1781,	  Foreign	  Secret	  Con-­‐	  sultations,	  23	  Feb.	  1782,	  
no.	  7,	  IOL	  [hereinafter	  FSC]	  
127	  Sulivan.	  1784.	  pp.	  307-­‐8.;	  Rsdt	  Delhi	  to	  Secy	  to	  Govt,	  13	  Oct.	  1813,	  FPC,	  I	  June	  18I6,	  no.	  13.	  These	  views	  
are	  repeated	  in	  Minute	  of	  Sir	  C.	  T.	  Metcalfe,	  14	  Dec.	  1829,	  FPC	  19	  Dec.	  1829,	  no.	  22.	  
128	  Resident	  Hyderabad	  to	  Secretary	  to	  Government,	  5	  September	  1816,	  FPC	  28	  September	  1816,	  no.	  15	  
129	  Lt	  James	  Davidson	  to	  Department	  Persian	  Translation,	  16	  Aug.	  1791,	  Foreign	  Miscellaneous	  Series,	  vol.	  
52,	  Nagpore	  Residency,	  19	  April	  1792,	  IOL.	  
130	  William	  Lee-­‐Warner,	  The	  Native	  States	  of	  India	  (London,	  I9I0),	  p.	  220.	  
131	  Aitchison.	  1909.	  
132	  See	  Sardar	  Ganda	  Singh,	  'Akhbarat-­‐i-­‐Lahaur-­‐o-­‐Multan,'	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Indian	  Historical	  Records	  
Commission	  21	  (Dec.	  1944):	  43-­‐6.	  Singh	  surmises	  from	  internal	  evidence	  that	  these	  akhbarat	  from	  Aug.	  
I848	  to	  Jan.	  I849	  for	  Ahmadpur,	  Bahawalpur,	  Lahore,	  Multan,	  and	  elsewhere	  were	  written	  for	  the	  
Maharaja	  of	  Patiala.	  They	  were	  found	  among	  other	  discarded	  papers	  from	  a	  collection	  of	  a	  Munshi	  in	  
Multan.	  Their	  language	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  English	  and	  hostile	  to	  the	  Sikhs	  opposing	  the	  English.	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practice	  as	  early	  as	  1813.	  While	  the	  Company	  thus	  did	  not	  literally	  forbid	  rulers	  from	  having	  a	  
foreign	   policy,	   it	   simply	   insisted	   that	   all	   communication	   pass	   through	   its	   hands	   and	  meet	   its	  
approval.133	   In	   practice	   it	  meant	   that	   the	   Residents	   could	   communicate	  with	   each	   other	   and	  
coordinate	   their	   efforts	  while	   the	   princes	  were	   forbidden	   to	   correspond	  with	   anyone	   except	  
through	  the	  Company.	  	  
	  
The	  assumption	  of	  paramountcy	   in	  1858,	  made	  the	  British	  the	  pre-­‐eminent	  power	   in	  the	   land	  
but	   the	   removal	   of	  military	   insecurities	   did	   not	  mean	   that	   non-­‐Whites	  were	   allowed	   the	   old	  
possibilities	  denied	  by	  Western	  modernity;	  nor	  were	  they	  permitted	  into	  the	  citadel	  of	  Western	  
modernity.	  To	  allow	  in	  the	  ‘other’	  would	  have	  undermined	  the	  entire	  project	  and	  the	  purity	  of	  
the	  Political	  Line	  was	  assiduously	  maintained.	  This	  was	  in	  the	  teeth	  of	  opposition,	  for	  locals	  still	  
did	   not	   think	   of	   the	   British	   as	   fundamentally	   alien.	   Locals	   remained	   untouched	   by	   the	   alien	  
metaphysic	  and	  sought	  personal	  success,	  status,	  etc.,	  thru	  the	  state	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  state	  
thought	  of	   the	   locals.	  Although	   locals	  were	  very	  slowly	  admitted	   into	   the	   ICS	  after	   the	  1860s,	  
they	  were	  specifically	  barred	  from	  the	  Residency	  system	  in	  1877.134	  Locals	  were	  never	  seriously	  
considered	  until	  the	  20th	  century.	  In	  May	  1918	  the	  first	  local,	  Abdul	  Qaiyum	  was	  finally	  accepted	  
into	  the	  Line	  after	  lifelong	  service	  as	  a	  support	  officer.	  His	  previous	  years	  of	  service	  meant	  that	  
this	  would	  not	  cause	  ‘an	  embarrassing	  precedent’	  as	  Qaiyum	  was	  to	  retire	  within	  12	  months.135	  
Following	  him	  a	  number	  of	  locals	  were	  raised	  from	  the	  support	  ranks	  to	  the	  full	  service	  but	  only	  
in	   1925	   did	   the	   first	   local,	   KPS	  Menon	   enter	   the	   Political	   Line	   from	   the	   ICS	   in	   keeping	   with	  
standard	  practice	  for	  a	  British	  officer.	  His	  appointment	  did	  not	  open	  the	  gates	  to	  Indianization	  
of	   the	   Political	   Line.	   As	   late	   at	   1935	   three	   Indians	   raised	   the	   issue	   of	   ‘White	   colour’	   being	   a	  
requirement	  for	  the	  Line	  in	  the	  Assembly.	  The	  reply	  was	  ‘Not	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware’.136	  Hogben	  
traces	   the	   reluctance	   of	   the	   British	   to	   Indianize	   the	   political	   line	   even	   on	   the	   eve	   of	  
                                                
133	  Secy	  to	  Govt	  to	  Acting	  Rsdt	  Nagpur,	  15	  Oct.	  1813,	  FPC	  15	  Oct.	  1813,	  nos	  3,	  4;	  Aitchison.	  Collection,	  2.	  P.	  
519-­‐27.	  
134	  Memo.	  D	  233,	  ‘Admission	  of	  a	  Native	  of	  India	  to	  the	  Political	  Dept’,	  and	  undated	  1918	  note	  by	  H.	  W.	  
Garrett,	  India	  Office,	  in	  L/P&S/I8;	  for	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  the	  topic	  to	  I919,	  cf.	  Hogben.	  1977;	  &	  Satakopan.	  
I94I.	  p.	  138.	  
135	  Telegram	  from	  Chelmsford,	  2	  May	  1918,	  with	  No.	  1914/1918,	  L/P&S/I	  1/135.	  
136	  LAD,	  Q.	  914,	  2I	  March	  I935,	  S.	  Satyamurti,	  and	  Metcalfe's	  reply;	  Q.	  I469,	  4	  April	  I935,	  S.	  Satyamurti,	  and	  
reply;	  Q.	  1503,	  4	  April	  1935,	  Sham	  Lal,	  and	  Q.	  1504,	  Sham	  Lal	  and	  T.	  S.	  A.	  Chettiar,	  and	  replies;	  and	  Q.	  
I505,	  4	  April	  1935,	  Sham	  Lal,	  S.	  Satyamurti,	  T.	  S.	  A.	  Chettiar	  and	  Mohan	  Lal	  Saksena,	  and	  reply,	  ibid.	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independence	  to	  ‘a	  certain	  sense	  of	  racial	  or	  moral	  superiority’	  founded	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  




Puri	  captured	  the	  processes	  described	  in	  this	  chapter	  when	  he	  wrote	  that:	  	  
‘It	   can	   hardly	   be	   suggested	   that	   the	   British	   evolved	   their	   own	   administrative	  
organisation	   independent	  and	  exclusive	  of	  the	  one	  they	   inherited.	  …	  [A]	  policy	  
of	  festina	  lente	  was	  followed	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  understand	  properly	  problems	  
connected	  with	  administration	  of	  people	  whose	  language,	  culture	  and	  tradition	  
were	  entirely	  unknown	  to	  them.	  Many	  of	  the	  administrative	   institutions	  of	  the	  
preceding	   ruling	   families	   were	   retained	   permanently,	   laws	   and	   usages	   left	  
undisturbed,	  and	  reforms	  in	  administration	  postponed.’138	  	  
The	  tessellation	  was	  only	  possible	  because	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practice	  what	  the	  British	  encountered	  
was	   no	   different	   in	   any	   meaningful	   sense	   to	   their	   own	   experience.	   The	   roots	   of	   diplomatic	  
practice	  in	  India	  lay	  with	  the	  secularised	  Mughal	  polity	  which	  developed	  in	  an	  India	  of	  dharma	  
making	   for	   a	   polity	   very	   different	   from,	   say,	   the	   Ottoman	   Empire.	   The	   Mughals	   limited	  
themselves,	  by-­‐and-­‐large,	  to	  the	  secular	  and	  the	  temporal	  in	  their	  diplomacy,	  creating	  a	  body	  of	  
knowledge	  ‘this	  worldly’.	  In	  doing	  so,	  diplomacy	  relied	  on	  the	  prevalent	  notion	  that	  sovereignty	  
though	  God	  given	  (as	  it	  had	  to	  be	  in	  a	  Muslim	  polity),	  was	  dependent	  on	  meeting	  requirements	  
originating	   in	   this	   world.	   The	   implications	   for	  modernity	   are	   encapsulated	   by	   Subrahmanyam	  
who	  argues	  that:	  	  
‘it	   is	  of	   some	   importance	   to	  delink	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘modernity’	   from	  a	  particular	  
European	  trajectory	  (Greece,	  classical	  Rome,	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  the	  Renaissance	  
and	   thus	   ‘modernity’	   ...),	   and	   to	  argue	   that	   it	   represents	  a	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  global	  
shift,	   with	   many	   different	   sources	   and	   roots,	   and-­‐inevitably-­‐many	   different	  
forms	  and	  meanings	  depending	  on	  which	  society	  we	  look	  at	  it	  from.’139	  	  
	  
At	   the	   level	   of	   practice,	   the	   evidence	  matches	   Subrahmanyam’s	   reading.	  What	   little	   practical	  
innovation	   in	  terms	  of	  diplomacy	  the	  British	  did	  perform	  was	  motivated	  by	  their	  metaphysics.	  
                                                
137	  Hogben.	  P.767	  
138	  Pure.	  1975.	  P.iv.	  
139	  Subrahmanyam.	  Theory	  and	  History.	  (Article	  on	  Textures	  of	  Time).	  P.737	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Of	  primary	  interest	  to	  civilizational	  analysis	  is	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  ‘othering’	  with	  
dharma.	   This	  meeting	   had	   dramatic	   consequences	   for	   the	   future	   of	   diplomacy.	   If,	   as	   Nelson	  
views	   it,	   that	   Europe’s	   long	   gestation	   produced	   a	   ‘maximum	   rationalization	   of	   intelligence’	  
predicated	   upon	   ‘substantial	   numbers	   of	   persons	   be[ing]	   legally	   empowered	   and	  
psychologically	  disposed	  to	  carry	  on	  mental	  production	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  operation	  without	  
being	   called	   to	   a	   halt	   by	   disabling	   private	   or	   public	   inhibitions	   or	   barriers’140	   then	   surely	   the	  
processes	  underway	  under	  the	  British	  was	  a	  ‘regression’.	  Instead	  of	  transcending	  ‘particularistic	  
restraints	  of	  family,	  kin,	  caste	  and	  class	  and	  allow	  their	  minds	  to	  wander	  within	  ‘neutral	  zones’	  
provided	  by	   institutions	   free	   from	  political	   and	   religious	  dictate’141	   the	  Raj	   reinforced	  Mughal	  
barriers	  (a	  militarized	  bureaucracy);	  deconstructed	  a	  secularized	  diplomatic	  service	  (the	  munshī	  
was	  firmly	  placed	  in	  a	  secondary	  position)	  and	  introduced	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  notion	  of	  ‘race’	  
to	  create	  an	  impermeable	  biological	  barrier.	  Ultimately	  the	  Raj	  deleted	  diplomacy.	  At	  the	  centre	  
of	  these	  innovations	  was	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  Western	  modernity	  and	  its	  ordering	  principles	  were	  
not	   only	   regressive	   but	   it	   also	   presented	   the	   most	   significant	   challenge	   the	   metaphysic	   of	  
contextual	   action.	   Whether	   binary-­‐logic	   would	   finally	   overwhelm	   dharma	   at	   the	   moment	   of	  




                                                
140p.184,	  187	  
141	  Nielsen.	  2001.	  p.409	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The	  final	  controversy	  this	  project	  will	  tackle	  arises	  from	  Der	  Derian	  theorising	  that	  the	  moment	  
of	   independence	   is	   the	  moment	  of	   victory	   of	   the	   ‘othering’	  metaphysic.2	   It	   is	   at	   this	  moment	  
when	   the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  effaces	   its	  history	  and	  begins	   to	  operate	  along	   the	  principles	  of	  
Western	  modernity.	  The	  aspiration	  of	   independence	  must	  be	  understood	   in	  such	  a	   reading	  as	  
the	  moment	  of	  arrival,	  when	  a	  people	  transform	  themselves	  into	  a	  state	  and	  interact	  with	  other	  
states	  through	  a	  diplomatic	  system.	  What	  actually	  came	  to	  pass	  in	  the	  state	  that	  became	  India	  
was	  that	  it	  found	  itself	  with	  a	  bureaucratic	  system	  which	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  Mughal	  Empire	  in	  
terms	   of	   practice	   and	   familiar	   with	   notions	   of	   statehood	   and	   sovereignty	   even	   if	   they	   were	  
understood	  as	  extensions	  of	  a	  royal	  body.	  These	  Mughal	  practices,	  modified	  by	  the	  British,	  were	  
however	  expected	  to	  perform	  in	  a	  manner	  and	  put	  forward	  a	  type	  of	  policy	  which	  the	  inherited	  
bureaucratic	   system	  was	  not	  designed	   for.	  To	   recap,	   the	  administrative	  apparatus	   India	   found	  
itself	  though	  Mughal	  was	  reorganised	  under	  the	  British	  to	  continue	  more	  rapacious	  policies	  of	  
extraction.	   The	   major	   British	   innovation	   was	   to	   totally	   de-­‐Indianize	   this	   apparatus	   whose	  
diplomatic	   arm	   remained	   sanitized	   of	   locals	   to	   the	   moment	   of	   independence.	   Yet,	   this	  
bureaucracy	  was	  expected	  to	  perform	  a	  role	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  totally	  novel	  because	  it	  arose	  from	  
the	  locals.	  This	  chapter	  will	   introduce	  this	  novel	  approach	  to	  international	  relations.	  It	  requires	  
returning	   to	   the	   subsumed	   ideas	   of	  dharma	   because	   it	  was	   the	   founding	   category	  which	   the	  
architects	   of	   modern	   Indian	   policy	   drew	   upon	   to	   formulate	   policy	   after,	   as	   Bajpai	   says,	   a	  
                                                
1	   Mahatma	   Gandhi.	   Message	   to	   Shanti	   Sena	   Dal,	   September	   5,	   1947(original	   in	   Bengali).	   In	   Collected	  
Works	  of	  Mahatma	  Gandhi.	  Downloaded	  from:	  http://www.gandhiserve.org/	  Henceforth	  CWMG.	  	  
2 Der	  Derian.	  1987.	  p.23.	  As	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  II,	  this	  idea	  is	  located	  in	  a	  disciplinary	  position	  
(Bull),	  in	  turn	  located	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  modernity.	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millennia.	   Developed	   by	   Mahatma	   Gandhi,	   the	   tenets	   of	   this	   policy	   are	   non-­‐violence	   and	  
virtuous	  action	  for	  oneself	  because	  it	  is	  good.	  A	  benefit	  is	  that	  it	  can	  also	  be	  an	  example	  to	  both	  
opponents	   and	   the	   uncommitted.	   The	   main	   proponent	   for	   these	   ideas	   was	   the	   first	   Prime	  
Minister	   and	   India’s	   diplomat	   par	   excellence,	   Jawaharlal	   Nehru.	   He	   was	   a	   vector	   because	   he	  
drew	  upon	  a	  Gandhian	  legacy	  and	  put	  it	  into	  operation.	  It	  is	  argued,	  that	  the	  abiding	  influence	  
on	  Nehru	  was	  Gandhi.	  Combined	  they	  crafted	  a	  foreign	  policy	  which	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  
terms	   of	   civilizational	   analysis	   –	   because	   the	   policy	   is	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   local	   notions	   of	  
action,	  physical	  conditions	  and	  diplomacy.	  They	  came	  together	  as	  non-­‐alignment	  which	  was	  the	  
international	  application	  of	  what	  Gandhi	  called	  satyāgraha	  –	  a	  technique	  developed	  to	  fight	  the	  
British.	  Ironically,	  the	  system	  was	  activated	  by	  a	  diplomatic	  machinery	  as	  old	  as	  Empire	  itself.	  
	  
Non-­‐alignment’s	  application	  was	  affected	  by	   two	  early	  conflicts	  with	  Pakistan	  and	  China.	  They	  
highlighted	  the	  principles	  of	  Indian	  international	  policy	  and	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  system	  
as	   inherited.	   Through	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	   two	  conflicts	   the	   chapter	  will	   argue	   that	  while	  Nehru	  
kept	   with	   the	   tenets	   of	   non-­‐alignment,	   there	   were	   two	   practical	   and	   complicating	   factors:	  
gaining	  familiarity	  with	  how	  to	  operate	  through	  a	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	  and	  the	  transition	  to	  
managing	   real	   power	   after	   Mughal	   and	   British	   rule.	   In	   terms	   of	   managing	   power,	   of	  
operationalizing	  a	  local	  logic	  of	  managing	  power,	  India	  had	  to	  rely	  upon	  a	  class	  of	  administrators	  
who	  though	  Indian	  had	  cut	  their	  teeth	  in	  the	  British	  bureaucratic	  apparatus.	  It	  meant	  that	  under	  
Nehru	  decision	  making	  was	  highly	  centralized	  and	  scant	  regard	  was	  paid	  to	  contrary	  opinion.	  In	  
the	  opinion	  of	  former	  Foreign	  Minister	  Jaswant	  Singh	  this	  is	  probably	  the	  reason	  why	  even	  in	  the	  
21st	  century	  ‘IFS	  officers	  are	  loath	  to	  provide	  any	  opinion.’3	  Power,	  in	  Nehruvian	  times	  coalesced	  
in	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  office	  and	  it	  has	  remained	  there.	  The	  corollary	  is	  that	  the	  prime-­‐meridian	  
of	  Indian	  policy	  has	  remained	  non-­‐alignment.	  Despite	  this,	  Indians	  and	  outsiders,	  academics	  and	  
newspapers	  argue	   to	   the	  contrary.	   It	   raises	  another	   riddle	  which	  will	  be	  undone	  by	  explaining	  
non-­‐alignment	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  practitioners	  and	  demonstrate	  how	  it	  remains	  central	  thru	  
the	   operation	   of	   nuclear	   policy.	   The	   chapter	   will	   conclude	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   revisionist	  
arguments	  about	  India’s	  non-­‐alignment	  as	  being	  specious	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  nuclear	  policy	  
continues	   to	   keep	   with	   satyāgraha	   in	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Gandhi	   developed	   and	   Nehru	  
understood	  the	  term.	  
	  
                                                
3	  Interview	  with	  Jaswant	  Singh.	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Gandhi’s	  innovations	  within	  a	  tradition	  of	  dharma	  
	  
Dharma	   suffuses	   Gandhi’s	   life.	   The	  word	   appears	  more	   than	   3,500	   times	   in	   his	  writings.	   This	  
section	   will	   explicate	   a	   clear	   philosophy	   of	   action	   (including	   diplomatic	   action)	   that	   Gandhi	  
articulated	   based	   on	   the	   Mb’s	   notion	   of	   dharma.	   However,	   there	   is	   the	   charge,	   fashionable	  
amongst	   post-­‐Enlightenment	   scholars,	   that	   Gandhi’s	   writings	   are	   a	   ‘jumble,’4	   bereft	   of	   order.	  
Reminiscent	  of	  the	  initial	  reaction	  of	  European	  scholars	  to	  the	  Mb	  –	  a	  text	  Gandhi	  drew	  on	  –	  the	  
accusation	  is	  not	  new	  and	  hints	  at	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  scholars	  (largely	  foreign	  but	  many	  local)	  
to	  accept	  Gandhi	  on	  his	  own	  terms.	  During	  Gandhi’s	  life	  fellow-­‐Indians	  upbraided	  him	  for	  falling	  
short	   of	   the	   type	   of	   rationality	  which	  Nandy	   derides.	  Never	   alienated	   from	   the	   texture	   of	   his	  
civilization,	   Gandhi	   operated	   on	   a	   distinctly	   local	   plane.	   He	   read	   the	  Mb	   as	   Indian	   diplomats	  
today	  do.	  He	  wrote	  the	  Mb	  is,	  ‘a	  profoundly	  religious	  book,	  largely	  allegorical,	  in	  no	  way	  meant	  
to	  be	  a	  historical	  record.	  It	  is	  a	  description	  of	  the	  eternal	  duel	  going	  on	  within	  ourselves,	  given	  so	  
vividly	   as	   to	  make	  us	   think	   for	   the	   time	  being	   that	   the	  deeds	  described	   therein	  were	   actually	  
done	  by	  human	  beings.’5	  Such	  views	  led	  some	  to	  conclude	  that	  ‘the	  ideal	  of	  truth	  is	  a	  Western	  
conception	  …	  in	  the	  East,	  craftiness	  and	  diplomatic	  wile	  have	  always	  been	  held	  in	  much	  repute.’6	  
Gandhi’s	  response	  to	  such	  criticisms	  provides	  the	  texture	  to	  decode	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  writing:	  
‘At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  I	  never	  think	  of	  what	  I	  have	  said	  before.	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  
be	   consistent	   with	   my	   previous	   statements	   on	   a	   given	   question,	   but	   to	   be	  
consistent	  with	   truth	  as	   it	  may	  present	   itself	   to	  me	  at	  a	  given	  moment.	  …	  But	  
friends	   who	   observe	   inconsistency	   will	   do	   well	   to	   take	   the	   meaning	   that	   my	  
latest	  writing	  may	  yield	  unless,	  of	  course,	  they	  prefer	  the	  old.	  But	  before	  making	  
the	   choice	   they	   should	   try	   to	   see	   if	   there	   is	   not	   an	   underlying	   and	   abiding	  
consistency	  between	  the	  two	  seeming	  inconsistencies.’7	  
The	   key	   to	   unlocking	   this	   passage	   is	   Gandhi’s	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘truth’.	   Gandhi’s	   ‘truth’	   or	  
‘underlying	   and	   abiding	   consistency’	   is	   what	   Hiltebeitel	   calls	   the	   highest	   dharma	   (henceforth	  
HD)	   in	   the	  Mb.	   It	   is	   to	  know	   the	  dharma	   appropriate	   for	   the	  particular	   situation	  one	   is	   in.8	   In	  
other	  words,	  a	  way	  of	  acting	  contextually.	  Such	  a	  system	  of	  action	  focuses	  on	  the	  self,	  requiring	  
                                                
4	  Markovits	  
5	  Sikhism.	  CWMG.	  Vol	  33.	  P.31-­‐32.	  p.32	  
6	  Oriental	  Ideal	  of	  Truth.	  p.227-­‐231.	  p.227-­‐229.	  CWMG.	  Vol.4	  23	  MAY,	  1904	  -­‐	  4	  NOVEMBER,	  1905	  178.	  	  
7	  Conundrums.	  CWMG	  Vol.	  76.	  p.355-­‐359.	  p.	  356	  
8	  Hiltebeitel.	  P.208	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knowledge	  of	  the	  self9	  as	  located	  in	  ‘time’	  and	  ‘space,’	  awareness	  of	  the	  socially	  prescribed	  and	  
learning	  –	  that	  is	  reflecting	  –	  on	  actual	  social	  reality.10	  Gandhi’s	  original	  contribution	  was	  that	  he	  
took	  HD	   and	   focused	  on	   the	   individual’s	  morality	  and	  used	   this	   to	   introduce	   the	   ideal	  of	  non-­‐
violence	   which	   translated	   into	   satyāgraha	   in	   practice.	   Since	   individual	   morality	   was	   the	  
underlying	   consistency	  of	  Gandhi’s	   approach,	   it	   became	   the	  grounds	   for	  his	   engagement	  with	  
the	  British.	  He	  chose	  this	  to	  protect	  himself	  from	  being	  infected	  by	  imperialism	  during	  his	  long	  
and	  intense	  engagement	  with	  British	  imperialism.	  In	  short,	  Gandhi’s	  opposition	  was	  to	  the	  very	  
mentality	  of	  imperialism.	  For	  fellow	  Indians	  to	  want	  anything	  else	  implied:	  
‘that	  we	  want	  English	  rule	  without	  the	  Englishman.	  You	  want	  the	  tiger’s	  nature,	  
but	   not	   the	   tiger;	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   you	   would	   make	   India	   English.	   And	   when	   it	  
becomes	   English,	   it	  will	   be	   called	   not	   Hindustan	   but	   Englistan.	   This	   is	   not	   the	  
Swaraj	  that	  I	  want.11	  
The	  mentalities	  of	   imperialism	  which	  Gandhi	  countered	  were	  many.	  For	  our	  purposes	  two	  are	  
consequential.	  One	  was	   the	   organisational	   principle	   of	   imperial	   society.	   This	  was	   ‘race’	  which	  
simultaneously	  stole	   individuality	   (by	  ascribing	   totalising,	   racial,	   characteristics)	  and	   fostered	  a	  
false	   dichotomy	   or	   hierarchy	   between	   entire	   populations	   (based	   on	  misreading	   of	   Darwinian	  
evolution).12	  The	  second	  was	  violence	  and	  the	  fear	  it	  produced.13	  Morality	  was	  Gandhi’s	  means	  
to	   counter	   both	   by	   creating	   a	   universalism	   of	   the	   particular	   based	   on	   resistance.	   It	   meant	  
Gandhi	   could	   oppose	   imperialism	   without	   resorting	   to	   the	   techniques	   of	   imperialism.	   This	  
contribution	  is	  what	  Nehru	  took	  from	  Gandhi	  and	  continues	  to	  define	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  India.	  
The	  first	  test	  of	  this	  system	  was	  the	  invasion	  of	  Kashmir	  in	  1947.	  That	  incident	  and	  the	  China	  war	  
of	  1961	  both	  produced,	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  Nehru,	  a	  Gandhian	  response.	  Though	  important	  
lessons	  were	  learned	  about	  the	  application	  of	  satyāgraha	  in	  the	  international	  context,	  the	  Indo-­‐
US	   nuclear	   deal	   essentially	   keeps	   to	   the	   same	   logics	   of	   diplomacy.	   The	   abiding	   influence	   of	  
dharma	   on	   the	   logics	   of	   and	   practice	   of	   Indian	   diplomacy	   can	   only	   be	   explained	   thru	  Gandhi	  
because	  he	  reintroduced	  it	  to	  the	  level	  of	  state-­‐politics	  in	  India.	  	  
	  
                                                
9	  Chapter	  3.	  footnote	  72	  
10	  Chapter	  3.	  p.17-­‐19	  
11	  I	  THINK.	  From	  HIND	  SWARAJ.	  CWMG	  Vol.	  10.	  p.255	  	  
12	  See	  Banton.	  1998.	  Of	  course	  race	  in	  itself	  was	  not	  a	  European	  invention	  (See	  Dikötter.	  2008.	  India	  had	  
caste	  –	  which	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  type	  of	  racial	  view	  –	  but	  Gandhi	  laboured	  against	  caste	  
oppression.	  
13	  See	  chapter	  5.	  
Page	  161	  of	  227 
 
In	  explicating	  Gandhi’s	   thought	   a	  number	  of	  misinterpretations	  have	   to	  be	  managed	  but	   they	  
themselves	  provide	   the	  means	  of	   investigating	  his	   thought.	  Though	  correct	   in	   calling	  Gandhi’s	  
thought	   ‘contextual	  pragmatism’	  meaning	  that	  what	  goes	   is	   ‘what	   is	  suitable	  …	  relative	   to	   the	  
person,	   the	   circumstances,	   and	   the	   object,’	   Gier	   is	   incorrect	   to	   base	   this	   upon	   the	   view	   that	  
although	  ‘Gandhi	  expressed	  faith	  in	  eternal	  Truth,	  he	  always	  reminded	  himself	  and	  his	  followers	  
that	   finite	   beings	   could	   only	   know	   finite	   truths.’14	   In	   arriving	   at	   this	   conclusion	   Gier	  makes	   a	  
levels-­‐of-­‐analysis	  error.	  Gandhi’s	  truth	  was	  perspectival	  but	  only	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  and	  this	  did	  
not	  mean	  that	  Truth	  was	  beyond	  people.	  The	  means	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  Gandhi’s	  thought	  on	  his	  
own	  terms	  requires	  focusing	  on	  his	  own	  writings	  and	  the	  texts	  he	  referred	  to.	  One	  pre-­‐eminent	  
source	  –	  for	  dharma	  –	   is	  the	  Mb.	  Between	  1905	  and	  1947	  he	  directly	  refers	  to	  or	  quotes	  from	  
the	  Mb	  nearly	   300	   times,	   translated	   entire	   sections	   of	   it,	   studied	   it	   and	   encouraged	   its	   study	  
nationally.	  Gandhi’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  text	  is	  an	  obvious	  texture	  to	  understanding	  him.	  It	  provides	  
the	  context	  to	  locate	  Gandhi’s	  thought.	  	  
	  
Gandhi’s	  notions	  were	  firmly	  grounded	  in	  the	  Mb’s	  notion	  of	  HD	  which	  countenances	  a	  dharma	  
for	  each	  age	  determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  needs,	  aspirations	  and	  capacities	  of	  the	  individuals	  
living	   in	   that	   age:	   in	   the	   age	   of	   truth	   the	   dharmas	   are	   different	   from	   the	   dharmas	   of	   the	  
dvaparayuga,	   in	   turn	  different	   from	   the	  kaliyuga.	  Dharma	   is	   context	   specific	   leading	  Vohra	   to	  
conclude:	  ‘Dharma,	  keeps	  changing	  in	  accordance	  with	  place	  and	  time.	  With	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  
and	  change	  of	  conditions	  –	  material	  or	  otherwise,	   the	  prevalent	  dharmas	  go	   into	  oblivion	  and	  
new	  dharmas	  take	  their	  place.	  There	  is	  no	  sanctity	  attached	  to	  the	  old	  or	  ancient	  in	  the	  Indian	  
tradition.’15	   Gandhi	   drew	   upon	   this	   fluid	   civilizational	   notion	   of	   dharma,	   in	   an	   age	   of	   fixed	  
certainties	   (religion,	  dogma	  and	  creed)	  and	  proactively	   sought	   to	  distance	  himself	   from	   them.	  
Gandhi	  wrote	  that:	  	  
‘One’s	   dharma	   is	   a	   personal	   possession.	   One	   is	   oneself	   responsible	   for	  
preserving	   it	  or	   losing	   it.	  What	  can	  be	  defended	   in	  and	  through	  a	  group	   is	  not	  
dharma,	   it	   is	   dogma.’16	   Dharma	   is	   unlike	   religions	   because	   the	   sources	   of	  
dharma	   are	   multiple.	   People	   could	   ‘get	   it	   whether	   from	   India	   or	   Arabia’17	  
because	  ‘Hinduism	  …	  is	  ever	  evolving.	  It	  has	  no	  one	  scripture	  like	  the	  Quran	  or	  
                                                
14	  Gier.	  2004.	  p.69,	  79	  
15	  Jain.	  2005.	  P.105	  
16	  Hindu-­‐Muslim	  Unity.	  CWMG.	  Vol.24,	  P.324-­‐327,	  p.325	  
17	  Some	  Reminiscences	  of	  Raychandbhai,	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  36,	  p.467-­‐477.	  p.475	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the	   Bible.	   The	  Gita	   itself	   is	   an	   instance	   in	   point.	   It	   has	   breathed	   new	   life	   into	  
Hinduism.	  It	  has	  given	  an	  original	  rule	  of	  conduct.’18	  	  
Neither	   was	   dharma	   an	   ideology	   because,	   like	   the	   Mb,	   he	   emphasized	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  
individual.	  Gandhi	  noted	  that,	  ‘there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  absolute	  morality	  for	  all	  times.	  But	  there	  
is	  relative	  morality	  which	  is	  absolute	  enough	  for	  imperfect	  morals	  that	  we	  are.’19	  Gandhi	  was	  not	  
after	  a	  static	  morality	  for	  ‘all	  times’.	  Statements,	  especially	  of	  this	  type	  have	  led	  various	  authors	  
to	  ascribe	  to	  him	  a	  lack	  of	  belief	  –	  such	  as	  Gier	  attributing	  perspectivalism	  to	  Gandhi	  and	  others,	  
unfamiliar	  with	  the	  texture	  of	   Indian	  thought,	  even	  rendering	  him	  a	  postmodern!20	  Gandhi	  did	  
countenance,	   in	   the	  manner	   of	   the	  HD	   of	   the	  Mb	  where	   the	   individual’s	   knowing	   and	   doing	  
arises	  from	  context	  –	  rather	  than	  an	  external	  authority.	  It	  is	  the	  Mb,	  rather	  than	  Gandhi	  which	  is	  
captured	  by	  Gier’s	   ‘contextual	  pragmatism’	  and	   from	  within	   this	   setting	  Gandhi	   improvised	   to	  
create	  an	  ‘absolute’	  –	  a	  dharma	  –	  for	  his	  age	  founded	  on	  his	  morality.	  
	  
The	  emphasis	  on	   the	   individual	  however	  did	  not	   signal	  a	  break	   from	  society	  which	   remained	  
fundamental	  to	  Gandhi	  as	   it	  was	   in	  the	  Mb	  where	  the	   individual	  was	  embedded	   in	  society.	   It	  
was	   through	  society	   that	  Gandhi	  overcame	   the	   limited	  perspective	  of	   the	   individual	  and	  also	  
found	   a	  means	   to	   find	   abiding	   truth.	   Gandhi	   wrote:	   ‘Dharma	   is	   a	   quality	   of	   the	   soul	   and	   is	  
present,	   in	   every	   human	   being.	   Through	   it	   we	   know	   our	   duty	   to	   human	   life	   and	   our	   true	  
relation	  with	  other	  souls.	   It	   is	  evident	  that	  we	  cannot	  do	  so	  till	  we	  have	  known	  the	  self	   in	  us.	  
Hence	  dharma	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  we	  can	  know	  ourselves.’21	  Knowing	  oneself	  came	  before	  
knowing	  one’s	   relations	  –	  but	   the	  purpose	  was,	   as	   in	   the	  Mb,	   to	  navigate	   society,	   not	  break	  
with	  it.	  Gandhi	  wrote:	  
‘Dharma	   does	   not	   lie	   in	   giving	   up	   a	   custom	   simply	   because	   no	   reason	   can	   be	  
given	   for	   it.	  On	   the	  contrary	  dharma	  consists	   in	   respecting	   the	  customs	  of	   the	  
society	   of	   which	   one	   is	   part,	   provided	   these	   do	   not	   go	   against	  morality.	   …	   A	  
person	   who	   gives	   up	   a	   practice	   because	   he	   cannot	   see	   any	   reason	   for	   its	  
continuance	  is	  unwise	  and	  wilful.’22	  	  
                                                
18	  Teaching	  of	  Hinduism.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  69.	  p.419-­‐420,	  p.420	  
19	  FAITH	  v.	  REASON,	  CWMG.	  vol.	  77,	  p.154-­‐156.	  p.155	  
20	  Rudolph	  &	  Rudolph.	  2006.	  
21	  CWMG.	  Vol	  36.	  	  
22	  Letter	  to	  Sumangal	  Prakash,	  CWMG	  VOL.	  60,	  p.275-­‐276	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In	  addition,	  he	  specifically	  stated	  that	  to	   ignore	  society	  was	  a	  right	  which	  had	  to	  be	  earned	  by	  
completely	  disengaging	  from	  society.	  Otherwise	  it	  was	  imperative	  to	  participate.	  He	  wrote:	  
‘Today,	  the	  dharma	  of	  our	  times	  is	  to	  spin	  and	  so	  long	  as	  the	  sadhu	  is	  dependent	  
on	   society	   for	   his	   daily	   needs,	   he	   must	   spread	   the	   dharma	   of	   the	   age	   by	  
practising	   it.	   …	   It	   is	   a	   different	   matter,	   however,	   if	   he	   eats	   left-­‐overs	   lying	  
around,	  does	  not	  care	  to	  cover	  himself,	  and	  lives	   in	  some	  unapproachable	  and	  
unseen	  cave	  away	   from	  society.	  He	   is	   then	   free	  not	   to	  observe	   the	  dharma	  of	  
the	  age.’23	  
‘Gandhi	  is	  not	  an	  absolutist,	  idealist	  or	  a	  theoretician	  but	  a	  man	  rooted	  in	  the	  ground	  reality	  of	  
human	  condition	  and	  predicament.	  Unlike	  Kant	  he	  never	   loses	  right	  of	  the	  real	  complex	  ‘lived’	  
situations	   that	   human	   beings	   face	   in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   life,’	   writes	   Jain.	   However,	   he	   repeats	  
Gier’s	   error	   in	   arguing	   that	   Gandhi	   follows	   Kant	   and	   ‘pleads	   for	   imperatives	   which	   are	  
categorical	  enough	  for	  mortals	  like	  us	  whose	  life	  is	  not	  black	  and	  white	  but	  bears	  many	  hues	  of	  
gray.’24	   Such	   a	   reading	   comes	   very	   close	   to	   asserting	   that	   Gandhi	   was	   no	   more	   than	   an	  
opportunistic	  operator	  who	  cloaked	  his	  realism	  in	  the	  garb	  of	  traditional	  sayings.	  Such	  a	  reading	  
cannot	  explain	  Gandhi	  because	  even	  if	  his	  activity	  was	  ‘tactical’	  in	  de	  Certeau’s	  sense,	  the	  tactic	  
relies	  on	  a	  metis.	  For	  Gandhi	  this	  was	  the	  civilizational	  idea	  of	  dharma	  and	  all	  it	  implied.	  
	  
Self-­‐evidently	   aware	  of	  his	  metis	   and	   the	  age	   in	  which	  he	   lived	  and	   intent	  on	   transforming	   it,	  
Gandhi	  sought	  to	  craft	  a	  dharma	  befitting	  his	  age.	   In	  short,	  Gandhi’s	  approach	  was	  to	  tap	   into	  
and	   convince	   his	   society	   to	   create	   an	   abiding	   truth	   whose	   sanctity	   arose	   from	   a	   meeting	   of	  
minds.	   This	   was	   not	   to	   be	   abstract	   thought	   but	   applicable	   to	   concrete	   policy	   formulations.	  
Gandhi’s	  modification	  was	   to	   take	   the	  Mb’s	  dharma	   and	  emphasize	   the	  morality	   implicit	   in	   it	  
and	  secondly	   to	   introduce	  the	  notion	  of	  non-­‐violence.	  These	   two	  components	  were	  necessary	  
for	  Gandhi	  to	  realise	  his	  avowed	  aim	  to	  not	  only	  end	  British	  imperialism	  but	  to	  do	  it	  in	  a	  manner	  
which	  did	  not	  mimic	  imperialism.	  Gandhi’s	  aim	  was	  socio-­‐political	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  create	  
a	  new	  political	  unit	  and	  a	  new	  social	  order.	  The	  political	  aspect	  was	  to	  replace	  imperialism	  with	  
the	  ‘sovereignty	  of	  the	  people	  based	  on	  pure	  moral	  authority.’25	  His	  name	  for	  the	  political	  unit	  
                                                
23	  Discussion	  with	  a	  Jain	  “Muni”	  at	  Palitana,	  CWMG	  VOL.31,	  p.112-­‐114,	  p.113	  
24	  Quoted	  in	  Jain.	  2005.	  p.109-­‐111	  
25	  Speech	  at	  Exhibition	  Ground,	  Faizpur.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  70.	  P.	  2	  -­‐	  235.	  P.232	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was	  Ramarajya	  or	  ‘the	  kingdom	  of	  God	  on	  earth.’26	  This	  had	  to	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  
manner	  because	  means	  mattered.	  He	  explained:	  	  
If	   I	  want	   to	  deprive	  you	  of	  your	  watch,	   I	   shall	   certainly	  have	   to	   fight	   for	   it;	   if	   I	  
want	  to	  buy	  your	  watch,	  I	  shall	  have	  to	  pay	  you	  for	  it;	  and	  if	  I	  want	  a	  gift	  I	  shall	  
have	  to	  plead	  for	  it;	  and,	  according	  to	  the	  means	  I	  employ,	  the	  watch	  is	  stolen	  
property,	  my	  own	  property,	  or	  a	  donation.	  Thus	  we	  see	  three	  different	  results	  
from	  three	  different	  means.’27	  
The	  means	  Gandhi	  wanted	  were	  moral	  means	  –	  in	  short	  non-­‐imperial	  means.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  
social	   element	   of	   his	   enterprise	   becomes	   significant.	  Gandhi	   had	   to	   create	   a	  movement	  which	  
was	   true	   to	  his	  own	  morality	   in	  his	   fight	  against	   the	  British.	   It	  was	  a	  difficult	   task.	  He	  wrote:	   ‘I	  
consider	  it	  to	  be	  man’s	  achievement	  to	  harmonise	  dharma	  [meaning	  morality]	  and	  the	  ultimate	  
aim	  of	   life,	  truth	  and	  swaraj:	  swaraj	  and	  government	  by	  all,	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  
welfare	  of	  all.	  That	  alone	  is	  the	  path	  that	  leads	  to	  moksha,	  that	  alone	  is	  what	  interests	  me.	  None	  
of	  my	  activities	  are	  carried	  on	  with	  any	  other	  end	  in	  view.’28	  
	  
There	   were	   two	   aspects	   to	   this	   harmonization	   entangled	   in	   Gandhi’s	   conception	   of	  morality.	  
One	   was	   to	   nationalise	   his	   dharma.	   This	   of	   course	   had	   to	   be	   done	   without	   violence	   which	  
created	  its	  own	  set	  of	  issues.	  Secondly,	  he	  had	  to	  then	  combat	  a	  system	  predicated	  on	  violence	  
with	  non-­‐violence.	  Essentially,	  for	  Gandhi	  non-­‐violence	  was	  a	  personal	  ‘article	  of	  faith’	  which	  he	  
felt	   was	   the	   ‘agraha’	   (wish)	   of	   individuals	   and	   should	   be	   of	   the	   nation	   as	   a	   whole.	   A	   real	  
democracy,	   Gandhi	   believed,	   emerged	   from	   a	   ‘personal	   liberation,	   an	   attitudinal	   revolution	  
within	  each	  citizen.’29	  It	  was	  this	  that	  Gandhi	  was	  aiming	  to	  perform.	  
	  
Non-­‐violence	   though	   central	   to	  Gandhian	   thought	  was	   not	   of	   local	   origins.	   It	  was	   in	  Nelson’s	  
terms	  a	  product	  of	  intercivilizational	  contact.	  Non-­‐violence,	  as	  Matilal	  argues,	  was	  ‘derived,	  pace	  
his	  [Gandhi’s]	  own	  comments,	  more	  from	  such	  Western	  sources	  as	  Tolstoy	  and	  Ruskin.’30	  Fully	  
cognizant	  that	  the	  British	  did	  not	  have	  a	  monopoly	  on	  violence,	  Gandhi	  wrote:	  ‘Hinduism	  as	  it	  is	  
practiced	   today,	   or	   has	   ever	   been	   known	   to	   have	   ever	   been	   practised,	   has	   certainly	   not	  
                                                
26	  Independence.	  CWMG.	  Vol.90.	  p.327-­‐328	  .	  p.327	  
27	  Hind	  Swaraj.	  CWMG.	  Chapter.	  16.	  Vol.10.	  p.245-­‐315.	  P.287	  
28	  What	  is	  one’s	  dharma?	  CWMG.	  Vol	  46.	  p.296-­‐298.	  p.298	  
29	  Dalton.	  I993.	  p.135-­‐138	  
30	  Bimal	  Krishna	  Matilal	  shows	  that	  non-­‐violence	  had	  an	  Indian	  lineage	  but	  that	  Gandhi	  did	  not	  draw	  upon	  
it.	  See	  Matilal.	  1980..	  See	  also	  Lavrin.	  1960.	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condemned	  war	   as	   I	   do.	  What,	   however,	   I	   have	   done	   is	   to	   put	   a	   new	  but	   natural	   and	   logical	  
interpretation	   upon	   …	   the	   spirit	   of	   Hinduism.31	   Leaving	   aside	   the	   social	   and	   practical	  
manoeuvres	   required	   to	   achieve	   Ramarajya	   non-­‐violently,	   we	   will	   consider	   the	   philosophical	  
integrity	   of	   non-­‐violence’s	   introduction	   since	   it	   became	   a	   constitutive	   element	   of	  metaphysic	  
being	  developed	  and	  adopted	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  Indian	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
	  
The	  degree	  of	  confusion	  surrounding	  Gandhi’s	  notion	  of	  non-­‐violence	  arises	  from	  a	  fundamental	  
failure	   to	   locate	   Gandhi	  within	   his	   own	   texture.	   As	   Bilgrani	   states,	   it	   would	   be	   a	   ‘spectacular	  
misreading’	   to	   view	   Gandhi’s	   non-­‐violence	   from	   within	   the	   Western	   canon	   of	   searching	   for	  
truth.32	   Indicative	   of	   the	  Western	   canon	   is	  Mill’s	  On	   Liberty,	  which	   argues	   that	   truth	   is	   never	  
something	   we	   are	   sure	   we	   have	   attained;	   We	   must	   therefore	   be	   made	   modest	   about	   our	  
opinions	   and	   not	   impose	   them.	   Gandhi	   agreed	   with	   being	   modest	   about	   morality,	   but	   not	  
because	  the	  truth	  of	  morality	  was	  in	  doubt.	  It	  was	  not.	  Gandhi,	  arising	  from	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Mb	  saw	  the	  self-­‐reflecting	   individual	   in	  his	  particular	  context	  as	  most	  significant.	  Gandhi	  made	  
the	  morality	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  most	  significant	  and	  used	  it	  to	  establish	  what	  Gier	  calls	  ‘organic	  
holism.’33	  In	  other	  words,	  Gandhi	  agreed	  with	  the	  Western	  tradition	  that	  morality	  was	  present	  in	  
everyone	  and	  underpinned	  everything	  but	  arrived	  at	   it	   from	  a	  different	  epistemology	  and	  this	  
had	  important	  ontological	  connotations:	  Morality	  for	  Gandhi	  was	  all	  pervasive	  not	  because	  of	  its	  
uniformity;	   rather	   because	   morality	   is	   a	   quality	   present	   in	   every	   individual.	   Gandhi	   wrote,	  
‘dharma	  means	  morality.	   I	   do	   not	   know	   of	   any	   dharma	   which	   is	   opposed	   to	   or	   goes	   beyond	  
morality.	  Dharma	  is	  morality	  practised	  to	  its	  ultimate	  limits.’34	  Morality	  was	  universal,	  but	  it	  was	  
highly	   individualistic	  and	  not	   subservient	   to	  external	  authority.	  The	   ‘seat	  of	  authority’,	  Gandhi	  
said	  ‘lies	  here	  (pointing	  to	  his	  breast).	  I	  exercise	  my	  judgement	  about	  every	  scripture,	  including	  
the	  Gita.’35	  What	  Gandhi	  did	  was	   to,	   in	   local	   terms,	  give	  pride	  of	  place	   to	  antahkarana	  or	   the	  
individual’s	   morality	   rather	   than	   śruti	   (revealed	   texts),	   smrti	   (traditions)	   and	   ācāra	   (expected	  
conduct).36	  To	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Mb,	  what	  Gandhi	  did	  was	  take	  the	  central	  notion	  of	  the	  
                                                
31	  Teaching	  of	  Hinduism.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  69.	  p.419-­‐420,	  p.420	  
32	  Bilgrami.	  
33	  Gier.	  2004.	  p.41;	  Such	  conceptions	  would	  have	  been	  available	  to	  Gandhi	  from	  his	  own	  background,	  in	  
particular	  the	  bhakti	  movement	  which	  was	  influential	  in	  Gandhi’s	  home	  state,	  Gujarat.	  See	  Brady.	  2001;	  
Rangarajan.	  1996.	  
34	  What	  is	  One’s	  Dharma.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  46.	  P.296-­‐298.	  p.296	  
35	  Discussion	  with	  Basil	  Mathews	  and	  others.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  70.	  P.113-­‐117.	  p.	  117	  
36	  See	  Bühler.	  1964.	  p.30	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individual	   in	   context	   and	   sought	   out	   the	   agent’s	   conscience	   and	   argued	   that	   the	   agent’s	  
operations	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  conscience.	  Gandhi’s	  personal	  morality	  was	  ‘truth	  and	  
non-­‐violence.	  While	  the	  end	  is	  truth,	  non-­‐violence	  is	  the	  means	  of	  attaining	  it.	  In	  such	  matters,	  
however,	   the	  means	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   the	   end.	  Hence	   I	   have	  written	   that	   truth	   and	  
non-­‐violence	  are	  the	  two	  sides	  of	   the	  same	  coin.’37	   In	  emphasizing	  morality,	  Gandhi	  kept	  with	  
the	  centrality	  HD	  accorded	  to	  the	  individual.	  His	  innovation	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  
individual.	  As	  Ganeri	  writes:	  	  
‘what	  is	  in	  question	  is	  not	  how	  the	  practice	  is	  made,	  but	  how	  it	  is	  made	  sense	  of,	  
and	   that	   is	   what	   preserves	   each	   of	   the	   virtues	   involved	   as	   itself	   an	   intrinsic	  
good.	  Gandhi	  was	   right	   to	   identify	   in	   the	   ideas	  of	  satyāgraha	   and	  non-­‐harm	  a	  
pair	  of	  pan-­‐Indian	  intrinsic	  values	  that	  support	  each	  other	  in	  achieving	  stability	  
under	  reflection.	  Philosophy,	  argumentation	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  truth	  are	  also	  
arts	   of	   the	   soul,	   ways	   of	   cultivating	   impartiality,	   self-­‐control,	   steadiness,	  
modesty,	  toleration	  and	  patience.’38	  
	  
This	  understanding	  of	  morality	  though	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  Western	  canon	  –	  was	  entirely	  
in	   keeping	  with	   the	  Mb’s	  HD.	   One	  Western	   response	   to	   Gandhi	  was	   that	   he	  was	   stuck	   in	   an	  
Orientalist	   view	   of	   India	   being	   different.39	   Such	   an	   argument,	   of	   course,	   is	   nothing	   less	   than	  
another	  attempt	  to	  reel	  Gandhi	  into	  the	  folds	  of	  the	  European	  canon.	  Gandhi	  was	  not	  different,	  
in	   the	   sense	   that	   he	  was	  unrecoverable	   to	   Europe.	  He	   assumed	  exactly	   the	  opposite	  because	  
Gandhi	  argued	  morality	  was	  absolute	  because	  the	  individual	  believed	  it.	  In	  doing	  so	  Gandhi	  kept	  
with	   the	   Mb’s	   focus	   on	   the	   individual	   acting	   contextually.	   This	   meant	   that	   the	   ‘pervasive	  
diffidence	  and	  lack	  of	  conviction	  in	  our	  opinions	  which	  is	  the	  character	  of	  the	  epistemology	  that	  
Mill’s	   argument	   presupposes,	   is	   entirely	   alien	   to	   Gandhi.’40	   In	   terms	   of	   action,	   Mill’s	   lack	   of	  
certainty	  meant	  one	  tolerates	  other	  moralities.	  In	  contrast,	  Gandhi	  was	  certain.	  It	  gave	  him	  the	  
courage	  to	  act	  on	  his	  convictions.	  His	  conscience	  told	  him	  that	  non-­‐violence	  was	  the	  moral	  path	  
and	  so	  it	  became	  for	  him	  the	  means	  of	  securing	  Ramarajya.	  This	  is	  why	  Gandhi’s	  conception	  of	  
non-­‐violence	  becomes	  essential.	  He	  explained	  that:	  	  
                                                
37	  What	  is	  One’s	  Dharma.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  46.	  P.296-­‐298.	  p.296	  
38	  Ganeri.	  P.235-­‐236	  
39	  Fox.	  1989.	  p.103	  
40	  Ibid.,	  P.253	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‘Not	   to	   hurt	   any	   living	   thing	   is	   no	   doubt	   a	   part	   of	   ahimsa.	   But	   it	   is	   its	   least	  
expression.	   The	   principle	   of	   ahimsa	   is	   hurt	   by	   every	   evil	   thought,	   by	   undue	  
haste,	  by	  lying,	  by	  hatred,	  by	  wishing	  ill	  of	  anybody.’41	  
It	  meant	  that	  the	  moral	  being	  could	  not	  bear	   ‘hostility	  to	  others	  or	  even	  criticise	  them;	   it	  only	  
required	  that	  one	  not	  follow	  these	  others,	  if	  conscience	  does	  not	  permit	  it.’42	  In	  other	  words	  an	  
ends	  free	  of	  criticism	  had	  to	  be	  accomplished	  without	  criticism.	  The	  alternative	  was	  resistance	  
because	  unlike	  criticism	  it	  was	  moral	  (as	  Gandhi	  understood	  the	  term)	  and	  it	  was	  not	  totalizing	  
in	   the	   sense	  of	   the	  Western	   tradition	  of	  moral	  philosophy.’43	  Resistance	  opposed	  but	  was	  not	  
like	  criticism	  which	  actually	  did	  violence	  to	  the	  opponent.	  Unlike	  criticism,	  resistance	   is	  not	  an	  
impurity	   of	   the	   heart,	   it	   does	   not	   get	   corrupted	   as	   easily	   nor	   does	   it	   breed	   hostility	   which	  
inevitably	   results	   in	  other	   forms	  of	   violence.	  Resistance	  differed	   from	  criticism	  because	   it	  was	  
devoid	   of	   implications	   of	   homogenizing	   universality	   because	   to	   criticise	   is	   the	   imposition	   of	  
individual	  morality	  upon	  another.	  Resistance,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  arises	  from	  a	  disagreement	  in	  
individual	   moralities	   but	   instead	   of	   attempting	   to	   either	   erase	   it	   (critique)	   or	   accept	   it	  
(toleration)	  what	  is	  done	  is	  to	  simply	  resist	  the	  immoral.	  It	  was	  through	  resistance	  that	  Gandhi	  
was	  able	  to	  harmonize	  his	  dharma	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  Ramarajya.	  	  
	  
If	   philosophically	   Gandhi’s	   approach	   is	   sound	   then	   the	   second	   act	   of	   harmonization	   he	   was	  
attempting	  was	  to	  meld	  his	  dharma	  with	  the	  people,	  in	  short,	  the	  question	  of	  Truth	  as	  absolute	  
for	  him,	  he	  now	  had	  to	  convince	  others	  (a	  process	  which	  also	  shaped	  him).	  Crucially,	  for	  Gandhi,	  
‘Truthfulness	   is	   even	   more	   important	   than	   peacefulness.	   Indeed,	   lying	   is	   the	   mother	   of	  
violence.’44	  For	  Gandhi,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Bondurant’s	  argument	  which	  is	  once	  again	  predicated	  on	  
the	  supposed	  relativity	  of	  truth,45	  truth	  was	  absolute.	  However	  he	  could	  not	  impose	  his	  truth	  on	  
others.	  The	  way	  of	  engaging	  the	  opponent	  was	  through	  resistance.	  The	  way	  of	  engaging	  those	  
who	  did	  not	  consider	  Gandhi	  an	  enemy	  was	  for	  Gandhi	  to	  demonstrate	  his	  truth	  to	  them.	  This	  
was	  essential	  because	  Gandhi	  was	  a	  humanist	  and	  creating	  a	  mass	  movement.	  It	  was	  impossible	  
for	  him	  to	  close	  himself	  off.	  Gandhi’s	  answer	  was	  to	  act	  virtuously,	   that	   is,	   in	  keeping	  with	  his	  
morality	  of	  non-­‐violence.	  This,	  like	  all	  virtues	  was	  not	  realisable	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Gandhi	  wrote:	  	  
                                                
41	  Letter	  to	  Narandas	  Gandhi.	  CWMG.	  Vol.49.	  P.406-­‐409.	  p.408	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  Bilgrami,	  op.	  cit.	  P.	  244	  
43	  Bilgrami.	  P.255	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  War	  or	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  Vol.	  35.	  p.244-­‐246.	  p.245	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‘A	  human	  being	  may	  keep	  perfect	  non-­‐violence	  as	  his	  or	  her	  ideal	  and	  strive	  to	  
follow	  it	  as	  completely	  as	  possible.	  But	  no	  matter	  how	  near	  it	  he	  reaches,	  he	  will	  
find	  some	  degree	  of	  violence	  unavoidable,	  in	  breathing	  or	  eating,	  for	  instance.’46	  	  
Impossibility	   in	  practice	  however	  did	  not	  diminish	  the	  value	  of	  the	  ideal:	   ‘The	  fact	  that	  perfect	  
non-­‐violence	  is	  impossible	  to	  practise	  while	  one	  lives	  in	  this	  body	  does	  not	  vitiate	  the	  principle	  
itself.’47	  Pontara	  mistakenly	  remarks	  that	  ‘Gandhi's	  rejection	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  solution	  of	  group	  
conflicts	  is	  in	  practice	  subject	  to	  so	  many	  qualifications	  that	  his	  whole	  position	  has	  to	  be	  sharply	  
distinguished	  from	  the	  traditional	  Western	  pacifist	  view.’48	  Gandhi’s	  position	  was	  certainly	  not	  
Western	   pacifism.	   It	   was	   distinct	   and	   arose	   from	   totally	   different	   epistemological	   origins.	   He	  
expected	   his	   actions	   to	   convert	   the	   immoral	   to	  morality	   but	   if	   it	   did	   not	   the	   only	   effect	  was	  
Gandhi’s	  disappointment	  since	  he	  never	  sought	  to	  prescribe	  to	  others	  what	  they	  ought	  to	  do.	  It	  
was	  not	  better	  but	  entirely	  distinct	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  criticism.	  	  
	  
So	  convinced	  was	  he	  of	  the	  desired	  response,	  that	  is,	  that	  humanity	  was	  unified,	  that	  not	  even	  
Hitler	   and	   Mussolini	   were	   beyond	   the	   veil.	   A	   questioner	   put	   it	   to	   Gandhi	   that	   Hitler	   and	  
Mussolini,	  ‘are	  incapable	  of	  any	  moral	  response.	  They	  have	  no	  conscience	  and	  are	  impervious	  to	  
world	   opinion.	   Seeing	   that	   dictatorships	   are	   unmoral	   by	   definition,	   would	   the	   law	   of	   moral	  
conversion	   hold	   good	   in	   their	   case?’	   Gandhi’s	   reply	   was	   that	   ‘non-­‐violence	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
assumption	   that	   human	   nature	   is	   one	   and	   therefore	   unfailingly	   responds	   to	   the	   advance	   of	  
love.’	  He	  added	  that	  ‘these	  dictators’	  defy	  world	  opinion	  because	  none	  of	  the	  ‘Great	  Powers	  can	  
come	   to	   them	  with	   clean	   hands’	   because	   of	   the	   ‘injustice	   done	   to	   their	   people	   by	   the	   Great	  
Powers	   in	  the	  past.’49	  For	  Gandhi	  then,	  non-­‐violence	  would	  always	  succeed	  because	  the	  world	  
was	  morally	  indivisible	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  had	  a	  sense	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	  –	  and	  in	  the	  specific	  
case	  of	  Hitler	  and	  Mussolini,	   their	  morality	  had	  not	  been	  activated	  because	  they	  were	  dealing	  
with	  immoral	  actors	  who	  themselves	  gloried	  in	  violence.50	  To	  effect	  a	  response	  one	  needed	  to	  
be	  virtuous.	  ‘Goodness	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  mysterious	  contagion’	  writes	  Bilgrani.	  There	  were	  also	  some	  
                                                
46	  Problem	  of	  Non-­‐violence.	  CWMG.	  Vol	  35.	  P.323-­‐324.	  p.323	  
47	  Letter	  to	  Ambalal	  Sarabhai.	  CWMG.	  Vol	  36.	  P.28-­‐31.	  p.30.	  See	  also:	  Letter	  to	  Premabehn	  Kantak.	  Vol.	  
56.	  p.263-­‐267.	  p.267	  and	  specifically	  a	  very	  idealistic	  portrayal	  of	  invasion:	  Triumph	  of	  Non-­‐violence.	  Vol.	  
21.	  P.512-­‐516.	  p.515	  
48	  Pontara.	  1965.	  p.209	  
49	  Discussion	  with	  Christian	  Missionaries.	  CWMG.	  Vol	  74	  P.307-­‐313.	  P.311-­‐312	  
50	  The	  difference,	  if	  any,	  between	  fascism	  and	  imperialism	  (Germany	  and	  Britain)	  was	  not	  of	  kind	  but	  of	  
degree	  argued	  Gandhi.	  See	  Statement	  to	  the	  Press.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  83.	  P.174-­‐177.	  p.176	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very	   utilitarian	   benefits	   to	   be	   reaped.	   For	   Klitgaard	   this	   is	   almost	   a	   Platonic	   lesson:	   acting	  
virtuously	  leads	  to	  the	  greatest	  utility.51	  	  
	  
The	   utility	   of	   Gandhi’s	   philosophy	   lay	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   resistance	   based	   on	   absolute	   truth.	  
Arising	   from	   a	   totally	   distinct	   epistemology	   (truth	   was	   perfect	   and	   realisable)	   it	   produced	  
satyāgraha	  a	  form	  of	  violence	  –	  since	  it	  opposes	  –	  ontologically	  different	  from	  imperial	  violence.	  
In	  practice	  satyāgraha	  meant	   resistance	   (not	  violence	  of	   the	   imperial	   variety)	   founded	  on	   the	  
absolute	  morality	  of	  the	  practitioner	  and	  knowing	  that	  morality	  was	  universal	  since	  the	  aim	  of	  
the	  action	  was	  to	  make	  the	  opponent	  abandon	  their	  immoral	  ways	  through	  Gandhi’s	  example.	  
The	   ontological	   difference	   between	   Gandhi’s	   violence	   and	   imperial	   violence	   meant	   that	  
satyāgraha’s	  object	  was	  to	  –	  unlike	  any	  previous	  form	  of	  violence	  –	  always	  appeal	  to	  the	  heart.52	  
It	   required	  a	  certain	  quality	  –	  morality	  –	   in	   the	   target.	  As	  Power	  notes,	  British	  attitudes	  made	  
Gandhi’s	   satyāgraha	   feasible.53	   Here	   was	   Gandhi’s	   proof	   of	   the	   universal	   nature	   of	   truth.	   It	  
might	  require	  intense	  action	  to	  tease	  it	  out,	  but	  it	  was	  possible.	  Gandhi’s	  success	  was	  due	  to	  the	  
British	  possessing,	  as	  Gandhi	  knew	  they	  did,	  the	  morality	  to	  realise	  their	  wrong.	  Klitgaard	  calls	  
this	   sympathy	   and	  adds	   that	   for	   satyāgraha	   to	   succeed	   it	   requires	   the	  opponent	   to	   also	  be	   a	  
‘maximizer’	  not	  an	  ‘absolutist’	  because	  if	  the	  opponent	  can	  absolutely	  commit	  to	  defeating	  the	  
satyāgrahi	   then	   the	   latter	   commits	   suicide.54	   These	   two	   reasons	   made	   Gandhi	   write:	   ‘You	  
cannot	   fast	  against	  a	   tyrant,’	  because	   ‘it	  will	  be	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  violence	  done	  to	  him.	  You	   invite	  
penalty	   from	   him	   for	   disobedience	   of	   his	   orders,	   but	   you	   cannot	   inflict	   on	   yourself	   penalties	  
when	   he	   refuses	   to	   punish	   and	   renders	   it	   impossible	   for	   you	   to	   disobey	   his	   orders	   so	   as	   to	  
compel	  infliction	  of	  penalty.’	  Gandhi	  concluded:	  	  
‘Fasting	   can	   only	   be	   resorted	   to	   against	   a	   lover,	   not	   to	   extort	   rights	   but	   to	  
reform	   him,	   as	   when	   a	   son	   fasts	   for	   a	   parent	   who	   drinks.	   I	   fasted	   to	   reform	  
those	  who	  loved	  me.	  But	  I	  will	  not	  fast	  to	  reform,	  say	  General	  Dyer	  who	  not	  only	  
does	  not	  love	  me,	  but	  who	  regards	  himself	  as	  my	  enemy.’55	  	  
Fasting,	   of	   course,	   was	   not	   the	   only	   tactic	   of	   non-­‐violent	   resistance.	   With	   someone	   as	  
intractable	   as	   Dyer	   there	   was	   only	   disappointment.	   However	   disappointment	   was	   not	  
                                                
51	  Klitgaard.	  1971.	  p.143-­‐153.	  
52	  Requisite	  Qualifications.	  CWMG.	  Vol.75.	  P.195-­‐197.	  P.196	  
53	  Power.	  1963	  p.99-­‐108.	  p.106-­‐107	  
54	  Klitgaard.	  p.143-­‐153.	  P.148	  
55	  Letter	  to	  George	  Joseph.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  27.	  p.225-­‐226.	  p.225	  Fasting	  in	  satyāgraha	  	  has	  well-­‐defined	  
limits.	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something	  Gandhi	   feared.	  Nandy	  notes	  that	  the	  Mb	  ends	   in	  a	  sort	  of	  disappointment.	  Gandhi,	  
wrote	  India's	  second	  President	  Radhakrishnan,	   ‘knows	  that	   life	  at	  best	   is	  a	   long	  second	  best,	  a	  
perpetual	   compromise	   between	   the	   ideal	   and	   the	   possible.	   The	   kingdom	   of	   God	   knows	   no	  
compromise,	  no	  practical	  limitations.	  But	  here	  on	  earth	  there	  are	  the	  pitiless	  laws	  of	  nature.	  We	  
have	  to	  build	  an	  ordered	  cosmos	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  human	  passions.	  Through	  effort	  and	  difficulty	  
ideals	  struggle	  to	  realisation.’56	  
	  
Life	   as	   second	   best	   however	   had	   much	   to	   commend	   it	   as	   far	   as	   Gandhi	   was	   concerned.	  
Practically,	   there	  were	  Gandhi’s	   pronouncements	   on	   Poland’s	   resistance	   to	  Nazi	   invasion.	   For	  
Gandhi,	  the	  Poles	  were	  non-­‐violent	  though	  they	  did	  fight	  the	  Nazis.	  Non-­‐violence	  was	  a	  virtue,	  it	  
was	   right	   and	   it	   had	   to	   be	   practiced.	   The	   very	   fact	   that	   it	   arose	   from	   Gandhi’s	   morality	   (or	  
anyone	  with	  a	  similar	  morality)	  made	  any	  capitulation	  a	  betrayal	  of	  oneself.	  Gandhi	   found	  the	  
Poles	  resistance	  non-­‐violent	  not	  because	  it	  was	  minimal.	  He	  found	  it	  non-­‐violent	  because	  it	  was	  
a	  sacrifice	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  non-­‐violence.	  In	  an	  analogy	  Gandhi	  said:	  
‘Haven’t	  I	  said	  to	  our	  women	  that,	  if	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  honour	  they	  used	  their	  
nails	  and	  teeth	  and	  even	  a	  dagger,	  I	  should	  regard	  their	  conduct	  nonviolent?	  …	  
Supposing	  a	  mouse	  in	  fighting	  a	  cat	  tried	  to	  resist	  the	  cat	  with	  his	  sharp	  teeth,	  
would	  you	  call	  that	  mouse	  violent?’	  Honour,	  was	  maintaining	  morality,	  oneself,	  
and	  so	  Gandhi	  wrote,	  ‘In	  the	  same	  way,	  for	  the	  Poles	  to	  stand	  valiantly	  against	  
the	   German	   hordes	   vastly	   superior	   in	   numbers,	   military	   equipment	   and	  
strength,	  was	   almost	  non-­‐violence.	  …	  You	  must	   give	   its	   full	   value	   to	   the	  word	  
‘almost’.	  	  
However,	  what	  was	  acceptable	  for	  Poland	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  massive	  aggressor	  was	  not	  for	  India.	  
He	   warned	   that	   the	   size	   of	   India	   meant	   that	   Indians	   could	   not	   organize	   itself	   into	   an	   army	  
because	  preparedness	  was	  synonymous	  with	  European	  exploitation.	  He	  wrote,	  ‘if	  we	  take	  that	  
path	   [to	   meet	   violence	   with	   superior	   violence],	   we	   will	   also	   have	   to	   choose	   the	   path	   of	  
exploitation	   like	   the	  European	  nations.’57	   Though	  committed	   to	  a	  different	  path	  arising	  out	  of	  
the	   dynamic	   of	   the	   civilization	   –	   it	   explains	   Gandhi’s	  massive	   support	   base	   –	   Gandhian	   ideas	  
were,	   by	   the	   time	  of	   the	   incipient	   state,	   also	   somewhat	  dated,	   not	   in	   terms	  of	   theory,	   but	   in	  
practical	  terms.	  
                                                
56	  Prabhu	  &	  Rao.	  1967.	  p.xi	  
57	  Discussion	  with	  B.G.	  Kher	  and	  others.	  CWMG.	  vol.	  79.	  p.121-­‐	  129.	  p.121-­‐122	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Gandhian	  theory	  in	  practice:	  Kashmir	  and	  China	  
	  
In	   any	   case,	   India	   did	   not	   have	   the	   time	   required	   to	   seriously	   consider	   the	   alternative	   routes	  
opened	  up	  by	  Gandhi.	  Within	  weeks	  of	  independence	  Pakistan	  invaded	  Kashmir	  and	  a	  few	  years	  
later	  India	  fought	  a	  short	  and	  bitter	  war	  with	  China.	  The	  two	  events	  were	  a	  test	  of	  the	  dharma	  
developed	   by	   Gandhi.	   The	   Indian	   response	   in	   Kashmir	   illustrated	   the	   operation	   of	   Gandhian	  
foreign	  policy,	  kept	  with	  dharma	  however	  important	  lessons	  were	  learned	  about	  the	  application	  
of	  such	  policy	   in	  the	   international	  realm.	  Kashmir	  demonstrated	  that	   in	  the	  moral	  response	  so	  
essential	   to	   Gandhian	   action	   could	   not	   be	   expected.	   Yet,	   India	   persisted	   in	   viewing	   it	   as	   a	  
universal.	  China	  was	  a	  more	  complicated	  test	  of	  dharma.	  The	  episode	  can	  only	  be	  explained	  in	  
terms	   of	   a	   satyāgraha	   with	   the	   deep	   thought	   Gandhi’s	   satyāgrahas	   required.	   The	   use	   of	   an	  
outdated,	   colonial	   era	   bureaucracy	   also	   complicated	   the	   application	   of	   Gandhian	   strategy	  
problematical.	  Though	  India	  emerged	  shaken	  and	  beaten	  Gandhian	  ways	  persisted	  because	  the	  
two	   events	   forced	   India’s	   leaders	   to	   formulate	   a	   practical	  means	   of	   applying	  Gandhian	   ideas.	  
These	  themes	  were	  noted	  by	  Nehru	  himself	  when	  speaking	  on	  the	  two	  conflicts.	  He	  said:	  
‘First	  of	  all,	  right	  at	  the	  beginning,	  after	  our	  independence	  there	  was	  a	  general	  
background	  of	  our	  not	  spending	  too	  much	  money	  on	  the	  army	  …	  We	  decided	  to	  
save	  money	  on	  defence	  and	  apply	   it	   to	   industrialisation	  …	  We	  hoped	   that	   the	  
cease-­‐fire	   in	   Kashmir	   (that	   is,	   1st	   January	   1948)	   would	   result	   in	   some	   kind	   of	  
settlement	  and	  we	  saw	  no	  other	  country	  likely	  to	  attack	  us	  and	  so	  we	  decided	  to	  
reduce	  the	  strength	  of	  our	  army.’58	  
Within	  the	  decade	  Nehru	  offered	  a	  ‘no	  war’	  pact	  to	  Pakistan.	  Accepted	  in	  1956,	  Nehru’s	  speech	  
to	  the	  Lok	  Sabah	  was	   justified:	   ‘It	   is	  not	  by	  military	  methods	  or	  threats	  of	  war	  or	  by	  talking	  to	  
each	  other	   from	   so-­‐called	  positions	  of	   strength	   that	  we	   shall	   come	  nearer	  …	  We	   can	  develop	  
strength	  in	  other	  ways,	  strength	  in	  friendship,	   in	  cooperation	  and	  through	  raising	  the	  standard	  
of	  our	  people.’59	  But	  within	  a	  year	  his	  tone	  had	  changed.	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  ‘Pakistan’s	  mind	  
was	  tied	  up	  with	  violence	  and	  hatred	  against	  India’	  but	  ‘At	  any	  rate	  we	  are	  not	  going	  to	  reply	  in	  
kind.	  We	  will	   continue	   to	   be	   friendly	  with	   them.’60	   Nehru	   also	   noted	   the	   difference	   between	  
India’s	  approach	  and	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  world	  when	  he	  said	   in	  1962	   ‘we	  are	  getting	  out	  of	   touch	  
                                                
58	  Lok	  Sabah	  Debates	  22	  August	  1963	  
59	  Lok	  Sabah	  Statement	  20	  March	  1956	  
60	  Nehru.	  1958.	  Speech	  in	  Madras.	  Jan	  31,	  1957.	  p.230	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with	   reality	   in	   the	  modern	  world,	   and	  we	  were	   living	   in	   an	   artificial	   atmosphere	   of	   our	   own	  
creation.’61	   This	   was	   interpreted	   as	   administrative	   failure	   arising	   out	   of	   its	   alienation	   leading	  
Nehru	  to	  clarify	  in	  1963	  that	  he	  meant:	  
‘What	  I	  meant	  was	  that	  this	  world	  is	  cruel.	  We	  had	  thought	  in	  terms	  of	  carrying	  
the	  banner	  of	  peace	  everywhere	  and	  we	  were	  betrayed.	  China	  betrayed	  us;	  the	  
world	   has	   betrayed	   us.	   Our	   efforts	   to	   follow	   the	   path	   of	   peace	   have	   been	  
knocked	   on	   the	   head.	   We	   are	   forced	   to	   prepare	   for	   a	   defensive	   war,	   much	  
against	  our	  will’.62	  
	  
For	  Gandhi	  the	  invasion	  of	  Kashmir	  was	  a	  test	  of	  his	  dharma.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  Empire,	  the	  King	  of	  
Kashmir	   chose	   to	   be	   independent.	   Pakistan	   invaded	   Kashmir	   using	   armed	   tribals.	   The	   King’s	  
reaction	  was	  to	  transfer	  responsibility	  to	  a	  populist	  politician,	  Sheikh	  Abdullah	  who	  was	  viewed	  
by	  Gandhi	   as	   the	   true	   representative	  of	   the	  Kashmiris.	  Abdullah	  asked	   for	   Indian	  help.	   India’s	  
response	  was	  that	  help	  would	  be	  conditional	  on	  accession	  to	   India.	  Abdullah	  agreed.	  The	  King	  
signed	  the	  instrument	  of	  accession	  and	  Indian	  troops,	  after	  having	  fought	  for	  imperialism	  in	  one	  
guise	   or	   another	   for	   centuries	   for	   the	   first	   time	   fought	   for	   dharma.	   They	   fought	   for	   dharma	  
because	  they	  resisted	  the	  immoral	  actions	  of	  Pakistan.	  In	  Gandhi’s	  terms	  Pakistan	  was	  immoral	  
on	  two	  counts.	  Firstly,	  Pakistani	  violence	  was	  a	  total	  negation	  of	  dharma	  not	  because	  they	  were	  
being	   violent.	   This	   would	   have	   been	   acceptable	   if	   it	   was	   to	   resist	   non-­‐violence.	   However	  
Pakistan	  used	  violence	  to	  destroy	  the	  virtue	  of	  non-­‐violence.	  The	  objective	  to	  Pakistani	  raiders	  
was	  to	  coerce	  Kashmiris.63	  	  
	  
The	   second	   form	   of	   immorality	   was	   a	   challenge	   to	   a	   fundamental	   notion	   for	   Gandhi	   and	   it	  
baffled	  Gandhi	  –	  indicating	  the	  conceptual	  limits	  of	  his	  dharma	  and	  the	  need	  to	  craft	  a	  dharma	  
suited	  for	  post-­‐independence	  India.	  Gandhi	  captured	  the	  notion	  best	  when	  he	  wrote:	   ‘Truth	   is	  
God.’64	   This	  was	  directly	   attacked	  when	  Pakistan	  denied	  playing	  any	  part	   in	   the	   invasion.	   This	  
was	  a	  blatant	  untruth	  for	  Gandhi,	  indicating	  a	  total	  lack	  of	  dharma	  as	  he	  understood	  it.	  In	  brief,	  
according	  to	  Gandhi	  morality	  was	  individual	  and	  Pakistan	  (for	  ease)	  was	  entitled	  to	  its	  morality	  
and	  to	  act	  upon	  it.	  For	  Gandhi	  this	  was	  truth.	  However,	  the	  Pakistani’s	  were	  not	  being	  truthful	  
                                                
61	  Lok	  Sabha	  Debates.	  Oct	  25,	  1962	  
62	  Lok	  Sabah	  Debates.	  22	  Aug	  1963	  	  
63	  Speech	  at	  Prayer	  Meeting.	  CWMG.	  Vol	  97.	  P.284-­‐287.	  p.286	  
64	  Truth	  and	  khilafat,	  CWMG.	  VOL.	  21,	  p.329-­‐330,	  p.329	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since	  they	  were	  lying	  about	  the	  use	  of	  raiders.	  Hence,	  it	  was	  not	  dharma	  according	  to	  Gandhi.	  As	  
he	  said:	  ‘If	  there	  are	  raids	  from	  outside	  the	  frontier	  of	  Kashmir,	  the	  obvious	  conclusion	  is	  that	  it	  
must	  be	  with	  the	  connivance	  of	  Pakistan.	  Pakistan	  can	  deny	  it.	  But	  the	  denial	  does	  not	  settle	  the	  
matter.	   …	   They	   keep	   saying	   that	   they	   want	   an	   amicable	   settlement	   but	   they	   do	   nothing	   to	  
create	   the	   conditions	   for	   such	   a	   settlement.’65	   Sometime	   later	   he	   said,	   ‘I	   can	   understand	   it	   if	  
every	  outsider	   leaves	  Kashmir	  and	  no	  one	   interferes	   from	  outside	  or	  sends	  help	  or	  complains.	  
But	  I	  cannot	  understand	  it	  if	  they	  (Pakistan)	  say	  that	  they	  themselves	  will	  remain	  in	  Kashmir	  but	  
that	  others	  should	  get	  out.’	  This	   lack	  of	  understanding	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  Gandhi’s	  history	  of	  
satyāgraha.	   Till	   Kashmir	   his	   target	  was	  British	   imperialism.	  Gandhi’s	   satyāgrahas	   had	   resisted	  
the	  British	  whom	  he	  trusted	  to	  respond	  with	  the	  correct	  moral	  response	  and	  they,	  by	  and	  large,	  
did	  not	  let	  him	  down.	  He	  applied	  the	  same	  approach	  to	  Pakistan,	  saying:	  ‘Why	  should	  we	  not	  so	  
conduct	  ourselves	  that	  any	  conflict	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  becomes	  impossible?	  We	  must	  
be	   brave	   and	   trust	   the	  Muslims.	   If	   later	   they	   violate	   the	   trust	   you	   can	   cut	   off	   their	   heads.’66	  
Unfortunately	  they	  did.	  
	  
Gandhi’s	  attitude	  towards	  violence	  was	  complex.	  As	  shown	  by	  Klitgaard,	  Gandhi	  was	  violent	   in	  
that	   he	   opposed	   British	   rule.	   However	   he	   performed	   a	   type	   of	   violence	   so	   removed	   from	  
imperial	  coercion	  that	  it	  was	  relationally	  and	  ontologically	  non-­‐violent.	  He	  did	  not	  disapprove	  of	  
violence	  but	  the	  manner	  of	   its	  application	  and	  the	  rationality	  underpinning	  it	  converted	  it	   into	  
something	   else.	   The	   quality	   of	   the	   action,	   arising	   from	   the	   context,	   made	   the	   difference.	   He	  
categorically	   stated,	   ‘I	   do	   not	   agree	   that	   the	   armed	   force	   our	   Government	   has	   dispatched	   to	  
Kashmir	   has	   committed	   aggression	   there.’67	  Nevertheless	   he	   found	   it	   ‘barbarous’	   that	   he	   had	  
been	  put	  in	  such	  a	  position	  because	  he	  had	  to	  actually	  use,	  even	  if	  for	  what	  was	  no	  more	  than	  
resistance,	   a	   type	   of	   violence	   which	   came	   very	   close	   to	   imperial	   violence.68	   No	   matter	   how	  
distasteful	  he	  found	  it	  in	  practical	  terms,	  philosophically,	  there	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
army	  was	  moral	  because	  it	  served	  morality.	  As	  always,	  Gandhi	  in	  keeping	  with	  HD	  was	  sensitive	  
to	  the	  context.	   ‘The	  simple	  fact	   is	  that	  Pakistan	  has	   invaded	  Kashmir.	  Units	  of	  the	  Indian	  army	  
have	  gone	  to	  Kashmir	  but	  not	  to	  invade	  Kashmir.	  They	  have	  been	  sent	  on	  the	  express	  invitation	  
of	  the	  Maharaja	  and	  Sheikh	  Abdullah.	  Sheikh	  Abdullah	  is	  the	  real	  Maharaja	  of	  Kashmir.	  Muslims	  
                                                
65	  Speech	  at	  prayer	  meeting.	  New	  Delhi,	  January	  4,	  1948	  CWMG	  Vol.	  98:6.	  p.169-­‐172.	  p.170	  
66	  Speech	  at	  prayer	  meeting.	  New	  Delhi,	  January	  2,	  1948	  CWMG	  Vol.	  98:	  6.	  p.159-­‐161.	  p.161	  
67	  Speech	  at	  prayer	  meeting.	  CWMG	  Vol.	  98:	  p.273-­‐276.	  p.275	  
68	  Speech	  at	  prayer	  meeting.	  New	  Delhi,	  December	  20,	  1947.	  CWMG	  VOL.	  98.	  p.85	  68.	  p.84-­‐86.	  p.85	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in	  their	  thousands	  are	  devoted	  to	  him,’	  said	  Gandhi.69	  This	  chain	  of	  events	  assured	  him	  that	  the	  
deployment	  of	  the	  Indian	  military	  was	  moral	  since	  the	  deployment	  enjoyed	  the	  sanction	  of	  both	  
the	  King	  (the	  old	  regime	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  British)	  and	  the	  new	  populist	  Sheikh.	  As	  Gandhi’s	  
secretary	  Pyarelal	  wrote:	  ‘It	  was	  therefore	  right	  for	  the	  Union	  Government	  to	  save	  the	  fair	  city	  
by	   rushing	   troops	   to	  Srinagar.	  He	   [Gandhi]	  would	  not	   shed	  a	   tear	   if	   the	   little	  Union	   force	  was	  
wiped	   out	   bravely	   defending	   Kashmir	   like	   the	   Spartan	   at	   Thermopylae.’70	   The	   analogy	   is	   not	  
perfect	   but	   within	   Gandhi’s	   philosophical	   approach,	   Indian	   resistance	   was.	   It	   was,	   in	   theory,	  
precisely	  what	  was	  required.	  It	  was	  also	  why	  Gandhi	  would	  not	  shed	  a	  tear.	  
	  
The	   befuddlement	   Kashmir	   caused	   Gandhi	   arose	   from	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   moral	   response	   from	  
Pakistan.	   It	   became	   a	   deep	   sense	   of	   hurt	   for	   Nehru	  with	   the	   China	  war	   of	   1963.	   Though	   the	  
Indo-­‐China	  war	  has	  been	  analysed	  repeatedly,	  Lamb	  and	  Maxwell	  will	  be	  considered	  as	  they	  are	  
the	   orthodoxy,	   despite	   having	   arrived	   at	   the	   conclusions	   from	   differing	   angles,	   refer	   to	   the	  
Indians	  own	  classified	  report	  on	  the	  conflict	  and	  draw	  on	  their	  experience	  of	  dealing	  with	  Indian	  
bureaucrats.71	  The	  failing	  of	  their	  approach	  is	  not	  their	  detail	  about	  the	  conflict	  in	  particular	  but	  
that	  they	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  direction	  their	  own	  evidence	  points.	  Rather,	  and	   inexplicably,	  they	  
foist	  upon	  Nehru	  a	  Machiavellian	  mentality	  to	  explain	  events.	  After	  examining	  their	  claims,	  this	  
section	  will	  explain	  the	  war	  in	  terms	  of	  Nehru’s	  texture	  –	  by	  situating	  him	  in	  his	  own	  context	  in	  
terms	  of	  personnel	  and	  his	  ‘strategy’.	  	  
	  
Lamb	  states	  that	   ‘the	  official	   Indian	   interpretation	  of	  documents	  did	  not	  accord	  with	  what	  the	  
documents	   in	   question	   actually	   said.’	   India’s	   position	   was	   riddled	   with	   discrepancies	   which	  
resulted	  in	  ‘cartographical	  aggression’	  –	  a	  border,	  especially	  in	  the	  Aksai	  Chin	  region	  which	  bore	  
little	  basis	  in	  the	  British	  position	  which	  independent	  India	  based	  its	  claims	  on.	  A	  ‘senior	  official	  in	  
the	   Indian	  High	   Commission	   in	   London,’	   to	  whom	   Lamb	  presented	   his	   findings	   in	   presumably	  
1962,	   ‘could	  not	  have	  been	  less	   interested.’	   It	   is	  this	  which	  provides	  the	  context	  for	  Maxwell’s	  
analysis	  which	  essentially	  argues	  that	  India	  brought	  the	  war	  upon	  itself.	  From	  1959	  India	  refused	  
to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Chinese.	  The	  latter	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s	  were	  able	  to	  craft	  a	  series	  of	  
                                                
69	  Speech	  at	  Prayer	  Meeting,	  CWMG.	  vol.98.	  p.112-­‐115.	  p.113	  
70	  Pyarelal.	  1968,	  vol	  I.	  p.502	  
71	  Most	  of	  these	  works	  are	  unwilling	  to	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  of	  local	  imperatives,	  instead	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  works	  approaching	  Indian	  international	  relations	  from	  a	  Cold	  War	  perspective	  see	  
Rowland.	  Van	  Nostrand.	  1967	  and	  Kavic.	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border	  agreements	  reproducing	  the	  old	  imperial	  borders	  with	  Burma,	  Nepal,	  Pakistan	  and	  even	  
Mongolia.	   But	   not	   with	   India.	   Why?	   Both	   Lamb	   and	   Maxwell	   do	   not	   find	   India’s	   legal	   case	  
credible.	   Both	   forward	   a	  wealth	   of	   detail	   demonstrating	   that	   in	   Aksai	   Chin	   India	   dramatically	  
misunderstood	   the	  historical	  position.	  Both	   then,	   inexplicable,	   forward	   the	   ‘hypothesis’	   that	   it	  
was	  because	  the	  Chinese	  claim	  on	  Aksai	  Chin	  –	  a	  section	  of	  Kashmir	  –	  would	  seriously	  weaken	  
India’s	  case	  against	  Pakistan	  and	  this	  made	  Nehru	  resort	   to	  occupying	  disputed	  territory	  –	  the	  
Forward	   Policy.	   They	   conclude	   thus	   despite	   their	   research	   demonstrating	   Indian	   bureaucratic	  
incompetence,	   not	   to	   mention	   Lamb’s	   personal	   experience	   of	   Indian	   diplomatic,	   at	   best,	  
disinterest.	   To	   ascribe	   this	   to	   Machiavellian	   villainy	   is	   not	   only	   unfair	   but	   a	   leap	   of	   the	  
imagination	  and	  an	  imposition	  of	  an	  alien	  texture	  upon	  the	  actors.	  	  
	  
The	   facts,	   as	   collected	   by	   Maxwell	   and	   Lamb	   point	   to	   a	   far	   more	   mundane	   explanation:	   a	  
combination	   of	   misadventure	   arising	   from	   bureaucratic	   incompetence	   to	   put	   into	   effect	   a	  
particular	   strategy	   which	   was	   Gandhian.	   Nehru,	   misadvised	   by	   his	   bureaucracy	   and	   perhaps	  
because	   he	   himself	   was	   so	   committed	   to	   Gandhian	   ways	   was	   convinced	   of	   the	   morality	   of	  
India’s	   case	   and	   essentially	   launched	   a	   Forward	   Policy	   –	   marking	   out	   disputed	   territory	   with	  
China	  thru	  troop	  deployments	  –	  which	  should	  be	  seen	  actually	  as	  a	  satyāgraha.72	  Nehru	  never	  
expected	  war	   and	   completely	   underestimated	   Chinese	   resolve.	   ‘Right	   up	   to	   the	  war,	   Nehru’s	  
perceptions	  were	   buttressed	   by	   the	   bureaucracy.’73	   Lamb	  himself	   comes	   very	   close	   to	   the	   ill-­‐
advice	   hypothesis	   when,	   speculating	   about	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   map	   of	   1954	   demarcating	   the	  
border,	  he	  writes:	   ‘Where	  did	   this	  border	  come	   from?	  Perhaps	   it	  was	   simply	   that	   someone	   in	  
the	  Survey	  of	  India	  merely	  copied	  from	  some	  old	  and	  dusty	  file	  left	  over	  from	  British	  times	  and	  
the	  product	  of	  British	  Russophobia.’74	  However	   instead	  of	  following	  the	  evidence	  both	  authors	  
impose	  an	  alien	  ideology	  upon	  Nehru	  which	  cannot	  account	  for	  his	  overwrought	  emotions,	  his	  
feeling	   of	   ‘betrayal’	   –	   unless	   one	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   he	  was	   pretending	   (as	   the	   Lamb/Maxwell	  
hypothesis	   would	   suggest).	   Maxwell	   assumes	   that	   Nehru	   encroached	   on	   Chinese	   territory	  
because	  at	  stake	  was	  the	  sanctity	  of	  Kashmir	  vis-­‐a-­‐vie	  Pakistan.	  However,	  his	  explanation	  cannot	  
explain	   why	   Nehru	   did	   not	   simply	   state	   this	   to	   parliament?	   Rather	   than	   impose	   a	   set	   of	  
ideologies	   upon	   Nehru	   –	   with	   little	   explanatory	   power	   –	   the	   next	   section	   will	   highlight	   the	  
                                                
72	  Put	  into	  effect	  in	  1961,	  Maxwell	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  Nehru	  knew	  the	  army	  was	  incapable	  of	  fighting	  a	  
war	  with	  China.	  P.199	  
73	  Acharya.	  1996.	  P.382-­‐393	  
74	  See	  also	  Sinha.	  1979;	  p.61-­‐62	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defining	  characteristics	  of	  Nehru’s	  foreign	  policy	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  and	  the	  implementation	  
of	  that	  policy.	  In	  explaining	  Nehru	  in	  his	  own	  terms	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  will	  be	  provided:	  
bureaucratic	  failure	  and	  a	  strategy	  which	  continues	  to	  shape	  Indian	  policy.	  	  
	  
The	  reason	  Nehru	  had	  to	  clarify	  in	  1963	  that	  his	  notion	  of	  ‘getting	  out	  of	  touch’	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  
administrative	   disconnect	   is	   because	   this	   is	  what	   Parliament	   suspected.	  A	   foreign	   diplomat	   in	  
Delhi	  said	  as	  much	  when	  he	  noted	  that,	  ‘Only	  a	  few	  senior	  officers	  had	  access	  to	  the	  PM	  and	  this	  
created	   “sycophancy,	   personal	   ad-­‐hoc	   approaches,	   and	   mixture	   of	   amateurishness	   and	  
subjectivity.”’75	  These	  vices	  did	  not	  affect	  one	  officer	  who	  was	  the	  principle	  adviser	  on	  all	  foreign	  
policy	  matters	  according	   to	  another	   senior	  officer.76	  He	  advised	  Nehru	  on	   the	  China	  crisis	  and	  
whose	  response	  unmasks	  the	  personal	  failure	  of	  the	  latter	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  rest	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	  bureaucracy.	  This	   combined	  with	   the	  strategy	  Nehru	  was	   following	   led	   to	   the	  war	  with	  
China.	   The	  officer	  was	  Sir	  G.S.	  Bajpai.	  Variously	   characterised	  as	  a	   ‘stooge’77	  of	   the	  British,	  he	  
had	   clashed	  with	   Gandhi	   on	   personal78	   and	   political	  matters.79	   Questioned	   on	   the	  wisdom	   of	  
employing	  such	  a	  man,	  a	  former	  Cabinet	  Secretary,	  writes	  Nehru’s	  reply	  was:	  ‘That	  may	  be,	  but	  
almost	  before	  I	  have	  completed	  a	  sentence,	  the	  man	  produces	  a	  draft	  perfectly	  stating	  my	  views	  
and	   conclusions.	   He	   does	   it	   so	   well	   that	   I	   then	   have	   merely	   to	   sign	   without	   even	   altering	   a	  
comma.’80	  Bajpai	  was	  an	  independent	  voice.	  He	  had	  a	  history	  of	  disagreeing	  with	  Nehru.	  Bajpai	  
was	   critical	   of	   India’s	   foreign	  policy	  being	   confined	   to	   ‘protestations	  of	   non-­‐alignment	   in	  Cold	  
War	   and	   to	   senseless	   chatter	   about	   colonialism,	   racial	   discrimination,	   etc.’81	   Bajpai,	   writes	   a	  
former	  MEA	   officer,	   is	   ‘remembered	   as	   the	   man	   of	   prescience	   who	   urged	   Nehru	   in	   1953	   to	  
resolve	   the	   issue	   of	   an	   imprecise	   boundary	   with	   China	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   urgent	   priority,	   in	   the	  
negotiations	   that	   led	   up	   to	   the	   1954	   Border	   Trade	   Agreement,	   advice	   that	   went	   unheeded	  
                                                
75	  Crocker.	  	  Nehru.	  A	  contemporary’s	  estimate.	  In	  Maxwell.	  1970.	  p.91	  
76	  Dutt.	  1977.	  p.23-­‐24	  
77	  Mathai.	  1979.	  p.133.	  
78	  See	  ‘Letter	  to	  additional	  secretary,	  Home	  Department,	  Government	  of	  India.’	  CWMG.	  Vol	  84.	  p.22-­‐24	  &	  
See	  A	  Letter.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  94.	  .	  p.351.	  
79	  Bajpai	  to	  Sapru	  [3	  May	  192I],	  Sapru	  Mss.	  Vol.	  III,	  B8.	  National	  Library,	  Calcutta	  Quoted	  Low.	  Feb.	  1966.	  
pp.	  241-­‐259.	  p.249	  
80	  Sahay.	  2004.	  p.154.	  In	  fact	  Gandhi	  made	  the	  very	  same	  recommendation	  on	  the	  same	  grounds	  in	  1947.	  
See	  also	  A	  Letter.	  CWMG.	  Vol.	  94.	  p.351	  and	  Talk	  with	  Dr.	  Syed	  Mahmud.	  Vol.96.	  p.147-­‐148.	  
81	  From	  Henderson	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  top	  secret,	  DOS,	  NA	  (Washington),	  No.	  825,	  7	  June	  
1950,	  p.	  1.	  Quoted	  in	  Kesavan.	  2003.	  p.250	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because	  Panditji	  was	  fixated	  on	  a	  different	  strategy.’82	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  strategy,	  the	  next	  




With	  very	  limited	  experience	  of	  conducting	  diplomacy,	  India’s	  foreign	  policy	  establishment	  was	  
created	  from	  scratch.	  It	  was,	  for	  Nehru	  unsuited	  to	  modern	  India	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  personnel	  
was	  a	  matter	  that	  vexed	  him.	  However	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  Nehru	  dominated	  decision	  making.	  As	  
the	   Bajpai	   example	   demonstrates,	   the	   advice	   of	   officials	   went	   unheeded.	   Former	   ICS	   officers	  
were	  incorporated	  not	  for	  their	  opinions	  but	  their	  technical	  skill	  and	  it	  was	  here	  that	  the	  errors	  
of	  the	  China	  war	  can	  be	  traced	  to.	  Lamb	  speculates	  about	  why	  the	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  the	  
Indo-­‐China	  maps?	   Though	  willing	   to	   foist	   a	   complicated	   theory	  upon	  Nehru	  he	   is	   unwilling	   to	  
ascribe	  it	  to	  simple	  bureaucratic	  failure.	  ‘India	  has	  some	  of	  the	  hardest-­‐working	  bureaucrats	  in	  
the	  world,	  but	  has	  an	  abysmal	  record	  of	  serving	  the	  public,’	  says	  the	  Economist	  after	  following	  
IAS	   officers	   during	   typical	   working	   days.	   Though	   limited	   to	   following	   the	   IAS	   the	   Economist	  
concludes,	  ‘All	  India’s	  administration	  is	  inefficient.’83	  The	  conditions	  witnessed	  at	  MEA	  offices	  in	  
New	  Delhi	  bear	  out	  the	  Economist’s	  findings	  and	  gives	  credence	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  Nehru	  was	  
misadvised	   by	   a	   bureaucracy	   working	   in	   sub-­‐optimal	   conditions.	   The	   technical	   information	  
provided	   by	   the	   bureaucracy	   convinced	   of	   the	  merits	   of	   India’s	   case.	   The	  map	   changes	  were	  
apparently	  made	  by	  the	  Home	  Ministry	  and	  hence,	  most	  likely,	  an	  IAS	  official.	  One	  can	  picture	  
an	  Indian	  official,	  sitting	  in	  an	  office	  with	  heaps	  of	  files	  surrounding	  him	  in	  New	  Delhi.	  The	  office	  
is	   about	   30	   feet	   by	   20	   feet.	   There	   are	   some	   shelves.	   His	   desk	   is	   of	   the	   plywood	   kind,	   edges	  
peeling.	  Or	  some	  might	  have	  an	  old	  heavy	  desk	  made	  of	  teak	  badly	   in	  need	  of	  polish,	  scraped	  
and	   worn	   after	   decades	   without	   any	   care.	   It	   is	   June.	   Everything	   is	   covered	   in	   dust	   because	  
nothing	   stops	   the	   loo	   from	   blowing	   in	   the	   dry	   Delhi	   dust	   into	   his	   office.	   It	   is	   35	   degrees	  
centigrade.	  All	  he	  has	  to	  cool	  himself	  is	  a	  table	  fan.	  This	  is	  not	  because	  he	  does	  not	  feel	  the	  heat.	  
Six	  months	  ago	  when	  he	  was	  allotted	  this	  office	  during	  the	  cold	  winter	  he	  knew	  summer	  would	  
come.	  Knowing	  it	  he	  filed	  an	  application	  for	  an	  air-­‐conditioner.	  It	  was	  still	  being	  processed.	  But	  
in	  other	  ways	  he	  was	  lucky.	  His	  office	  has	  an	  attached	  bathroom	  with	  a	  bathtub.	  It	  is	  full	  of	  files.	  
The	  taps	  might	  drip	  but	  that	  has	  been	  going	  on	  for	  decades.	  They	  have	  been	  dripping	  onto	  the	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  Rana.	  2005.	  p.xvii	  
83	  India’s	  civil	  service.	  Battling	  the	  babu	  raj.	  The	  Economist.	  March	  6,	  2008.	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rotting	  files	  for	  decades.	  Cockroaches	  scramble	  between	  them.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  approximation	  but	  
the	  description	  of	  offices	  of	  Indian	  diplomats	  as	  experienced	  by	  the	  author.	  Parts	  of	  it	  are	  drawn	  
from	  interviews	  with	  diplomats.	  This	  is	  what	  ‘should	  be	  written	  about,’	  says	  a	  diplomat.	  ‘Write	  
about	  it.	  Write	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  you’ve	  been	  sitting	  here	  for	  one	  hour	  and	  I’ve	  asked	  for	  tea	  
for	  us	   three	   times.	  Write	  about	  our	   conditions	  of	   service.’	   The	   tea	   finally	  arrived	  half	   an	  hour	  
later	  as	  the	  interview	  was	  concluding.	  Is	  it	  too	  much	  to	  suppose	  that	  a	  diplomat	  working	  in	  such	  
conditions	  would	  resort	  to	  duplicity	  or	  just	  get	  done	  whatever	  has	  to	  be	  done	  with	  the	  minimum	  
of	  effort	  and	   fuss?	  Of	  course	  senior	  officers	  would	  not	  occupy	  such	  offices,	  but	  neither	  would	  
senior	  officers	  be	  scrambling	  through	  archives	  and	  pouring	  over	  maps.84	  
	  
At	  the	  birth	  of	  India,	  diplomacy	  within	  India	  had	  been	  eliminated	  and	  there	  were	  just	  a	  handful	  
of	  locals	  experienced	  in	  conducting	  diplomacy	  on	  behalf	  of	  British	  Empire.	  The	  Resident	  system	  
was,	   upon	   independence,	   a	   system	   backward,	   authoritarian	   and	   exploitative	   in	   style.	   The	  
authority	  of	  the	  Resident	  was	  supreme	  and	  it	  was	  a	  veiled	  dictatorship	  and	  authority	  was	  finally	  
exercised.85	   It	  was	   from	   this	   system	   that	   the	  bureaucratic	  apparatus	   to	   conduct	   foreign	  policy	  
had	  to	  seek	  its	  practitioners.	  These	  members	  of	  the	  Indian	  Civil	  Service	  (ICS)	  had	  some	  600	  locals	  
because	   it	   had	   been	   Indianized,	   unlike	   the	   Political	   Line.	   Of	   the	   600	   some	   100	   opted	   for	  
Pakistan.86	   These,	   along	  with	   some	  new	   recruits	  made	   up	   the	   foreign	   policy	   establishment	   of	  
independent	  India.	  Their	  contribution	  was	  limited	  to	  enacting	  the	  orders	  and	  direction	  of	  Nehru	  
–	  their	  contribution	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  policy	  was	  nil.	  Nehru’s	  views	  before	  independence	  was	  
that	   ‘Of	  one	  thing	   I	  am	  quite	  sure	  …	  that	  no	  new	  order	  can	  be	  built	  up	   in	   India	  so	   long	  as	  the	  
spirit	  of	  the	  ICS	  pervades	  our	  administration	  and	  our	  public	  services	  …	  the	  ICS	  and	  similar	  service	  
must	  disappear	  completely,	  as	  such,	  before	  we	  can	  start	  real	  work	  on	  a	  new	  order.’	  	  
	  
Upon	   becoming	   Prime	  Minister,	   Nehru	   said	   that	   the	   ‘services	   were	   fossilised	   in	   their	   mental	  
outlook.	   They	  were	  wedded	   to	   bygone	   and	   obsolete	  methods	   and	   refused	   to	  move	  with	   the	  
times	  …	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  long	  we	  can	  function	  in	  these	  circumstances.	  The	  experience	  
of	  the	  past	  three	  or	  four	  months	  has	  shown	  us	  that	  the	  conduct	  and	  attitude	  of	  the	  officers	  has	  
not	  changed.’87	  However,	  Nehru	  persisted	  in	  attempting	  to	  reform	  what	  he	  variously	  called	  the	  
                                                
84	  Visits	  to	  the	  offices	  of	  junior	  level	  officers	  of	  the	  MEA.	  Unattributable	  conversations	  with	  two	  officers.	  	  
85	  Panikkar.	  1927,	  p.90-­‐122.	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  Saxena.	  1990.	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  Indian	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‘spirit’	  and	  ‘attitude’	  of	  these	  men.	  One	  of	  his	  targets	  was	  the	  strictly	  hierarchical	  order	  under	  
the	  British.	  He	  noted	  that	  ‘checking	  and	  constant	  supervision	  are	  necessary’	  but	  added	  that	  ‘To	  
hold	  up	  work	  for	  petty	  sanctions	  from	  distant	  authority	  is	  not	  only	  to	  delay	  but	  to	  waste	  money	  
and	  energy.	   It	   is	  not	   sufficiently	   realised	   that	   time	   in	   this	   context	   is	  money.’88	  He	  emphasized	  
that	   ‘Constant	   supervision	   is,	   of	   course,	   always	   necessary,	   but	   in	   a	   way	   so	   that	   it	   does	   not	  
impede	  work’.89	  
	  
However	  when	  it	  came	  to	  policy	  making,	  Nehru	  as	  PM	  and	  Foreign	  Minister	  was	  above	  all	  else.	  It	  
became	  the	  defining	  characteristic	  of	   Indian	  diplomacy.	   It	  appears,	  as	  the	  Bajpai	  example	  with	  
China	  demonstrates,	  Nehru	  was	  unwilling	  to	  take	  note	  of	  any	  opinions	  which	  did	  not	  match	  his.	  
A	  Cabinet	  Secretary	  writes,	   ‘In	  the	  field	  of	  defining	  policies,	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  role	  has	  been	  
overwhelming.	   Take	   foreign	   policy.	   It	   was	   his	   special	   genius	   to	   establish	   that,	   in	   the	  
circumstances	   of	   his	   time,	   non-­‐alignment	   was	   the	   right	   policy	   of	   India.	   In	   this	   he	   was	   far	   in	  
advance	  of	  his	  advisors.	   If	  he	  had	  followed	  the	  advice	  of	  people	  around	  him,	  India	  would	  have	  
started	   as	   an	   aligned	   State	   …	   .	   Of	   our	   foreign	   policy,	   it	   may	   truly	   be	   said	   he	   was	   both	   the	  
architect	   and	   the	  main	   implementer.’	   If	  with	  Nehru	  a	  new	  policy	   formulation	   totally	   removed	  
from	   the	   ICS	   considerations	   of	   the	   old	   order	   was	   introduced,	   it	   also	   had	   unintended	  
consequences.	  ‘One	  result	  of	  this	  was	  that	  External	  Affairs	  Ministry	  did	  not	  get	  into	  the	  habit	  of	  
producing	  situation	  reports	  stating	  the	  considerations,	  analysing	  them	  and	  presenting	  options.	  
There	  was	  a	  marked	  tendency	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  word	  from	  the	  PM	  himself.’90	  An	  ICS	  officer	  who	  
worked	  for	  sometime	  as	  Nehru	  Principle	  Secretary	  notes	  that	  the	  PM	  never	  held	  it	  against	  the	  
officer	  that	  he	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  old	  order,	  ‘But	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  while	  
he	  was	  most	  kindly	  and	  considerate	  to	  many	  of	  us	  in	  the	  service	  as	  individuals,	  he	  did	  not	  think	  
of	  us,	  as	  a	  class,	  as	  being	  particularly	  distinguished.	  We	  were	  there	  to	  do	  a	  job	  of	  work.	  Some	  of	  
us	  were	  good	  and	  some	  mediocre,	  but	  we	  were	  not	  people	  with	  whom	  it	  was	  appropriate	  for	  
him	   to	   discuss	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   problem	   that	   was	   thrown	   up	   to	   the	   Prime	  
Minister	  of	  India.	  In	  other	  words	  …	  one	  did	  not	  get	  the	  impression	  that	  one	  had	  any	  share	  in	  the	  
making	   of	   decisions.’91	   Even	   a	   cabinet	   colleague	   from	   the	   first	   cabinet	   writes,	   ‘My	   five	   years	  
                                                
88	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru	  and	  Public	  Administration,	  1975,	  p.49.	  
89	  Nehru,	  Letters	  to	  Chief	  Ministers,	  Vol.	  I,	  op.cit.,	  pp	  493	  
90	  Sahay.	  P.157-­‐158	  
91	  Iyengar.	  1967.	  p.38-­‐41	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experience	   in	   the	   Cabinet	   [was]	   that	   no	   one	   would	   say	   a	   word	   against	   Nehru.	   …	   and	   even	  
Cabinet	  members	  dared	  not	  oppose	  him,	  let	  alone	  the	  civil	  servants.’92	  	  
	  
The	   acute	   centralization	   of	   foreign	   policy	   matters	   is	   reflected	   to	   this	   day,	   having	   become	   a	  
defining	   feature	   of	   India’s	   foreign	   policy	   establishment.	   The	   effects	   of	   centralization	   have	  
cascaded	  within	  the	  MEA.	  Dayal,	  an	  MEA	  officer	  under	  Indira	  Gandhi	  describes	  how	  the	  foreign	  
intelligence	  service	  –	  RAW	  –	  was	  established.	  ‘One	  day	  the	  Director,	  RN	  Kao,	  came	  to	  me	  with	  a	  
brief	  typewritten	  note	  and	  asked	  for	  my	  signature	  …	  the	  request	  was	  made	  casually,	  as	  though	  it	  
was	  a	  matter	  of	  minor	  routine.	  But	  one	  glance	  at	  the	  paper	  took	  me	  aback.	  [it	  said	  new	  service	  
for	  external	  intelligence	  and	  that	  the	  EAM	  should	  include	  the	  names	  of	  the	  operatives	  to	  ensure	  
cover	  …	  ]	  When	  I	  asked	  when	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  I	  was	  told	  blandly	  that	  it	  had	  been	  taken	  by	  
the	  PM!	  It	  seemed	  extraordinary	  that	  a	  far	  reaching	  decision	  which	  so	  obviously	  and	  intimately	  
concerned	   External	   Affairs	   should	   have	   been	   taken	  without	   a	   word	   of	   consultation	  with	   that	  
Ministry.’93	  As	  far	  as	  input	  into	  policy	  making	  –	  even	  within	  the	  non-­‐aligned	  paradigm	  –	  it	  was	  as	  
late	   as	   2004,	   MEA	   officers	   state,	   when	   chiefs	   of	   territorial	   divisions	   began	   to	   actually	   make	  
decisions	  rather	  than	  offer	  a	  range	  of	  options	  to	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Saran.94	  	  
	  
Towards	   the	  end	  of	  his	  administration	  Nehru	   is	   reported	   to	  have	  said	   that	  his	  greatest	   failure	  
was	   to	   de-­‐colonize	   the	   mentality	   of	   the	   administration.	   Vittachi	   writes,	   Nehru	   said	   gently	   ‘I	  
failed	   to	   change	   this	   administration.	   It	   is	   still	   a	   colonial	   administration.’95	   The	   impetus	   Nehru	  
provided	  was	  realised	  only	  after	  his	  death.	  What	  was	  required	  was	  to	  introduce	  into	  the	  colonial	  
era	   bureaucracy	   locals.	   These	   locals	   had	   to	   understood	   not	   as	   the	   Anglicised	   products	   of	   the	  
major	  Indian	  cities	  but	  as	  hailing	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  those	  disempowered	  not	  
only	  under	  the	  British	  but	  by	  millennia	  of	  local	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  revolving	  around	  notions	  of	  
impurity	  and	  caste.	  Though	  the	  process	  began	  in	  1951	  –	  with	  reservations	  for	  groups	  designated	  
SC/ST	  –	  it	  took	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  for	  its	  effects	  to	  be	  felt	  because	  even	  amongst	  the	  reserved	  
categories,	  frequently	  it	  was	  the	  elite	  from	  these	  groups	  who	  entered	  the	  services.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  
1979	  that	  candidates	  were	  allowed	  to	  take	  the	  entrance	  exams	  for	  the	  civil	  service	  in	  any	  Indian	  
language.	  With	  it,	  the	  services	  were	  opened	  to	  a	  mass	  of	  people	  who	  had	  been	  excluded	  from	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positions	  of	  authority.96	  Major	  changes	  followed.	  The	  most	  momentous	  being	  the	  broadening	  of	  
positive	  discrimination	  to	  50	  percent	  in	  1992	  by	  the	  Mandal	  Commission.	  In	  November	  2006	  the	  
total	  strength	  of	  the	  MEA	  was	  599	  out	  of	  which	  some	  175	  came	  from	  the	  positive	  discrimination	  
categories.97	  The	  social	  transformation	  of	  the	  MEA	  did	  not	  however	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  strategy	  




This	  section	  will	  outline	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Indian	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  words	  of	  its	  architect	  and	  
foremost	  exponent.	  Nehru	  said	  his	  strategy	  was	  entirely	  within	  Gandhi’s	  philosophy.	   In	  Nehru,	  
India	   brought	   this	   politics	   to	   the	   international	   arena	   and	   ever	   since	   it	   has	   led	   to	   a	   host	   of	  
misunderstandings	  and	   confusions	  which	  plague	  not	  only	   those	  who	  engage	   India	  but	   Indians	  
themselves.	  Within	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  of	  independence	  Nehru	  reminded	  parliament	  that:	  	  
‘we	  were	  bred	   in	  a	  high	   tradition	  under	  Mahatma	  Gandhi.	  That	   tradition	   is	  an	  
ethical	   tradition,	  a	  moral	   tradition	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	   it	   is	  an	  application	  of	  
those	   ethical	   and	  moral	   doctrines	   to	   practical	   politics.	   That	   great	  man	   placed	  
before	  us	  a	  technique	  of	  action	  which	  was	  unique	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  combined	  
political	   activity	   and	   political	   conflict	   and	   a	   struggle	   for	   freedom	  with	   certain	  
moral	  and	  ethical	  principles.’	  	  
After	  explaining	  how	  no	  one	  could	  live	  up	  to	  his	  example,	  Nehru	  said	  ‘we	  have	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  
those	  very	  ideals	  to	  which	  we	  have	  pledged	  ourselves	  so	  often.’	  These	  were	  the	  ideals	  of	  non-­‐
violence	  and	  truth,	  Gandhi’s	  ‘article	  of	  faith’	  and	  Nehru	  made,	  amongst	  others,	  two	  points.	  One	  
that	  ‘we	  should	  do	  our	  utmost	  to	  live	  up	  as	  far	  as	  we	  can	  to	  that	  standard,	  but	  always	  judging	  a	  
problem	   by	   the	   light	   of	   our	   own	   intelligence;	   otherwise	   we	   will	   fail.’98	   In	   short,	   Gandhi	   had	  
inculcated	   in	  Nehru	  non-­‐violence	  as	  an	   ‘article	  of	   faith’	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  self-­‐reflection	  
employing	   non-­‐violence	   as	   a	   means	   of	   conducting	   policy.	   Nehru	   made	   the	   point	   in	   his	  
autobiography.	   	   ‘What	   is	   truth?	   I	  do	  not	  know	  for	  certain,	  and	  perhaps	  our	   truths	  are	   relative	  
and	  absolute	  truth	  is	  beyond	  us.	  Different	  persons	  may	  and	  do	  take	  different	  views	  of	  truth,	  and	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each	   individual	   is	  powerfully	   influenced	  by	  his	  own	  background,	  training	  and	   impulses.	  So	  also	  
Gandhi.	  But	   truth	   is	   at	   least	   for	   an	   individual	  what	  he	  himself	   knows	   to	  be	   true.’99	   In	   keeping	  
with	  Gandhi’s	  notion	  of	  the	  individual	  being	  highest,	  Nehru	  added,	  ‘God	  we	  may	  deny,	  but	  what	  
hope	   is	   there	   for	   us	   if	   we	   deny	   man	   and	   thus	   reduce	   everything	   to	   futility?’100	   Nehru,	   like	  
Gandhi,	  never	  articulated	  a	  theory	  of	  international	  relations.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  inimical	  to	  someone	  
who	  believed	  in	  the	  individual’s	  morality	  and	  that	  to	  inflict	  criticism	  on	  it	  was	  a	  form	  of	  violence	  
to	  do	  so.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  situating	  himself	  within	  Gandhi’s	  system	  and	  forwarding	  it	  provides	  
clues	  to	  the	  strategy	  of	  Indian	  international	  relations.	  	  
	  
Nowhere	   is	   this	   more	   evident	   than	   in	   an	   interview	   conducted	   by	   Karanjia.101	   Urbane	   and	  
anglicised,	  he	  spoke	  of	  a	  ‘people	  of	  my	  way	  of	  thinking’	  who	  ‘consider	  his	  [Gandhi’s]	  philosophy	  
to	  be	  somewhat	  confused	  and	  unscientific.’	  Karanjia,	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  unconfused	  men	  of	  
science,	  views	  Nehru	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  camp	  and	  states	   that	  Nehru	  paid	   lip	  service	  to	  
Gandhi	  and	  upon	  independence	  that	  influence	  ended.	  Karanjia	  says:	  ‘…	  the	  Gandhian	  era	  ended	  
with	   the	   assumption	   of	   political	   power	   by	   the	   Congress.	   The	   year	   1947	   ushered	   in	   what	   is	  
universally	  hailed	  as	  the	  Nehru	  epoch	  of	  our	  country.	  Should	  I	  be	  right	  in	  the	  inference	  that	  from	  
Freedom	  onwards,	  you	  used	  the	  Gandhian	  means	  to	  serve	  the	  Nehru	  ends	  …	  most	  importantly,	  
your	  insistence	  on	  a	  foreign	  policy	  based	  on	  World	  Peace	  and	  Non-­‐alignment?’	  In	  a	  reply	  which	  
must	  have	  confused	  Karanjia,	  Nehru	  mounted	  a	  point-­‐by-­‐point	   refutation.	  Karanjia	  was	   totally	  
wrong,	  Nehru	  said:	  
‘You	  are	  wrong	  in	  using	  words	  like	  the	  Nehru	  epoch	  or	  the	  Nehru	  policy.	  I	  would	  
call	   ours	   the	   authentic	   Gandhian	   era	   and	   policies	   and	   the	   policies	   and	  
philosophy	  which	  we	  seek	  to	  implement	  are	  the	  policies	  and	  philosophy	  taught	  
to	   us	   by	  Gandhiji.	   There	   has	   been	   no	   break	   in	   the	   continuity	   of	   our	   thoughts	  
before	   and	   after	   1947,	   though,	   of	   course,	   new	   technological	   and	   scientific	  
advances	   since	  have	  made	  us	   re-­‐think	   in	   some	  ways	  and	  adapt	  our	  policies	   to	  
the	  new	  times.	  But	  here	  also	  Gandhiji	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  prophetic.	  His	  thoughts	  
and	   approaches	   and	   solutions	   helped	   us	   to	   cover	   the	   chasm	   between	   the	  
Industrial	  Revolution	  and	  the	  Nuclear	  Era.	  After	  all,	  the	  only	  possible	  answer	  to	  
the	  Atom	  Bomb	  is	  non-­‐violence.	  Isn’t	  it?’	  
                                                
99	  Nehru.	  1960.	  p275.	  
100	  Ibid.	  p.412	  
101	  Karanjia.	  1961.	  P.22-­‐24,	  25	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To	   Karanjia’s	   point	   that	   Nehru	   had	   ‘gone	   beyond	   non-­‐violence	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   a	   more	  
positive	  solution	  to	  this	  threat	  of	  the	  atom	  bomb	  in	  Panch	  Sheel	  or	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Peaceful	  Co-­‐
existence,’	  the	  reply	  was:	  
‘All	   that	  was	   inherent	   in	   Gandhism.	   In	   fact,	   this	   approach	   of	  Panch	   Sheel,	   co-­‐
existence,	   peace,	   tolerance,	   the	   attitude	   of	   live	   and	   let	   live,	   has	   been	  
fundamental	   to	   Indian	   thought	   throughout	   the	   ages	   and	   you	   find	   it	   in	   all	  
religions.	  Great	  emperors	  like	  Ashoka	  practised	  it	  and	  Gandhiji	  organised	  it	  into	  
a	  practical	  philosophy	  of	  action	  which	  we	  have	  inherited.	  There	  was	  no	  place	  for	  
the	  ‘cold	  war’	  in	  Ashoka’s	  mind,	  and	  Gandhiji	  gave	  the	  world	  the	  most	  practical	  
substitute	  for	  war	  and	  violence	  by	  bringing	  about	  a	  mighty	  revolution	  with	  the	  
bloodless	   weapon	   of	   passive	   resistance.	   The	  most	   important	   thing	   about	   our	  
foreign	  policy	  is	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  our	  great	  historical	  tradition.	  Do	  you	  know	  the	  
story	  of	  Chanakya?’	  
Nehru	  narrated	  how	  after	  King	  Chandragupta	  was	  only	  able	  to	  put	  down	  a	  rebellion	  under	  the	  
directions	  of	  his	  Chief	  Minister	  Chanakya.	  Asked	  by	  Chandragupta	  on	  what	  to	  do	  next	  Chanakya	  
said	  he	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  new	  Chief	  Minister	  –	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  rebels	  –	  for	  this	  was	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  goodwill.	  Nehru	  cited	  this	  an	  example	  of	  coexistence.	  Left	  unsaid	  
is	   the	   implicit	   notion	   of	   self-­‐sacrifice	   in	   the	   story.	   Finally,	   Karanjia	   expressed	   the	   ‘conviction	  
amongst	   progressives	   that	   Gandhiji	   broke	   and	   emasculated	   your	   earlier	   faith	   in	   scientific	  
Socialism	  with	  his	  sentimental	  and	  spiritual	  solutions,’	  to	  which	  Nehru	  replied:	  
‘Some	  of	  Gandhiji’s	   approaches	  were	   old-­‐fashioned,	   and	   I	   combated	   them,	   as	  
you	   know	  well	   enough.	   But	   on	   the	  whole	   it	   is	  wrong	   to	   say	   that	   he	   broke	   or	  
emasculated	  me	  or	   anybody	  else.	  Any	   such	   thing	  would	  be	  against	   his	  way	  of	  
doing	  things.	  The	  most	  important	  thing	  he	  insisted	  upon	  was	  the	  importance	  of	  
means:	   ends	  were	   shaped	   by	   the	  means	   that	   led	   to	   them,	   and	   therefore	   the	  
means	  had	  to	  be	  good,	  pure	  and	  truthful.	  That	  is	  what	  we	  learnt	  from	  him	  and	  it	  
is	  well	  we	  did	  so.’	  
Evidently,	   Nehru	   sees	   himself	   as	   a	   product	   of	   Gandhi	   of	   whom	   Dallmayr	   writes:	   ‘Neither	   his	  
engagement	  for	  the	  poor	  nor	  his	  cultivation	  of	  ‘weak’	  virtues	  kept	  Gandhi	  away	  from	  politics	  or	  
from	  political	   struggle.	   Like	   the	   ‘meek’	  he	  was	  non-­‐submissive	  and	  unyielding,	  as	  well	  as	  calm	  
and	   frequently	   cheerful;	   he	   was	   particularly	   unyielding	   when	   dealing	   with	   abusive	   and	  
oppressive	   political	   power.	   In	   his	   struggle	   for	   independence,	   Gandhi	   did	   not	   shrink	   from	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inserting	   himself	   in	   the	   thick	   of	   politics	   –	   but	   a	   politics	   of	   a	   different	   kind,	   carried	   on	   in	   a	  
different	  register,	  at	  odds	  with	  and	   in	  defiance	  of	  power	  politics.’102	  This	  could	  be	  a	  manifesto	  
for	   Indian	   foreign	   policy.	   It	   also	   explains	   Nehru’s	   anguish	   and	   sense	   of	   betrayal	   which	   in	  
combination	  with	  having	  been	  misadvised	  on	  the	  China	  border	  is	  an	  explanation	  in	  keeping	  with	  
the	   history	   of	   India’s	   leaders	   rather	   than	   an	   imposition	   of	   alien	   ideology.	   Neither	   does	   an	  
explanation	   aware	   of	   local	   texture	   fall	   need	   to	   speculate	   –	   in	   this	   case	   India	   supposedly	  
demanding	  Aksai	  Chin	  to	  legitimise	  Kashmir	  vis-­‐a-­‐vie	  Pakistan.	  
	  
Nehru’s	   strategy	   was	   Non-­‐Alignment.103	   It	   meant	   the	   right	   to	   follow	   an	   independent	   foreign	  
policy	  (in	  a	  world	  of	  Cold	  War	  blocks)	  and	  the	  policy	  had	  to	  be	  moral.	  Morality	  quickly	  became	  to	  
be	  understood	  as	  an	  end	  to	  discrimination	  (arising	  out	  of	   the	  experiences	  of	  racism	  under	  the	  
British)	   and	   non-­‐violence.	   This	   was	   the	   dharma	   of	   an	   age	   where	   discrimination	   and	   violence	  
was,	   from	  India’s	  perspective,	  rife.	   It	  was	  not	  much	  changed	  from	  Gandhi’s	  struggles.	   ‘What	   is	  
insufficiently	   appreciated	   is	   the	   influence	   of	   Mahatma	   Gandhi’s	   thinking	   and	   philosophy	   on	  
India’s	  foreign	  policy,’	  writes	  Sikri	  a	  top-­‐ranking	  officer	  who	  resigned	  from	  the	  MEA,	  reiterating	  
India’s	   first	   Foreign	   Secretary’s	   ideas	   and	   the	   first	   National	   Security	   Adviser’s	   ideas.104	   ‘The	  
essential	  elements	  of	  Gandhi’s	  philosophy	  were	  the	  concepts	  of	  non-­‐violence,	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  moral	  dimension	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  men	  as	  well	  as	  nations,	  and	  satyāgraha	  	  or	  the	  struggle	  
for	  truth,	  compassion	  and	  justice.	  All	  these	  principles	  continue	  to	  influence	  India’s	  foreign	  policy	  
even	  today.’105	  	  
	  
To	  recap,	   it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  Gandhi	  developed	  his	  notion	  of	  dharma	   from	  his	   reading	  of	  
the	   Mb	   which	   provided	   a	   theory	   of	   pragmatic	   contextual	   action	   for	   the	   individual.	   Gandhi	  
                                                
102	  Dallmayr.	  2004.	  p.188-­‐9.	  
103	  For	  Nehru’s	  explanation	  of	  this	  see	  Appadoria	  (ed.)	  1982.	  The	  following	  speeches	  are	  especially	  
relevant	  for	  the	  Gandhian	  influence	  on	  Nehru:	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  Statement	  on	  Foreign	  Policy.	  7	  
September	  1946;	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  on	  the	  ideal	  of	  one	  world.	  22	  January	  1947;	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  on	  
the	  Implications	  of	  non-­‐alignment.	  4	  December	  1947;	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  statement	  that	  non-­‐alignment	  
‘can	  only	  be	  a	  policy	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  to	  our	  best	  judgement.	  9	  December	  1958;	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  
on	  Racial	  Equality.	  22	  March	  1949;	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  on	  means	  and	  ends.	  20	  December	  1956.	  	  
104	   See	  Menon.	  1965.	  p.272;	  Dixit.	   2004.	  P.34.	  On	  p.50	  he	  writes:	   ‘Mahatma	  Gandhi	   imparted	   impulses	  
against	  realpolitik	  as	  a	   factor	   in	   foreign	  policy	  decisions.	  All	   this	  was	  underpinned	  by	  his	  conviction	  that	  
ends	  did	  not	  justify	  means,	  and	  that	  world	  peace	  and	  stability	  could	  only	  be	  achieved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
moral	   terms	   of	   reference	   of	   justice,	   fair	   play,	   abjuring	   the	   use	   of	   force,	   mutual	   respect	   and	   mutual	  
cooperation.	  In	  a	  manner,	  he	  provided	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  five	  principles	  of	  
peaceful	  coexistence	  and	  the	  ideology	  of	  nonalignment	  emerged	  in	  later	  years.	  
105	  Sikri.	  3	  January	  2008.	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emphasized	   the	   morality	   of	   the	   individual	   and	   made	   non-­‐violence	   a	   tenet.	   Non-­‐violence	  
however	  did	  not	  condemn	  the	  use	  of	  force.	   It	  could	  be	  used	  to	  defend	  oneself.	  Gandhi’s	  main	  
contribution	   was	   on	   how	   this	   force	   was	   to	   be	   used.	   This	   abhorred	   even	   criticism	   since	   that	  
would	  be	  an	  imposition	  of	  oneself	  on	  another.	  Force	  was	  to	  be	  used	  as	  resistance	  which	  in	  turn	  
was	  based	  upon	  exemplary	  conduct	  and	  a	  universal	  notion	  of	  morality	  –	  the	  opponent	  was	  to	  be	  
convinced	  of	  their	  error	  through	  the	  resister’s	  virtuous	  conduct	  and	  the	  opponent	  was	  expected	  
to	  accede	  to	  the	  resister’s	  demands	  thru	  a	  moral	  response.	  This	   is	  what	  Nehru	  brought	  to	  the	  
international	   scene	   upon	   India’s	   independence.	   In	   practice,	   India	   resisted	   apartheid	   and	  
imperialism	  internationally	  while	  within	  implementing	  positive	  discrimination	  as	  a	  means	  to	  end	  
discrimination	  within.	  The	  ability	  of	  this	  model	  to	  explain	  Indian	  foreign	  policy	  will	  be	  examined	  
in	   the	  next	   section	  with	   reference	   to	  nuclear	  policy.	   It	  has	  been	  chosen	  because	   it	  provides	  a	  
fertile	  ground	  to	  investigate	  Gandhian	  theory	  in	  practice.	  
	  
Strategy	  in	  practice:	  Indian	  Nuclear	  Policy	  
	  
It	  is	  the	  contention	  of	  authors	  –	  academic	  and	  policy	  –	  that	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  has	  eroded	  the	  
Gandhian	  values	  underpinning	  non-­‐alignment.106	  India’s	  nuclear	  program	  in	  particular	  is	  taken	  as	  
a	  signifier	  of	  this.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  incorrect.	  Understanding	  nuclear	  policy	  is	  only	  possible	  
in	  terms	  of	  satyāgraha	  as	  it	  was	  developed	  and	  enacted	  by	  Gandhi.	  In	  short,	  non-­‐alignment	  was	  
the	   international	   application	   of	   that	  Gandhian	   idea.	   This	   section	  will	   demonstrate	   that	   Indian	  
nuclear	  policy	  has	  kept	  within	  the	  parameters	  –	  with	  one	  notable	  exception	  –	  of	  the	  Gandhian	  
way	   in	   terms	   of	   both	  morals	   and	   virtue.	   However,	   the	   onset	   of	   a	   nuclear	  world	   required	   the	  
crafting	  of	  a	  dharma	  befitting	  the	  age.	  This	  section	  will	  outline	  the	  background	  of	  Indian	  nuclear	  
diplomacy	   and	   then	   focus	   on	   the	   chief	   architect	   of	   the	   dharma	   for	   a	   nuclear	   age,	  
Subrahmanyam,	   a	  man	   fundamentally	  misunderstood	   as	   a	   ‘hawk’	   and	   close	  with	   the	   nuclear	  
doctrine	  he	  developed.	  
	  
India’s	   nuclear	   diplomacy	   is	   redolent	   of	   Gandhian	   satyāgraha.	   Decades	   before	   US	   President	  
Barack	   Obama’s	   call	   for	   disarmament,	   India	   resisted	   nuclear	   weaponisation	   and	   offered	  
numerous	   plans	   to	   prevent	   both	   horizontal	   and	   vertical	   proliferation.	   At	   the	   centre	   of	   Indian	  
efforts	   were	   the	   twin	   pillars	   of	   ending	   nuclear	   diplomacy	   (the	   Cold	   War’s	   Mutually	   Assured	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Destruction)	   and	   ending	   nuclear	   apartheid	   –	   that	   is	   the	   West’s	   insistence	   that	   only	   certain	  
countries	   could	   legitimately	   possess	   nuclear	   technology	   and	   weapons.	   Simultaneously	   this	  
meant	   that	   till	   the	  West	   renounced	   its	  policies	  and	   the	  gradual	   creeping	  expansion	  of	  nuclear	  
weapons	  was	  terminated	   India	  was	  under	  threat.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  new	  experience	  since	   Indians	  
were	  at	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  real	  violence	  till	  very	  recently.	  The	  difference	  between	  resistance	  
against	   the	  British	   and	   resistance	   to	  nuclearisation	   in	   a	  weaponised	  world	  was	   that	   the	   latter	  
threatened	  Indians	  with	  extinction	  since	  India	  lacked	  any	  deterrence.	  Fully	  aware	  of	  this	  threat,	  
India	  persisted	  in	  resistance	  which	  took	  many	  forms.	  	  
	  
Within	  a	  decade	  of	  independence	  India	  was	  the	  first	  country	  to	  suggest	  a	  ‘Standstill	  Agreement’	  
calling	   for	   the	   suspension	   of	   nuclear	   testing.	   India	   did	   have	   a	   nuclear	   energy	   program.	  When	  
India’s	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1948	  Nehru	  insisted	  that	  the	  program	  was	  for	  
‘the	  welfare	  of	  the	  people	  of	   India	  and	  other	  peaceful	  purposes.’	   In	  1957	  he	  said	  ‘No	  man	  can	  
prophesy	  the	  future.	  But	   I	  should	   like	  to	  say	  on	  behalf	  of	  any	  future	  Government	  of	   India	  that	  
whatever	  might	  happened,	  whatever	  the	  circumstances,	  we	  shall	  never	  use	  this	  atomic	  energy	  
for	  evil	  purposes.	  There	  is	  no	  condition	  attached	  to	  this	  assurance,	  because	  once	  a	  condition	  is	  
attached,	   the	   value	   of	   such	   an	   assurance	   does	   not	   go	   very	   far.’107	   There	   was	   no	   material	  
response	  to	  India’s	  position.	  
	  
Nehru	  stuck	  to	  his	  convictions	  to	  his	  end.	  Days	  before	  his	  death	   in	  May	  1964	  he	  said,	   ‘We	  are	  
determined	  not	  to	  use	  weapons	  for	  war	  purposes.	  We	  do	  not	  make	  atom	  bombs.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  
we	  will.’108	  The	  situation	  changed	  in	  October	  1964	  when	  China	  tested	  its	  first	  nuclear	  weapon.109	  
The	   immediate	  response	  was	   in	  keeping	  with	  Nehruvian	  policy	  of	  resistance.	  The	  resistance	  to	  
go	   nuclear	   in	   the	   face	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   threats	   clearly	   came	   from	   within.110	   In	   1965	   India	  
proposed	   a	   treaty	   ‘To	   Prevent	   the	   Proliferation	   of	   Nuclear	   Weapons’	   five	   years	   before	   the	  
Nuclear	   Proliferation	   Treaty	   (NPT).	   India	   did	   not	   sign	   this	   because	   to	   do	   so	   would	   require	  
sacrificing	  its	  moral	  stance	  against	  discrimination.	  Secondly,	  key	  Indians	  were	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  
immorality	  of	  the	  NPT.	  The	  US,	  argued	  Subrahmanyam	  –	  the	  architect	  of	  Indian	  nuclear	  policy	  –	  
in	  1981,	  clandestinely	  supported	  Israel	  and	  South	  Africa	  in	  developing	  the	  bomb.	  Similarly,	  Japan	  
                                                
107	  Nehru’s	  statement	  at	  inaugural	  of	  Aspara,	  India’s	  first	  nuclear	  reactor,	  at	  Trombay	  on	  20	  January,	  1957	  
108	  Quoted	  in	  Mirchandani.	  1968.	  p.23	  
109	  Lewis	  &	  Xue	  Litai.	  1988	  
110	  P.185	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and	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   were	   what	   he	   calls	   crypto-­‐nuclear	   weapons	   states.111	  
Given	   its	   bias,	   the	   NPT	   made	   no	   move	   to	   provide	   a	   space	   for	   India’s	   demand	   that	   the	  
dissemination	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  any	  form	  be	  stopped	  and	  that	  the	  nuclear	  powers	  should	  
move	  towards	  total	  disarmament.112	  The	  NPT	  divided	  the	  world	  on	  a	  temporal	  metric	  –	  simply	  
stating	   that	   all	  who	   had	   tested	   a	  weapon	   by	   1970	  were	   nuclear	   powers	   but	   this	   became	   the	  
legal	   anchor	   for	   a	   global	   nuclear	   regime	   ‘increasingly	   legitimated	   in	   racialized	   terms.113	  
Gusterson	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  based	  on	  a	  profoundly	  Orientalist	  discourse	  where	  ‘we’	  (the	  West)	  
are	   rational,	  disciplined,	  while	   ‘they’	  are	   the	  mirror	  opposite.	   In	  policy	   terms	   it	   translates	   into	  
Indians	  being	  viewed	  as	  wasting	   scare	   resources	  on	  weapons	  development	  even	   though	   India	  
spent	   just	   2.8	   percent	   of	   GDP	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   US’s	   4	   percent	   and	   that	   deterrence	  will	   be	  
unstable	  in	  the	  third	  world,	  i.e.,	  the	  dominant	  discourse	  assumes	  that	  leaders	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  
make	  decisions	  differently	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  West	  (after	  an	  analysis	  of	  flight	  times).	  
Gusterson’s	  intention	  is	  to	  show	  the	  binary	  representation	  of	  ‘us’	  and	  ‘them’	  which	  permeates	  
Western	  nuclear	  rhetoric.	  However,	  in	  a	  sense	  the	  rhetoric	  is	  justified	  –	  just	  not	  when	  they	  arise	  
from	  the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  analysts	  and	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  West	  base	  their	  judgements.	  
There	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  India	  and	  the	  rest	  because	  of	  the	  overtly	  moral	  nature	  of	  India’s	  
position.	   India	   argued	   that	   the	  world	   should	  disarm	  as	   a	  matter	  of	  principle	   and	   continues	   to	  
make	  the	  argument.	  Making	  such	  an	  argument,	  of	  course,	  requires	  virtue,	  i.e.,	  not	  developing	  a	  
nuclear	  capacity	  oneself.	  
	  
India’s	   test	   in	   1974	   termed	   a	   ‘peaceful	   explosion’	  was	   not	   viewed	   as	   such	   by	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  
world.114	  The	  same	  charge	  of	  Machiavellian	  politics	  was	  made	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Indira	  Gandhi	  as	  
had	   been	   of	   Nehru’s	   China	   campaign.	   The	   test	   was,	   as	   Dayal	   attests,	   a	   solo	   affair,	   hardly	  
reflecting	   any	   concerns	   of	   the	   administrative	   apparatus.	   Dayal	   writes,	   ‘There	   were	   no	   policy	  
papers	  nor	  had	  there	  been	  any	  discussion	  on	  this	  crucial	  matter	  [nuclear	  policy]	  in	  the	  External	  
Affairs	   Ministry.’	   Dayal	   writes	   that	   he	   had	   suggested	   drawing	   up	   background	   papers,	   Mrs.	  
Gandhi	  agreed	  but	  on	  the	  appointed	  day	  for	  the	  discussion	  Mrs.	  Gandhi	  glowered,	  asking	  who	  
                                                
111	  Subrahmanyam.	  1981.	  
112	  See	  Government	  of	  India.	  Disarmament:	  India’s	  Initiatives.	  1988	  
113	  Gusterson.	  P.24	  
114	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  IAEA	  had	  held	  four	  technical	  conferences	  on	  PNE	  technology.	  The	  
United	  States	  too	  supported	  PNE	  at	  the	  UN.	  Year	  Book	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  1971.	  p.78;	  Even	  the	  claim	  
of	  a	  key	  scientist	  that	  a	  bomb	  was	  tested	  does	  not	  negate	  the	  PNE	  hypothesis.	  A	  nuclear	  explosion,	  is	  after	  
all,	  an	  explosion	  and	  therefore	  similar	  to	  a	  bomb.	  See	  Sengupta.	  October	  17,	  1997,	  p.	  14	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had	  authorised	  their	  preparation.	  ‘I	  tried	  to	  refresh	  her	  memory,	  but	  she	  would	  have	  none	  of	  it.	  
She	  said	  something	  about	  a	  ‘national	  decision’,	  but	  we	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  national	  decision	  
or	  even	  debate	   in	  Parliament	  on	  the	  sensitive	   issue.	  At	   least	  three	  of	  us	  [defence,	   finance	  and	  
foreign	  secretaries]	  were	  greatly	  puzzled	  at	  our	  summary	  and	  inexplicable	  rebuff	  for	  carrying	  out	  
what	  we	  conceived	  to	  be	  our	  assigned	  duty.’115	  Dayal’s	  report	  of	  the	  circumstances	   leading	  up	  
the	  explosion	  are	  in	  keeping	  with	  Hyman’s	  contention	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  take	  such	  a	  step	  has	  a	  
lot	  to	  do	  with	  ‘the	  hearts	  of	  state	  leaders	  themselves.’116	  There	  was	  no	  follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  test,	  no	  
will	  to	  power.117	  Mrs.	  Gandhi	  returned	  to	  her	  father’s	  path.	  She	  publicly	  denounced	  deterrence	  
as	  ‘untenable’118	  and	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  to	  even	  incorporate	  nuclear	  weapons	  into	  strategic	  
policy.	  It	  was,	  at	  first	  glance,	  ‘ad	  hocism,’	  writes	  Kumaraswamy,	  arising	  from	  constant	  revision	  in	  
the	  international	  nuclear	  situation.119	  However,	  while	  the	  decision	  was	  personal,	  the	  mistake	  is	  
to	   assume	   it	   was	   ad	   hoc.	   Mrs.	   Gandhi	   had	   attempted	   to	   ensure	   that	   India’s	   safety	   against	  
nuclear	  diplomacy	  –	  that	  is	  Western	  style	  MAD	  diplomacy.	  She	  dispatched	  a	  senior	  pro-­‐Western	  
diplomat,	   Jha,	   to	  Moscow	  and	  Washington	   in	  1967	   to	  discuss	  a	  guarantee	   to	  deter	   India	  ever	  
falling	  victim	  to	  the	  diplomacy	  of	  MAD.	  Jha	  failed.120	  After	  two	  decades	  (at	  least)	  of	  living	  under	  
a	  nuclear	  threat,	  Mrs.	  Gandhi	  made	  (what	  was	  to	  an	  extent)	  a	  show	  of	  strength.	  It	  was	  also	  for	  
public	  consumption	  –	  for	  while	  Gandhian	  notions	  and	  her	  father’s	  notions	  coloured	  the	   Indian	  
elite	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  it	  to	  similarly	  tint	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  population.121	  The	  next	  Prime	  
Minister,	  Rajiv	  Gandhi’s	  nuclear	  policy	  was	  also	  remarkable	  in	  its	  orthodoxy	  –	  ‘he	  was	  genuinely	  
against	   the	   bomb’	   states	   Gandhi’s	   scientific	   adviser122	   and	   his	   ‘first	   international	   act	   was	   to	  
launch	  the	  Six	  Nation	  Five	  Continent	  Appeal	   for	  nuclear	  disarmament	  at	  a	  summit	  meeting,	   in	  
New	  Delhi	   in	   January	  1985.’	   In	  1988	  Gandhi	  offered	  an	   ‘Action	  Plan	   for	  Ushering	   in	  a	  Nuclear	  
Weapon-­‐Free	   and	  Non-­‐violent	  World’	   of	  which	   a	   former	   Foreign	   Secretary	  writes	   ‘It	   [such	   an	  
order]	   envisions	   a	   world	   without	   hate,	   fear	   and	   confrontation,	   a	   world	   which	   is	   a	   true	  
                                                
115	  Dayal.	  1998.	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  Hymans.	  2006.	  P.7	  
117	  See	  Mansingh.	  1984.	  &	  Sen	  Gupta	  1984.	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  Pande.	  1989.	  p.363	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  Kumaraswamy.	  p.22	  
120	  See	  Noorani.	  July	  1967.	  pp.	  490-­‐502.	  
121	  The	  threat	  from	  China	  and	  Pakistan	  was	  overwhelming.	  Indira	  Gandhi	  told	  a	  foreign	  ambassador	  on	  1	  
July,	  1968:	  “With	  China	  on	  India’s	  back,	  and	  Pakistan	  lurking	  on	  the	  sidelines,	  I	  foresaw	  no	  alternative	  but	  
to	  keep	  open	  our	  option	  on	  the	  production	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.’	  The	  decision	  was	  not	  ideological,	  simply	  
ensuring	  security.	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  question	  her	  understanding	  of	  ‘security’.	  See	  Indira	  saw	  no	  
option	  but	  to	  go	  for	  N-­‐weapons.	  New	  Delhi.	  5	  July	  
122	  Chengappa.	  2000.	  p.304	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democracy	  of	   nations.	   This,	   in	  Rajiv	  Gandhi’s	   own	  phrase,	   is	   ‘India’s	  millennial	   concept	  of	   the	  
world	   as	   a	   family’.	   This	   vision	  of	   a	  new	  world	  order	   is	   a	   spiritual	   vision,	   not	  unlike	   Jawaharlal	  
Nehru’s	   but	   closer,	   it	   seems,	   to	   Mahatma	   Gandhi’s	   vision	   of	   the	   world.’123	   It	   was	   closer	   to	  
Gandhi,	   who	   had	   in	   the	   context	   of	   independent	   India	   encouraged	   the	   use	   of	   force	   but	   only	  
defensively.	  Having	  seen	  the	  failure	  of	  his	  predecessors	  to	  ensure	  security	  through	  disarmament	  
and	  then	  through	  a	  guaranty	   in	  a	  world	  predicated	  on	  nuclear	  annihilation	  Rajiv	  Gandhi	  began	  
the	  process	  of	  weaponisation	   in	  1983.124	   It	   came	  nearly	   twenty	  years	  after	   the	  1965	  war	  with	  
Pakistan	   when	   100	   parliamentarians	   wrote	   to	   the	   then	   PM	   calling	   for	   India	   to	   weaponize.125	  
Their	  letter	  was	  provoked	  by	  the	  Chinese	  threat	  to	  open	  a	  second	  front	  to	  protect	  Pakistan.	  
	  	  
Despite	   the	   clear	   and	   present	   danger	   of	   nuclear	   attack,	   till	   1983	   India	   persisted	   in	   classic	  
satyāgraha.	  India	  resisted	  nuclearisation	  and	  its	  diplomacy	  was,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  its	  centralization	  
in	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  also	  consistent.	  The	  decision	  to	  weaponize	  came	  after	  some	  
40	   years	   of	   opposition	   in	   a	   world	   scenario	   which	   had,	   from	   India’s	   perspective	   rapidly	  
deteriorated	   –	   Pakistan	   had	   refused	   to	   respond	   and	   China	   had	   gone	   nuclear.	  Weaponisation,	  
writes	  Subrahmanyam,	   followed	  Gandhi’s	   repeated	  attempts	   to	  craft	  a	  means	  of,	  at	   the	   least,	  
reigning	  in	  nuclear	  weapons.126	  In	  1998	  India	  conducted	  its	  second	  test	  prompting	  the	  question:	  
Did	  this	  mark	  a	  clear	  shift	  in	  policy?	  Basrur	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  key	  writings	  of	  the	  Indian	  nuclear	  
weapons	  elite	  –	  policy	  makers	  –	   concludes	   that	   ‘nuclear	  weapons	   are	   viewed	  with	   less	  doubt	  
and	  suspicion	  than	  in	  the	  past,	  though	  their	  limitations	  are	  acknowledged.	  They	  are	  certainly	  not	  
privileged	  as	   the	  principal	  providers	  of	   the	  nation's	  security,	  which	   is	  widely	  seen	   in	  economic	  
and	   social	   terms.’127	   Nearly	   half	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   strategic	   elite	   interviewed	   did	   not	  
consider	  nuclear	  retaliation	  necessary	  even	  in	  response	  to	  a	  minor	  nuclear	  attack.	  ‘This	  presents	  
a	   remarkable	   picture	   of	   restraint	   in	   the	   face	   of	   grave	   provocation.’	   A	   restraint	   which	   was	  
formalized	  and	   institutionalized	   in	   the	  nuclear	  doctrine	  of	  1999	  and	   it	   is	   argued	  originating	   in	  
Gandhian	   thought.	   This	   made	   India	   the	   first	   country	   to	   renounce	   the	   right	   to	   a	   nuclear	   first	  
strike.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  position	  of	  ambiguity	  as	  adopted	  by	  Israel	  and	  later	  Pakistan	  but	  one	  founded	  
squarely	   in	   the	   Gandhian	   paradigm	   and	   the	   doctrine	   transformed	   the	   nature	   of	   nuclear	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diplomacy	   at	   the	   time.	   Following	  New	  Delhi’s	   pronouncement,	   China	   also	   stated	   it	  would	  not	  
use	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  a	  first	  strike.	  
	  
The	   responsibility	   for	   this	   subtle	   shifting	  of	   nuclear	   violence	  which	   transformed	   the	  nature	  of	  
violence	  in	  a	  nuclear	  world	  lay	  with	  K.	  Subrahmanyam.	  In	  a	  recent	  festenschrift	  ,	  Subrahmanyam	  
is	   presented	   as	   an	   arch-­‐realist.	   Indeed	   most	   of	   the	   chapters	   view	   some	   sort	   of	   polar	   divide	  
between	  idealism	  and	  realism.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  explainable	  by	  the	  zeal	  of	  his	  students.	  However,	  it	  
would	  be	  far	  more	  appropriate	  to	  view	  Subrahmanyam	  in	  his	  own	  terms.	  To	  return	  to	  him	  his	  
texture	  makes	   it	  apparent	  that	  he	  does	  not	  perceive	  the	  world	   in	  such	  stark	  terms	  and	  that	   in	  
him	   one	   can	   find	   a	   clear	   line	   of	   continuity	   with	   Gandhi	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	  dharma	   of	   acting	  
contextually	  but	  emphasizing	  morality	  and	  non-­‐violence.	  Subrahmanyam	  writes:	  
‘A	  future	  [security]	  strategy	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  vision	  of	  non-­‐violence,	  a	  time-­‐
bound	   programme	   towards	   a	   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free	   world,	   turning	   away	   from	  
conflictual	   to	   co-­‐operative	   approaches	   among	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   world	   and	  
among	   peoples	   within	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   world.	   There	   are	   no	   alternatives	   to	  
such	  a	  strategy.	  Either	  humanity	  unites	  to	  survive,	  or	  it	  is	  bound	  to	  face	  a	  bleak	  
future.	  The	  strategy	  of	  a	  non-­‐violent	  and	  nuclear-­‐free	  world	  has	  no	  alternative,	  
if	   future	   generations	   are	   to	   survive	   in	   conditions	   of	   sustainable	   development.	  
We	  of	  this	  generation	  have	  a	  stark	  choice	  before	  us.	  Either	  we	  become	  saviours	  
of	  our	  posterity	  or	  its	  executioners.	  Either	  we	  opt	  for	  life	  or	  shatter	  the	  future	  of	  
mankind.	  Let	  us	  opt	  for	  life.’128	  	  
The	  error	  of	  Subrahmanyam’s	  followers	  is	  that	  in	  their	  eagerness	  to	  co-­‐opt	  him	  into	  their	  binary	  
view	   of	   the	   world	   –	   something	   that	   Gandhi	   assiduously	   avoided	   and	   Nandy	   criticises	   many	  
current	  Indians	  for	  acting	  on	  –	  they	  have	  rendered	  the	  man	  a	  caricature.	  	  
	  
Subrahmanyam’s	   complexity	   and	   Gandhian	   thoughts	   are	   easily	   extricable.	   Subrahmanyam	  
writes	   that	   Gandhi	   taught	   ‘violence	   was	   better	   than	   cowardice,’	   that	   is,	   ‘he	   preferred	   non-­‐
violence	  as	  the	  best	  method	  of	  conducting	  the	  struggle	  against	  domination.’	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  
lessons	  Gandhi	  and	  Nehru	  learned	  in	  Kashmir	  –	  that	  a	  moral	  response	  is	  only	  possible	  in	  certain	  
situations	   –	   Subrahmanyam	  writes	   that	   ‘non-­‐violence	   as	   a	   resistance	   strategy	   had	   to	   be	   on	   a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis:	   it	   cannot	  be	   treated	  as	  universally	  applicable	  against	  all	   aggressions	   in	   the	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world.’	   Non-­‐violence	   is	   the	   ideal	   which	   can	   be	   realised,	   as	   it	   was	   under	   Emperor	   Ashoka.	  
However,	   ‘Today	  the	  globe	  has	  shrunk	  to	  a	  small	  space	  station	  earth	  …	  So	   it	   is	  not	   just	  a	  non-­‐
violent	  state	  that	  we	  should	  aim	  at	  but	  a	  non-­‐violent	  globe.’	  This	   is	  why	  the	   ‘responsibility	   for	  
giving	   the	   lead	   towards	   peaceful	   co-­‐existence	   and	   a	   nuclear-­‐weapon-­‐free	  world	   lies	   with	   the	  
industrialized	  nations	  …	  The	  starting-­‐point	  must	  be	  eliminating	  the	  ultimate	  symbol	  of	  violence	  –	  
nuclear	  weapons.’129	   Arising	   from	   such	   a	  weltanschaung,	   Subrahmanyam’s	   nuclear	   doctrine	   is	  
significant	  because	  it	  permitted	  India	  to	  find	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  its	  own	  dharma	  in	  the	  wake	  
of	  a	  history	  which	  exposed	  the	  nuclear	  powers	  as	  unwilling	  to	  either	  renounce	  their	  weapons	  or	  
to	   offer	   India	   a	   guaranty	   of	   no-­‐use.	   In	   return	   India	   always	   offered,	   indeed,	   did	   not	   engage	   a	  
nuclear	  weapons	  program	  for	  decades,	   living	  under	   the	  threat	  of	   the	  bomb	  of	  not	   just	   the	  US	  
and	   USSR	   but	   also	   China	   –	   a	   country	   with	  whom	   a	  war	   had	   been	   fought.	   For	   decades,	   India	  
practiced	   virtue	   –	   by	   setting	   an	   example	   to	   the	  world	   by	   not	   engaging	   in	   a	   nuclear	  weapons	  
program.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   both	   discrimination	   Gandhian	   virtue	   was	   lost	   with	  
weaponisation.	  A	  sense	  of	  double	  standards	  is	  integral	  to	  understanding	  this	  shift.	  As	  an	  Indian	  
Foreign	  Secretary	   said:	   ‘The	  white	  man	  has	   it,	   it’s	   safe	   in	  his	  hands...	   the	  yellow	  man	  has	  also	  
come	  along	  because	  he’s	  been	  cooperating	  with	  the	  white	  man,	   it’s	  safe	   in	  his	  hands.	  But	   the	  
brown	   man	   is	   not	   good	   enough	   to	   guard	   and	   hold	   these	   weapons.	   This	   is	   the	   mentality	   of	  
nuclear	   apartheid,	   which	   they’ve	   been	   promoting	   for	   some	   time.’130	   An	   alternate	   view,	  
Subrahmanyam’s	   perspective,	   is	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   weaponize	   was	   symbolic	   of	   having	   the	  
courage	  to	  defend	  oneself	  in	  the	  face	  of	  overwhelming	  odds.	  This	  defence	  is	  not	  based	  on	  either	  
MAD	  diplomacy,	  not	  even	  on	  the	  prospect	  of	  responding	  in	  kind	  to	  a	  small	  nuclear	  attack.	  India,	  
due	  to	  Subrahmanyam,	  has	  stated	  that	  it	  will	  only	  respond	  with	  a	  nuclear	  strike	  against	  a	  major	  





This	  chapter	  has	  brought	  together	  the	  two	  strands	  that	  compose	  diplomacy	  thru	  the	  medium	  of	  
history.	  They	  are	  the	  philosophy	  of	  diplomatic	  action	  (the	  philosophy	  underpinning	  policy)	  and	  
its	  practical	   implementation.	   Intellectually,	   it	   is	  not	   just	  modern	   Indian	  diplomats	  who	  refer	  to	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the	   Mb	   to	   orient	   themselves.	   Gandhi	   did	   so	   too	   but	   his	   intellectual	   contribution	   is	   more	  
profound:	   he	   drew	   on	   the	  Mb’s	   philosophy	   of	   contextual	   action	   and	   emphasized	  morality	   as	  
both	   a	  means	   of	   connecting	   him	   to	   the	   cosmos	   and	   as	   a	  means	   of	   producing	   change	   in	   the	  
world.	   Gandhi	   also	   introduced	   the	   concept	   of	   non-­‐violence	   as	   the	   ideal	  means	   for	   producing	  
change.	   These	   ideas	   were	   first	   put	   to	   the	   test	   internationally	   with	   Kashmir	   where	   Gandhi	  
realised	  that	  morality	  could	  not	  be	  always	  relied	  upon	  (as	  he	  himself	  had	  noted	  it	  could	  not	  be	  
relied	   upon	   with	   certain	   Englishmen).	   These	   teachings	   of	   Gandhi	   were	   internalized	   and	  
operationalised	   by	   Nehru.	   He	   attempted	   to	   put	   into	   practice	   a	   Gandhian	   philosophy	   of	  
international	  politics	  but	  relied	  upon	  a	  bureaucratic	  system,	  a	  diplomatic	  system,	  developed	  by	  
the	   Empire	   and	   animated	   by	   the	   Raj.	   It	   was	   here	   that	   the	   colonial	   legacy	   of	   bureaucratized	  
decision	   making	   encountered	   Gandhian	   philosophy.	   The	   results	   were	   not	   optimal.	   Gandhi’s	  
systems	   required	   localized	   study	   –	   that	   is	   a	   deep	   familiarity	   of	   a	   particular	   situation	   –	   before	  
launching	  a	  campaign	  to	  rectify	  a	  particular	  wrong.	  This	  was	  not	  possible	  with	  a	  bureaucratized	  
system.	  The	  failures	  of	  such	  a	  system	  became	  apparent	  in	  the	  China	  war.	  Here	  Nehru	  was	  both	  
misadvised	  by	  a	  bureaucracy	  which	  presumably	  had	  become	  alienated	  from	  the	  purpose	  it	  was	  
meant	   to	   serve	   and	   by	   Nehru’s	   inability	   to	   accept	   advice	   when	   it	   did	   not	   match	   his	   own	  
perceptions.	  
	  
The	  second	  strand	  of	  Indian	  diplomacy	  analysed	  was	  nuclear	  as	  an	  example	  of	  classic	  Gandhian	  
action.	  Essentially,	  India	  attempted	  to	  realise	  the	  ideal	  of	  disarmament	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  acted	  
virtuously	  –	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   texture	   of	  Gandhian	   thought	  –	   till	  weaponisation	   in	  1983.	  
Throughout	   its	   history,	   India	   acted	   in	   accordance	   with	   stated	   principles,	   did	   not	   take	   part	   in	  
discriminatory	   treaties	   and	   therefore	   broke	   no	   international	   agreements.	   The	   process	   began	  
under	  Nehru	  when	  India	  adopted	  nuclear	  technology	  for	  its	  scientific	  and	  economic	  benefits	  in	  
the	   longue	  durée.	   Simultaneously	   India	  made	  the	   first	  calls	   for	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  after	  
repeated	  attempts	  at	  securing	  this	  objective	  through	  resistance	  failed	  sought	  a	  nuclear	  guaranty	  
from	  the	  superpowers.	  None	  was	  forthcoming.	   India’s	  seeking	  such	  assurances	  was	  due	  to	  the	  
world	  having	  been	  shrunk	  to	  a	  small	  space	  station	  and	  due	  to	  having	  to	  live	  under	  the	  shadow	  of	  
a	  nuclear	  armed	  nations	  including	  China.	  India’s	  first	  nuclear	  test	  was	  a	  loss	  of	  virtue	  –	  India	  no	  
longer	   set	   an	   example	   to	   the	   world	   and	   thus	   immeasurably	   weakened	   its	   moral	   position.	  
However,	   this	   was	   not	   a	   break	   with	   the	  Mb’s	  HD.	   Neither	   was	   it	   in	   any	  manner	   contrary	   to	  
‘truth’	   which	   Gandhi	   said	   was	   even	  more	   important	   than	   non-­‐violence.	   Key	  members	   of	   the	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Indian	  elite	   viewed	   significant	  not	   the	   test,	  but	   the	  weaponisation	   in	  1983.	  That	   this	   followed	  
after	   two	  decades	  of	   the	  Chinese	  bomb	   is	   in	   itself	   significant	   from	  a	  Gandhian	  perspective	  of	  
resistance.	  What	   animated	   the	   decision	   to	   weaponise	   was	   an	   impossible	   calculation:	   nuclear	  
annihilation	  or	  non-­‐violence.	  Though	  that	  principle	  was	  sacrificed,	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  in	  the	  
Mb’s	  terms	  of	  contextual	  action.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1998	  tests	  India	  once	  again	  broke	  new	  
ground	  by	  de-­‐linking	  its	  diplomacy	  from	  nuclear	  weapons	  with	  a	  unique	  nuclear	  doctrine	  where	  
India	  unilaterally	  gave	  up	  the	  right	  to	  first	  strike.	  In	  terms	  of	  diplomacy	  what	  this	  meant	  is	  that	  
India	   never	   practiced	   nuclear	   diplomacy.	   In	   terms	   of	  dharma	   India’s	   actions	  were	   based	   on	   a	  
total	  belief	  in	  the	  truth	  of	  its	  actions.	  It	  sought	  to	  convert	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  and	  failed.	  In	  the	  
process	   India	   never	   attempted	   coercion	   (of	   course	   nor	  was	   India	   able	   to).	   However,	   the	   real	  
indicator	  that	   India	  was	  not	  –	  and	  continues	  to	  abhor	  –	  coercion	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	   in	   its	  
diplomacy	  is	  the	  sanctity	  accorded	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  no-­‐first-­‐use	  now	  that	  India	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
coerce	   thru	   nuclear	   weapons.	   Indian	   resistance-­‐diplomacy	   was	   always	   under	   the	   direct	  
command	  and	  control	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  which	  is	  where	  all	  decisions	  were	  made,	  sometimes	  
without	   any	   reference	   to	   the	   MEA.	   Indeed	   the	   nuclear	   doctrine	   emerged	   from	   a	   group	   of	  
outsiders,	  not	  MEA	  officials.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  the	  MEA	  is	  today	  irrelevant	  to	  
questions	  of	  policy	  or	  that	  diplomacy	  is	  limited	  to	  resistance.	  The	  next,	  and	  concluding	  section,	  
will	  return	  to	  the	  123	  Agreement	  and	  diplomacy	  of	  deconstruction.	  	  	  
	  
ENDS	  




This	   project’s	   argument	   is	   founded	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   student	   of	   IR	   cannot	   fully	  
understand	  what	  IR	  professes	  to	  study	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  international	  system	  –	  without	  actually	  going	  
out	   and	   investigating	   the	   world	   of	   diplomacy.	   This	   needs	   to	   be	   done	   on	   the	   terms	   of	   the	  
protagonists	  because	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  produce	  international	  politics.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  
enough.	   The	   tropes	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   protagonists	   also	   need	   to	   be	   juxtaposed	   with	   the	  
significant	  corpus	  of	  histories	  and	  theories	  of	  international	  and	  social	  relations	  that	  Europe	  has	  
produced.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  to	  verify	  the	  discipline’s	  texts	  but	  to	  deploy	  the	  insights	  of	  disciplinary	  
texts	   to	   excavate	   and	   order	   the	   raw	   matter	   that	   investigations	   of	   the	   field	   produce.	   The	  
literature	  can	  also	  serve	  to	  identify	  the	  main	  ruptures	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  empirical	  data.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  the	  literature	  helps	  identify	  the	  more	  significant	  avenues	  for	  exploration.	  Finally,	  these	  
explorations	   require	   investigation	   historically	   if	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   understand	   not	   just	   what	   is	  
happening	  today,	  but	  how	  it	  became	  possible.	  These	  are	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  project.	  
	  
The	   researcher	   entered	   the	   field	   and	   collected	   raw	   data.	   It	  was	   collected	   in	   a	   very	   particular	  
way,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  texture,	   i.e.,	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  signals	  and	  signs	   implanted	  in	  texts	  and	  
also	   produced	   reflexively	   within	   engagements	   between	   people	   and	   situations.	   These	   can	   be	  
gauged	   by	   the	   engagement	   between	   the	   researcher	   and	   the	   GoI.	   For	   instance,	   access	   would	  
never	  have	  been	  granted	  if	  the	  researcher	  was	  not	  a	  known	  quantity	  in	  familial	  terms	  to	  the	  GoI.	  
Officers	  would	  not	  have	  been	  willing	  to	  speak	  to	  a	  foreigner,	  or	  even	  to	  an	  Indian	  outsider	  –	  why	  
is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project.	  The	  raw	  data	  had	  certain	  implications	  which	  ran	  counter	  to	  
the	   literature’s	   established	   position	   that	   diplomacy	   –	   in	   theory	   and	   practice	   –	   originated	   in	  
Europe.	  This	  was	  not	   just	  a	  controversy	  about	  petty	  origins,	   implicated	   in	   it	  was	   the	  nature	  of	  
the	  modern	  world	   and	   the	   rationale	  underpinning	  decisions	  which	  directly	   affect	  hundreds	  of	  
millions	  of	  humans.	  So	  fundamental	  is	  the	  rupture	  between	  the	  literature	  and	  practice	  that	  what	  
was	   required	   was	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   analytical	   space	   which	   could	   contain	   the	   possibilities	  
rendered	  impossible	  by	  the	  discipline.	  Those	  are	  that	  modernity	  may	  also	  have	  extra-­‐European	  
origins	  and	  that	  these	  may	  contain	  possibilities	  un-­‐theorized	  by	  the	  discipline.	  	  
	  
Upon	  creating	  the	  analytical	  space,	  by	  deploying	  civilizational	  analysis,	  the	  project	  proceeded	  to	  
populate	  the	  space	  in	  three	  ways.	  All	  three	  had	  a	  common	  origin:	  the	  present.	  The	  first	  way	  was	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the	  exploration	  of	  the	  field,	  and	  the	  findings	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  literature	  for	  
reasons	   outlined	   above.	   This	   act	   of	   ostranenie	   raised	   significant	   lines	   of	   enquiry.	   First,	   the	  
theoretical	   foundations	  of	  modern	  practices	  and,	  second,	  the	  practical	  origins	  of	  the	  MEA.	  For	  
an	  investigation	  interested	  in	  the	  weltanschauung	  of	  the	  protagonists	  the	  project	  relied	  on	  the	  
agents	   themselves	   to	  provide	   the	   lines	  of	  enquiry.	  These	  were	  not	  provided	  overtly	  but	  arose	  
without	  provocation	  from	  the	  textures	  of	  everyday	  life	  which	  though	  prevalent	  are	  only	  notable	  
to	  the	  attuned	  observer.	  
	  
The	   first	   step	   was	   to	   identify	   theoretical	   underpinnings:	   the	   chapter	   on	   the	  Mb	   argued	   that	  
detailed	  stories	  about	  diplomacy	  existed	  in	  the	  Indian	  imagination	  for	  at	  least	  2,500	  years.	  These	  
were	   implanted	   in	   a	   theory	   of	   action,	  dharma,	   which	   is	   user-­‐centric	   and	   premised	   not	   on	   an	  
‘other’	  but	  on	  an	  inextricably	  intermeshed	  world.	  It	  is	  a	  world	  not	  of	  alienated	  actors	  attempting	  
to	   overcome	   each	   other,	   but	   a	   crowded	  world	  where	   though	   one	   attempts	   to	   improve	   one’s	  
position	   one	   does	   so	   by	   causing	  minimal	   inconvenience	   to	   others	  while	   doing	   so.	   In	   the	  Mb,	  
dharma	   is	   about	   knowing	   what	   is	   right	   in	   a	   given	   situation.	   The	   actor	   bases	   the	   decision	   on	  
personal	  motivation	  and	   societal	   norms,	  but	   as	   the	   terminal	   story	   in	   the	  Mb	  –	  about	   the	  dog	  
entering	  heaven	  –	  demonstrates,	  ultimately,	  it	  is	  the	  individual	  who	  just	  manages	  to	  ease	  ahead	  
of	   society	   in	   the	   calculations	   underpinning	   action.	   The	   calculations	   are	   required	   because	   the	  
world	   is	  viewed	  as	   inextricably	   interconnected,	  which	  means	   that	   the	  actor’s	  actions	   resonate	  
universally.	   The	   Mb’s	   diplomacy	   is	   conducted	   within	   this	   theory	   of	   action.	   The	   chapter	   also	  
demonstrated	  how	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  god-­‐man	  Krsna	  is	  never	  realisable,	  a	  parable	  for	  realising	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  divine.	  
	  
Though	  the	  Mb	  continues	  to	  animate	  the	  cultural	  circuits	  of	  Indian	  civilization,	  it	  was	  subsumed	  
by	  Mughal	  norms	  during	  the	  moment	  of	  first	  diplomatic	  contact	  between	  India	  and	  Europe.	  This	  
era	   requires	   investigation	   because	   the	   literature	   invests	   it	   with	   significance:	   the	   coming	   of	  
modernity	   and	   the	   shaping	   of	   today.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   literature	   on	  modernity,	   chapter	   four	  
demonstrates	  that	  it	  was	  actually	  the	  British	  who	  slotted	  themselves	  into	  well-­‐established	  local	  
diplomatic	   practices.	   These	   were	   secular	   despite	   being	   practiced	   by	   an	   Islamic	   regime.	   It	   is	  
argued	  that	  this	  secularization	  of	  the	  Mughals	  was	  due	  to	  their	  operating	  in	  a	   land	  of	  dharma.	  
However,	   this	   period	   was	   not	   to	   last	   and	   the	   next	   chapter	   explores	   what	   actually	   happened	  
during	  the	  British	  interregnum	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  theory	  and	  practice.	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Chapter	  five	  argues	  that	  what	  the	  British	  exported	  to	   India	  was	  their	  metaphysic	  of	   ‘othering’.	  
This	  was	  directly	  contrary	  to	  dharma.	  However	  their	  metaphysic	  was	  activated	  thru	  the	  already	  
existing	  diplomatic	  circuits	  of	  the	  Mughal	  Empire,	  including	  its	  personnel.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  locals	  
who	   had	   survived	   in	   a	   generally	   secularized	   regime	   –	   though	   not	   totally	   free	   from	   Muslim	  
religious	  fundamentalism	  as	  Nik	  Rao’s	  broken	  temple	  reminds	  us	  –	  did	  not	  perceive	  the	  British	  
as	   irreconcilably	   alien.	   In	   fact,	   noting	   the	  demise	  of	   the	  Empire	   and	   the	   rise	  of	   the	  Raj,	   locals	  
offered	  their	  services	  and	  expected	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  top	  of	  their	  profession	  under	  the	  British.	  The	  
British	  metaphysic	   precluded	   this.	   It	   treated	   India	   and	   Indians	   as	   the	   ‘other’.	   This	  meant	   that	  
locals	   were	   excluded	   from	   diplomacy	   while	   the	   nature	   of	   diplomacy	   was	   fundamentally	  
transformed	  from	  an	  activity	  designed	  to	  communicate	  to	  avoid	  war	  to	  one	  which	  relied	  first	  on	  
war	  and	  then	  turned	  to	  negotiations.	  In	  short,	  local	  diplomacy	  was	  exterminated.	  
	  
Such	   events	   are	   taken	   by	   the	   literature	   as	   evidence	   that	   Indian	   modernity	   was	   directly	  
transplanted	  from	  Europe.	  However,	  as	  this	  project	  has	  argued,	  in	  terms	  of	  actual	  practice,	  the	  
British	   appropriated	   local	   systems	  and	   the	  personnel	   of	   diplomacy.	   They	  used	   this	   to	   activate	  
their	  metaphysic	  of	  ‘othering’.	  Hence	  the	  European	  input	  into	  India	  was	  the	  metaphysic	  of	  their	  
modernity,	   ‘othering’,	   rather	   than	   any	   practical	   conception	   or	   organization.	   Of	   course,	   the	  
European	  metaphysic	  was	   fundamental	  because	   it	  ordered	  society	   in	   terms	  of	   race	  which	  had	  
significant	  consequences	  for	  Indian	  modernity.	  Exploring	  these	  requires	  investigating,	  yet	  again,	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  key	  Indian	  personalities,	  what	  happened	  at	  the	  time	  of	  independence.	  	  
	  
The	   final	   chapter	   attempts	   to	  do	   this	   by	   relying	  on	   the	  wealth	  of	  material	   India’s	   preeminent	  
diplomats	  and	  bureaucrats	  have	   left	  behind.	  The	  chapter	  presents	  Nehru	  and	  Gandhi	  to	  argue	  
that,	   as	   the	   protagonists	   themselves	   say,	   modern	   Indian	   foreign	   policy	   is	   rooted	   in	   ancient	  
notions	   of	   dharma.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   was	   Gandhi,	   whose	   understanding	   of	   dharma	   was	   a	  
result	   of	   his	   intensive	   study	   of	   the	  Mb.	   But	  Gandhi	  modified	   the	   concept	   by	   emphasizing	   the	  
morality	  of	   the	  actor	   and	  decreeing	   that	   the	   individual’s	  morality	  ought	   to	  be	  guided	  by	  non-­‐
violence	  and	  truth.	  This	  was	  a	  radical	  step	  for	  the	  philosophy	  of	  dharma.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  
evidences	  the	  working	  of	  the	  mentality	  in	  practical	  terms.	  At	  the	  birth	  of	  India	  the	  bureaucratic	  
system,	   which	   had	   performed	   along	   the	   impetus	   of	   ‘othering’	   until	   then,	   was	   required	   to	  
perform	  along	  totally	  new	  lines.	  This	  was	  a	  Gandhian	  foreign	  policy	  and	  its	  implementation	  by	  a	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residual	   system.	   Pakistan’s	   invasion	   of	   Kashmir	   and	   the	   India-­‐China	   war	   demonstrated,	   it	   is	  
argued,	  the	  conceptual	  limits	  of	  Gandhian	  thought,	  and	  also	  played	  a	  definitive	  role	  in	  adapting	  
Gandhian	   dharma	   to	   contemporary	   political	   challenges.	   The	   transformations	   are	   explored	   in	  
terms	  of	  not	  just	  the	  key	  players	  but	  also	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  expose	  how	  mentalities	  were	  put	  
into	  practice.	  The	  main	  finding	  was	  the	  centralization	  of	  Indian	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  in	  
the	  PM’s	  office.	  The	  centralization	  is	  further	  evidenced	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  which	  explores	  
Indian	   nuclear	   policy	   because	   of	   the	   inherent	   tension	   between	  weapons	   of	  mass	   destruction	  
and	  India’s	  long-­‐standing	  ostensible	  commitment	  to	  non-­‐violence	  and	  disarmament.	  
	  
It	   is	  argued	  that	   Indian	  nuclear	  policy	  was	  premised	  on	  Gandhi’s	  satyāgraha	  –	   that	   is	  violence	  
but	   radically	   different	   from	   the	   types	   of	   violence	   used	   by	   the	   imperial	   powers.	   It	   required	  
disarmament	   as	   an	   ideal	   and	   India	   pursued	   this	   at	   every	   international	   forum	   as	   well	   as	  
independently,	  but	  without	  any	   success.	  The	   rationale	  was	  not	  provided	  only	  by	   the	   threat	  of	  
nuclear	   coercion	   but	   also	   because	   it	   was	   a	   fundamental	   matter	   of	   principle.	   In	   this,	   policy	  
reflected	   Gandhian	   thought.	   However,	   experience	   with	   Pakistan	   and	   China	   also	   helped	   to	  
modify	   Indian	   policy.	   So	   far	   as	   Pakistan	   was	   concerned,	   India	   learnt	   that	   the	   time	   it	   took	   to	  
produce	  the	  desired	  response	  from	  an	  adversary	  might	  be	  too	  long.	  In	  a	  nuclear	  world	  the	  risk	  
was	   annihilation.	   This	  was	   brought	   into	   relief	   by	   China’s	  weaponisation	   in	   1964.	   Despite	   this,	  
India	  persisted	   in	   satyāgraha	   until	   1983	  when	   the	  decision	   to	  weaponise	  was	   taken.	   In	   short,	  
India	   lived	   under	   a	   nuclear	   threat	   for	   19	   years	   without	   the	   safeguard	   of	   Mutually	   Assured	  
Destruction.	  When	   India	   did	  weaponise,	   the	  decision	  was	   taken,	   it	   is	   argued	   for	   two	   reasons.	  
First,	   the	   established	  nuclear	  weapons	   states	   used	   these	  weapons	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   their	  
diplomacy,	   thereby	   opening	   India	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   nuclear	   coercion.	   Second,	   India	   was	  
unable	   to	   cope	  with	   the	   threat	   of	   nuclear	   annihilation	   posed	   by	   its	   nuclear	   armed	  neighbour	  
with	  whom	  a	  war	  had	  been	  fought	  and	  with	  whom	  vast	  swathes	  of	  borderland	  was	  in	  dispute.	  
However	   weaponisation	   did	   not	   signal	   the	   demise	   of	   Gandhian	   notions.	   As	   the	   section	   on	  
Subrahmanyam,	   the	   architect	   of	   India’s	   nuclear	   doctrine	   demonstrates,	   India	   was	   the	   first	  
country	  to	  give	  up	  the	  right	  to	  a	  nuclear	  first	  strike.	  In	  doing	  so,	  India	  removed	  the	  nuclear	  factor	  
from	  its	  diplomatic	  arsenal.	  Effectively,	  India	  never	  relied	  on	  nuclear	  diplomacy.	  The	  only	  reason	  
for	   maintaining	   what	   is	   called	   a	   Credible	   Minimum	   Deterrence	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   nominal	  
protection	   against	   a	   nuclear	   first	   strike.	   In	   adopting	   such	   a	   position,	   India	   kept	   faith	  with	   the	  
tenets	  of	  dharma	  –	  always	  acting	  with	  full	  awareness	  of	  the	  world	  but	  not	  acceding	  to	  the	  world	  
Page	  198	  of	  227 
 
if	  it	  contrasted	  with	  the	  first	  principles	  Gandhi	  introduced.	  Essentially,	  India	  never	  claimed	  to	  be	  
non-­‐violent.	  What	   Indian	   policy	   reflected	  was	   the	   urge	   to	   reap	   benefits	  while	  minimizing	   the	  




In	  closing,	   the	  project	   returns	  to	  the	  123	  Agreement	  to	  argue	  that	   Indian	  nuclear	  policy	  arises	  
from	   the	   highly	   localized	   logics	   and	   practices	   uncovered	   in	   the	   preceding	   pages.	   These	  
encompass	   Indian	   society.	   Yet,	   if	   the	   treaty	   arose	   from	   the	   nation’s	   dharma,	   why	   was	   it	  
opposed?	   The	   opposition	   of	   the	   ruling	   Congress	   party’s	  major	   political	   rival,	   the	   BJP,	   did	   not	  
indicate	   any	   difference	   in	   opinion.	   Rather,	   it	   was	   a	   case	   of	   sour-­‐grapes	   –	   the	   BJP	   which	   had	  
initiated	   the	   process	   did	   not	   want	   the	   Congress	   to	   reap	   the	   benefits.	   Testimony	   to	   this	   is	  
provided	  not	  only	  by	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  deal	  by	  the	  BJP	  Foreign	  Minister	  Jaswant	  Singh1	  but	  
also	  by	  the	  action	  of	  the	  BJP	  National	  Security	  Adviser	  and	  former	  MEA	  officer	  Brajesh	  Mishra2	  
who	  broke	  ranks	  with	  his	  party	  to	  support	  the	  deal	  as	  negotiated	  by	  Congress.	  In	  other	  words,	  
politically	  the	  deal	  was	  not	  really	  opposed	  by	  any	  major	  party.	  
	  
Secondly,	   both	   BJP	   and	   Congress	   followed	   a	   negotiating	   pattern	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	   highly	  
centralised	  approach	  to	  policy	  from	  Nehruvian	  times.	  Decision-­‐making	  continues	  to	  reside	  with	  
the	  Prime	  Minister	  as	  was	  made	  clear	  during	  the	  123	  negotiations.	  An	  officer	  who	  objected	  to	  
negotiations	  with	  the	  US	  and	  was	  in	  line	  for	  the	  top	  slot	  in	  the	  MEA	  was	  not	  given	  the	  position.	  
He	  resigned,	  went	  public	  and	  in	  a	  fit	  of	  pique	  accused	  the	  PM	  of	  a	  range	  of	  offences	  about	  the	  
selection	   and	   promotion	   of	   officers.3	   PM	  Manmohan	   Singh,	   under	  whose	  watch	   the	   123	  was	  
signed,	   responded	  during	   an	   informal	   conversation	  by	   saying	  quite	   simply,	   ‘But	  Deep	   it	   is	   the	  
prerogative	  of	  the	  PM	  to	  appoint	  his	  Foreign	  Secretary.’4	  The	  PM	  appoints	  who	  he	  sees	  fit	  not	  
just	   in	   terms	   of	   ability	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   texture,	   knowing	   the	   dharma	   of	   the	   age.	   This	  
centralization	   in	   policy-­‐making	   applied	   to	   the	  BJP	   too.	   Jaswant	   Singh,	   the	  BJP	  negotiator,	  was	  
assisted	  by	  MEA	  officers	  but,	  as	  he	  laments	  the	  bureaucracy	  is	  loath	  to	  provide	  direction.	  They	  
                                                
1	  Jaswant	  Singh	  in	  conversation	  with	  author.	  New	  Delhi.	  26	  May	  2008	  
2	  Brajesh	  Mishra	  in	  conversation	  with	  author.	  New	  Delhi.	  6	  June	  2007	  
3	  Sikri.	  March	  28	  &	  29,	  2007	  
4	  Manmohan	  Singh	  in	  conversation	  with	  author.	  New	  Delhi.	  21	  May	  2008	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appear	  happy	  to	  abdicate	  all	  responsibility	  for	  decision-­‐making	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  politician	  though	  
they	  are	  capable	  drafters	  and	  negotiators.	  	  
	  
Ultimately,	   the	   consensus	   for	   the	   deal	   arose	   out	   of	   the	   notions	   of	   poverty,	   jugar	   and	   status	  
identified	   in	   Indian	   diplomatic	   society.	   The	   manner	   of	   manoeuvring	   was	   classic	   dharma	  
understood	   as	   negotiating	   one’s	   way	   thru	   a	   crowded	   world	   without	   causing	   offence,	   that	   is	  
creating,	   ‘strategic	   space.	   Our	   diplomacy	   is	   to	   create	   the	   room	   for	   us	   to	   manoeuvre,’5	   for	  
example	  voting	  with	  the	  US	  against	  Iran	  at	  the	  UN	  during	  the	  negotiations	  to	  enter	  the	  nuclear	  
world.	   The	   means	   of	   negotiating	   was	   jugar	   –	   making	   do	   in	   the	   face	   of	   overwhelming	   US	  
diplomatic	  resources	  and	  the	  motivations	  were	  poverty	  and	  status.	  India	  sought	  to	  maximise	  its	  
rising	  capital	   in	   the	  US	  to	   fulfil	   its	  own	  requirements.	  These	  requirements	  arise,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
India,	  not	  out	  of	  any	  ideology	  but	  rather	  from	  the	  twin	  events	  which	  motivate	  the	  private	  lives	  
and	   career	   choices	   of	   the	   men	   and	   women	   who	   join	   the	   MEA.	   Poverty	   and	   status	   are	   not	  
confined	   to	   the	   individuals	  who	   comprise	   the	  MEA.	   They	   also	  motivate	   the	   operations	   of	   the	  
nation-­‐state	  –	  in	  fact	  they	  have	  to	  if	  any	  political	  party	  is	  to	  remain	  in	  power.	  
	  
The	  rationale	  for	  the	  deal	  was	  twofold:	  first	  the	  sense	  of	  inferiority	  stemming	  from	  British	  racism	  
and	  perpetuated	  through	  nuclear	  diplomacy	  and	  apartheid,	  and,	  second,	  the	   idea	  that	  nuclear	  
technology	  is	  the	  means	  of	  overcoming	  the	  massive	  poverty	  that	  afflicts	  everyday	  India.	  Hence,	  
status	  and	  poverty.	  The	  agreement	  unlocks	  thousands	  of	  technologies	  the	  US	  has	  placed	  on	  its	  
‘Entity	  List’	  and	  to	  which	  India	  was	  denied	  access	  because	  they	  are	  classed	  ‘dual	  use’	  and	  may	  be	  
used	   for	   military	   purposes.6	   Essentially,	   the	   deal	   marks	   the	   birth	   of	   a	   ‘knowledge	   economy’	  
where	  India	  will	  be	  able	  to	  access	  existing	  technologies	  and	  perform	  research	  and	  development.	  
The	  objective?	   India	  wants	   to	  become	   in	  R&D	  what	  China	   is	   in	  manufacturing.7	  With	   cheaper	  
labour	  costs	  India	  expects	  to	  be	  able	  to	  undercut	  the	  West.	  An	  additional	  perceived	  advantage	  is	  
that	   while	   demand	   for	   manufactured	   goods	   is	   susceptible	   to	   economic	   considerations,	  
technology	  is	  far	  more	  resistant	  to	  market	  fluctuations.	  But	  all	  of	  this	  depends	  on	  getting	  access	  
to	  the	  latest	  technologies	  which	  means	  accessing	  the	  US	  Entity	  List.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  nuclear	  issue	  
was	   seen	  as	   vital.	   It	  was	  perceived	  as	  essential	   to	  help	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  escape	  
                                                
5	  Shiv	  Shankar	  Menon.	  Interview.	  
6	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  Nuclear	  Deal	  Marks	  Birth	  of	  the	  Knowledge	  economy.	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post.	  October	  7,	  
2008.	  P.A11	  
7	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  Positive	  Energy.	  DNA.	  1	  October,	  2008.	  P.14	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from	  poverty.	  Secondly,	   it	  was	  also	  an	  emotive	  issue	  that	  resonated	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  –	  
made	  palpable	  by	   the	  simple	   fact	   that	   India	   is	  denied	  technologies.	   In	  short,	   the	  nuclear	   issue	  
was	   chosen	   as	   the	   vector	   for	   foreign	   policy	   because	   it	   met	   the	   two	   age-­‐old	   considerations	  
underpinning	  Indian	  thought:	  poverty	  and	  injustice.	  
	  
Finally,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  most	  significant	  aspect	  of	  the	  argument,	  India	  operates	  a	  diplomacy	  not	  
of	   ‘othering,’	   overcoming	   the	   ‘other’	   or	   of	   producing	   a	   ‘third	   culture’.	   Rather	   it	   is	   one	   of	  
empathy,	   of	   knowing	   the	   negotiating	   partner.	   In	   short	   India,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   does	   not	  
negotiate	   with	   an	   ‘other’	   but	   another,	   and	   one	   essentially	   much	   like	   itself.	   A	   lead	   Indian	  
negotiator	  says:	  
‘In	  a	  negotiation	  you	  have	  to	  always	  remember	  there	  is	  someone	  else.	  You	  have	  
to	  think	  of	  them.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  think	  of	  them	  and	  ...	  say	  ...	  you	  are	  able	  to	  force	  
your	  view	  upon	  them	  then	  your	  agreement	  won’t	  last.	  A	  successful	  negotiation	  
is	  when	  both	  parties	  are	  satisfied.	  There	  is	  give	  and	  take.	  So	  remember.	  Think	  of	  
the	  other	  party.’	  	  
Implicit	  in	  the	  statement	  is	  that	  the	  starting	  assumption	  in	  the	  Indian	  weltanschauung	  is	  not	  that	  
the	  world	  is	  populated	  by	  alienated	  individuals.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  to	  entertain	  
an	  opposing	  party’s	   ideas	  and	  adopt	   its	  position.	  Dharma,	  which	  argues	   that	  one’s	  position	   in	  
the	  world	  determines	  one’s	  attitude,	  underlies	  this	  position.	  Self	  evidently	  different	  players	  have	  
differing	   positions	   but	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   any	   position	   is	   incomprehensible	   to	   other	  
players.	  The	  diplomat’s	  duty	  is	  to	  empathise.	  This	  played	  itself	  out	  in	  a	  process	  of	  give-­‐and-­‐take	  
in	   the	   123	   negotiations	   because	   both	   parties	   understood	   that	   to	   successfully	   conclude	   the	  
agreement,	   there	   were	   certain	   positions	   on	   which	   either	   party	   could	   not,	   for	   a	   variety	   of	  
reasons,	  give	  ground.	  
	  
Central	  to	  India’s	  position	  was	  the	  requirement	  that	  some	  of	  its	  reactors	  are	  never	  opened	  for	  
international	   inspection.	   It	   amounted	   to	   Indian	   exceptionalism	  which	  was	   to	   be	   realised	   thru	  
engagement.	  However,	  Indian	  negotiators	  were	  flexible	  on	  some	  points,	  which	  they	  were	  not	  on	  
the	   question	   of	   inspection.	   India	   is	   now	   the	   only	   entity	   permitted	   to	   segregate	   its	   nuclear	  
programme	   into	   civilian	   and	  military	   components.	   India	   is	   also	   allowed	   to	   build	   new	  military	  
reactors	  as,	   and	  when,	  deemed	  necessary.	  As	   for	   inspection,	   IAEA	  officials	  will	   have	  access	   to	  
civilian	   reactors.	   The	   right	   to	   reprocess	   spent	   fuel	   under	   India-­‐specific	   IAEA	   safeguards	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addresses	   another	   key	   concern.	   It	   ensures	   that	   India	   benefits	   from	   the	   additional	   energy	  
potential	   in	  spent	  fuel	  and	  addresses	  international	  concerns	  about	  material	  being	  siphoned	  off	  
for	  military	  applications.	  
	  
An	  area	  where	   the	  US	  was	  unwilling	   to	   give	  ground	  was	  on	   testing	  –	   a	   right	   India	   insisted	  on	  
maintaining.	   The	   solution	   was	   to	   craft	   a	   means	   to	   address	   both	   positions.	   Initially,	   the	   US	  
demanded	   an	   explicit	   Indian	   commitment	   to	   maintain	   its	   self-­‐imposed	   nuclear	   moratorium	  
which	  India	  thought	  was	  tantamount	  to	  surrendering	  a	  sovereign	  right.	  Responding	  creatively	  to	  
this	   hurdle,	   negotiators	   –	   working	   in	   tandem	   with	   US	   representatives	   –	   formulated	   the	   key	  
Article	  14	  of	  the	  agreement	  which	  states:	  	  
‘The	   parties	   agree	   to	   carefully	   consider	   the	   circumstances	   that	   may	   lead	   to	  
termination	   or	   cessation	   of	   co-­‐operation.	   They	   further	   agree	   to	   take	   into	  
account	  whether	   the	   circumstances	   that	  may	   lead	   to	   termination	  or	   cessation	  
resulted	  from	  a	  party’s	  serious	  concern	  about	  a	  changed	  security	  environment	  
or	  as	  a	  response	  to	  similar	  actions	  by	  other	  states	  which	  could	  impact	  national	  
security.”8	  
In	   short,	   an	   Indian	   test	  will	   not	   automatically	   lead	   to	   the	   agreement	   being	   terminated.	   It	  will	  
however	  initiate	  a	  round	  of	  negotiations	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  broader	  political	  and	  security	  
situation	  justified	  the	  test.	  If	  India	  can	  convince	  the	  US	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  US	  will	  not	  
terminate	   the	   agreement	   and	   ask	   for	   the	   return	   of	   nuclear	   equipment	   and	   fuel.	   As	   India’s	  
modernization	  hinges	  on	  this	  equipment,	  it	  also	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  not	  to	  test.9	  In	  short,	  the	  
agreement	   moves	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   neither	   overwhelming	   nor	   absorbing	   and	   deleting	   the	  
‘other’.	   There	   is	   in	   the	   Indian	   conception	   no,	   ‘other’,	   simply	   differently	   located	   individuals	  
attempting	  to	  deal	  with	  each	  other	  while	  causing	  the	  minimum	  of	  friction.	  
	  
As	   the	   two	   examples	   above	   demonstrate,	   minimizing	   friction	   was	   as	   much	   an	   Indian	   as	   an	  
American	   imperative.	   It	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  analysis	  to	  speculate	  on	  US	  compulsions.10	  
But	   the	  argument	   is	   that	   India	  acted	   in	   this	  manner	  because	   its	  dharma	  enjoins	   it	   to	  carefully	  
                                                
8	  See	  the	  full	  text	  of	  the	  Indo-­‐US	  123	  Agreement	  at	  
http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2007/08/03pr01.pdf	  	  
9	  Datta-­‐Ray.	  Test	  Match.	  In	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post.	  9	  August,	  2007.	  P.A13	  
10	  Several	  commentators	  suggest	  it	  is	  because	  the	  US	  wants	  to	  cultivate	  India	  to	  play	  the	  old	  game	  of	  
containment,	  the	  target	  this	  time	  around	  being	  China.	  See	  Singh,	  J.	  p.382.	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navigate	  a	  crowded	  world	  full	  of	  people	  much	  like	  itself.	  	  Familiarity	  with	  cultural	  norms	  is	  useful	  
in	  this	  exercise	  but	  not	  essential.	  In	  fact,	  the	  native’s	  knowledge	  of	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  
prevalent	  culture	  might	  even	  be	  a	  handicap.	  An	  incident	  during	  Indo-­‐US	  negotiations	  explicates	  
the	  point.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Madeline	  Albright	  commented	  that	  India	  had	  ‘dug	  itself	  into	  a	  hole’	  
provoking	  the	  charge	  of	  cultural	  insult	  from	  the	  Indian	  Foreign	  Minister	  who	  said,	  ‘I	  must	  point	  
out	   that,	   civilisationally,	  we,	   in	   India,	   do	  not	   dig	   holes	   to	  bury	  ourselves,	   even	  metaphorically	  
speaking.	   Therefore	   this	   observation	   exemplifies	   yet	   another	   fundamental	   lack	   of	  
comprehension	   about	   the	   Indian	   state	   and	   about	   addressing	   Indian	   sensitivities.’11	   Indians,	   of	  
course,	   burn	   their	   dead	   and	   the	  means	   to	   avoid	   such	   friction,	   it	   has	   been	   argued,	   is	   for	   the	  




                                                
11	  Talbot.	  P.82	  
12	  ‘Dig	  yourself	  into	  a	  hole’	  stems	  from	  a	  common	  biblical	  metaphor,	  for	  example,	  in	  Jeremiah	  18:20	  we	  
find:	  ‘they	  have	  digged	  a	  pit	  for	  my	  soul’.	  See	  “dig”	  The	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  Idioms.	  Ed.	  Judith	  Siefring.	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  Oxford	  Reference	  Online.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Royal	  Borough	  of	  
Kensington	  and	  Chelsea.	  	  14	  October	  2009.	  
See:	  	  http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t35.e691	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